THE PEOPLE,
2d Crim. No. B325200
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX
Filed 4/5/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Super. Ct. No. 22CR04156) (Santa Barbara County)
But what if a facially neutral reason given by a party to remove a juror—such as “lack of life experience“—is based on a presumptively invalid reason, such as lack of employment or demeanor? Absent reasons articulated by the party exercising the peremptory challenge that bear on the prospective juror‘s ability to be fair and impartial and concern the case to be tried, and without corresponding express findings by the trial court, we hold that such a practice violates
Israel Marcial Uriostegui appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted him of first degree residential burglary.2 (
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jury selection
Uriostegui‘s jury trial commenced in November 2022. During voir dire, the trial court asked prospective juror T.N. to provide “basic information.” T.N. provided her name, which had a Spanish surname. She said, “I work at Taco Bell” but “I am not currently working because of an injury.” She also said she
In response to questioning by Uriostegui‘s counsel, T.N. stated she would not need the defense “to prove anything,” she did not need the defendant to testify to find him not guilty, and it was “perfectly fine” for the defendant to use an interpreter. The prosecutor did not ask T.N. any questions about these issues.
Outside the presence of the other jurors, T.N. disclosed that her mother was convicted of a crime and her father was sent to prison. These convictions occurred about eight years earlier. T.N. told the court that having close family members convicted of crimes would “absolutely not” affect her ability to serve as a juror in this case.
During questioning by the prosecutor, T.N. said she was not close with her biological parents, had been in foster care, and had no feelings about incarceration. What happened to her parents was “definitely” fair under the circumstances. The prosecutor said he had no further questions.
Uriostegui‘s counsel objected when the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against T.N. Referencing
“[T.N.] told us that . . . she works at Taco Bell. That she has an [a]ssociates degree in Arts. No military service. That she is not currently working. That she has a significant other but no kids, no prior jury service. I think that People‘s peremptory was based in a lack of life experience. So the fact that she has no children, seems to—seems very young in—or rather very inexperienced in her presentation of herself. Perhaps appears even younger than she actually is. I think that is attributable to life experience, and to limited ties to the community. I would also note that she appeared very malleable in terms of her answers to questions. That she was agreeable to all of the lines of questioning presented by the Defense, then was equally agreeable to all the lines of questioning presented by the Prosecution. So she appeared kind of reluctant, timid, malleable. Not the kind of person who would independently make a judgment about the facts in a case, come to her own conclusions and not be swayed by her fellow jurors. Her soft-spokeness [sic], reluctance and timidity, I think, were apparent to everybody.”
The prosecutor also said he had “concerns” about T.N.‘s “ability to fully understand” the questions asked during voir dire.
The trial court acknowledged that T.N. “[c]ertainly has potentially a Hispanic last name,” but denied the objection because “in light of the totality of circumstances” there was “not a substantial likelihood” that T.N.‘s actual or perceived membership in a protected class was a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge. It reasoned, “[W]hile I think there was certainly more questions that could have been asked by both sides, [T.N.] did, based on the questions and based on [the prosecutor‘s] explanation as to why he exercised the preemptory [sic], I don‘t believe it was a socio-economic one.” The court noted T.N.‘s age and concluded that “it is reasonable that her lack of life experience is unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias as to that specific juror. I don‘t believe that his reason for peremptory had anything to do with the fact that she may be Hispanic.”
DISCUSSION
Uriostegui contends the trial court erred when it denied his objection pursuant to
Section 231.7
Prior to January 1, 2022, trial courts examined peremptory challenges under the three-step inquiry established by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler), overruled in part by Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162. Unlike challenges for cause based on a juror‘s incapacity, relationship to the parties, bias, or prejudice (see
While the prior Batson/Wheeler inquiry helped eliminate overt intentional discrimination, it “plainly fail[ed] to protect against—and likely facilitate[d]—implicit bias. Implicit bias is increasingly accepted as pervasive throughout the criminal justice system, and it is particularly pernicious in the context of peremptory challenges.” (People v. Bryant (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 525, 545 (conc. opn. of Humes, P. J.).) Recognizing this, “the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) . . . to add . . .
In enacting
Now, trial courts “need not find purposeful discrimination” to sustain an objection to a peremptory challenge. (
Presumptively invalid reasons include the prospective juror‘s “[l]ack of employment or underemployment.” (
We review de novo the trial court‘s denial of an objection under
Analysis
At the outset, we reject the Attorney General‘s claim of no error because it was unclear whether T.N. was Hispanic. Uriostegui‘s counsel objected because T.N. “appears to be Hispanic.”
We also reject the argument that Uriostegui, as the party objecting to the peremptory, must show the number of empaneled jurors who are Hispanic. Under
The prosecutor here exercised a peremptory challenge against T.N. based on her “lack of life experience,” reasoning that T.N. was young,
We also disagree with the Attorney General‘s blanket claim that “lack of life experience” is not a presumptively invalid reason for excusing a prospective juror. Here, because T.N.‘s alleged lack of life experience was based in part on the presumptively invalid reason of “lack of employment or underemployment,”
In conjunction with the “lack of life experience” explanation, the prosecutor claimed that T.N.‘s demeanor was problematic because she was too “malleable” by agreeing with questions posed by both the defense and the prosecutor. We respectfully disagree. Our review of the record shows that the prosecutor only asked T.N. questions about her family members’ convictions, her feelings about their incarceration, and whether she felt comfortable being a juror. And with respect to her responses to questions posed by the defense, T.N. stated that she would not need the defense “to prove anything,” the defendant did not need to testify, and it was fine for the defendant to use an interpreter. T.N.‘s responses show only that she would follow the law.
The prosecutor also claimed that T.N. was reluctant, timid, and soft-spoken. But these demeanor-based reasons for excusing T.N. are now presumptively invalid because they “have historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection.” (
The prosecutor additionally claimed that T.N. had limited ties to the community. But it is significant that the prosecutor did not question T.N. regarding this issue, which raises an inference of discrimination. (
Ortiz, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th 768, on which the Attorney General relies, is not to the contrary. Ortiz held “that the substantial evidence standard applies where . . . the trial court has made explicit findings in the confirmation stage.” (Ortiz, at p. 801.) Because the trial court here did not make any findings regarding T.N.‘s alleged inability to understand the questions, there are no factual findings to review for substantial evidence. (
Under
In reaching this conclusion, we need not, and do not, determine whether the prosecutor was motivated by bias. The Legislature intended
Conclusion
“[D]ecision-making by racial stereotype . . . should be anathema in our courts.” (People v. Johnson (1978) 22 Cal.3d 296, 299.) “It is not only litigants who are harmed when the right to trial by impartial jury is abridged. Taints of discriminatory bias in jury selection—actual or perceived—erode confidence in the adjudicative process, undermining the public‘s trust in courts.” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1154.) It is therefore imperative that trial courts heed
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
BALTODANO, J.
I concur:
CODY, J.
GILBERT, P. J.
I respectfully dissent.
When patent racial prejudice occurs in any form in our judicial system, the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 requires reversal, even when guilt has been established beyond “beyond a reasonable doubt.” In People v. Simmons (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 323, this court reversed a criminal conviction of a Black defendant despite overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The prosecutor‘s cross-examination and comments during oral argument regarding defendant‘s skin color compelled reversal under the act.
We reasoned the Legislature‘s concern that racial prejudice in a court proceeding so infects and pollutes our judicial system that its presence adversely affects a finding of guilt. This, despite the cogent argument raised by Justice Yegan in his dissent in Simmons that the Racial Justice Act violates the doctrine of separation of powers. (See People v. Simmons, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th 323 (dis. opn. of Yegan, J.);
I applaud the Legislature‘s recognition that implicit bias – an unconscious trait we all carry within us whatever our race, background, or life experience – has no place in our judicial system. (See Godsil & Richardson, Racial Anxiety (2017) 102 Iowa L.Rev. 2235-2263.) Members of the judiciary and the bar attend courses to raise awareness of these biases. Yet I seriously doubt the majority‘s literal interpretation of
Uriostegui was caught on a home security camera entering the garage of the victim‘s residence. He was apprehended close to the residence when police arrived a short time later. He matched the description of the individual captured on the security camera and was found in possession of a knife stored in the victim‘s garage.
At the sidebar proceeding concerning the prosecution‘s request to exercise a peremptory challenge to the juror in question here (T.N.), defense counsel said, “She appears to be a member - she appears to be Hispanic. I am
Although the prosecution relied on a number of reasons for the peremptory challenge, the trial court denied the defense objection solely on the lack of life experience. The court found there was no “substantial likelihood” that “an objectively reasonable person” would believe “race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation or perceived membership in any of those groups is a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.”
The trial court went on to expressly find that the prosecutor did not exercise his peremptory challenge for the presumptively invalid reason of T.N.‘s “socio-economic” circumstances of being unemployed. The court concluded: “I think it is reasonable that her lack of, or [the prosecutor‘s] reasoning for challenge is a lack of life experience is unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias as to that juror. I don‘t believe that his reason for [the] peremptory had anything to do with the fact that she may be Hispanic . . . but the court is satisfied that the reason for the peremptory is not invalid pursuant to [section] 231.7.”
Contrary to the majority‘s conclusion, in finding that the peremptory challenge was not based on T.N.‘s socio-economic status, the trial court necessarily concluded the prosecutor was not using the facially neutral reason of “lack of life experience” to conceal a presumptively invalid reason. (See People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 907 [lack of life experience is a nondiscriminatory and legitimate reason to disqualify a juror].)
This trial judge was aware of the statute and implicit bias. Yet the majority reverses because the judge did not repeat verbatim the words of the statute, i.e., the trial court did not expressly add that the reasons articulated by the prosecution “bear on the prospective juror‘s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
GILBERT, P. J.
Von Deroian, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
Andrea Keith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.