THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER M. YEOMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No. 3-14-0324
Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District
June 17, 2016
July 15, 2016
2016 IL App (3d) 140324
Hon.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 11-CF-1335. Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.
Michael J. Pelletier and Bryon Kohut (argued), both of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
James Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Mark A. Austill (argued), of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice O’Brien and Justice McDade concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 After a jury trial, defendant, Christopher M. Yeoman, was convicted оf one count of second degree murder (
FACTS
¶ 2 ¶ 3 On June 2, 2011, defendant was involved in a road rage incident with the victim in this case, Frank Egas. The incident took place at about 4:30 p.m. on 135th Street, a public way, in Romeoville, Will County, Illinois. The incident allegedly started when defendant, who was stopped directly behind Egas at a traffic light, honked his horn to let Egas know that the light that they were both waiting for had turned green. In response, Egas allegedly gave defendant the finger. After Egas and defendant both turned right, Egas allegedly gave defendant the finger again, honked his horn, cut defendant off, and refused to let defendant pass, all of which allegedly took place several times. Defendant’s wife and young children were in the vehicle with defendant at that time.
¶ 4 At some point, Egas and defendant werе again stopped in the left hand turning lane of another intersection with a stoplight waiting for the light to change (135th Street) with defendant’s vehicle again located behind Egas’s vehicle. While they were waiting for the light, defendant and his wife got out of their vehicle, went up to Egas’s vehicle, and briefly confronted Egas about his actions. After defendant and his wife returned to their vehicle, Egas got out, walked to the rear of his vehicle, and started yelling at defendant. Defendant got back out of his vehicle, and a confrontation ensued. During the confrontation, defendant punched Egas one time in the face. That was the only blow that was struck during the entire confrontation by either party.
¶ 5 Egas was stunned or knocked out, fell back, and hit his head on the pavement. As onlookers tried to help Egas,
¶ 6 After Egas passed away, defendant was charged with two counts of second degree murder (Class 1 felonies), one count of aggravated battery of a senior citizen (a Class 2 felony), one count of aggravated battery on a public way (a Class 3 felony), and one count of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm (a Class 3 felony). One of the counts of second degree murder was later dismissed. Defendant claimed self-defense.
¶ 7 During the pretrial discovery process, defendant learned that in summer 2010, Egas had participated in group counseling for anger management and had been involved in a prior incident of road rage. In one of the group counseling sessions in September 2010, Egas told the group that someone had cut him off the previous week when he was driving; that he drove fast and followed the vehicle until it stopped at an intersection; and that he jumped out of his car, ran up to the vehicle, and was “all set to do something” when he saw that it was a woman with a child. The woman and child were scared. Egas asked the woman if she knew what she had done. The woman responded that she had not seen Egas and apologized for cutting him off. Egas told the woman not to do that again. After Egas told the group about the incident, he was given feedback from some of the members of the group.
¶ 8 Defendant later filed a motion in limine seeking to admit at trial the statement that Egas had made at the group counseling session. Defendant sought to present that evidence through the testimony of a registered nurse who was present for the group counseling session and who had prepared the progress note for that session. Defendant asserted that the evidence was admissible as a statement against penal interest, an exception to the heаrsay rule. The State objected. After a hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion in limine. In so doing, the trial court found that the statement was hearsay, that it was not a statement against interest, and that there was no recognized hearsay exception that would allow for the admission of the statement.
¶ 9 The case proceeded to a jury trial in January 2014. Numerous witnesses were called to testify, including four witnesses who had seen the road rage confrontation take place. Defendant and his wife testified as well. As a whole, the evidence was conflicting as to whether defendant or Egas was the aggressor at the time that defendant punched Egas in the face. All or most of the eyewitnesses from the scene testified that Egas walked to the rear of his vehicle and stopped and that he did not swing or motion at defendant before defendant punched Egas in the face. Although most of those witnesses indicated that Egas’s hands were up at the time, they stated that his hands were in more of a
¶ 10 Defendant and his wife, however, testified to the contrary. Dеfendant stated that Egas put his hands up and that he thought that Egas was going to hit him. Defendant’s wife stated that Egas was standing in a fighting pose with his fists up close to his body by his shoulders, that Egas swung at defendant first, and that defendant swung back and hit Egas.
¶ 11 Regarding the general characteristics of defendant and Egas, the evidence indicated that defendant was 39 years old, that he had been a carpet installer for the past 22 years, that he was 5’7” tall, and that he weighed 160 pounds. As for Egas, the evidence established that he was almost 64 years old, that he was very active and had great mobility for his age, that he was 5’6” tall, and that he weighed 160 pounds as well.
¶ 12 After all of the evidence had been presented in this case and the attorneys had made their closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury on the law. Among other things, the jury was instructed on self-defense. Defendant specifically declined to have the jury instructed on the uncharged lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. After several hours of deliberation, the jury found defendant guilty of all four charges.
¶ 13 Defendant filed a motion for new trial, alleging, among other things, that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court had erred in excluding evidence of the statement that Egas had made at the group counseling session. After a hearing, the motion for new trial was denied. Following a sentencing hearing, defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 18 years on the second degree murder conviction and 5 years on each of the aggravated battery convictions. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was later denied. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Second Degree Murder
¶ 14 ¶ 15 ¶ 16 As his first point of contention on appeal, defendant argues that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of second degree murder. Defendant asserts that the evidеnce was insufficient to prove the knowledge element of the offense—that defendant knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. Defendant claims that there can be no such knowledge when an accused, who is about the same size as the victim, punches the victim only one time in the face with a bare fist. Rather, defendant contends that what happened in this case was a freak occurrence that did not constitute second degree murder. Based upon the alleged deficiency in the evidence, defendant asks that we reverse his conviction for second degree murder and enter a conviction instead for the uncharged lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter.
¶ 17 The State argues that defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that his second degree murder conviction should be affirmed. The State disputes that the victim’s injury or death in this case was a freak occurrence and asserts that when an individual runs at another person and strikes that person in the head with a “roundhouse” punch, the individual knows that the other person will likely fall to the ground and that there is a strong probability of, at the very least, great bodily harm and, possibly, death to that person. The State contends, therefore,
¶ 18 When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the reviewing court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Austin M., 2012 IL 111194, ¶ 107; People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). The reviewing court will not retry the defendant. Austin M., 2012 IL 111194, ¶ 107. Determinations of witness credibility, the weight to be given testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence are responsibilities of the trier of fact, not the reviewing court. People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 43 (1989). A reviewing сourt will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that it leaves a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Austin M., 2012 IL 111194, ¶ 107.
¶ 19 In this particular case, defendant was charged with second degree murder under a knowing murder theory. Therefore, one of the elements that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to prevail on the charge was the mental state element of “knowledge” or “knowing“—that defendant knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim.
¶ 20 There is a long-standing general rule in this state that death is not ordinarily contemplated as a natural consequence of a blow or blows from a bare
attack); Nibbe, 2016 IL App (4th) 140363, ¶ 34 (reversing a defendant’s second degree murder сonviction where the defendant punched the victim once or twice in the face with a bare fist, the victim was not substantially smaller or weaker than the defendant, the victim died from falling backward and hitting his head on the concrete rather than directly from the defendant’s punches, and the defendant had been drinking and was in an excitable state due to the victim entering the apartment area of defendant’s friends without permission).
¶ 21 There are, however, some exceptions to the general rule that have been recognized over the years. Nibbe, 2016 IL App (4th) 140363, ¶ 28. For example, the courts have held that striking another person with a bare fist may constitute murder when there is a great disparity in size and strength between the defendant and the victim. See Crenshaw, 298 Ill. at 417-18 (recognizing the possibility of such an exception to the general rule); People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 451-52 (1984) (affirming the murder conviction of an adult defendant for the beating death of a four-year-old child, even after implicitly assuming, for argument’s sake, that the injuries were inflicted with a bare fist); Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 180 (affirming the murder conviction of a 21-year-old defendant for the barehanded beating death of an 85-year-old woman); Gresham, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 1007-08 (recognizing that the barehanded beating death of a child by an adult could constitute murder); People v. Drumheller, 15 Ill. App. 3d 418, 421 (1973) (affirming the murder conviction of an adult defendant for the beating death of a 14-month-old infant); Lengyel, 2015 IL App (1st) 131022, ¶ 52 (recognizing the exception to the general rule); Nibbe, 2016 IL App (4th) 140363, ¶ 28 (same). Another exception to the general rule has been applied where the defendant inflicted multiple blows to the victim. See People v. Rodgers, 254 Ill. App. 3d 148, 151-54 (1993), vacated on other grounds, 156 Ill. 2d 564 (1994) (supervisory order), readopted in pertinent part, 265 Ill. App. 3d 1, 2 (1994) (affirming the defendant’s murder conviction where the defendant punched the victim in the head numerous times while the victim was sleeping); Nibbe, 2016 IL App (4th) 140363, ¶ 28 (recognizing the exception to the general rule).
¶ 22 After having considered the general rule noted above and the established exceptions in relation to the facts of the present case, we find that the evidence was insufficient to prove the knowledge element of the second degree murder charge. See Mighell, 254 Ill. at 59; Crenshaw, 298 Ill. at 416-18; Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 180; Gresham, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 1007; Lengyel, 2015 IL App (1st) 131022, ¶¶ 50-55; Nibbe, 2016 IL App (4th) 140363, ¶ 34. Regardless of how the verbal altercation between defendant and Egas started, there is no dispute in this case that defendant struck Egas only one time in the face with his bare fist. That conduct alone is not the type of conduct that would generally create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim. See Crenshaw, 298 Ill. at 416-18. Defendant, therefore, could not have knowledge that such a result was practically certain to occur. See id. In reaching that conclusion, we note that the Fourth District Appellate Court came to a similar conclusion on a case in which the mаterial facts were nearly identical to that of the present case. See Nibbe, 2016 IL App (4th) 140363, ¶ 34. We, therefore, reverse defendant’s conviction for second degree murder.
¶ 23 We need not determine whether a conviction for involuntary manslaughter should be entered against defendant in this case, since, as will be discussed later in this opinion, involuntary manslaughter would be a less serious offense than aggravated battery of a senior citizen and the State concedes that all of the less serious offenses should be vacated on one-act, one-crime principles.
II. Exclusion of Egas’s Statement About the Prior Incident of Road Rage
¶ 24 ¶ 25 As his second point of contention on appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to admit at trial evidence of Egas’s statement from group anger management counseling about his prior incident of road rage. Defendant asserts first that since he was claiming self-defense, the statement was relevant to show that Egas was the aggressor during the confrontation in corroboration of defendant’s version of events. Second, defendant asserts that the statement was not excluded by the hearsay rule and was admissible
¶ 26 The State argues that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling was proper and should be upheld. The State asserts first that the statement was not relevant because it did not pertain to a prior act of violence. Rather, the State suggests, defendant is merely speculating that the prior incident would have gotten violent if a female driver and child passenger had not been involved. The State also asserts that any potential relеvance was undermined by the remoteness of the statement—it was made nine months before the current incident—and because of subsequent events—Egas later completed anger management counseling and had not engaged in a similar incident of road rage since that time. Furthermore, according to the State, the statement lacked relevance because no credible evidence was presented that Egas was the aggressor in the instant case or that defendant was acting in self-defense. Second, the State asserts that the statement was not admissible under Rule 803(4) because the stаtement was made for the purpose of anger management counseling and not for the purpose of medical treatment. Third, the State asserts that the statement was also not admissible because it was confidential in nature and entitled to protection under the health care confidentiality laws. Although the State recognizes that there is a homicide exception to those laws, the State posits that the exception does not apply here because the statement in question did not directly relate to the facts or immediate circumstances of the homicide in the present case. Fourth and finally, the State asserts that defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the statement because the statement was ambiguous about what Egas intended to do when he reached the offending vehicle during the prior incident and because admission of the statement would not have changed the outcome of the trial in this case. For all of the reasons set forth, the State asks that we affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling and that we reject defendant’s arguments and assertions on this issue.
¶ 27 The determination of whether evidence is relevant and admissible is in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171, ¶ 12; People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 455 (2001); People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991). Under the abuse of discretion standard, “[t]he reviewing court owes some deference to the trial court’s ability to evaluate the impact of the evidence on the jury.” People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 186 (2003). The threshold for finding an abuse of discretion, therefore, is a high one and will not be overcome unless it can be said that the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court. See In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 460 (2008); Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 182. Reasonable minds can disagree about whether certain evidence is admissible without requiring a reversal of a trial court’s evidentiary ruling under the abuse of discretion standard. See Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 186. If a trial court commits an abuse of discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence, a new trial should be ordered only if the trial court’s ruling appears to have affected the outcome of the trial. See Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d at 460; Troyan v. Reyes, 367 Ill. App. 3d 729, 732-33 (2006).
¶ 28 When a defendant raises a theory of self-defense, appropriate evidence of the victim’s aggressive and violent character (the victim’s propensity for violence) is relevant for two distinct purposes.
¶ 29 The second purpose for which appropriate evidence of the victim’s aggressive and violent character is relevant when a defendant raises a theory of self-defense is to support the defendant’s version of the facts where there are conflicting accounts of what happened.
¶ 30 In the present case, however, the evidence that defendant sought to admit did not constitute evidence of aggressive and violent character. See Cruzado, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 137. To the contrary, there was no indication in the prior statement that Egas made at the group counseling session that he did anything more than approach the offending vehicle and possibly yell at the driver. Such conduct is not sufficient to qualify as aggressive and violent behavior under the law. See id. (stating that neither yelling nor disorderly conduct constitutes violent behavior); compare id., with Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d at 203 (recognizing that battery is generally prima facie probative enough of aggressive and violent tendencies to be admissible). We find, therefore, that the trial court properly excluded defendant’s request to admit at trial evidence of the statement that Egas made at group counseling regarding his prior road rage incident. See Cruzado, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 137 (because the evidence in question did not tend to show that the victim had a violent character, the evidence had no probative value in determining whether the victim or the defendant was the aggressor during the altercation).
III. Defendant’s Convictions and Sentences on the Less Serious Offenses
¶ 32 ¶ 33 As his final point of contention on appeal, defendant argues, and the State concedes, that defendant’s convictions and sentences for the less serious offenses should be vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule. See People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 97 (2010) (a defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses that are based upon the same single physical act; if a defendant has been convicted of two or more offenses based upon thе same single physical act, the convictions and sentences for the less serious offenses must be vacated). Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s convictions and sentences for the less serious offenses in this case—aggravated battery on a public way and aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, both of which were Class 3 felonies. See id. Defendant’s conviction on the remaining most serious offense, aggravated battery of a senior citizen, a Class 2 felony, still stands as does the sentence of five years in prison, which was the sentence imposed on that offense by the trial cоurt. We reject defendant’s request to remand the matter for resentencing on the Class 2 felony charge, although we do remand the case for the trial court to enter a new sentencing order that is consistent with our decision in this case.
CONCLUSION
¶ 34 ¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, we (1) vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence for second degree murder, (2) affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence for aggravated battery to a senior citizen, (3) vacate defendant’s convictions and sentences for aggravated battery on a public way and aggravated battery causing great bodily hаrm, and (4) remand this case for the trial court to enter a new sentencing order consistent with our ruling here.
¶ 36 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.