People v. StokesPeople v. Stokes
Following the shooting of two victims on April 15, 2013, the suspected shooter was apprehended and found to be in possession of ammunition, but not a firearm. Shortly thereafter, an informant purchased from defendant the defaced firearm that had been used during the shooting. As a result, in June 2013, defendant was charged by indictment with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (two counts) and criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree. Defendant was arrested later that month and a jury trial commenced in May 2014. At the conclusion of the trial, defendant was acquitted of one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and otherwise convicted as charged. He was subsequently sentenced, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate prison term of 14 years to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.
Defendant first contends that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial by virtue of the 13-month delay between the commission of the crime and the time of trial. In reviewing this claim, “the factors to be considered are the length of and reason for the delay, the nature of the charges, whether there was extended pretrial incarceration and whether the defense was prejudiced” (People v Pope, 96 AD3d 1231, 1233 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1064 [2013]; see People v Romeo, 12 NY3d 51, 55 [2009], cert denied 558 US 817 [2009]; People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]; People v Chaplin, 134 AD3d 1148, 1149 [2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1067 [2016]). Defendant was indicted approximately two months after the commission of the crime and arrested two weeks later in another state. Although defendant‘s 10 1/2-month period of incarceration between his arrest and the trial militates in his favor (see People v Anderson, 114 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2014], lv denied 22 NY3d 1196 [2014]), the remaining factors do not. In this regard, the delay at issue was not excessive and it can be attributed, at least in part, to the motions filed by defendant (see People v Scaringe, 137 AD3d 1409, 1412 [2016]). In addition, despite defendant‘s contention to the contrary, the charges are serious in nature (see People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 446), and he does not specify any prejudice occasioned by the delay (see People v Scaringe, 137 AD3d at 1412; People v Pope, 96 AD3d at 1234). Thus, upon consideration of the relevant factors, we find no constitutional violation (see People v Mercer, 105 AD3d 1091, 1093 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1017 [2013]; People v McNeal, 91 AD3d 1204, 1205 [2012], lv denied 18 NY3d 996 [2012]).
Defendant also challenges County Court‘s response to a jury note seeking guidance on whether the precise time that the criminal sale occurred was important. It is well settled that “while a trial court is without discretion in deciding whether to respond [to a jury note], the court does have discretion as to the substance of the response” (People v Santi, 3 NY3d 234, 248 [2004]; see People v Haardt, 129 AD3d 1322, 1324-1325 [2015]; People v Briskin, 125 AD3d 1113, 1121 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1069 [2015]). County Court conferred with the parties and then reread the elements of the criminal sale charge to the jury. Upon our review of the record, we are satisfied that this response was well within its discretion and was a meaningful response to the jury‘s inquiry (see
We also reject defendant‘s contention that County Court erred in calculating the duration of the order of protection issued in favor of the informant, as the record reflects that the duration takes into account defendant‘s jail time credit and properly includes the period of postrelease supervision (see
Defendant‘s remaining contentions have been considered and determined to be lacking in merit.
Peters, P.J., Garry, Mulvey and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.