THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MOISES JAMIE JAIME, Defendant and Appellant.
C096022
(Super. Ct. No. SCCR-CRF-2020-436)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Siskiyou)
Filed 5/19/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Siskiyou County, Anne Bouliane, Judge. (Retired judge of the S.F. Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Robert Gezi, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before January 1, 2022, trial courts examined peremptory challenges under the three-step inquiry established by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258. Recognizing the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 3070) to add
Under
The prosecutor later exercised a peremptory challenge against L., and defense counsel asked the trial court to “make our record in the back.” The court took a break from jury selection and asked L. to remain. The following dialogue ensued without her:
“THE COURT: For the record the Court has asked [L.] to remain and she is outside because I anticipate that it‘s a Wheeler motion; is that right?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It‘s a –
“THE COURT: Batson-Wheeler.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.
“THE COURT: So since one of the remedies should I find a prima facie case and grant the motion is to have the juror remain seated I asked [L.] to remain.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.
“THE COURT: Okay. So that‘s the reason.
“So at this time, [defense counsel], you should make your motion.”
Defense counsel then argued that L. said she would follow the law and the evidence and would do so as an impartial member of the jury despite “unusual circumstances in her experience from her youth.” Defense counsel further argued L. was in a protected class because of her surname.
The prosecutor countered that defense counsel did not establish a prima facie case. She further stated the following concern with L.: “So [L.] provided information that her cousin was prosecuted by our office for in her words murder. That he was sent to prison and that she had an experience with
The court concluded that “based on the district attorney‘s statements . . . based on my view of everything that I don‘t believe that this was a racially motivated challenge. [¶] So the Batson-Wheeler will be denied . . . .”
The next morning, after the jury had been impaneled and witnesses had testified, the trial court stated that the prosecutor “had asked for an opportunity and the Court would like an opportunity also to make more of a record on what transpired at the Batson-Wheeler motion.”
The prosecutor stated as follows:
“Due to our lengthy morning I didn‘t refresh myself on the new update on the law. So when I had relayed that I didn‘t think the defense raised a prima facia case, I was applying the previous standard of law.
“With that being said, the new update does require that when such a challenge is made that the other party must state the reasons that the peremptory challenge was exercised.
“I do believe that I did relay those reasons, specifically the specific incident raised by the potential juror regarding what seemed to be a very sensitive issue that happened and based on the sense that I got it was an experience that did affect and bother her.
“Therefore, the People exercised a peremptory challenge on that basis.”
After defense counsel reiterated the same arguments made the day before, the court continued to apply the Batson-Wheeler analysis: “And so the Court – I was aware and am aware of the – there has to be a showing of reasonable inference of a systematic exclusion of a cognizable group. I didn‘t think it was there.”
“However, I am aware of case law and I – because often courts will ask for further reasoning, and I did, even though I didn‘t think there was a prima facia case.” The court concluded as follows: “I find based on everything that I saw and heard that the challenge was not based on an impermissible purpose, that it was a valid constitutional peremptory challenge.” After a jury found defendant guilty on all four counts, the trial court placed defendant on two years of formal probation.
In general, the failure to articulate an objection to a peremptory challenge forfeits the issue on appeal. (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 662.) With that understanding, the purpose of the forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. (Unzueta v. Akopyan (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 199, 215.) Such a purpose is absent when it is clear the court will not make a correction despite awareness of an error. Thus, an exception to the forfeiture rule exists where the record shows an objection would be futile. (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 793.) While the futility exception to the forfeiture rule applies only in unusual and extreme circumstances (People v. Lima (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 468, 479), we conclude such circumstances are present here.
According to the record, the People informed the trial court that the law governing peremptory challenges had been updated and, under the new law, “when such a challenge is made . . . the other party must state the reasons that the peremptory challenge was exercised.” The People were referring to the changes made by
The record further shows that the prosecutor provided no evidence to rebut the presumptively invalid reasons for exercising the peremptory challenge. The People argue that their reasons alone provide clear and convincing evidence to show the challenge was unrelated to L.‘s perceived membership in a protected group and concerned her ability to be fair and impartial. We disagree. Allowing a party to use the presumptively invalid reasons to overcome the presumption would render
Despite the lack of evidence to overcome the presumption, the trial court concluded the challenge was proper based on “the district attorney‘s statements” and its “view of everything.” This was prejudicial error, and we reverse the judgment and remand the matter for a new trial. (
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The case is remanded for a new trial.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.