*1 (No. 59207. ILLINOIS, Appel- OF THE STATE
THE OF PEOPLE SR., lee, LYNCH, Appellant. v. PAUL 19, 1984. Rehearing Opinion October — filed 30, 1984. denied November *3 RYAN, C.J., WARD, J., dissenting. Stone, Gromes, of & of Waukegan,
Jed Stone Robinson, Palatine, Mary appellant. General,
Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney Springfield Rotert, General, (Mark L. Assistant of Chi- Attorney for the cago, counsel), People.
JUSTICE SIMON delivered the opinion court: Paul Sr. shot Lynch, (the defendant), Lester Howard head, and was tried for murder in the circuit court self-defense; He Lake claimed the verdict County. court, following The circuit Peo- voluntary manslaughter. Ill. 3d excluded evi- ple v. Wolski App. three be- battery, of the victim’s convictions dence of them he shot cause the defendant was unaware when court affirmed in a Rule Howard. 23 order appellate Ill. 2d R. on a different (87 23) ground defend- —-that of those fail- ant waived convictions admissibility to make an offer of Ill. 3d ing proof (117 App. 1162). We *4 for leave to (87 allowed defendant’s petition appeal 315), Ill. 2d R. and we now reverse and remand a new trial. sketch conflicting; only we
Much of the evidence issues in legal perspective. of it to enough put son, (Junior), physically Paul Jr. Lynch, defendant’s without One day, apparently and mentally handicapped. Ernest Bell’s car and wrecked authorization, Junior took for repairs. from the defendant money it. Bell demanded turned out down when the estimates broke Negotiations Accord- than the could Lynches pay quickly. to be more he and said defendant, angry to the Bell was very ing his or kill Junior. would get money front of later, noticed, Some time that Bell had used car apartment, parked Junior’s for his son’s Fearing he the defendant. when visited He had the defendant went to apartment. safety, Junior for give in his had planned gun pocket (cid:127) Bell, and Junior, his mind. had changed but protection, Howard, a friend Bell’s whom Lester Bell left the defend- in Bell’s car when sitting had seen earlier, discussing repair problem were ant’s home bigger Bell and Howard were both arrived. Lynch when Howard defendant, drinking. and both had been than apart- to Junior’s one-room door only stood blocking sat down, the defendant up ment while Bell paced Junior on of a small table. dresser, top of a on top told remark, and the defendant made an angry Howard started Bell. Howard deal with him that them defendant, between stepped toward to the door. went back and Howard arrived, 15 minutes after About to this here and listen to sit said, “I don’t have Howard testified The defendant further.” g------b-------any his back forward, behind reaching lunged Howard The defendant hand. right coat with his his and beneath Bell testi- him. to shoot that Howard was going thought ad- him but in front of hands were that Howard’s fied the inci- after shortly had told the police mitted that he *5 199 the off Falling hands. see Howard’s he did not dent that at shot once and gun his dresser, pulled he hand, and door, in gun he to Then went Howard. went a neighbor and there while Junior Bell stayed and arrived, the police When police. had a to have them, appears and out to meet went The the body. room with in the few seconds alone No never searched. Bell was was arrested. defendant body. found on Howard’s was weapon trial, at and police to In his statements that he claimed shooting, admitted about conflicting The testimony in self-defense. shot the details of about and negotiations the progress the shooting. just events before Bell if counsel asked cross-examination, defense On convic- had prior that Howard he was aware outside ensuing colloquy objected. The State tions. there were established of the jury presence the defendant’s convictions, theory and that three such for that rea- Howard along very that Bell brought Because the to shake down Junior. son, help as “muscle” Howard, defendant was unaware them when shot ir- that the convictions were the circuit ruled judge and inadmissible. relevant the defendant’s to important convictions were the jury’s judg- have affected might however. They the facts the various versions
ment of how credible complete pic- have were, helped and This could have affected testimony. by ture provided reasona- the defendant acted the decision as whether the state of the law the circumstances. Given under bly v. Gossett (see People in the appellate cannot cases cited we therein), Ill. 3d App. it neverthe- ruling, the trial for his but was judge fault less error. tend character may and violent
A victim’s First, ways. of self-defense two support theory violent tenden- victim’s knowledge the defendant’s of and reactions affects his perceptions cies necessarily force that The same deadly to the victim’s behavior. with a presum- unreasonable in an altercation would be response reasonable citizen peaceful ably aggres- a man of known violent similar behavior knows, can consider facts one tendencies. One sive is irrele- of the victim’s character however, and evidence unless the defendant of self-defense vant to this theory *6 the case nature, which is not violent knew of the victim’s here. for vio- the victim’s
Second, propensity evidence of the defendant’s version lence tends to support hap- accounts of what conflicting there are facts where knew of situation, whether In this pened. If the is irrelevant. at the time of the event this evidence the defend- themselves what exactly could see for jurors evidence would time, at the such circumstantial ant saw However, happened the evidence of what unnecessary. raised, is is the case where self-defense here, as is often Everything happened and conflicting. both incomplete to his defendant, according which during an instant — his gun out getting fell off a dresser while testimony, analyze could hardly it. The witnesses firing and it detail, and describe or remember great in any scene impressions. could form quick They with precision. all the needed jury occurred really To decide what con- of Howard’s facts, including available battery. victions for is of self-defense theory hold that when
We character is violent raised, the victim’s the defend- was the aggressor, to show who relevant evidence, regardless it appropriate ant show may v. Miranda (State 176 it. he learned when sec. 63 1A Evidence 622; Wigmore, A.2d 107, 405 Conn. 201 sec. Annot., rev. A.L.R.3d (Tillers 1983); ed. a It is with the related rule that vic (1965).) consistent are even against tim’s threats admissible if not they were communicated defendant. This 116-17.) v. 227 Ill. (Neathery People (1907), case is because the analogous a threat closely defense was to show not that Howard was simply trying man, violent but also that took him along pre that reason. There is little an cisely distinction between inference that someone who has made a threat is likely to do as he threatened and an inference that someone chosen to a role because he violent or play frightening will behave accordingly.
There was evidence here that was the ag- Howard gressor, remark, made threatening and went for the defendant at close quarters, his back. reaching behind The evidence does not exclude possibility Howard for a reaching which Bell later re- weapon, moved. But even were it established that Howard clearly armed, was not his character still be relevant of whether he aggressor. Conduct to a amounting assault deadly nevertheless look like one. The defendant was entitled to have the jury judge reasonableness his behavior in light all *7 the relevant facts.
Convictions for crimes violence, of such as Howard’s three for convictions are evi- battery, reasonably reliable dence of a violent character. Such evidence is ordinarily inadmissible a for against defendant the prov- of purpose the offense ing because the of charged, danger prejudice outweighs the relevance of the evidence where the defendant stands to lose his or even life if liberty his convicted. Where the victim’s for violence is propensity however, the of question, to the danger prejudice evidence, defendant lies in to refusing admit such while its high degree relevance and remains con- reliability case, therefore, In this Howard’s convictions were
stant. he that was the proving admissible purpose aggressor. concluding
The erred appellate not attack the exclusion of the character could evidence because had failed make an offer of proof. The an is to the courts offer enable purpose proof As there is to decide the case on facts. no adequate convictions could have been battery question issue of legal we need decide whether proved, only case, Furthermore, in this only were admissible. considered, fur- to be since courts’ needs have reviewing court, have influenced the circuit ther details would not of an offer of requirement its view of the law. given ritual, not an aid justice; a formalistic proof no such will be served, requirement where is not justice no if required enforced. For offer is there was example, one of the trial no make because practical opportunity hostility. Giddings v. Williams (1929), 336 Ill. court’s 482, 489-90. and materi- if a shows
Similarly, purpose form, ad- is in evidence, clearly ality proper answer, need not make the proponent mits of a favorable be, unless the formal offer of what answer would v. Moretti (People 6 Ill. (1955), trial court asks one. v. Boston Store Hartnett 265 Ill. 520-21; (1914), 2d de- need not all the provide An offer of 337.) proof itself, ex- nor need proponent tail of inferences be drawn out the natural point pressly v. Davies (Bartholow evidence. proffered from the court’s 505, 515.) ruling 276 Ill. appellate therefore, if in this a review- correct would be re- from the fairly determine whole court could ing re- convictions was excluding cord whether error. versible enough do not know is that we argument
The State’s *8 203 about the facts of batteries to tell whether Howard’s sort were the that demonstrate general aggressive At least one has said propensities. any battery conviction does. v. Beck (Commonwealth necessarily 1371, Pa. 402 1373.) A.2d We need not, however, so far this case. go
The here from Bell, be elicited State’s de- witness, chief initial knowledge fense about the convictions from the gained came State’s answer. The State therefore knew as much discovery defense, as the about facts unless the had made an investigation on his own. In these circum- stances, least, we at should not demand that the record provide detail; if, exhaustive it is from the record enough us, before canwe with confidence that the say proffered evidence should have been This is admitted. not a case of an facts, attorney disclosing misleading selection of hoping slip that, into evidence a conviction were all known, the facts inadmissible. clearly be In general, battery prima probative enough facie of aggressive and violent tendencies be admissible. sheets in the rap included State’s answer discovery show that three recent, all convictions were the last six coming homicide; weeks before all were Illinois, so there is no problem strange definition in another If jurisdiction. the State believed that there was nevertheless something so about peculiar inadmissible, batteries as make them the State could have asked for further details from or counsel, defense them or investigated itself, Bell, the questioned State’s witness, However, about details knew. the State did not it do that. Nor did mention that any necessary
details of the batteries were at time in missing any circuit court, the issue of their exclusion on the although ground that defendant was unaware them at the time of the homicide was briefed and extensively argued motion. State’s post-trial complaint
on *9 offer is an after- there should have been an of proof com- academic. The batteries were wholly and thought, an evidence to that Howard was petent prove man. and violent the argues ruling
The State next that circuit court’s Bell the should be affirmed because was asked about of any pre- convictions before evidence self-defense was trial If made this in the objection sented. the State had re- the the court, problem by defense could have cured of the evidence self-defense calling necessary after made the first in. Such an be for was objection (Belfield Coop v. 293, 8 on Ill. 2d appeal. (1956), time made so cured must 304-05.) objections Specific easily v. Mutual (Logan trial, are waived. at the or Life Insurance Co. 510, Ill. It for this 513-14.) 293 is (1920), that a is as regarded going reason general objection the not the form of the testimony, of and competency so is sought perti- that where testimony question, v. objection (People nent, it is error to sustain such an Allen To on ground Ill. affirm this (1941), 169). error and for the court’s punish a futile act. perform his counsel’s failure that the State’s evidence argument Essentially a foun- offered without proper inadmissible because was a not introduce evi- It is true that defendant may dation. has character until some evidence of the victim’s dence be, was, that the victim or appeared presented been therefore acted assailant, and However, to en- the reason for rule is self-defense. unless evidence is not admitted that such character sure Allen v. (People in the is at issue case. self-defense re- From counsel’s 284.) opening 50 Ill. 2d to the po- and from the defendant’s statements marks with, it clear was familiar was lice, which the prosecutor it fact, In to be an issue. going that self-defense the evi- contested issue. In such where we do not later, dence will or surely be admissible sooner think the on the State has to exclude it right solely of ground prematurity. The order is within proof who, discretion of the trial the interest con- judge, venience and have decided to efficiency, might properly allow out of the proof usual order.
It was reversible error exclude Howard had three battery convictions. judgments appellate court the circuit court of Lake County reversed, are cause is remanded to the circuit on the retrial manslaughter charge. has, course, been of murder. acquitted reversed;
Judgments remanded. cause *10 CHIEF RYAN, JUSTICE dissenting: The for reason dissent in this case is that primary my the record just before us does not the of support opinion the court and is not sufficient enable this to de- court cide the issues that have been The as- presented. opinion sumes, and victim, the defendant that the argues, Howard, had three This prior convictions. con- clusion is based on the that discovery assertion proce- dures disclosed State, these convictions and that the as well as the counsel, defense of This knew them. may true, well be but there is not an iota of evidence in record, convictions this nor was offer there an of of proof concerning any conviction the victim of the of- of fense fact that all of this information battery. in the contained file is a inade- may lawyer’s totally reason for the of this If we are quate holding opinion. the adhere to the should going system, case adversary be tried and decided use adversarial accepted A on procedures. court should decide the issues review it on before the record that been made through has case on not decide a should of such We procedures.
use in his file have had may on what the appellant review not offer in evidence. did but the ruling opinion for this court’s sole basis objection sustaining prosecutor’s trial court of Bell as on cross-examination a question by As battery. the victim had been convicted to whether there are two in the opinion, noted and as stated below First, such this nature. reasons evidence offering rea- tend to show that acted may must also be case it force, in which using sonably of the victim’s knowledge the defendant had shown that that show Second, may such evidence conduct. prior character, which and aggressive had a violent victim he When aggressor. that was tend establish to the defendant’s objection sustained judge bat- concerning prior on cross-examination question ruling that its was indicated convictions, the court tery not have knowl- did the fact that on based line of If defendant’s convictions. of such edge the reason- to show not being pursued was questioning counsel action, defense belief of defendant’s ableness informed the have easily could attempting that he was purpose for that put and aggressive had a violent the victim to establish that the aggressor. therefore probably character not do. This did not be the same evidence later
I will discuss convic- a simple and that purposes both admissible *11 to establish sufficient should battery tion of that therefore important It was character. victim’s the ques- for which the purpose informed as to court be if battery, pur- of the the nature asked and tion was and violent the victim’s was to establish pose character. in a cross-exami- asked question
The objected-to nation of the witness. There is noth- first prosecution’s ing wrong time; such a at that how- asking question ever, the defendant to proper time appropriate establish his defense is not during presentation State’s of the during presentation defendant’s case. At trial, of the the defend- stage ant made no to introduce of the attempt any evidence victim’s prior convictions of Thus the court had battery. no on the opportunity pass of such evi- admissibility dence. The of this opinion court as speaks though court denied admission of evidence of these convictions. not, It did because such evidence never offered. The appellate that, noted properly after the sustaining of the objection to the on cross-examination, question defendant did not make other any attempt prove up the convictions. above,
As noted I agree there are two purposes for which evidence of the victim’s conduct bemay admitted. However, I feel that opinion the court blurs the distinction between these two purposes and may lead to the belief that the same type evidence is admissible in all cases where the issue of self-defense is involved, regardless of the defendant’s knowledge convictions. This is not so. There be evidence of may threats and conduct of the which, victim if known to the defendant, would be relevant to the of the rea- sonableness of his belief that the use of force was neces- However, the sary. same threats or conduct not be may sufficient to establish that the victim was a of a person violent and aggressive Also, character. the mere fact that a person has been convicted of a is not nec- evidence of essarily a violent and aggressive character. Nor, if known defendant, would it have a bearing on defendant’s belief that the use of force was necessary. Such a conviction arise out of a domestic or dispute, out of charges countercharges out of a growing *12 Under our stat entered default. and is often
quarrel, of an insult an individual contact with ute, any physical Rev. (Ill. constitutes a battery. or nature ing provoking Thus, an intended 38, 1983, 3(a)(2).) ch. par. Stat. 12 — our stat under battery constitute may or a push slap aggressive of violent and ute, not be evidence but would court, acknowledging of the while character. The opinion battery that any court has held the Pennsylvania propensities general conviction demonstrates 478, 402 v. Beck 485 Pa. (Commonwealth that any so far as to hold did not 1373), go A.2d for such a purpose, conviction admissible which, of conduct range of the wide so because properly law, battery. constitute under the Illinois can a reversal that before there I would hold objection sustaining on the solely based concerning on cross-examination battery, of Howard for convictions prior of the purpose court not only to inform the have convictions, but the prior show trying which to the make a representation he would have to also was the basis of the conduct which as to the nature I herein, For the reasons stated convictions. dissent. in this dissent. joins
JUSTICE WARD