42 Cal.App.5th 408
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- Defendant Damion Wilson forcibly entered a former partner’s home and raped her; charged with kidnapping, forcible rape (in the course of burglary), first‑degree burglary, and assault; he pleaded no contest to forcible rape and admitted a prior strike and a prior serious felony.
- Plea was negotiated: agreed term 6 years (midterm) doubled to 12 for the strike, plus a 5‑year serious‑felony enhancement, for a total sentence of 17 years; court accepted the plea and imposed sentence.
- On the day set for trial, Wilson sought to represent himself (Faretta motion) after a denied Marsden motion; the trial court denied the Faretta request as equivocal (and the Court of Appeal also found it untimely).
- Wilson argued on appeal that (1) the Faretta request should have been granted, (2) his waiver of jury trial on the priors was not knowing and intelligent, (3) he was entitled to remand under Senate Bill No. 1393 to allow the court to consider striking the 5‑year prior, and (4) the trial court should have held an ability‑to‑pay hearing before imposing fines/assessments.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed: Faretta denial proper (untimely/equivocal), plea and waiver were knowing and intelligent, Senate Bill No. 1393 does not require remand for negotiated pleas, and Wilson forfeited the ability‑to‑pay challenge (court also criticized Dueñas reasoning).
Issues
| Issue | People's Argument | Wilson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of Faretta request | Request was equivocal and made too late (day of trial); trial court acted within discretion | He unequivocally invoked the right to self‑representation and Faretta should have been granted | Denial affirmed: request was effectively equivocal and, in any event, untimely under Windham factors (no reasonable time, counsel ready, likely continuance) |
| Validity of jury‑trial waiver for priors | Single, contemporaneous advisement/waiver during plea proceeding sufficed for both substantive charge and priors | He was not separately advised of jury right on enhancements, so waiver was not knowing and intelligent | Waiver valid: plea/waiver occurred in a single proceeding and the advisement covered constitutionally required rights (Forrest governs) |
| Remand under Sen. Bill No. 1393 to strike 5‑year prior | Trial court may not alter agreed‑upon negotiated term; SB 1393 does not authorize striking enhancements for negotiated pleas | SB 1393 is retroactive and gives courts discretion to strike serious‑felony priors; remand for resentencing is required | No remand: negotiated plea bars resentencing to alter the bargained‑for term; SB 1393 does not authorize courts to rewrite negotiated pleas |
| Ability‑to‑pay hearing for fines/assessments | Wilson forfeited challenge by not objecting; Dueñas is flawed and does not mandate remand here | Dueñas requires inquiry into ability to pay before imposing fines; remand required | Forfeited on appeal; court declines to follow Dueñas on due‑process grounds and finds no basis for remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (constitutional right to self‑representation)
- Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1969) (guilty pleas require personal waiver of jury and other rights)
- People v. Windham, 19 Cal.3d 121 (Cal. 1977) (timeliness standard and factors for Faretta requests)
- In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122 (Cal. 1969) (advisement and waiver requirements for pleas)
- In re Yurko, 10 Cal.3d 857 (Cal. 1974) (prior‑conviction advisement before admission)
- People v. Forrest, 221 Cal.App.3d 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (single‑proceeding advisement suffices for priors)
- People v. Dent, 30 Cal.4th 213 (Cal. 2003) (appellate review can affirm on alternative grounds supported by record)
- People v. Hurlic, 25 Cal.App.5th 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (discussion of SB 1393 remand in unpublished portion)
- People v. Fox, 34 Cal.App.5th 1124 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (SB 1393 does not authorize trial courts to disregard express plea terms)
- Harris v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.5th 984 (Cal. 2016) (limits on withdrawing plea agreements when laws change; distinguished here)
- Doe v. Harris, 57 Cal.4th 64 (Cal. 2013) (parties to plea agreements are generally subject to subsequent changes in law; court explains limits)