People v. Thompson

(No. 109033. ILLINOIS,

THE PEOPLE THE STATE OF Appel- OF lant, THOMPSON, Appellee. ANGELO

Opinion October filed General, of and Attorney Springfield, Lisa Madigan, (James E. Alvarez, Chicago State’s Attorney, Anita J. Murphy, Spellberg Robin Alan Fitzgerald, Reilly, Eve Fischer, Attorneys, Peter D. Assistant State’s counsel), the People. for Defender, Pelletier, Patri- Appellate

Michael J. State Penick, Unsinn, Defender, and Elena B. As- Deputy cia Defender, of the Office of State Appellate sistant Defender, for Appellate Chicago, appellee. judgment KILBRIDE delivered the

JUSTICE court, with opinion. Thomas, Justice and Justices Gar- Fitzgerald

Chief man, in the judgment and Karmeier concurred opinion. dissented, joined by

Justice Burke with opinion, Justice Freeman.

OPINION Angelo ag Defendant was convicted of Thompson (720 gravated weapon unlawful use of a ILCS 5/24— 6(a) (West 2004)) year I. and sentenced to one in prison. The appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction based on the trial Supreme court’s violation of Court 431(b). Official Reports (April Advance Sheet No. 8 11, 2007), R. May eff. 2007. allowed the

We State’s for leave to petition appeal (210 315(a)). 111.2d R. hold that court erred in reversing defendant’s conviction based on a Supreme violation of Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court’s and affirm the judgment judgment of the circuit court.

I. BACKGROUND Defendant was charged aggravated with six counts of unlawful use of a A was selected on weapon. May At time, Court Rule the trial court to ask each potential juror whether he understood and accepted defendant was presumed innocent of the the State had the charge, doubt, proving burden of him a reasonable guilty beyond evidence, and required present any defendant was not against his decision could not be held testifying Advance Sheet Reports (April him. Official No. selection, 2007), May During R. eff. as a prospective jurors group the trial court informed the that: law, presumed to be innocent

“Under the charge against presumption of the him. This remains with every during your throughout stage him of the trial and it is not overcome unless deliberations on a verdict and evidence, you’re beyond a reason- from all the convinced has the guilty. [The] able doubt the defendant is State beyond the defendant a proving guilt burden of the of on State [the] reasonable doubt. This burden remains required prove not throughout the case. Defendant is innocence, any required present nor is he evidence his behalf, in- simply rely presumption own on his on his nocence.” the individu- prospective jurors

The trial court asked if of the defendant would ally charge against the nature The court ability impartial. affect their to be fair they whether understood individually then asked them doubt and the beyond a reasonable concept proof any The court did not ask presumption of innocence. those they accepted prospective jurors however, court, asked each of The trial principles. follows: at the substantially “[i]f as prospective jurors had its proven end of all the evidence felt the State you doubt, any have you a reasonable would beyond case “[i]f, on other guilty a verdict” problem signing beyond the case hand, felt had not you they proven doubt, any problem signing have you reasonable would guilty not verdict.” any prospective court did not ask

The trial defendant was they accepted if understood evidence, one of but instructed any to offer not innocence, presumption “[u]nder them that The court any evidence.” present defense need not jurors individually further asked the prospective would be affected if ability impartial their to be fair and testify. defendant chose not to attorney any objections Defendant’s did not make dire, voir but asked one of the during prospective right whether he understood that defendant had a not to could not be held testify against testifying and the choice against prospective juror responded the defendant. The that he understood and accepted principle. at trial

Following jury, testimony selection of the established that officers Rosas Chicago police Antonio and Roman were on a marked patrol driving Zawada police January 13, They truck on to an responded emergency call at 9:19 approximately p.m. they When ar- rived, the men standing officers observed three outside a two-flat residential building. standing Defendant was on stairs and the him porch recognized officers as a person wanted for detec- questioning by Chicago police tives. The officers exited the truck and announced their office. Defendant began running toward the front door of the residence. Officer Rosas followed defendant while Of- ficer Zawada detained one of the other men outside the residence.

As Officer Rosas entered the vestibule of the resi- dence, he observed defendant remove a black steel- handgun handled from his and it waistband toss to the floor. Rosas testified he observed defendant from the back and right saw defendant’s hand toward his reaching waistband before handgun. defendant threw the Officer Rosas testified he clearly gun saw defendant’s hand and was within 10 feet of defendant when he tossed gun.

Rosas forced defendant and wall detained Kovacs, him. He then observed John was Officer who unit, part assisting handgun of an retrieve the from the floor. Officer Kovacs unloaded the it handgun placed in his waistband. handgun

Officer Rosas testified that was not registered, cased or defendant did not have a firearm identification, owner’s identification military card that he lived at a different address reported cross-examination, than where the arrest occurred. On he he handgun Rosas testified that did not see a when first observed defendant. Rosas also stated that he did part not see where the was concealed in the front gun pulled defendant’s waistband or where defendant gun from. arrived,

Officer Kovacs testified that when he he chasing subject Officer Rosas into the observed residence. Kovacs ran inside the residence and saw Rosas defendant the wall. Rosas directed Ko- holding against located gun gun vacs to from the floor. The was pick up the handgun about two feet from Rosas. Kovacs recovered the Kovacs weapon. and unloaded nine live rounds from in people during testified there were no the vestibule defendant, and the these events other than Rosas and lighting. area was lit with artificial Defendant did not witnesses in testify present any his defense. After the trial court closing arguments, jury, pertinent part, instructed the in that: charge presumed “The defendant is to be innocent of through- him presumption him. This remains with every stage during your the trial and deliberations out of verdict, unless from all the on the and is not overcome case, you beyond in are a reason- evidence this convinced guilty. able doubt that he is proving guilt of the The State has the burden doubt, beyond and this burden defendant a reasonable throughout the case. The defendant remains on the State innocence. The fact that the prove is not to his by you in testify not be considered defendant did not must any way arriving your in at verdict.” unlaw- guilty aggravated The found defendant for a new filed a motion weapon. ful use of a Defendant trial court claim that any trial but did not include 431(b). The Rule failed to with Court comply Supreme sentenced him denied defendant’s motion and trial court year prison. to one must be argued defendant his conviction appeal,

On comply reversed because the trial court failed 431(b). Rule The court noted that appellate at object alleged did not to the violation it in motion but determined posttrial trial or include his subject error was review. alleged plain-error court concluded that the trial court com- appellate by failing comply mitted reversible error with Rule court reversed defen- Accordingly, dant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. No. (unpublished Supreme 1—07—2891 order under 23).

II. ANALYSIS court, On appeal to this the State contends that a violation Court Rule is not structural requiring error automatic reversal. The State asserts this although court’s decision v. Glasper, (2009), 234 Ill. 2d 173 addressed a previous version of reasoning applies that case also to the amended rule appeal. involved accordance with Glasper, failure to with the amended rule is not per se reversible error. The State also contends that defendant forfeited his claim of error and it is not review able under either prong plain-error Finally, rule. the State contends that the trial court’s questioning complied substantially requirements with the responds

Defendant that the trial court’s questioning fell far short of requirements the Rule and a bright-line rule of reversal should failure apply for to comply with the rule. defendant contends Alternatively, that the violation of amended Rule is reversible under the second prong plain-error review because it

606 challenged

affected the fairness of the trial and judicial argues of the Defendant further integrity process. judge’s rule should be relaxed because “a the forfeiture trial conduct was at issue” and he is entitled to new not harmless a reasonable beyond because the error was doubt. must first arguments, we addressing parties’

determine whether the trial court violated 431(b). This issue involves construction Court Rule of this court’s rules is interpretation the rule. The to the principles applicable controlled the same Santiago, v. 2d People construction of statutes. 236 Ill. (2010). 417, give Our is to ascertain and ef objective 428 Santiago, 2d at 428. to the drafters’ intent. 236 111. fect rule, language The best indication of intent is the Marker, v. meaning. People given plain ordinary its (2009). 158, language 165 the rule’s When as written applied it will be unambiguous, clear and Camp v. People aids of construction. without resort to (2006). bell, 80, interpretation The proper de novo. of our court rules is reviewed supreme Suarez, 37, 41-42 Ill. 2d amended, provides: as juror, individually or potential “The court shall ask each juror accepts that understands and group, in a (1) in- presumed defendant is following principles: that the (2) her; before him or charge(s) against nocent of the prove the can be convicted the State must a defendant (3) doubt; beyond that the guilty defendant a reasonable any his or offer evidence on defendant is not to (4) behalf; defendant’s failure to her own her; however, no testify against him or cannot be held into the juror shall be made prospective of a inquiry objects. testify when the defendant’s failure juror each inquiry provide shall The court’s method of concerning specific questions opportunity respond Reports Official set out in this section.” principles 2007), 431(b), May R. eff. (April Advance Sheet No. 431(b) unambigu clear and The language ask” that the trial court “shall ous. The rule states accept understand and they whether potential jurors prospective jurors may principles. enumerated While in a the method of individually group, be questioned juror opportunity must each an inquiry “provide 431(b)] specific questions concerning [Rule respond emphasize The committee comments principles.” may give trial courts not “a broad statement simply by question applicable general law followed to follow the law.” 177 concerning juror’s willingness Ill. 2d R. Committee Comments. 431(b), therefore, specific question

Rule mandates a process. The trial court must ask each response potential juror whether he or she understands and ac- each of the The cepts principles the rule.

may performed individually be either or in a but group, the rule requires opportunity for a from each response prospective on their juror understanding acceptance principles. those case,

In this the trial court failed to comply with 431(b) in respects. several Most notably, trial court did not question any on the prospective third principle, understood and they accepted that defendant was not required produce any evidence on his own behalf. requires trial courts to address each of the enumerated principles. failure to itself, address the third constitutes noncom- principle, pliance with the rule. while the trial court Additionally, asked the if prospective jurors they understood the innocence, did presumption the court not ask whether they accepted principle. requires question- The rule ing on whether the understand and potential jurors both Therefore, each of the enumerated we accept principles. necessarily conclude that the trial court violated Rule

The parties arguments impact raise several on the the Rule violation this case.

A. Structural Error The State first contends that a violation of 431(b) requiring Court Rule is not a structural error automatic reversal. The on our argument State’s focuses Glasper. recent decision in

In court of a Glasper, this considered effect trial comply preamended court’s failure to with the version of pre 234 Ill. 2d at 188-89. The Glasper, amended rule began phrase, “[i]f version rule, therefore, the defendant.” The requested if required questioning only requested by the defendant. introductory The amendment to the rule eliminated that phrase. the trial court refused the defendant’s Glasper,

request principle for on the fourth understood and prospective jurors testify that the defendant’s failure to could not accepted him. 234 Ill. 2d at 189. This Glasper, be held that under the version of the preamended court noted rule, question prospec the trial court was required tive in accordance with Rule once a 234 Ill. 2d at 189. request. Glasper, defendant made 431(b)(4) by refusing The trial court violated Rule clearly 2d at 189. the defendant’s 234 Ill. request. Glasper, issue, trial court’s therefore, The became whether the automatic required failure to with Rule Glasper, reversal of the defendant’s conviction. reversal 2d at 189. This court noted that automatic deemed “structural.” only when an error is Illinois, 197, v. 556 quoting 234 Ill. 2d at Rivera Glasper, 1446, 320, 330-31, 148, 160, 129 S. Ct. U.S. 173 L. Ed. 2d (2009). systemic, serving are 1455 Structural errors “ and under integrity judicial process ‘erode the ” Glasper, trial.’ 234 mine the fairness of the defendant’s

609 Herron, 197-98, v. quoting People Ill. 2d at 1, (2005); Rivera, Ill. 2d 19-20 167, 186 v. 227 (2007). only as structural typically designated An error is fundamentally trial necessarily if it renders criminal in determining guilt means of unfair or an unreliable 196, Rivera, 234 Ill. 2d at 556 Glasper, quoting nocence. 330-31, 160, at 173 L. Ed. 2d at 129 S. Ct. at 1455. U.S. has an error as recognized in a limited class of cases. very Glasper, structural 198, States, 234 Ill. 2d at Neder v. United 527 quoting 1827, 1, 8, 35, 46, U.S. 144 L. Ed. 2d 119 S. Ct. States, 461, 468-69, (1999); Johnson v. United 520 U.S. 718, 728, 137 L. Ed. 2d S. Ct. 1549-50 counsel, Those cases include a denial of trial complete before a judge, biased racial discrimination in the selec trial, tion a grand jury, denial of at self-representation trial, denial of public and a defective reasonable doubt Recuenco, Washington instruction. 548 U.S. n.2, n.2, 165 L. Ed. 2d 126 474 S. Ct. 2551 n.2 we observed that the trial Glasper, court’s failure 431(b)(4) to with Rule did comply not involve a funda mental or a right protection. constitutional Glasper, Rather, Ill. 2d at 193. only the error involved a violation of this court’s rules. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 193. A viola tion supreme of a court rule does not require reversal in every instance and applied this court has harmless-error review to violations of our Glasper, rules. 234 Ill. 2d at 193.

While Rule was intended to ensure a fair help and impartial jury, questioning under the rule could not be considered to a fair indispensable Glasper, trial. Ill. 2d at 196. This inherent in the point language was rule if preamended mandating questioning only at requested by Glasper, defendant. language rule, Given the of the we concluded history 431(b) did that the trial court’s violation of Rule not rise Glasper, to the level of structural error. 234 Ill. 2d at 199-200. Glasper acknowledge

We that our decision was based, at least in on the part, permissive language 431(b). Glasper, See 234 Ill. 2d at 200. preamended our was limited to that ver emphasized holding that sion of rule re requiring questioning when Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 200. quested by defendant. Nonetheless, our discussion on part the crucial structural error also to the amended Rule applies comply The essential is that a trial court’s failure to point with Rule does not result in a biased automatically of whether that is manda jury, regardless Glasper; tory under our rule. As we held permissive “If the facts in this case demonstrated that the trial court’s with Rule question failure to 431(b)(4) the venire accordance before a biased being resulted in defendant tried jury, we would not hesitate to reverse defendant’s convic tion, jury constitute as a trial before a biased would However, there are no such facts in the structural error. reject the idea that the trial court’s failure instant case. We 431(b)(4) questioning makes it inevitable to conduct Rule biased, when the record jury particularly that was jurors in this case were before us demonstrates against forming and instructed both admonished based on his decision adverse inference presume us to testify. require not to To do so would the law and the instruc ignore citizens sworn as contrary to our given them. This notion is tions opposite pre us to make the precedent which instructs Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 200-01. sumption.” Glasper applies equally That statement from the trial court’s failure involving case is jury trial before a biased amended Rule While reversal, failure to to automatic subject structural error 431(b) result in a necessarily does not with Rule 431(b) simply way is one Rule jury. biased Glasper, impartial jury. helping See ensure a fair and Despite trial court’s failure to 2d at 195-96. 234 Ill. comply 431(b) case, there is no evidence with Rule jury. also note that defendant was tried a biased 431(b) of the Rule that the trial court did address some requirements Glasper, and, as in in its voir dire 431(b)principles. was admonished and instructed on Rule important, Although compliance necessarily a trial rule does not render violation of the fundamentally determining guilt unfair or unreliable the trial court’s violation or innocence. We conclude that of the amended version category very fall within the limited

this case does not require and, thus, structural errors does not automatic of defendant’s conviction. reversal

B. Forfeiture parties arguments applying also raise alternative plain-error and harmless-error review to this case. When issue, a defendant has forfeited review of an reviewing only plain court will consider error. McLaurin, v. Harmless-error analysis preserved is conducted when a defendant has ap McLaurin, issue for review. plication 235 Ill. 2d at 495. The plain-error review, or harmless-error there depends fore, on whether defendant has forfeited review of the issue.

The State contends that defendant’s claim is forfeited and there is no reason to excusethe forfeiture. Defendant forfeited, concedes his claim is but asks this court to judge’s relax the forfeiture rule conduct was “because recognized impracticality at issue” and this court has party objecting judge’s questions aof to a trial or com- ments. preserve review, both

To a claim for a defendant must object alleged at trial and error in a written include the posttrial People Enoch, motion.

612

(1988). Here, trial court’s object defendant did not to the 431(b) failure to with Rule or include that issue in that posttrial Accordingly, agree his motion. we has claim. defendant forfeited review his relaxing of his on the forfeiture support argument rule, defendant raises what this court has termed the “Sprinkle that under recently explained doctrine.” We doctrine, Sprinkle may the forfeiture rule be relaxed when a trial his or her in the judge oversteps authority effectively or when counsel has been presence jury “ from because it would have ‘fallen prevented objecting ” Hanson, People v. 74, 118 on deaf ears.’ McLaurin, 235 (2010), 2d at 488. The failure quoting Ill. the Sprinkle an error will be excused under preserve circumstances, however, extraordinary doctrine remarks to a judge inappropriate such as when a makes commentary or relies on social instead of evidence McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at imposing a death sentence. v. 296, citing People Woolley, 488, 205 Ill. 2d 301-02 (2001). Lameron, v. People (2002); 171 the forfei importance applying have stressed the We situations compelling ture rule uniformly except failure to raise a claim denies the trial properly because an error or a new opportunity grant court an to correct McLaurin, trial, resources. wasting judicial thus time Ill. 2d at 488. case, that the trial court In this there is no indication objection have to the Rule ignored would have the trial court would presume questioning. mandatory language with the complied out at trial. pointed had the error been trial court Moreover, argue does not A simple in the authority jury’s presence. its overstepped trial court to correct would have allowed the objection there voir dire. we conclude during Accordingly, the error rule in reason to relax the forfeiture compelling is no case. Error C. Plain bypasses plain-error normal forfeiture rule reviewing principles court to consider un and allows a preserved specific of error in circumstances. claims apply plain- Ill. 2d 18 Wewill Averett, when: error doctrine

“(1) error occurred and the evidence is a clear or obvious tip closely so balanced that the error alone threatened defendant, justice regardless the scales of (2) error, the seriousness of the a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected challenged trial and the fairness of the defendant’s integrity judicial regardless of the of the closeness process, Piatkowski, 551, People the v. 225 Ill. 2d of evidence.” (2007). step plain-error determining The first of review is any error occurred. 232 Ill. 2d Walker, People v. (2009). already 113, 124-25 have concluded that the 431(b). violating Supreme trial erred in court Court Rule plain-error persuasion review, In the burden of rests with the defendant. 235 Ill. 2d at 495. McLaurin, argue plain Defendant does not under error the first prong, requiring finding closely a that the evidence is so guilty may balanced that the verdict have resulted from Rather, the error. defendant contends that the violation 431(b) infringed right impartial jury, his to an affecting challenging thus the of fairness his trial integrity judicial process. therefore, Defendant, the of the prong contends the error the is reversible under second plain-error of review. prong plain-error review,

Under the second of “[prejudice presumed to the defendant is because of the importance right involved, of the of the ‘regardless ” strength (Emphasis original.) of the evidence.’ Her quoting 215 Ill. 2d at ron, Blue, equated this court the second Glasper, prong plain-error error, assert review with structural ing only required that “automatic reversal is where an i.e., ‘structural,’ systemic

error is deemed error which ‘erode integrity judicial process serves to of the ” undermine the fairness the defendant’s trial.’ Herron, Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 197-98, quoting at 186.

A that defendant was tried a biased finding jury second certainly satisfy prong plain-error would right review because it would affect his to a fair trial and challenge integrity judicial process. Critically, however, presented any defendant has not evidence that has the jury was biased in this case. Defendant cannot persuasion presume burden of on this issue. We erred simply was biased because the trial court 431(b) in conducting questioning. the Rule Glasper was holding Defendant maintains our based in on the large part permissive language pre- rule amended Rule Unlike the preamended requiring request, the defendant’s questioning upon duty the amended rule on trial courts imposes aby criminal case tried perform every the amendment to Rule jury. argues Defendant as compliance this court now views signifies to a fair trial. indispensable not indicate that amendment to Rule does

Our rule now to a fair indispensable with the is compliance failure to conduct Rule trial. As we have the explained, 431(b) necessarily does not result a biased questioning is manda questioning of whether that jury, regardless the amend Although under our rule. tory permissive the selection of an to the rule serves to promote ment Rule mandatory, jury by making questioning impartial 431(b) helping one method of only is Glasper, See jury. of an impartial ensure the selection of achiev only It is not the means 234 Ill. 2d at 195-96. 431(b) does not of Rule objective. A violation ing protec- or constitutional right a fundamental implicate of this court’s rules. tion, involves a violation but Despite Glasper, our amendment 234 Ill. 2d at 193. 431(b) question rule, conclude that Rule the we cannot impartial jury. ing indispensable to the selection of prospectivejurors some, case, received but In this 431(b) questioning. The all, Rule not on Rule venire was also admonished and instructed 431(b) principles. not established that the Defendant has 431(b) resulted in a biased trial court’s violation jury. therefore, burden has, Defendant failed to meet his showing the error affected the fairness of his trial and challenged integrity judicial process. Accord- ingly, prong plain-error the second review does not provide excusing procedural a basis for defendant’s default. Bright-Line

D. Rule of Reversal Finally, bright- adopt defendant asks this court to any line rule of reversal for violation of bright-line Defendant contends that a rule compliance important will ensure trial courts’ with 431(b) requirements promote judicial efficiency by eliminating case-by-casereview of violations. Defen- 431(b) dant asserts that trial courts have violated Rule repeatedly bright-line and a rule of reversal would “quickly application lead to consistent of the amended rule.” acknowledge comply the failure to subject significant

amended Rule has been the litigation. App. Hammonds, See 399 Ill. (2010) cases). (collecting law, 950-54 Given this case it is undeniable that failure to with the rule has been recurring problem. ap Nonetheless, Hammonds, pellate court noted that in most cases the violations oc immediately following curred in the months our amend App. Hammonds, ment rule. 3d at 956. court observed that Rule had been 616

unchanged following for a decade and the months amendment to adjustment period unlikely marked an be Hammonds, 399 Ill. 3d at 956. repeated. App. with the court’s observation in appellate Consistent Hammonds, ap- this case was selected to Rule proximately two weeks after our amendment this court urges became effective. While to rule of reversal to ensure adopt bright-line compli- courts, step ance trial we do not believe that drastic will not automatic reversal for necessary. impose We to send a every simply message violation trial the amended rule. comply to our courts take notice are confident that trial courts will continue to all important employ necessary steps of this rule before every ensure full criminal case tried compliance further note that trial courts risk reversal of jury. We by failing review ordinary appellate convictions under 431(b). we decline defen- Accordingly, with Rule every for a rule of reversal for request bright-line dant’s violation of Rule

III. CONCLUSION reasons, reverse the foregoing For the we conviction and judgment reversing court’s defendant’s The trial court’s this matter for a new trial. remanding is affirmed. judgment reversed;

Appellate judgment court judgment circuit court affirmed. BURKE, dissenting: JUSTICE is whether it is appeal question presented prospective to fail to ask error for a trial court plain required by Supreme questions 431(b) (Official (April Advance Sheet No. Reports 2007). If our deci 2007), May ignore eff. we R. Zehr, (1984), major as the sion in is “no.” But if we does, the answer to this ity question Zehr, principles I must under consider as believe we decisis, is “yes.” stare then the answer Zehr, this court considered years ago, More than 25 in dur required permit inquiry a trial court was whether and ac jurors dire as to whether the understood ing voir the proving the State has the burden of cepted that doubt, a reasonable the guilty beyond defendant against not be held right testify may defendant’s not Zehr, him, presumed and that the defendant is innocent. at concluded that such was inquiry 476. We held: required. We qualification that essential to the opinion

“Weare they in a criminal case is that know that a of innocent, presumed required defendant is that he is not behalf, any offer evidence in his own that he must be doubt, proved guilty beyond a reasonable and that his testify in against failure to his own behalf cannot be held juror prejudice against any has a him. these basic If of guarantees, given an instruction at the end the trial will of have little curative It is also vital to the selection a effect. of impartial jury juror and that a who finds that the fair State proof guilt has failed to sustain its burden of beyond a prejudices against reasonable doubt have no returning guilty. a verdict of not note parenthetically We juror equally important that it is that a who finds that the State has sustained its proof prejudice burden of have no *** '[Ejach against returning a guilty. verdict of these questions goes particular to the prejudice heart bias or deprive right which would to a his and defendant of fair (110 impartial jury’ 458, 461), App. although Ill. 3d they precisely need not have been asked in the form submitted, subject questions matter of the should have been covered in interrogation the course of on voir dire.” added.) (Emphases Zehr, 2d at 103 Ill. 477. of Zehr holding subsequently was codified 431, See R. Com (Rule 431(b) Comments,

mittee at Ixxix “is intended to ensure compliance requirements (1984)”). Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472 As originally adopted, to ask the Zehr the trial required judge questions However, if requested by defendant. unanimously members of this court voted to amend the impose duty rule so as to an affirmative on trial courts to case, potential jurors, every they ask under- accepted stood and the principles “(1) presumed the defendant innocent of the (2) her; him charge(s) against that before a defendant can prove guilty be convicted the State must (3) doubt; beyond a reasonable that the defendant is not behalf; any to offer evidence on his or her own (4) testify be that the defendant’s failure to cannot Reports him Official Advance Sheet held or her.” 11, 2007), 431(b), May (April No. 8 R. eff.

As Zehr rationale for explained, imposing duty on trial courts is that these can only by asking questions any juror might hidden biases which a harbor potential questions be uncovered and that in the absence of such “ deprived right the defendant would be ‘his to a fair ” Zehr, 477, and 103 Ill. 2d at impartial jury.’ quoting Zehr, v. People 110 Ill. 3d 461 App. us,

In court reversed appellate the case before use of a aggravated defendant’s conviction for unlawful question prospec the trial court did not weapon because tive in accordance with amended majority, appellate like the Although court, the trial court violated Rule finds judgment. Relying court majority reverses Glasper, v. People on our decision in 173 manda (2009), the holds that adherence our majority and, thus, a fair trial a viola tory rule is not essential se reversible error. 238 Ill. 2d at 610-11. per tion is not Glasper, preamended In this court found that harmless-error review. I dis- subject was I belief Glasper my expressed my sented in and in dissent “essential,” Zehr to be which we held bias and “vital,” uncovering “at the heart” dispensable. Glasper, not be deemed could prejudice (Burke, J., Free dissenting, joined by Ill. 2d at 216-32 J.). belief. man, I continue to maintain that nor Glasper, Zehr in majority did not overturn Indeed, majority it do so in the case. present does deci rendering cite Zehr in its does not discuss even both in majority holdings, sion in this case. Yet the here, pro at odds with our directly are Glasper 238 Ill. 2d at 611 e.g., nouncements in Zehr. Compare, (“violation 431(b)] not render a necessarily does [Rule unfair”) Zehr, 103 2d at 477 Ill. fundamentally trial (it impartial jury” is “vital to the selection of a fair and asked). been attempt Zehr be No has questions that the does not us to explain why require made to stare decisis follow Zehr. view, which are my questions the failure to ask

not mandated but which are “vital to by court jury” necessarily the selection of a fair and impartial Cole, amounts to error. See plain (“The (1973) right impartial to a trial tribunal right requires is so basic that a violation of the reversal”). majority rejects Because the this conclusion and, in so our doing, completely disregards pronounce Zehr, ments in I dissent. joins

JUSTICE in this dissent. FREEMAN

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Thompson

Court Name: Illinois Supreme Court

Date Published: Oct 21, 2010

Citation: 939 N.E.2d 403

Docket Number: 109033

Court Abbreviation: Ill.