THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. TYSHON THOMPSON, Appellant.
Docket No. 129965
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
June 26, 2025
Modified upon denial of rehearing September 22, 2025
2025 IL 129965
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Holder White, and Cunningham concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Overstreet dissented, with opinion. Justice O’Brien took no part in the decision.
¶ 1 Defendant, Tyshon Thompson, was convicted of violating
¶ 2 Defendant contends the appellate court committed reversible error when it upheld
¶ 3 Although defendant is correct that his public carriage of a handgun is presumptively protected, Bruen itself stands for the proposition that Illinois’s nondiscretionary, “shall-issue” firearm licensing regime does not violate the
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 On the evening of March 25, 2020, an altercation at a gas station in Forest Park escalated into an exchange of gunfire between two vehicles on a highway. The police pulled over one of the vehicles and found defendant in the driver’s seat and an uncased, loaded handgun inside the glove compartment. Chemical testing
¶ 6 A Cook County grand jury indicted defendant on one count of AUUW, alleging that defendant
“carried on or about his person, in any vehicle, when not on his land or in his abode, legal dwelling or fixed place of business, or on the land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an invitee with that person’s permission, a handgun, pistol or revolver, and the handgun, pistol or revolver, possessed was uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible, and he had not been issued a currently valid license under the firearm concealed carry act, at the time of the offense, in violation of [section 24-1.6 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (
720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1) ,(a)(3)(A-5) (West 2020))].”1
¶ 7 Defendant does not contest that he possessed the handgun within the vehicle while on the highway or that the handgun was uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible. Moreover, the State presented evidence at trial that, although defendant had been issued a valid FOID card at the time of the incident, he had not applied for a CCL. Defendant was convicted of AUUW and sentenced to 30 months in prison.
¶ 8 On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the text-and-history standard set forth in Bruen establishes that
¶ 9 The appellate court accepted defendant’s framing of the issue as one of open carriage, rather than concealed carriage, but the court affirmed the AUUW conviction anyway. The court concluded that Bruen “explicitly held that open carry without a license was not mandated under the second amendment.” Id. ¶ 58 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9). The appellate court stated: “Thus, the Bruen [C]ourt upheld Illinois’s laws providing for a CCL application. Nothing in Bruen suggests
¶ 10 The appellate court also concluded that defendant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the firearm licensing requirements because defendant did not submit to the challenged policy. Id. ¶ 59. The court noted that defendant did not offer any evidence that he attempted to apply for a CCL and was denied one. Id.
¶ 11 We granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Defendant renews his second amendment challenge to the AUUW statute (
¶ 15 As a threshold matter, we note that defendant, by mischaracterizing his firearm possession as open carriage, is attempting to challenge the constitutionality of a statute unrelated to his conviction. The State is correct that concealed carriage, not open carriage, is at issue because the AUUW provisions under which defendant was convicted do not implicate Illinois’s ban on open carriage.
¶ 16 Open carriage of a ready-to-use firearm is illegal in Illinois, regardless of licensure. The unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) statute, for example, requires that a firearm be “carried or possessed in accordance with the Firearm Concealed Carry Act by a person who has been issued a currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act.”
¶ 17 Defendant’s possession of the handgun in the vehicle without a valid CCL constitutes unlicensed concealed carriage and is punishable under
¶ 19 For example, a FOID card applicant must submit proof that he or she is a citizen who has not been convicted of a felony and does not suffer from narcotics addiction or mental health issues.
¶ 20 Only those who are at least 21 years old and who already possess or are applying for a FOID card may apply for a CCL.
“[t]he Department shall issue a [CCL] to an applicant *** if the person:
***
*** has a currently valid [FOID card] and at the time of application meets the requirements for the issuance of a [FOID card] and is not prohibited under the [FOID Card Act] or federal law from possessing or receiving a firearm.” (Emphasis added.)
Id. § 25(2) .
¶ 21 The application requirements of the Concealed Carry Act and the FOID Card Act are similar. For example, a CCL applicant must submit proof that he or she has not been convicted of a felony or certain other offenses.
¶ 22 The fee for a new CCL application by an Illinois resident is $150.
¶ 23 A significant difference between FOID card and CCL licensure involves firearms training. A CCL applicant must undergo at least 16 hours of firearms training and must submit a certificate of completion.
“A certificate of completion for an applicant’s firearm training course shall not be issued to a student who:
(1) does not follow the orders of the certified firearms instructor;
(2) in the judgment of the certified instructor, handles a firearm in a manner that poses a danger to the student or to others; or
(3) during the range firing portion of testing fails to hit the target with 70% of the rounds fired.”
Id. § 75(e) .
¶ 24 With this licensure framework in mind, we address whether the AUUW statute’s prohibition of unlicensed concealed carriage in public is facially unconstitutional under the
¶ 25 The United States Supreme Court explained in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008), that the phrase “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” sets out the “textual elements” of the clause that “guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” Heller interpreted the
¶ 26 The
¶ 28 The New York regime made it a crime to possess a firearm without a license, whether inside or outside the home. But an individual who wished to carry a firearm outside the home could obtain an unrestricted license to ” ‘have and carry’ ” a concealed ” ‘pistol or revolver’ ” by proving that ” ‘proper cause exist[ed]’ ” for doing so. Id. at 12 (quoting
¶ 29 The Bruen Court described New York’s firearm licensing regulations as a ” ‘may issue’ ” regime that granted the government discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need or suitability. Id. at 13-14. In addition to New York, five states and the District of Columbia had “may issue” regimes that required citizens to show ” ‘proper cause’ ” to carry a handgun in public for self-protection. Id. at 15.
¶ 30 In contrast to “may issue” jurisdictions, 43 other states had what the Court described as ” ‘shall issue’ ” licensing regimes “where authorities must issue concealed-carry licenses whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements, without granting licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need or suitability.” Id. at 13. The Court accurately identified Illinois’s Concealed Carry Act as a “shall issue” licensing statute. Id. at 13 n.1.
“When the
Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside thesecond amendment’s unqualified command.” (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 24.
¶ 32 Thus, the text-and-history standard—adopted in Heller and clarified in Bruen—requires courts faced with
¶ 33 The Bruen Court held that the
¶ 34 The Bruen Court determined that none of the cited historical evidence established a tradition of broadly prohibiting the public carriage of commonly used firearms for self-defense as did New York’s proper-cause requirement. Id. at 38-39. The Court explained that it was “not obliged to sift the historical materials for evidence to sustain” the challenged law, because that is the government’s burden. Id. at 60.
¶ 35 Bruen teaches that courts are not tasked with addressing historical questions in the abstract. Instead, courts resolve the “legal questions presented in particular cases or controversies.” Id. at 25 n.6. This legal inquiry is ” ‘a refined subset’ ” of a broader historical inquiry based on evidentiary principles and default rules to resolve uncertainties, such as the principle of party presentation, which entitles the courts to decide a case based on the historical record compiled by the parties. Id. (quoting William Baude & Stephen Sachs, Originalism and the Law of the Past, 37 L. & Hist. Rev. 809, 810 (2019)).
¶ 36 The Bruen Court undertook what it described as a “long journey through the Anglo-American history of public carry” to reach its conclusion that the government failed to prove that New York’s proper-cause requirement was consistent with the second and
¶ 37 Defendant cites Bruen for the proposition that the appellate court committed reversible error by omitting from its analysis any discussion of the constitutional text and regulatory history of shall-issue licensing regimes. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has repeated that courts must apply Heller’s text-and-history standard to
¶ 38 Defendant correctly observes that the Bruen Court undertook extensive analysis of the cited historical precursors as they related to New York’s may-issue regime, without undertaking the same analysis for shall-issue regimes. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38-71. However, the Bruen Court went out of its way to address the precise issue presented in this appeal: whether shall-issue firearm licensing regimes, like those set forth in Illinois’s Concealed Carry Act and FOID Card Act, comport with the
¶ 39 The foundation of Bruen’s holding is the difference between the proper-cause requirements in may-issue licensing regimes and the objective requirements in shall-issue licensing regimes. Licensing decisions in shall-issue states, like Illinois, turn on objective criteria, not on a licensing official’s subjective opinion or an applicant’s showing of some additional need for self-defense. The Bruen Court expressly declared shall-issue licensing regimes facially constitutional under the
“To be clear, nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of the 43 States’ ‘shall-issue’ licensing regimes, under which ‘a general desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a [permit].’ [Citation.] Because these licensing regimes do not require applicants to show
an atypical need for armed self-defense, they do not necessarily prevent ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ from exercising their Second Amendment right to public carry. [Citation.] Rather, it appears that these shall-issue regimes, which often require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms safety course, are designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’ Ibid. And they likewise appear to contain only ‘narrow, objective, and definite standards’ guiding licensing officials [citation], rather than requiring the ‘appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion’ [citation]—features that typify proper-cause standards like New York’s. That said, because any permitting scheme can be put toward abusive ends, we do not rule out constitutional challenges to shall-issue regimes where, for example, lengthy wait times in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary citizens their right to public carry.” Id. at 38 n.9.
¶ 40 Defendant attempts to diminish the significance of the above-quoted language because it appears in a footnote. However, “the location, whether in the text or in a footnote, of something which the writer of an opinion thinks should be said, is a matter of style which must be left to the writer.” Phillips v. Osborne, 444 F.2d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1971).
¶ 41 Moreover, in case there was any doubt about the Court’s view of the constitutional validity of shall-issue licensing regimes, Justice Kavanaugh reinforced the majority opinion by elucidating the crucial difference between proper-cause and shall-issue regulations:
“First, the Court’s decision does not prohibit States from imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for self-defense. In particular, the Court’s decision does not affect the existing licensing regimes—known as ‘shall-issue’ regimes—that are employed in 43 States.
The Court’s decision addresses only the unusual discretionary licensing regimes, known as ‘may-issue’ regimes, that are employed by 6 States including New York. As the Court explains, New York’s outlier may-issue regime is constitutionally problematic because it grants open-ended discretion to licensing officials and authorizes licenses only for those applicants who can show some special need apart from self-defense. Those features of New York’s
regime—the unchanneled discretion for licensing officials and the special-need requirement—in effect deny the right to carry handguns for self-defense to many ‘ordinary, law-abiding citizens.’ [Citations.] The Court has held that ‘individual self-defense is “the central component” of the Second Amendment right.’ [Citation.] New York’s law is inconsistent with the Second Amendment right to possess and carry handguns for self-defense. By contrast, 43 States employ objective shall-issue licensing regimes. Those shall-issue regimes may require a license applicant to undergo fingerprinting, a background check, a mental health records check, and training in firearms handling and in laws regarding the use of force, among other possible requirements. [Citation.] Unlike New York’s may-issue regime, those shall-issue regimes do not grant open-ended discretion to licensing officials and do not require a showing of some special need apart from self-defense. As petitioners acknowledge, shall-issue licensing regimes are constitutionally permissible, subject of course to an as-applied challenge if a shall-issue licensing regime does not operate in that manner in practice. [Citation.]
Going forward, therefore, the 43 States that employ objective shall-issue licensing regimes for carrying handguns for self-defense may continue to do so. Likewise, the 6 States including New York potentially affected by today’s decision may continue to require licenses for carrying handguns for self-defense so long as those States employ objective licensing requirements like those used by the 43 shall-issue States.” (Emphases omitted.) Bruen, 597 U.S. at 79-80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.).
¶ 42 Thus, the United States Supreme Court expressly held in Bruen that shall-issue firearm licensing regimes, like the one enacted in Illinois, comport with the
¶ 43 Consistent with Bruen, we hold that, when the
¶ 44 Here, defendant’s possession of a ready-to-use firearm in his vehicle constitutes public concealed carriage, which is presumptively protected under Bruen. See People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 21 (
¶ 45 Defendant seeks reversal based on the appellate court’s failure to undertake the text-and-history analysis, arguing that Bruen’s invalidation of may-issue licensure is simply not relevant to shall-issue licensure. However, Bruen itself demonstrates that applying the text-and-history standard to Illinois’s shall-issue regime is unnecessary. Specifically, Bruen advises that the constitutional defects of a may-issue regime can be cured by stripping the statute of its problematic features, which are what distinguish may-issue regimes from shall-issue regimes in the first place. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 80 (states affected by the Bruen decision may continue to require licenses for carrying handguns for self-defense so long as the states employ objective licensing requirements). Defendant’s ultimate argument is that Illinois’s shall-issue regime is unconstitutional. But one cannot reconcile his position with Bruen’s pronouncement that a may-issue regime will pass constitutional muster if it is amended to operate like a shall-issue regime. For the reasons expressed in Bruen, Illinois’s shall-issue regime does not violate the
¶ 46 We note that our interpretation of Bruen is consistent with appellate court decisions that have cited footnote 9 correctly for the proposition that Illinois’s shall-
¶ 47 We also distinguish this decision from Atkinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1018 (7th Cir. 2023), where the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reached a different result on a similar issue. Atkinson involved a
¶ 48 Defendant alternatively argues that Illinois’s firearm licensure is not really a shall-issue regime at all, because the Concealed Carry Act gives the government too much discretion to deny applications. First, he contends the firearms training requirement for a CCL allows the government to deny licensure by arbitrarily withholding a certificate of completion. However, defendant concedes that the Concealed Carry Act provides an “objective description of the required training” and provides that instructors “shall” issue certificates when the required training
¶ 49 Second, defendant contends the regime is impermissibly discretionary because any law enforcement agency may object to a CCL application based on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant is a danger to himself or herself or others, or a threat to public safety.
¶ 50 Third, defendant asserts
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 53 When the
¶ 54 Judgments affirmed.
¶ 55 JUSTICE OVERSTREET, dissenting:
¶ 56 I respectfully disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion that, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 38 n.9 (2022), the United States Supreme Court “expressly” held that shall-issue firearm licensing regimes, like Illinois’s firearm licensing requirements, pass constitutional muster under
¶ 58 The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, concluding that Illinois’s firearm licensing scheme is permissible under the second amendment standards set out in Bruen. Specifically, the appellate court interpreted footnote 9 of the Bruen decision as explicitly upholding Illinois’s Concealed Carry Act under second amendment standards. 2023 IL App (1st) 220429-U, ¶ 58. The majority agrees with this interpretation of Bruen’s footnote 9. However, I dissent from the majority’s opinion because I believe the majority has reached an incorrect and unsupported conclusion with respect to the significance of footnote 9 in Bruen. My interpretation of Bruen is founded in the elementary principle that, when our country’s highest court issues crucial, landmark rulings that define the basic meaning of our Bill of Rights, it does so with clear, direct, and express language, not with hints or indirect suggestions hidden in a vague footnote in a case where the issue was not raised. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 n.25 (2008) (“It is inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill of Rights upon such a footnoted dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was not argued.“). Accordingly, I believe the majority has resolved defendant’s constitutional challenge in this appeal by reading a holding into Bruen’s footnote 9 that simply does not exist.
¶ 60 The
¶ 61 The
¶ 62 Applying the
¶ 63 In Heller, the United States Supreme Court made its first effort to reconcile modern firearm regulations with the right embodied within the language of the second amendment. To guide lower courts facing second amendment challenges to modern firearm regulations, the Heller Court defined specific considerations the courts must consider when addressing the scope of the second amendment in light
¶ 64 Following Heller, many lower courts incorrectly applied Heller’s text-and-history standard by including means-end scrutiny in their
¶ 65 The Bruen Court’s occasion to expand on its discussion of this text-and-history standard arose in the context of a constitutional challenge by two citizens to New York’s firearm licensing regulations, called the “Sullivan Law” (1911 N.Y. Laws 442), which regulated law-abiding citizens’ ability to carry firearms in public. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 11-12. As noted by the majority in the present case (see supra ¶ 29), the Court identified New York’s licensing statute as a “may issue” scheme that granted government authorities discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived need or suitability. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 13-15. At the time, New York, five other states, and the District of Columbia had “may issue” licensing schemes that required citizens to show “proper cause” to be able to carry a handgun in public for self-protection. Id.
¶ 66 To draw a contrast between New York’s firearm licensing regulations that were at issue in Bruen against some of the other states’ approach to firearm licensing,
¶ 67 Under New York’s licensing scheme at issue in Bruen, an individual who wanted to carry a firearm outside his or her home could obtain an unrestricted license to ” ‘have and carry’ ” a concealed handgun only if that individual could prove that ” ‘proper cause exist[ed]’ ” for doing so (id. at 12) (quoting
¶ 68 The Bruen Court emphasized, expressly and in no uncertain terms, that when courts are faced with this constitutional question, the courts must apply the text-and-history analysis established in Heller. Id. at 24 (When the second amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, “[t]he government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” (Emphasis added.)). The Bruen Court expressly stated that it is only after the government meets its burden under the text-and-history test “may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the
¶ 69 In Bruen, the Court explicitly demonstrated how the text-and-history standard applies by undertaking this analysis to determine the constitutionality of New York’s licensing regulations. The Court first applied the text prong of the standard and concluded that the
¶ 70 In an effort to meet their burden with respect to the historical prong of this standard, the government respondents in Bruen directed the Court to consider an extensive array of historical precedents that spanned five different time periods, from medieval times to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Id. The Court, however, after an exhaustive analysis of the cited precedents, found that none of the cited historical precedents offered by the respondents were sufficiently analogous to justify New York’s regulations, which denied citizens the right to publicly carry a firearm without a showing of proper cause. Id. at 38-39, 70.
¶ 71 To reach this conclusion, the Bruen Court undertook a comprehensive analysis of the cited historical precursors in light of New York’s regulatory scheme. Id. at 38-71. The Court did not expressly consider any of this widespread historical evidence to determine the constitutionality of any other, alternative firearm licensing scheme. It applied the mandatory text-and-history test only to determine the constitutionality of New York’s requirement that citizens show a special need to obtain a license to publicly carry a firearm for self-defense.
¶ 72 To complete its analysis, the Bruen Court undertook a “long journey through the Anglo-American history of public carry,” reaching the conclusion that the Bruen respondents failed to meet their burden to show that New York’s proper-cause regime met constitutional muster under the second and
¶ 73 Approximately two years after Bruen, in Rahimi, the Court again addressed a
¶ 74 At the outset of its analysis, the Rahimi Court again reminded lower courts that they are directed to examine ” ‘constitutional text and history’ ” (id. at 691 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 22)) and consider our ” ‘historical tradition of firearm regulation’ ” to determine the contours of the
¶ 75 After conducting the text-and-history analysis established in Heller and as made further explicit in Bruen, the Rahimi Court concluded that the federal statute that prohibits possession of handguns by citizens subject to domestic violence restraining orders is constitutional under the
¶ 76 Importantly, for purposes of interpreting footnote 9 in the Bruen decision, the Rahimi Court did not short-circuit the text-and-history analysis merely because the end result of the analysis was consistent with “what common sense suggests.” Id. at 698. Instead, the Rahimi Court required the government to meet its burden under the historical prong of the test. The Court analyzed the government’s historical evidence, concluding that the government presented “ample” evidence that the
¶ 77 Bruen and Rahimi unequivocally illustrate how the Supreme Court’s mandated text-and-history inquiry, established in Heller, applies when parties raise second
¶ 78 Here, contrary to what Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi plainly require, the majority has bypassed all textual and historical considerations in relation to Illinois’s firearm regulations by suggesting that Bruen’s footnote 9 embodies a holding that directly contradicts what Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi expressly state is required. However, nowhere in Heller, Bruen, or Rahimi does the Court analyze any aspect of Illinois’s Concealed Carry Act or any other states’ “shall issue” licensing statute under the text-and-history standard, and the Court offers no express language whatsoever stating that second amendment challenges to shall-issue licensing schemes are exempt from consideration of textual and historical issues. Instead, each time the Court has addressed a
¶ 79 Nothing in any of the Court’s discussion of the text-and-history standard in Bruen leads to the conclusion that a majority of the Court has, sua sponte, completed this required comprehensive analysis with respect to shall-issue licensing regimes, with no post-Heller appeal before the Court raising a challenge to those licensing regimes. To reach this conclusion, one has to surmise that, at some point after Heller was decided, a majority of the Court conducted a nonpublic text-and-history analysis of shall-issue licensing, relieving the government of any burden of establishing that shall-issue regulations comport with our country’s historical regulation of firearms and reaching the conclusion that shall-issue regimes are supported by some unnamed historical precursors. Moreover, in order
¶ 80 Absent the above described absurd speculation, the obvious conclusion is that a majority of the Court has not conducted this required text-and-history analysis. The Court has not canvassed any historical record furnished by the government to determine if requiring any license, even one with objective criteria, has analogues in American history, and the Bruen Court went to great lengths to emphasize that this was the required inquiry before a court can conclude that any firearm regulations comply with our constitution’s second amendment.7
¶ 81 Considering context, the Bruen Court inserted footnote 9 into its decision after the Court elaborated on Heller’s text-and-history analysis and just before the Court explained that applying these principles to New York’s proper-cause requirement for public carry of a firearm revealed that New York’s statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 38-39 (majority opinion). In this context, it becomes apparent that the Court added footnote 9 for the sole purpose of emphasizing that its analysis of New York’s licensing regime was not applicable to other states’ shall-issue licensing regimes because New York’s statute was distinguishable. See id. at 38 n.9. Therefore, the only conclusion that can be reached from the content and context of footnote 9 is that the text-and-history analysis of “shall issue” licensing statutes will be different than the analysis set out in Bruen and that Bruen should not be interpreted as invalidating shall-issue gun licensing regulations that were not considered in that case. Nothing more can be gleaned from footnote 9.
¶ 82 The language of the footnote itself bears this out.8 Footnote 9 begins with a citation of Justice Hardiman’s dissent in Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 442 (3d Cir.
¶ 83 Next in footnote 9, the Court cited Heller for the proposition that “shall-issue” licensing regimes do not require applicants to show an atypical need for armed self-defense and, therefore, do not necessarily prevent law-abiding, responsible citizens from exercising their second amendment right to public carry. Bruen, 597 U.S. at
¶ 84 With respect to the remaining cases the Court cited in footnote 9, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), they do not address second amendment challenges under any standard, much less the required text-and-history standard. At most, these cases are cited in the footnote as principles that the courts may need to consider when faced with a second amendment challenge to shall-issue licensing schemes; they are not cited as justification for bypassing the text-and-history analysis that the Court went to great lengths to set out in detail in the body of the opinion along with repeated mandatory directives that the test must be used.
¶ 85 In concluding that footnote 9 in Bruen “expressly held” that Illinois’s shall-issue licensing scheme complies with the
¶ 86 Furthermore, Justice Alito stated in his concurrence that Bruen “decides nothing about who may lawfully possess a firearm or the requirements that must be met to buy a gun.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 72 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito’s clarification is equally true concerning the scope of the
¶ 87 Accordingly, I agree with defendant that the appellate court below erred in disregarding the textual and historical analysis. Because the appellate court did not properly conduct this analysis, I believe this court should vacate the appellate court’s decision and remand this case to the appellate court with directions that it consider defendant’s second amendment challenge by applying the textual and historical analysis mandated by our Supreme Court in Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi for analyzing second amendment challenges to modern firearms regulations. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 88 JUSTICE O’BRIEN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.