THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS v. JIMARIA F. WILEY
NO. 5-23-0036
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIFTH DISTRICT
September 19, 2025
2025 IL App (5th) 230036-U
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County. No. 22-CF-247. Honorable Randall B. Rosenbaum, Judge, presiding.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Barberis and Boie concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Defendant‘s conviction is reversed where the State failed to disprove defendant‘s self-defense claim.
¶ 2 Defendant, Jimaria Wiley, files a direct appeal from her conviction for aggravated battery and sentence of 24 months’ probation. On appeal, she contends that (1) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was not acting in self-defense, (2) the trial court erred by giving an “initial aggressor” jury instruction, (3) the trial court erred by restricting the jury to a single viewing of the video evidence, (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct by voicing his personal opinion and misstating the evidence and the law, and (5) her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions, the prosecutor‘s alleged misconduct, and the court‘s limitation of the jury‘s review of the video evidence. For the following reasons, we reverse.
¶ 3 On March 2, 2022, defendant was charged, by information, with one count of aggravated battery (
¶ 4 Defendant‘s trial began on November 8, 2022. The parties provided opening statements, at which time the State laid out its proposed evidence and defense counsel argued that the case was about self-defense.
¶ 5 The State‘s presentation of evidence started with the testimony of Officer Jonathan Kristenson. Officer Kristenson testified that he worked for the Champaign Police Department and he, along with other officers, responded to the Ulta Beauty parking lot located on North Prospect in Champaign, Illinois, on March 1, 2022. He explained that Ulta Beauty was part of a strip mall with an open parking lot. He spoke with defendant after she left the scene and noted she had blood on the back of her shirt. He stated that defendant admitted being involved in an incident and injuring somebody. Officer Kristenson also made contact with the victim, Lavell, who had blood on his right side from two stab wounds, one on his lower right back and the other near his right buttocks. Officer Kristenson stated that defendant was detained.
¶ 6 After investigating the incident, Officer Kristenson determined the incident arose from a Facebook post which led to a confrontation at the Ulta Beauty store involving a group of people and one of the Ulta Beauty employees. Officer Kristenson stated that defendant told him that she went to the store to confront the group of people confronting the Ulta Beauty employee. Two of the people in the group were Lavell Fleming, and his mother, Rona Wiley-Hillsman. When defendant arrived, there was a verbal altercation between defendant and Rona; Lavell tried to
¶ 7 On cross-examination, Officer Kristenson agreed defendant told him that she was on her way to the police department when she saw the police and came back to the scene to talk to the police. He also agreed that defendant told him that she had injured someone in self-defense. The officer stated that a female named Morgan drove defendant in defendant‘s car to Ulta Beauty. He agreed that defendant went to Ulta Beauty to stop Rona from confronting Coretha Ford, who was an Ulta Beauty employee.
¶ 8 Officer Kristenson agreed that defendant told him that she had issues with Rona in the past. He further agreed that defendant and Rona had a verbal altercation in the parking lot. He testified that defendant told him that Rona came up to her, flicked her on her nose a couple of times, and
¶ 9 On redirect, Officer Kristenson stated that he looked but did not find any complaints made by defendant about Lavell. On cross-examination, the officer confirmed that he was looking for police reports filed in the ARMS database and agreed he did not look to see if any calls for assistance were made by defendant.
¶ 10 Following Officer Kristenson‘s testimony, two stipulations were read to the jury. The first stipulation involved the collection of evidence and stated that on March 1, 2022, Officer Brian Greear responded to the scene of a stabbing outside Ulta Beauty. He collected the knife and machete found at the scene and placed them into evidence. The stipulation agreed to the admission of People‘s Exhibit Nos. 1 (the knife) and 2 (the machete). The second stipulation involved a cell phone video. The stipulation stated that Officer Danielle Griffet responded to the scene of the stabbing and spoke with witness, Zachary Clark, who stated that he tried to record the incident on his phone, and it appeared that Lavell was trying to separate the females. The video was placed into evidence by Officer Griffet. The stipulation further stated that the video did not depict the entire altercation and there was no objection to the admission of People‘s Exhibit No. 3 (the cell phone video).
¶ 11 Following the court‘s reading of the stipulations, the State published People‘s Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2 to the jury. Thereafter, the State played the cell phone video. Our review of the video,
¶ 12 Lavell testified that he was 23 years old and worked at Tire Barn. He stated that defendant, who was an ex-girlfriend, stabbed him twice on March 1, 2022, once in the hip and once in the right butt cheek. Lavell stated that he went to Ulta Beauty on that date to keep his mother, Rona, “from getting into an altercation with another person” who worked at Ulta Beauty. He was there with his girlfriend, Ivory, who was pregnant at the time. When Lavell got to the store, his mother was already in the store, so he proceeded into the store. There was no physical altercation in the store, only a verbal altercation. Rona left the store with Lavell and Ivory, and defendant showed up with Lavell‘s “first baby mama,” Morgan. Two children, aged two and four years old, were also in defendant‘s car. The two-year-old child was Lavell and Morgan‘s child.
¶ 14 Lavell stated that he never verbally threatened defendant at the scene and had no weapons. He did not try to punch, kick, bite, scratch, or slap her. He stated that after he took defendant down, he separated from her, saw her get in her car, and try to leave.
¶ 16 Lavell agreed that defendant told his mother that she should not have brought the Facebook post up to where Coretha worked. He did not hear his mother respond that she was 40-some years old and defendant was not going to tell her what she could or could not do. He said he had walked away and was going to talk to Morgan. He only turned around because defendant and Rona got louder. Lavell stated that he was trying to get everyone to leave the area. He saw his mother get the machete and stated he did not try to take it away from her because “as her child I know not to touch her hand.” He explained this by saying this had to do with “her past.” Lavell confirmed that he did not feel safe removing the machete from Rona‘s hand. He felt safer staying in between his mother and defendant.
¶ 17 Lavell stated that he felt the need to forcefully pick up defendant in the air and slam her to the ground. He further stated that he did not feel like his mother was the threat; defendant was the threat. He said that his mother only retrieved the machete as self-defense. He agreed defendant‘s knife was not open in her hand when his mother got the machete from her vehicle or when Rona returned carrying the machete. He said that defendant was letting everyone know that she had the knife and kept showing it. He agreed the entire blade of the machete was showing the whole time.
¶ 19 Rona Wiley-Hillsman testified that she was Lavell‘s mother. She was 47 years old and worked as a tour bus driver for Peoria Charter. She agreed that she went to Ulta to confront one of its employees about a Facebook post. She said that she and defendant arrived within a few minutes of each other. She went into the store and, at some point, her son arrived. She stated that the situation inside Ulta was defused, and she left the store with Lavell. She was then confronted by defendant in the parking lot. Rona knew defendant because she had previously dated Lavell.
¶ 20 Rona stated that defendant was running towards her in the parking lot and defendant was mad because Rona went to Ulta to confront the employee. She agreed that a verbal altercation ensued between her and defendant and that Lavell was present during the altercation. She stated that Lavell tried to intervene by stepping in between her and defendant. Lavell separated them and then headed for defendant‘s car to get his daughter. After Lavell‘s child was retrieved, Rona noticed that defendant had a knife in her hand which prompted Rona to get her machete out of her truck. She said the two vehicles were about 10 feet away from each other. Rona identified the machete as People‘s Exhibit No. 2. She explained that she had the machete for protection because she was a female who left work at night and had to park away from her employer‘s building.
¶ 21 Rona confirmed that after she saw that defendant had a knife, she got her machete. She stated that defendant put the knife back in her car and she returned the machete to the truck. There was a reengagement of the verbal altercation and defendant pulled the knife back out of her car.
¶ 23 On redirect, Rona agreed that her grandchild was removed from the car. She further agreed that defendant was in the car when her grandchild was removed and stated defendant could have driven away too.
¶ 24 Scott Stromley is a 28-year-old video gaming repair technician who was at PetSmart on the day of the incident. He saw the younger female and an older female in a verbal altercation and then a male was in the middle of them. He said the younger female had a knife in her hands. He opined that the male was trying to break the whole thing up. He did not see any weapons in the male‘s hands or that the male was acting in an aggressive manner toward anyone. He said that after the knife was brought out, the male bear-hugged the girl and took her to the ground. Scott walked over and grabbed the knife out of the young girl‘s hand. The other female then handed him a machete. He stated that after the incident, the male was bleeding and the girl got into her car.
¶ 26 Courtney Chancellor is a teacher at Franklin Middle School who was headed to Ulta Beauty on the same day as the incident involving defendant. She parked in the parking lot and heard an argument start behind her. She saw a shorter woman and a tall, skinny younger woman arguing. Courtney stated there was a lot of cussing and loud voices, so she stayed in her car because she was concerned there would be trouble. She did not see anything physical until the argument moved closer to a car. Courtney testified that she heard a man say, “my mom‘s crazy, stay away.” She thought it sounded like he was trying to break up the verbal altercation. She saw the male wrap his arms around the skinny girl‘s waist and try to pull her away. She did not see him with any weapons and opined that the male was not aggressive. Courtney stated that he was almost pleading for the girl to stay away from his crazy mother.
¶ 27 On cross-examination, Courtney stated that the older woman was yelling at the other girl telling her she could not tell her what to do. The male was also telling his mother to stop. She did not see the male throw the skinny girl to the ground. She did not see anybody with any weapons.
¶ 28 Following Courtney‘s testimony, the State rested. Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, which was denied.
¶ 29 Defendant testified that she was 20 years old, 5‘5“, and weighed 135 pounds on the day of the incident. She identified photographs taken of her injuries following the incident. The injuries included a scratch next to her right eye, a bruise on the right side of her forehead, scratches on her left knuckle, scratches on her left and right wrists, a swollen and bruised knee, a scrape on her elbow, and back pain for a couple of weeks. The photographs were admitted without objection and published to the jury. Defendant stated that Coretha Ford was her friend, and she often babysat
¶ 30 Morgan then told defendant that Rona was going up to Ulta. Defendant testified that she planned to drop off the children and Morgan at Morgan‘s house and later head to Ulta to speak with Coretha‘s manager to ensure Coretha did not get fired. She explained that she did not want Coretha to lose her job because she had a child. However, instead of Morgan driving to her own home, Morgan turned the car around and headed straight to Ulta. When they got to the parking lot, defendant saw Rona get out of her car and start walking toward the store. She then saw Lavell get out of a different car and start walking with his girlfriend to the same store. Morgan got on the phone and called Rona who answered her phone while screaming at the store manager. Morgan told defendant to speak with Rona on the phone. Defendant stated that she tried to speak with Rona, but Rona was belligerent, screamed at her, and would not listen. Therefore, defendant got out of her car and started walking toward Ulta so she could talk to Rona.
¶ 31 Defendant explained that Rona was asking her about claims that Morgan was being abusive to Coretha‘s child. When defendant stated she did not know anything about it, Rona just kept
¶ 32 Defendant said that she tried to remain calm, but Rona started pushing her and pointing her fingers at her face. Rona then accused defendant of “shoulder-checking” Lavell and told defendant to do that to her. Defendant disputed Rona‘s statement, telling her that she was only 5‘5” and Lavell was six feet tall. Rona kept telling defendant to do it to her. Defendant stated that she felt threatened and that Rona kept getting closer to her and kept pushing defendant with her chest.
¶ 33 At that point, Lavell walked over, and Rona asked him if defendant shoulder-checked him. He said that defendant “pushed my shoulder,” so Rona kept coming after defendant. Defendant clarified that the shoulder-checking incident actually happened a week earlier. Defendant testified that as Rona kept coming after her, Lavell started pushing defendant really hard. He had his hands on her shoulders, told her to get out of Rona‘s face, and pushed defendant away from his mother. When asked about her previous relationship with Lavell, defendant stated that she and Lavell only dated for about a month from August to September in 2021. She got into a relationship with someone else but after that relationship ended, she contacted Lavell for comfort. They were together for a day but broke it off when Lavell found out his girlfriend was pregnant. However, defendant remained in contact with Morgan, who was the mother of Lavell‘s first child.
¶ 34 Defendant stated that Rona ran towards her when Rona left the store. The argument continued in the parking lot. After she walked away the first time, defendant saw Lavell‘s girlfriend, Ivory, in defendant‘s car, rummaging through bags. She asked Ivory what she was doing and told her to get away from the car. She stated that Lavell then ran over and into defendant
¶ 35 Rona then asked defendant if she pulled a boxcutter on Lavell. Defendant said no, and Rona said, “one moment.” Rona walked away, and defendant told Lavell to get his child and everything else out of her car and to get away from her. Rona pulled her vehicle right next to defendant‘s car. Rona got out of the vehicle and said, “you play with boxcutters, this is what I play with, B. I will kill you.” Defendant explained that “B” was short for the word “bitch.” Defendant stated that she “absolutely” felt threatened by Rona. Defendant turned back to her car to get Morgan‘s things out of the car so defendant could leave. She handed Morgan‘s phone out the driver‘s side window and that was when Rona walked over, flicked defendant‘s nose, and told her to get out of the car. Defendant said “no” and told Rona not to touch her. Defendant got out of the car and again told Rona not to touch her. Rona walked over, flicked defendant‘s nose again, and then Rona “backed up and she in like the fighting motion. And she [was] just bobbing back and forth,” and she said, “I just touched you twice and you didn‘t do anything.” Defendant said, “you didn‘t touch me, you flicked my nose.” Rona then slapped defendant.
¶ 36 Defendant stated that Rona dropped the machete to the ground after she had flicked her twice and was not holding the machete when Rona slapped her. Defendant continued to hold the knife and phone in her hand, stating the blade was not exposed. As soon as Rona slapped defendant, Lavell stepped in between them, pushed defendant, grabbed her, and picked her up off the ground. Defendant started screaming and told Lavell to let her go. She stated that she was terrified when
¶ 37 On cross-examination, defendant stated that she saw the machete go up when she was on the ground. She agreed that no one else testified that the machete was raised but stated that it looked like it went up when she was on the ground. She also agreed that everything she told the officer was on the body camera. She disagreed that she told the officer that Lavell came at her like a football player. She also believed that she told Officer Kristenson that someone threatened to kill her. She agreed that she did not post anything on Facebook and interjected herself into the situation when Rona was leaving the store. She also agreed that when she got out of the car, and initially confronted Rona, that she had a knife in her hand. She further agreed that once Lavell separated
¶ 38 Following defendant‘s testimony, the defense rested. Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, but the motion was stayed until the State decided if it was going to present rebuttal evidence. The parties then held a jury instruction conference. The State objected to the use of any self-defense instruction claiming the burden had not been met. The court overruled the objection and allowed the self-defense jury instructions. After noting that many of the jury instructions were erroneous, court ended the day with directions to the attorneys to fix the instructions.
¶ 39 The trial resumed the following day, and the revised jury instructions were submitted with no objection. The State then requested the court provide an “initial aggressor” Illinois Pattern Instruction, Criminal, Nos. 24-25.09 (Initial Aggressor‘s Use of Force) and 24-25.09X (Non-Initial Aggressor—No Duty to Retreat) (hereinafter IPI Criminal Nos. 24-25.09 and 24-25.09X). IPI Criminal No. 24-25.09 states:
“A person who initially provokes the use of force against himself is justified in the use of force only if
[1] the force used against him is so great that he reasonably believes he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the other person.
[or]
[2] in good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the other person and indicates clearly to the other person that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the other person continues or resumes the use of force.”
IPI Criminal No. 24-25.09X states, “A person who has not initially provoked the use of force against himself has no duty to attempt to escape the danger before using force against the aggressor.” Defense counsel objected to both instructions.
¶ 40 The court allowed instruction No. 24-25.09 stating:
“Well, I understand the arguments on both sides. This is a unique situation where really the *** battle was between the two women, and the man got in between and may have escalated it, it may not have, it‘s for the jury to determine. I don‘t think her walking into the situation is the provocation here. She has the right to be there and to have conversation with Rona and others, I don‘t think that‘s what provokes the use of force. But it‘s my recollection, and I think [defense counsel] agrees, that although the knife [was] like a switchblade, the knife can come out. It was not out at first, but she has the knife in her hand, everybody sees the knife handle in her hand. She‘s the one who produces it. It‘s not out at that moment, but I think that that does sort of escalate it from a verbal altercation to something more serious when she brings out the knife, even if it‘s not exposed, because that‘s just upping the ante, so to speak, and eventually she does expose it, which escalates things at that point. So I‘m going to note the defense objection, I am going to allow 24-25.09.”
¶ 41 The court also allowed instruction No. 24-25.09X stating:
“Well, this is a close call. It kind of goes hand in hand with the initial aggressor‘s use of force instruction, which I just allowed. There is varying testimony here, it‘s in contradiction, and the defendant did say that he was an aggressor, and that she was protecting herself when she stabbed him.
I think both parties have asked witnesses, could you have just walked away, and I think reluctantly everybody said yeah, I guess I could have, so everybody had the ability to walk away and nobody did. But I think when it comes to jury instructions and telling the jury what the law is, I think this is an appropriate statement and if *** the jury finds that Lavell was not the initial aggressor, I think the law is clear that he has no duty to attempt to escape. They may not find that. They may find he was the initial aggressor, in which case this would not apply. But I think it is appropriate to advise the jury on the law. I‘m going to overrule the defense objection and grant it.”
¶ 42 Thereafter, the State advised the court that it was going to publish portions of Officer Kristenson‘s body camera video that contained three interactions with defendant. The State advised the court that the video was to rebut defendant‘s testimony regarding Lavell tackling her and stating that someone threatened to kill her. The portions of the video were published to the jury and the State rested. Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, which was denied.
¶ 43 The court read the jury instructions, including IPI Criminal Nos. 24-25.09 and 24-25.09X, after reading the jury instruction for self-defense. IPI Criminal No. 24-25.09 was read as follows:
“A person who initially provokes the use of force against himself is justified in the use of force only if the force used against him is so great that he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of great bodily harm, and he has exhausted every
reasonable means to escape the danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause great bodily harm to the other person. Or in good faith he withdraws from physical contact with the other person and indicates clearly to the other person that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the other person continues or resumes the use of force.”
The court then read IPI Criminal No. 24-25.09X stating, “A person who has not initially provoked the use of force against himself has no duty to attempt to escape the danger before using force against the aggressor.”
¶ 44 Following the jury instructions, the parties then provided closing argument. The State argued that the statutory elements were shown and said, “The only thing we‘re sitting here for you all to decide is if she is allowed to do what she did, and I do not believe that she is allowed to do that. I do not believe that she acted in self-defense.” After going through the incident, the State argued:
“One, ladies and gentlemen, I suggest to you [that] you do not take her word at face value because she lied to you twice yesterday on the stand: That‘s why we watched that body cam. I do my job. I watched it. The officer watched it, and where did she ever say to the officer, she threatened to kill me? Not once in those three times did she ever say, at the time of the incident she threatened to kill me. I gave her the opportunity when I stood right here and said that‘s on body cam. You never said that. Yes, I did. She doubled down. Proof right there. She said Lavell tackled me in a football-style way into the car. Not once did she say that to the police officers. Those are what are called self-serving statements so that the jury says well, she said it, it must be true.
Well, she lied twice to you, ladies and gentlemen. What else is she lying about? Because she is the only person that gives her version of events. There has been zero shown to you against what I have said, that Lavell went there acting as a peacemaker. This is completely self-serving on her point. This is the knife she had. She wants to say it was merely a pocket knife. It was closed in her hand the whole time. I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, one thing. I carry a pocket knife from time to time, too. Not allowed to in the courthouse. If you‘re carrying a pocket knife in a normal manner, it‘s sitting like this/(indicating) You‘re speaking with somebody. Is that person aggressive whatsoever? They have a knife on them. Does it matter? You might go to a job site, people have boxcutters, they‘ve got all sorts of tools. If you come up to somebody and now all of sudden you‘re holding a knife in your hand, and you‘re pointing your finger at them. You‘re yelling at them. You‘re getting in that person‘s face. And you‘re holding a knife? That changes the ball game, ladies and gentlemen. You could be out playing baseball, holding a bat. That‘s not aggressive. You take that bat up, depending on what you‘re doing that bat becomes a weapon, doesn‘t it?
That‘s how quick it opens up, ladies and gentlemen. That‘s how quick that knife opens up. So don‘t let the argument, sitting here saying oh, it‘s just a knife in her hand. That‘s how quick that knife opens up, how quickly she stabbed Lavell Fleming two times in the leg. This, with an aggressive person in your face, doesn‘t need to be open for you to be scared. I would agree that if it is open, big difference. But she comes to this situation by her own admission, that doesn‘t involve her, has
Lavell has no duty to run away. Lavell wasn‘t the person who was the aggressor in this situation. Lavell didn‘t do anything except try and stop the situation from happening, and in so doing got himself stabbed, ladies and gentlemen.
*** What person, with their mother involved, with a two-year-old daughter involved, themself, a pregnant girlfriend standing there, who wouldn‘t be a bit concerned with somebody with a knife? She wants to take the stand and give—I can‘t even call them alligator tears because there were no actual tears that happened when she sat up there, ladies and gentlemen. There were sounds, I didn‘t see a tissue rub the eyes once.”
¶ 46 Defense counsel‘s argument was based on self-defense and explained that in addition to the elements of the alleged crimes, the State also had to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not entitled to use self-defense, that she was not entitled to protect herself. Counsel further explained that defendant told police that she received a threat but did not say she was threatened to kill and further stated that she was tackled into the car but did not say “football tackle.” Counsel argued that those statements did not make defendant a liar. She further argued that defendant was not the aggressor and further referenced Lavell‘s testimony about being afraid to take the machete from Rona‘s hand. Counsel also addressed defendant‘s testimony about Rona flicking and slapping her. Counsel played the cell phone video and argued about how Lavell handled defendant prior to the stabbing.
¶ 47 In response, the State argued:
The facts that are here *** is that she showed up. She got in Rona‘s face. She produced the knife. She could have gone back and done a number of different
¶ 48 Following closing arguments, the jury was sent to deliberate at 10:55 a.m. At 11:15 a.m. the jury sent two questions to the court. The first requested to view the cell phone video again. Both parties agreed they should see the video and it was decided that the jury would be returned to the courtroom to watch the video. The second question asked if they needed to decide whether great bodily harm occurred and, if so, the definition for great bodily harm. Both parties agreed the jury needed to figure that issue out on their own so the court stated the jury would be advised that they had all the instructions of law they needed to decide the case and should just continue the deliberations. The jury was returned to the courtroom. The court spoke to the jury saying:
“Please be seated. Ladies and gentlemen, we did get your note, there‘s two parts to it. We‘re going to take them one at a time. The first is can we see the cell phone
¶ 49 The video was then played to the jury. Following the video, the court advised the jury that they had all the instructions of law needed to make the decision. It concluded by saying, “So at this time I‘m going to ask you all to go back and continue your deliberations, okay? Thank you very much.” The jury then retired for more deliberations at 11:40 a.m. The jury reached its verdict at 2:15 p.m. The court read the verdict which found defendant not guilty of aggravated domestic battery but guilty of aggravated battery. The jury was polled and released. The court ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI) and set sentencing for December 20, 2022.
¶ 50 On November 30, 2022, defense counsel filed a motion for acquittal, or in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. The motion contended that the State failed to prove defendant guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The motion also argued that the court erred in denying the requests for directed verdict following the closure of the State‘s evidence and after State‘s rebuttal evidence and erred in allowing jury instructions IPI Criminal Nos. 24-25.09 and 24-25.09X. The motion further argued that the guilty verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and no rational jury could find the State proved defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 51 On December 20, 2022, the trial court first addressed the posttrial motion, stating the issues were addressed at the time of the directed verdict and during the jury instruction conference. It believed “the court‘s rulings were appropriate” as was the “jury‘s verdict” which was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court denied the posttrial motion and moved to the sentencing hearing. No objections or revisions to the PSI were necessary. The State argued for 30 months’ probation. Defense counsel requested 12 months’ probation. Defendant provided a
¶ 52 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 53 Defendant raises five issues on appeal. She contends (1) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was not acting in self-defense when Lavell was stabbed, (2) the court denied her a fair trial by allowing the “initial aggressor” jury instruction because there was no evidence she was the initial aggressor and allowing the instruction made the self-defense instruction confusing, (3) the court denied her a fair trial when it restricted the jury to a single viewing of the video evidence during deliberation, (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by providing his own personal opinion and misstating the law and evidence, and (5) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions, the State‘s misconduct during closing argument, and the court limiting the jury to only one view of the evidence during deliberations. The State disagrees, repeatedly arguing that the issues raised do not involve Rona and solely involve defendant and Lavell. The State requests affirmation of defendant‘s judgment and sentence.
¶ 54 Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was not acting in self-defense. “Self-defense is an affirmative defense, and once a defendant raises it, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense, in addition to proving the elements of the charged offense.” People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 224-25 (2004) (citing People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 127 (1995)). In order to show self-defense, the defendant must show: “(1) that unlawful force was threatened against a person; (2) that the person threatened was not the aggressor; (3) that the danger of harm was imminent; (4) that the use of force was necessary; (5) that the person threatened actually and subjectively
¶ 55 The second part of section 7-1 states:
“In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of ‘aggressor’ set forth in Section 7-4 of this Article *** against the person *** using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct.”
720 ILCS 5/7-1(b) (West 2020).
¶ 56 Section 7-4 states:
“The justification described in the preceding Sections of this Article is not available to a person who:
(a) Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of, a forcible felony; or
(b) Initially provokes the use of force against himself, with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or
(c) Otherwise initially provokes the use of force against himself, unless:
(1) Such force is so great that he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or
(2) In good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force.” Id. § 7-4 .
¶ 57 On review, we consider whether, “after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant did not act in self-defense.” Lee, 213 Ill. 2d at 225 (citing People v. Young, 347 Ill. App. 3d 909, 920 (2004)). As such, we consider the evidence but first note that the State‘s recitation of the evidence, both in its brief and at oral argument, is inconsistent with the record before us.
¶ 58 The first altercation involved Rona and defendant.1 This incident occurred shortly after Rona, Lavell, and Ivory left Ulta, and saw defendant in the parking lot. While it started as a verbal confrontation, the evidence reveals that the verbal altercation escalated to pointed fingers and eventually a physical confrontation when Rona pushed defendant in the parking lot. Lavell got between defendant and Rona, grabbed defendant‘s shoulders, and told defendant to get out of his mother‘s face. Lavell‘s actions broke Rona and defendant apart and the parties then removed Lavell‘s child from defendant‘s car.
¶ 59 The second altercation started with Rona flicking defendant‘s nose while defendant was seated in the car. After defendant refused to leave her car, Rona flicked defendant‘s nose a second time. After flicking defendant twice, Rona smacked defendant when defendant continued to point her fingers at Rona. Rona then told defendant that was “not what you want to do.”
¶ 61 On a sufficiency of evidence claim regarding self-defense, this court is required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt defendant did not act in self-defense. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d at 225. As such, this court will accept reasonable inferences stemming from the evidence and resolve conflicting evidence in the State‘s favor because that is a duty of the jury. See Young, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 920; see also People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 43 (1989). Instead, the reviewing court will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant‘s guilt. People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1984). While we defer to the jury‘s findings on the credibility of witnesses and the reasonable
¶ 62 The State argues that the jury believed defendant did not act in self-defense and therefore, the case should be affirmed. In addressing the elements of self-defense, it first argues that defendant was not threatened with unlawful force. In support, the State argues, “Defendant possessed a dangerous, illegal switchblade.3 Initially, it was closed but it can and was opened with a flick.” It further argues that Lavell “attempted to continue his role as peacemaker, stepped in between defendant and [Rona]. He knew defendant had a switchblade and he heard it open. Placing her in a bear hug was not unlawful force.”
¶ 63 Notably the State‘s argument fails to address any of Rona‘s actions during the altercations. Here, as at trial, the State argues that the only altercation that should be considered is the one between Lavell and defendant. However, no citation to support the contention that only Lavell and defendant should be considered was provided and we have found no case law requiring the fact finder from considering the entire incident as opposed to only considering the final moments when the violence occurred. Indeed, in some instances the altercations can be lengthy and even interrupted by other people, but all of the incidents are considered. See People v. Guja, 2016 IL App (1st) 140046, ¶¶ 53, 55; People v. McGrath, 193 Ill. App. 3d 12, 28-29 (1989). As such, we
¶ 64 The evidence reveals, and it is undisputed, that Rona escalated every altercation with defendant. When they were yelling, Rona pushed defendant. When defendant was in her car, Rona twice flicked defendant‘s nose and later slapped her. When Rona saw defendant had a closed knife, Rona returned with a machete. Even reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State which would have defendant brandishing an open knife toward an unarmed Lavell, based on the State‘s evidence, Rona‘s machete remained in such close proximity to defendant—no more than 10 feet based on Rona‘s testimony—that this court cannot find that the State negated the element of unlawful force threatened against defendant.
¶ 65 The second element requires defendant not to be the initial aggressor. The State argues that defendant had an open switchblade when Lavell stepped between defendant and Rona and “simply put her in a bear hug.” The remainder of the argument discusses the prior romantic relationship between defendant and Lavell and argues that defendant stabbing Lavell twice in reaction to Lavell‘s bear hug was disproportionate. If those were the only facts at issue, we might agree.
¶ 66 While this court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, this court cannot ignore the State‘s evidence that repeatedly confirmed Rona aggressive actions and close proximity to defendant with easy access to a machete when Lavell grabbed defendant. While it is undisputed that Lavell was unarmed, it is equally undisputed that Lavell was attempting to restrain defendant while his mother was: (a) actually holding a machete based on Lavell‘s testimony, (b) the machete was in a truck 10 feet away based on Rona‘s testimony, or (c) was on the ground at Rona‘s feet based on defendant‘s testimony. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to
¶ 67 The State‘s reliance on People v. Banks, 227 Ill. App. 3d 462, 474 (1992), and People v. Belpedio, 212 Ill. App. 3d 155, 161 (1991), to support its claim that defendant was the initial aggressor, is gratuitous at best. Both cases are easily distinguishable. In Banks, the record revealed that the defendant was the first to make physical contact against both the decedent and victim and the defendant verbally threatened to kill the unarmed decedent before shooting the decedent and two others. Banks, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 474-75. Here, defendant never made first contact and issued no verbal threat to either Rona or Lavell. Belpedio involved the defendant punching an opponent in the face during a touch football game after the victim elbowed the defendant when he was trying to make a catch. Belpedio, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 162. While the victim in Belpedio made the first physical contact, which is similar to the facts here, the victim‘s contact was part of a touch football game and defendant‘s punching the victim was pure retaliation for the victim‘s initial interference during the catch. Here, there was no evidence submitted that defendant stabbing Lavell was in retaliation for any previous action by Lavell. In fact, Rona‘s testimony confirmed that defendant abandoned the fight when she returned the closed knife to her car after Rona appeared with a machete. Despite defendant‘s attempt to abandon the altercation, Rona walked to defendant‘s car and flicked defendant twice. Regardless, because no argument regarding retaliation was previously raised, the argument is disregarded. See Estrada, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 626.
¶ 68 Here, the State‘s evidence revealed that Rona was the aggressor in every situation. Notably, defendant‘s knife was closed when Rona approached defendant with the machete. Illinois case law
¶ 69 The third element requires the State to show that defendant was not in imminent danger of harm. Once again, the State attempts to limit the court‘s consideration solely to the actions of Lavell but again provides no legal basis to do so. The argument remains unsatisfactory. See
¶ 70 There is no dispute that Rona was wielding a machete at some point during the third altercation. It was also undisputed that even Lavell was too afraid of his mother to even try to take away Rona‘s machete, yelled at defendant to get away from Rona, and called his mother “crazy.” Further, contrary to the State‘s unsupported argument, Rona‘s threatening behavior occurred in the present. Lavell testified that he grabbed defendant the second time because he was worried someone would get hurt badly because “one person had a knife and the other had a machete.” Rona testified that the machete was in the truck when Lavell grabbed defendant. Defendant testified that
¶ 71 The fourth element requires the State to show that the use of force was unnecessary. Here, the State argues that that the “saying made famous in the movies about not bringing a knife to gun fight” was applicable, because “defendant brought a switchblade to an argument.” In support, the State relies on People v. Baggett, 115 Ill. App. 3d 924, 932 (1983). In Baggett, the defendant shot the victim after being called names and shoved one time. Id.
¶ 72 If we were constrained to limit the confrontation to that of Lavell and defendant, Baggett might have relevance. However, the confrontations included more than just Lavell and defendant. Once again, the State omits any mention of Rona or her machete and fails to provide any legal basis as to why Rona‘s machete would not be applicable to the analysis or how defendant holding a closed knife would be disproportionate to Rona‘s machete. It is equally relevant that Lavell, who
¶ 73 The fifth element requires the State to show that defendant did not actually and subjectively believe a danger existed that required the use of force. “It is well settled that the test in self-defense is not what the jury thinks a reasonable man would believe, but rather what the defendant, as a reasonable man, believed.” People v. McClain, 410 Ill. 280, 287 (1951) (citing People v. Grady, 381 Ill. 224 (1942)); see also People v. Johnson, 2 Ill. 2d 165, 172 (1954).
¶ 74 Here, the State argues that defendant had no reason to fear Lavell because he was unarmed. In support, the State cites People v. Davis, 33 Ill. App. 3d 105, 109-10 (1975). In Davis, the defendant fired a warning shot, turned to leave, had her wig pulled off her head, was threatened that she would be killed, and turned around and shot the victim. Id. If the interaction was solely between defendant and Lavell, Davis might be relevant. However, similar to above, the State provided no argument regarding Rona and her machete. Defendant testified that she was terrified when Rona came toward her with the machete and was also terrified when Lavell grabbed her after Rona slapped her. The video confirms defendant was screaming and flailing her legs in an attempt to get out of Lavell‘s grip. Accordingly, we cannot find sufficient evidence supports the State‘s claim that it negated this element.
¶ 75 The final element requires the State to show that the defendant‘s belief of a threat was not objectively reasonable. In support, the State contends that defendant “knew, or should have known
¶ 76 We first address Lavell‘s actions. As noted above, if Lavell‘s actions were indeed limited to only trying to break up the fight between his mother and defendant, and Rona was no longer at the scene, the State‘s argument might have merit. However, the unrebutted evidence revealed that Rona and her machete were never more than 10 feet away from defendant based on Rona‘s testimony and was much closer based on Lavell‘s testimony. As noted above, it is more than objectively reasonable for defendant to fear being restrained by someone larger than herself when Lavell described his mother as “crazy,” Rona had easy access to a machete, and remained in close proximity to defendant.
¶ 77 The State‘s argument regarding defendant‘s testimony that Rona did not have her machete is equally disingenuous. As such, we include a full summary of defendant‘s testimony prior to that statement. Defendant‘s testimony begins with Rona moving toward defendant, who was in her own vehicle, with the machete. Rona tells defendant “you play with boxcutters, this is what I play with, B. I will kill you.” Defendant states that she “absolutely” felt threatened by Rona at that time. After Rona got her machete, defendant testified that she returned to her car so she could leave. She handed Morgan her phone out the driver‘s side window and Rona walked over and flicked
¶ 78 While the State claims defendant‘s fears were not objectively reasonable, if we are basing the case on defendant‘s testimony, the evidence revealed that even if Rona did not have the machete at the exact moment Lavell attempted to restrain defendant—the machete was on the ground at defendant‘s feet. The evidence also reveals that Rona picked up the machete while Lavell was trying to detain defendant and returned with the machete after defendant was pinned to the ground under Lavell. Even considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, it is undisputed that Rona picked the machete up while Lavell was detaining defendant and returned with the machete after defendant was pinned to the ground.
¶ 79 Finally, the State argues that “[t]he jury agreed” that defendant‘s “belief that she needed to use a 5-inch switchblade to protect herself from [Lavell] was not objectively reasonable” and the reasonableness of defendant‘s use of force and the amount of force “are factual determinations solely for the trier of fact to decide.” This court is well aware that it is the function of the jury to assess the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, and to resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d at 225. However, the jury was also told that the “trial isn‘t about Rona Wiley,” and the
¶ 80 The law of this state has long held that, “[w]hen a person is assaulted in such a manner as to induce a reasonable belief that [she] is in danger of loss of life or great bodily harm [she] may exercise [her] right of self-defense whether the danger is real or only apparent.” Johnson, 2 Ill. 2d at 171. Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we do not see how a finding that the State negated the element requiring that defendant‘s belief of a threat be objectively reasonable, is even possible.
¶ 81 Due to its failure to address Rona and the unsupported contention that any altercations between Rona and defendant were merely “red herrings,” we find the State‘s arguments unpersuasive, at best. We are aware of no legal basis, and the State failed to present one either at trial or on appeal, that constrains the factfinder, to only consider the last actions of violence in a series of altercations that undoubtedly escalated over time when the same parties were present for each altercation. When the focus of the case involves the entire incident rather than on the last act, we do not see how any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did not act in self-defense. Accordingly, we reverse defendant‘s conviction for aggravated battery. As the conviction must be reversed, we need not address defendant‘s four remaining issues on appeal.
¶ 82 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 83 For the above-stated reasons, we reverse defendant‘s conviction for aggravated battery.
¶ 84 Reversed.