People v. Uribe
878 N.W.2d 474
Mich.
2016
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BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CITY OF PONTIAC POLICE & FIRE RETIREE PREFUNDED GROUP HEALTH & INSURANCE TRUST V CITY OF PONTIAC

No. 151717

Michigan Supreme Court

April 6, 2016

309 Mich App 590

evidence that was not discovered before the first motion for relief from judgment, MCR 6.502(G)(2), and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial on the facts of this case. In light of this disposition, we decline to address the other issues presented in our order granting leave to appeal. We do not retain jurisdiction.

MCCORMACK, J., did not participate because of her prior involvement in this case as counsel for a party.

On April 6, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the March 17, 2015 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). The Court of Appeals erred in its reading of Executive Order 225 (EO 225). Contrary to the Court of Appeals conclusion, EO 225 by its plain language expresses the intent of the emergency manager to extinguish the defendant‘s 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution. Although that contribution accrued on June 30, 2012, the defendant had not yet paid the obligation when EO 225 went into effect. EO 225 clearly states that, as of August 1, 2012, the defendant no longer has an obligation “to continue to make contributions” under Article III of the Trust Agreement. It does not differentiate between already accrued, but unpaid obligations and future obligations, and thus by its terms applies to both. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the emergency manager did not intend to extinguish the defendant‘s 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution. Nonetheless, although the Court of Appeals determined that the emergency manager could retroactively extinguish the 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution through his authority under 2011 PA 14, it did not specifically address whether EO 225 was a permissible retroactive modification of the plaintiff‘s accrued right to the contribution. See . We therefore reverse that part of the Court of Appeals judgment which interprets EO 225, vacate that part of the Court of Appeals judgment which discusses the plaintiff‘s breach of contract claim, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for it to consider: (1) whether the retroactivity analysis stated in applies to EO 225; (2) if so, whether the extinguishment of the defendant‘s accrued, but unpaid, 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution by EO 225 is permissible under ; and (3) if does not apply, the appropriate method for determining whether EO 225 constitutes a permissible retroactive modification of the 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution. We do not retain jurisdiction.

PEOPLE V URIBE

No. 151899

Michigan Supreme Court

March 10, 2016

310 Mich App 467

On March 10, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the May 12, 2015 judgment of the Court of Appeals. The application is again considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals analysis of whether the Eaton Circuit Court reversibly erred by excluding the proposed MCL 768.27a evidence under MRE 403 is flawed in several central respects. Most notably, the Court of Appeals failed to duly acknowledge and consider the following legal principles, which this Court articulated in : (1) the trial court‘s evidentiary ruling is “review[ed] for an abuse of discretion,” ; (2) while MCL 768.27a prevails over MRE 404(b) as to evidence that falls within the statute‘s scope, the statute does not mandate the admission of all such evidence, but rather “the Legislature necessarily contemplated that evidence admissible under the statute need not be considered in all cases and that whether and which evidence would be considered would be a matter of judicial discretion, as guided by the [non-MRE 404(b)] rules of evidence,” including MRE 403 and the “other ordinary rules of evidence, such as those pertaining to hearsay and privilege,” ; and (3) there are “several considerations” that may properly inform a court‘s decision to exclude such evidence under MRE 403, including but not limited to “the dissimilarity between the other acts and the charged crime” and “the lack of reliability of the evidence supporting the occurrence of the other acts,” .

While we vacate the Court of Appeals judgment in full, we nonetheless reach the same result: we conclude that the proposed testimony falls within the scope of MCL 768.27a and that the trial court‘s exclusion of that evidence, when properly evaluated under MRE 403 and , amounted to an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. In ruling the proposed testimony inadmissible under MRE 403, the trial court, citing the illustrative list of “considerations” in , expressed concern regarding apparent inconsistencies between the proposed testimony and prior statements made by the witness, and certain dissimilarities between the other act and the charged offenses. The trial court, however, failed to explain—and this Court, on review of the record, fails to see—how or why these concerns were sufficient in this case to render the “probative value [of the proposed testimony] . . . substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence,” as required for exclusion under MRE 403. . The list of “considerations” in provides a tool to facilitate, not a standard to supplant, this proper MRE 403 analysis, and it remains the court‘s “responsibility” to carry out such an analysis in determining whether to exclude MCL 768.27a evidence under that rule. See . The trial court misconstrued and neglected this fundamental responsibility in its evidentiary analysis; as a result of these legal errors, the court abused its discretion by excluding the proposed testimony under MRE 403. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court‘s ruling to that effect, and we remand this case to the Eaton Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order.

Leave to Appeal Denied May 20, 2016:

In re COPE/HECT, Nos. 153511 and 153512; Court of Appeals Nos. 328536 and 328537.

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