THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAMION WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.
B287272
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Filed 11/20/19
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION* (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA454306). APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jose I. Sandoval, Judge. Affirmed. * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts I, II, and IV of the Discussion.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistаnt Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BACKGROUND
Wilson and the victim had a brief relationship. After it ended, he forcibly entered the victim‘s home and raped her. An information therefore charged Wilson with kidnapping (
I. Faretta request
On the eve of trial, Wilson asked to represent himself. The trial court denied the request, finding it equivocal. As we now explain, the request was properly denied, but for another reason, untimeliness.
A defendant in a criminal case has a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself or herself. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20.) To invoke this right, the defendant must unequivocally assert it within a reasonable time before trial (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127–128), and the request must be knowing and voluntary (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453). A timely, unequivocal request for self-representation must be granted, no matter how unwise the rеquest. (Windham, at p. 128.) Otherwise, untimely requests for self-representation are addressed to the trial court‘s sound discretion. (Id. at pp. 127–129.) Also, an equivocal request must be distinguished from a conditional one. A conditional request is one, for example, where the defendant asks that counsel be removed and, if not removed, that the defendant wants to represent himself. (People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 524.) Such a request is not equivocal. (Ibid.) To evaluate whether a trial court erred by denying a Faretta request, we look at the defendant‘s words and conduct to determine whether the defendant really wanted to give up the right to counsel. (Marshall, at pp. 25–26.)
Here, Wilson‘s words and conduct were clear that if he did not get a different counsel, then he wanted to represent himself.
Wilson then asked if he could have cocounsel, and the trial court told him no, this was not a way to get a different lawyer. Wilson replied, “What I‘m saying—I don‘t need a lawyer to represent me. A standby lawyer—I don‘t need somebody that‘s going—” At that point, the trial court interrupted Wilson and asked why he needed a standby lawyer. Wilson said, “just in case if I have a question.” When the trial court explained that this was not how a standby lawyer works, Wilson said he did not need counsel, then. The trial court repeated that the request was
As this demonstrates, Wilson‘s dissatisfaction with his counsel prompted his Faretta request. But, a clearly stated Faretta request motivated by dissatisfaction with counsel is not equivocal. (Moon v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1529–1530.) In People v. Weeks (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 882, for example, a public defender represented the defendant. The defendant then was permitted to go pro se. After several months, the defendant asked if his standby counsel could take over but was told that if he lost his pro per status the original public defender would be reappointed. The defendant made it clear that if he had to choose between remaining in propria persona or being represented by his original public defender, then he would choose the former. (Id. at p. 885.) Finding the defendant‘s position to be equivocal, the trial court revoked his status and reappointed the original public defender. Weeks held that denying the request was error. (Id. at p. 887.) Like the defendant in Weeks, Wilson clearly expressed he would rather represent himself than continue being rеpresented by his counsel. Hence, his request was conditional.
Although the trial court did not state it was also denying Wilson‘s Faretta motion on the ground of untimeliness, we can independently review the record to determine whether it would properly have been denied on this ground. (See People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 433, fn. 15.) In People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 218, for example, the trial court denied a Faretta motion for an improper reason. Nonetheless, because the record established the request was properly denied on other grounds, the court upheld the trial court‘s ruling. (Dent, at p. 218; see People v. Scott, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1206, [sufficient reasons on record constitute implicit consideration of Windham factors].)
The record here similarly shows that Wilson‘s motion was properly denied. Wilson made his Faretta motion on the day set for trial. The next afternoon, the trial court swore in a prospective panel. On its face, the motion was untimely. Also, the trial court hаd the opportunity to evaluate the quality of
II. Waiver of right to jury trial
Wilson contends he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial on the strike and enhancement. We disagree.
A criminal defendant‘s guilty plea or inculpatory admission requires personal waiver of the right to a trial by jury. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243.) The trial court accordingly must advise a defendant of his or her rights аnd obtain a waiver of them before taking a plea or admission. (In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132.) A valid waiver is one that is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Boykin, at p. 242.) These advisements also must be given before the trial court may accept a defendant‘s admission that he or she has suffered prior felony convictions. (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 863.)
The plea bargain here required Wilson to plead no contest to the substantive forcible rape charge and to admit a prior strike and a prior serious felony. The prosecutor advised Wilson of the substantive charges, and Wilson acknowledged he had discussed them with his counsel and that he understood he would be
However, because the prosecutor detailed only the substantive charges before Wilson waived his jury trial right, Wilson now argues he was never advised he had a right to a jury trial on the enhancements; therefore, his waivers and plea were not knowing and intelligent. People v. Forrest (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 675 rejected a similar contention. The defendant in that case argued that he had to be expressly and separately advised of his right to a jury trial on prior convictions. (Id. at p. 678 & fn. 3.) Forrest held that nothing in applicable case law requires a separate advisement and waiver of rights where a defendant “in a single proceeding” pleads to the substantive charge and to the prior convictions. (Id. at pp. 679, 681.)
We agree. Here, as in People v. Forrest, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at page 679, Wilson‘s plea to the substantive offense and to the prior convictions occurred in a single proceeding and was not separate in time. The single, express advisement adequately advised Wilson of his constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial on both the substantive offense and prior
III. Senate Bill No. 1393
Alternative to his argument that his admission to the five-year prior conviction must be reversed, Wilson argues that he is at least entitled to a remand so that the trial court can consider whether to strike the prior under Senate Bill No. 1393. When Wilson was sentencеd in 2017, the trial court had no discretion to strike a
Courts of appeal are divided as to the interplay between Senate Bill No. 1393 and sentences arising from plea agreements. The first area of disagreement concerns whether defendants like Wilson whose sentences arise from plea agreements must obtain a certificate of probable cause before raising on appeal Senate Bill No. 1393, or its counterpart Senate Bill No. 620. (See, e.g., People v. Stamps (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 117 [certificate unnecessary], review granted June 12, 2019, S255843 (Stamps); People v. Baldivia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1071 [same]; People v. Hurlic (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 50 [same] (Hurlic); but see People v. Alexander (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 827, 843 (conc. & dis. opn. of Needham, J.) [certificate necessary], review granted Oct. 16, 2019, S257190; People v. Galindo (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 658 [same], review granted Aug. 28, 2019, S256568; People v. Fox (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1124 [same], review granted July 31, 2019,
The issue before us is whether Wilson is entitled to a remand so that the trial court can exercise its discretion whether to strike the five-year prior. As we have said, Senate Bill No. 1393 gives trial courts discretion to strike a five-year prior, and it applies retroactively to cases, such as Wilson‘s, not final when the bill took effect. (See People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 973.) However, that does not mean Wilson is entitled to а remand for resentencing. Rather, Wilson‘s 17-year sentence was negotiated. A negotiated or agreed-upon sentence must be distinguished from an open plea. In an open plea, the defendant pleads unconditionally to all charges, and is therefore exposed to the maximum possible sentence. (People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 381, fn. 4.) While the trial court may indicate the sentence it will impose, there is no promise it will do so. (People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 570.)
In contrast, a nеgotiated plea is one in which the defendant pleads to specific charges and enhancements, and the trial court plays no part except to approve or disapprove the plea and to enter sentence thereon. (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 931Ibid.; see People v. Fox, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138, rev. granted.)
Hurlic and Stamps give trial judges a power they have never had, making them active players in plea negotiations. Neither the law nor Senate Bill No. 1393 supports giving trial judges such a role. Senate Bill No. 1393 does not empower “a trial court to disregard the express terms of a plea agreement by imposing a sentence that does not reflect an agreed-upon term for a firearm enhancement.” (People v. Fox, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138, rev. granted; accord, People v. Kelly (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1017, review granted June 12, 2019, S255145.) Rather, the discretion afforded trial courts under Senate Bill No. 1393 arises only when a defendant is sentenced or resentenced under another law, and nothing in the bill disposes
Our California Supreme Court decisions in Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984 and Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64 do not support a contrary view. The defendant in Harris v. Superior Court entered a negotiated plea that included dismissal of a robbery charge and allegations. Thereafter, the electorate passed Proposition 47, which reduced certain nonviolent crimes to misdemeanors and created a petitioning procedure for defendants to have their felonies reclassified. The People moved to withdraw from the plea agreement and to reinstate charges on the ground resentencing would deprive it of the benefit of the bargain. The court, however, found that Proposition 47 expressly applied to someone serving a sentence “‘whether by trial or plea.‘” (Harris v. Superior Court, at p. 991, italics omitted.) Hence, the People were not entitled to set aside the plea agreement when defendant sought to have his sentence recalled. In contrast to Proposition 47, Senate Bill No. 1393 “does not expressly mention convictions by plea but grants discretion to the trial court to strike or dismiss such enhancements” and does not have a procedural mechanism allowing defendants to reduce their sentences. (People v. Galindo, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 671, rev. granted.) Harris v. Superior Court therefore does not help Wilson.
Doe v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64 also does not help him. Doe said the general rule in California is that unless a plea agreement contains a term requiring the parties to apply only the law in existence when the agreement is made, parties to a plea agreement are deemed to know and to understand that the state, subject to constitutional limitations, may enact laws that will
Permitting a trial court, under the guise of Senate Bill No. 1393, to strike a five-year prior from a negotiated plea is thus contrary to the real-world practicalities of plea bargaining. In practice, what happens in negotiated pleas is the prosecution has a number in mind. That number is not arbitrary. It is based on numerous factors that may include policies of the district attorney‘s office, the charged crimes and enhancements, and consultation with the victim or victims. The prosecution then crafts an offer using the various options—high, mid or low terms and enhancements—to reach that number.
With this in mind, assume that a trial court acting in the here and now, with the benefit of Senate Bill No. 1393, is presented with a stipulated plea that includes a five-year term under
Now consider the circumstances here. The prosecutor‘s pre-preliminary hearing offer was 21 years, which Wilson did not take. Thereafter, the prosecutor offered 17 years but explained that her unit almost never went below the pre-preliminary hearing offer. To get the offer of 17 years, the prosecutor had to consult the victim, investigating officer, assistant head deputy and head deputy. So, the prosecutor informed defendant, “[i]t‘s not getting any better than this. I can‘t do any better than this. This is as good as it gets.” Wilson, who was facing multiple life terms and decades more in state prison if convicted of all charges and allegations, took the deal. We can infer that the trial court found the plea bargain to be consistent with the interests of justice, as the trial court approved it. Were we to find that the trial court could on remand strikе the five-year term and reduce Wilson‘s sentence to 12 years, this makes the plea more akin to an open one, thereby flipping longstanding law on its head. (See People v. Alexander, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 847.) The general rule may be that pleas, even negotiated ones, are not immune from changes in the law. But the change in law
Wilson is not entitled to a remand.
IV. Ability to pay hearing
Without objection, the trial court imposed on Wilson a $300 restitution fine under
Unlike the defendant in Dueñas, Wilson did not object below to the assessments on the ground of his inability to pay and made no showing of indigence. Generally, where a defendant has failed to object to a restitution fine based on an inability to pay, the issue is forfeited on appeal. (See People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 729.) This general rule applies here. (People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126; but see People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485.)
In any event, we agree with those cases finding that Dueñas‘s due process analysis is flawed. (See, e.g., People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320; People v. Caceres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 917; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1039 (conc. opn. of Benke, J.).) As Hicks notes, Dueñas improperly wove together two distinct strands of due process
Further, not all defendants are similarly situated to Dueñas, whose cerebral palsy rendered her unable to work and whose inability to pay fines and fees was directly related to her poverty. (See People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134.) Here, there was no evidence Wilson lacked income-earning capacity. Also, Wilson is serving a 17-year sentence. Even if we assumed he suffered a due process violation when the trial court imposed a modest financial burden on him without taking his ability to pаy into account, he has ample time to pay it from a readily available source of income while incarcerated, i.e., prison wages.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.
DHANIDINA, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.