THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS v. CHARLES P. WISE
No. 3-17-0252
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT
September 18, 2019
2019 IL App (3d) 170252
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 14th Judicial Circuit, Henry County, Illinois. Circuit No. 15-CF-170. The Honorable Carol M. Pentuic, Judge, presiding.
Justice O‘Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Carter dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
Defendant was charged with several offenses and, pertinent to this case, was found guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The trial court based its verdict on testimony that defendant was aware that the gun was in the vehicle and that, at some point, defendant was seated near the firearm. On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was “on or about his person” as required by the offense charged. We agree and vacate defendant‘s conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 18, 2015, defendant Charles Wise was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon under section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2014)) and unlawful possession of a controlled substance under section 402(c) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2014)). He was also charged with an open alcohol container violation and with a speeding violation. On June 19, 2015, Wise posted bond and was released from custody. A bench trial commenced in March 2016. The State introduced into evidence a certified copy of Wise‘s prior Iowa felony conviction of burglary.
The State also presented Illinois State Police Trooper Edwin Shamblin, who testified as follows. On June 18, 2015, he pulled over a 2005 Dodge Caravan minivan for speeding on I-74 in Henry County, Illinois. The inside of the van consisted of three rows of seats and a rear cargo area. The first row had two “bucket” seats, and the second and third rows had bench seating. At the time of the stop, Wise was in the driver‘s seat, Darnell Montgomery was in the passenger seat, and Jerry Horne was in the third row on the passenger side. After he smelled a “strong odor of burnt cannabis,” Shamblin decided to search the vehicle and discovered two black gloves lying in the third seating row near Horne. Shamblin moved one glove and dislodged a Derringer .357 firearm, which had been inside of it. The gun was completely obscured from view before Shamblin moved the glove. Shamblin believed that the gun was located about 5 to 10 feet away from the driver‘s seat where Wise was sitting, and he did not think it was possible for Wise to reach the gun from the driver‘s seat. Shamblin arrested Wise and read him Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Shamblin further testified that Wise agreed to speak with him and told Shamblin that he knew the firearm was in the van but it was not his; it belonged to his friend Wade Burrell, who sometimes borrowed the van. Burrell purchased the gun at Gander Mountain in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, about three months earlier.
Wise testified that he had taken a trip to Louisville, Kentucky, and was returning to Cedar Rapids, Iowa, when he was stopped by the police for speeding. He was driving a van he had borrowed from his brother, Johnny. Horne drove for about 10 minutes into the trip, and Wise drove the remainder of the trip. Wise stated that he did not know that the gun was in the van, and he denied telling Shamblin that he knew the gun was in the van. Wise was physically disabled, and his health issues included diabetes, high blood pressure, chronic back pain, and depression. He took multiple medications for his conditions.
Montgomery testified that he, Wise, and Horne were leaving Louisville and traveling to Cedar Rapids on June 18. Horne drove the first 20 miles, and thereafter, Wise drove the remainder of the trip. Montgomery testified that, when the police stopped the van, he was seated in the passenger seat, Horne was seated in the back seat, and Wise was in the driver‘s seat driving the van.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Wise argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun was “on or about his person” as required under the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon statute. Wise claims that Illinois courts have established that a weapon is “on or about” a person when the weapon is within arm‘s reach of the accused and that, in this case, the gun was not within his reach when he was pulled over in Illinois. Wise also argues that his interpretation is supported by the legislature‘s decision to exclude the “on or about his person” language from similar provisions that exclude general unlawful possession, actual and constructive, of firearms.
The State argues that the “on or about his person” language in section 24-1.1(a) is not limited to possession within the accused‘s reach but expands the scope of possession where the accused has possession of a firearm in an area that is under his exclusive control. The State alleges that Wise‘s interpretation renders the “about his person” language superfluous because it essentially carries the same meaning as “on his person.”
Section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code states, “It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any *** firearm *** if the person has been convicted of a felony ***.”
The parties dispute the meaning of “on or about his person” under section 24-1.1(a). Our supreme court has not construed the meaning of this phrase under section 24-1.1(a); however, several districts of the Illinois Appellate Court have interpreted it. The court in People v. Rangel, 163 Ill. App. 3d 730 (1987), held that a gun found in a vehicle, rather than on the defendant‘s body, could constitute being “on or about his person” under section 24-1.1. In Rangel, the police responded to a call from a woman stating that the defendant had threatened to kill her with his gun. Id. at 732. As the police were searching the apartment building where the incident occurred, one of the officers observed the defendant exiting a vehicle and walking toward the building. Id. at 733. The officer stopped the defendant in the building hallway and arrested him for aggravated assault. Id. Afterward, the officer walked over to defendant‘s vehicle and retrieved a loaded .22-caliber pistol lying on the floor of the driver‘s side of the vehicle. Id. Defendant was subsequently charged and convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon under section 24-1.1. Id. at 732. On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the weapon was recovered “on or about his person.” Id. at 738. The First District rejected this argument, holding that “the recovery of the gun from defendant‘s car rather than from his person, does not, in itself, exclude him from the provisions of the statute under which he was charged.” Id. at 739. The court explained that the definitive question is whether the defendant knowingly possessed the weapon and determined that, based on the evidence, defendant was properly found guilty under section 24-1.1. Id.
In People v. Jastrzemski, 196 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1038 (1990), the defendant was stopped for driving with a broken brake light. The officer checked defendant‘s driver‘s license and discovered that his license was suspended. Id. at 1038-39. The officer placed defendant under arrest and searched his vehicle. Id. at 1039. During the search, he found a loaded revolver under the hood of the car. Id. Ultimately, defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Id. The First District held that the location of the gun, along with the evidence that he owned the car and knew where the gun was hidden, was sufficient to show that the weapon was on or about the defendant‘s person. Id. Analogizing its case to the court‘s rationale in Clodfelder, the First District determined that a gun need not be immediately accessible to show that a firearm was “on or about” the accused‘s person. Id. at 1039-40. It held that the location of the gun, along with the evidence that he owned the vehicle and knew where the gun was hidden, was sufficient to show that the weapon was on or about the defendant‘s person. Id. at 1040.
Second, the statutory language does not support a conclusion that the legislature intended for section 24-1.1 to encompass an entire vehicle. Nonetheless, the Jastrzemski court held that a firearm found under the hood of the defendant‘s vehicle, which is neither on the defendant‘s person nor within his reach and is not reasonably accessible to the defendant, satisfied the statutory requirement. We disagree with this interpretation of section 24-1.1(a). The rationale reads language into section 24-1.1(a) that is simply not there. The legislature specifically listed the places where a felon is culpably in possession of a firearm, including “on or about his person,” “on his land,” “in his abode,” and in his “fixed placed of business.” Notably, there is no mention of a vehicle of any kind in section 24-1.1(a). If the legislature had intended to impose liability for possession anywhere “in his vehicle,” it would have included that language in the statute. It did not, and we cannot rewrite a statute to add provisions or limitations the legislature did not include. Relf v. Shatayeva, 2013 IL 114925, ¶ 29. We, therefore, limit our focus to whether the firearm was “on or about” Wise‘s person rather than whether the firearm was located in the vehicle.
Given our construction of the statute, the evidence here shows that the gun was not on or about Wise‘s person as required by section 24-1.1 when his vehicle was searched. Wise was driving the minivan when Trooper Shamblin stopped and searched the vehicle. During the search, Shamblin discovered a .357 Derringer hidden inside a glove. The firearm was located two rows or, as Shamblin testified, about 5 or 10 feet behind the driver‘s seat. Shamblin also testified that he did not believe it was possible for Wise to reach over and grab the gun from the driver‘s seat. Thus, at the time of the stop the gun was not “on or about [the] person” of the defendant.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the State failed to prove Wise guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Accordingly, we vacate his conviction. We need not address Wise‘s issue concerning his credit for time served, as this issue is dispositive of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the circuit court of Henry County is vacated.
Vacated.
JUSTICE CARTER, dissenting:
Applying a typical constructive possession analysis in this case, I would find that the State‘s evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant possessed the gun in question on or about his person. See Rangel, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 739-40 (upholding a defendant‘s conviction of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon where a gun was found on the driver‘s side floor of the vehicle the defendant had been driving); Jastrzemski, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 1039-40; Clodfelder, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 1032-34. The evidence showed that the gun was found inside a glove located on the third-row seat of the minivan defendant was driving and was approximately 5 to 10 feet away from the driver‘s seat of the van. Although defendant was allegedly not the owner of the van, he had been driving the van for some time, had control over the van, and admitted knowledge of the presence of the gun. It was for the trial court, as the trier of fact, to determine whether it believed the testimony of the alleged owner of the gun—that he had taken the gun into the vehicle with him for protection while he was running errands about a month earlier and had forgotten the gun in the vehicle. See Pollard, 2015 IL App (3d) 130467, ¶ 26. In this particular case, the trial court found that the alleged owner‘s testimony was not believable and ultimately concluded that defendant was in possession of the gun. I would affirm the trial court‘s ruling in that regard.
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry County, No. 15-CF-170; the Hon. Carol M. Pentuic, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys for Appellant: James E. Chadd, Peter A. Carusona, and Steven Varel, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Attorneys for Appellee: Matthew Schutte, State‘s Attorney, of Cambridge (Patrick Delfino, Thomas D. Arado, and Gary F. Gnidovec, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of counsel), for the People.
