THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RONALD L. STOECKER, Appellant.
(Docket No. 124807)
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Opinion filed September 24, 2020.
2020 IL 124807
Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, Neville, and Michael J. Burke concurred in
OPINION
¶ 1 Over 16 years after Ronald L. Stoecker‘s convictions and sentences for first degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault were affirmed on direct appeal and after numerous other petitions for collateral relief were dismissed or denied, he filed the instant petition for relief from judgment under
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 ¶ 3 In 1998, a jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault of a 15-year-old girl. The evidence adduced at trial established that petitioner drove the girl to a remote, rural area of Illinois, sexually assaulted her, slit her throat, and left her for dead in a field. Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of natural life and 30 years in prison.
¶ 4 His convictions and sentеnces were affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Stoecker, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1107 (1999) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Thereafter, petitioner filed numerous unsuccessful petitions for collateral relief.1 Relevant to this appeal, in 2005 petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment, contending inter alia that he was entitled to resentencing. He argued that the circuit court‘s procedures in imposing a life sentence for murder violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), where the United States Supreme Court held that, other than the fact of а prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum sentence must be submitted
¶ 5 The circuit court construed the filing as a petition for postconviction relief and appointed counsel to represent petitioner. In a report filed with the court, counsel thoroughly addressed petitioner‘s Apprendi claim and the legal underpinnings of his argument. Recognizing that petitioner‘s claim had been squarely addressed by this court in People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426 (2003), counsel concluded that “the Illinois Supremе Court‘s decision controls and we need not address this issue further.” The circuit court dismissed the petition. Although petitioner filed four subsequent amended petitions for relief related to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, he did not appeal from the court‘s ruling on the Apprendi issue.
¶ 6 Seven years later, in 2012, petitioner filed another petition for relief from judgment, again raising the Apprendi issue. The circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely. The appellate court affirmed, holding that, under De La Paz, the rule established in Apprendi did not apply retroаctively to cases whose direct appeals were exhausted prior to the Supreme Court‘s decision. Stoecker, 2014 IL App (3d) 130389-U, ¶ 16.
¶ 7 In August 2016, petitioner filed yet another petition for relief from judgment under
¶ 8 On September 26, 2016, the circuit court appointed counsel to represent petitioner and ordered the State to respond to the petition within 30 days. The certificate of mailing filed by the circuit clerk reflects that appointed counsel was served with the appointment order by regular mail on that date.
¶ 9 On November 14, 2016, the State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the claim was both untimely, and barred by res judicata because the issues had been previously litigated and other matters asserted were of record at the time of trial. The certificate of service reflects that the State served the motion on appointed counsel by e-mail and regular mail the same day.
¶ 10 Four dаys later, on November 18, 2016, the circuit court dismissed the petition, announcing its ruling on the record. The report of proceedings reflects that only the State was present for the ruling, though it made no argument before the court. The record does not show that appointed counsel was notified of the proceeding. After stating that petitioner‘s presence was not required, the court ruled that it had reviewed the file and the pleadings and determined that the State‘s motion was correct as a matter of law. The certificate of mailing reflects that appointed counsel was served with the court‘s order.
¶ 11 Petitioner then filed a pro se motion to reconsider, arguing that the court had
¶ 12 On appeal, petitioner argued that his due process rights were violated because the circuit court failed to give him a meaningful opportunity to respond to the State‘s motiоn to dismiss and because it held an ex parte hearing on the motion. He further argued that his counsel‘s performance was deficient.
¶ 13 The appellate court affirmed. 2019 IL App (3d) 160781, ¶¶ 10-20. The court found that, even if petitioner‘s due process rights were violated, any violation was harmless because the deficiencies in the petition could not be cured on remand. Id. ¶ 10. The petition was untimely, barred by res judicata, and meritless. Id. ¶¶ 12, 16. With respect to appointed counsel‘s representation, the appellate court found that under any standard of representation, counsel‘s representation was nоt inadequate where the defects in the petition were not curable. Id. ¶¶ 14-16. Justice Lytton dissented, finding that appointed counsel‘s failure to appear, file any pleadings, or provide any representation was inadequate under any relevant standard. Id. ¶ 25 (Lytton, J., dissenting). We subsequently granted petitioner leave to appeal.
ANALYSIS
Due Process Claim
¶ 14 ¶ 15 ¶ 16 We first address petitioner‘s contention regarding the manner in which the circuit court heard and ruled upon his petition. Petitioner reasserts that his due process rights werе violated because he was not given a meaningful opportunity to respond to the State‘s motion to dismiss and because the court dismissed his petition during an ex parte hearing. He maintains that these errors were necessarily prejudicial because they affected the “integrity of the proceedings.”
¶ 17 A procedural due process claim presents a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 15. An individual‘s right to procedural due process is guaranteed by the United States and Illinois Constitutions. See
¶ 18 In the context of a petition for relief from judgment,
¶ 19 In Vincent, this court examined the propriety of a sua sponte dismissal by the court and its impact on procedural due process where no responsive pleading had been filed. We explained that, where the State chose to forgo filing any response to
¶ 20 In contrast, Illinois courts have recognized that basic notions of fairness dictate that a petitioner be afforded notice of, and a meaningful opportunity to respond to, any motion or responsive pleading by the State. See People v. Rucker, 2018 IL App (2d) 150855; People v. Bradley, 2017 IL App (4th) 150527; People v. Gaines, 335 Ill. App. 3d 292, 295-96 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 12; People v. Coleman, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1070 (2005); Merneigh v. Lane, 87 Ill. App. 3d 852 (1980) (applying the concepts in the context of a complaint for mandamus); see also English v. Cowell, 10 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 1993) (notice and an opportunity to respond to a dispositive motion are “deeply imbedded in our concept of fair play and substantial justice“).
¶ 21 Procedures exist in our civil practice rules that contemplate notice and an opportunity to be heard in the context of pretrial dispositive motions. See, e.g.,
¶ 22 Here, the record reveals that both petitioner and his appointed counsel were served with the State‘s motion to dismiss. Yet the circuit court ruled on the motion four days after it was filed and served without giving petitioner a reasonable opportunity to respond, thereby bypassing the safeguards provided by our rules of procedure. The record does not reflect that petitioner or appointed counsel were given notice of thе proceeding at which the court ruled on the State‘s motion. Had counsel been given notice, he could have requested a briefing schedule to file a response to the motion, or he could have orally addressed the motion. Alternatively, counsel could have sought to withdraw as appointed counsel. We reiterate today that the protection of a petitioner‘s right to procedural due process in postjudgment proceedings is of utmost importance, and wе trust that this type of procedural violation in the circuit court will not be repeated.
¶ 23 Nevertheless, we find the procedural violation is subject to harmless error review. This court has adhered to a strong presumption that most errors of constitutional dimension are subject to harmless error analysis. People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2010); People v. Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d 40, 61 (2000). Harmless error analysis is “based on the notion that a defendant‘s interest in an error-free [proceeding] must be balanced against societal interests in finality and judicial economy.” People v. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d 259, 275-76 (1988). We have explained that automatic reversal is only required
¶ 24 The United States Supreme Court has held that an error qualifies as structural when the error has “consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006). This court has adhered to those principles as a matter of state law. See, e.g., Averett, 237 Ill. 2d at 14 (where the impact of the circuit court‘s blanket policy of deferring rulings could be quantified, it was not structural error subject to automatic reversal); People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (2007) (error amenable to harmless error review where it was “possible to qualitatively assess for harm“); see also People v. Taylor, 349 Ill. App. 3d 718, 720-21 (2004) (issue amenable to harmless error review where patently incurable as a matter of law).
¶ 25 The error complained of here—a reasonable opportunity to respond to a dispositive motion in a сollateral civil proceeding and lack of notice before it was dismissed as a matter of law—cannot be equated with the narrow class of automatically reversible errors articulated by the United States Supreme Court and this court. Although the error is serious, it does not necessarily render the proceedings automatically unfair or unreliable. The impact of the circuit court‘s error under these circumstances is not one that is necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate; rathеr, the impact is one that can be quantified. Additionally, procedural corrective safeguards are in place to protect against erroneous rulings. See
¶ 26 After reviewing the impact of the error in this case, we determine the error to be harmless because petitioner‘s claims were procedurally defaulted and patently incurable as a matter of law and because no additional proceedings would have enabled him to prevail on his claim for relief.
¶ 27 The petition was untimely, having been filed 16 years after the expiration of the statute‘s two-year limitation period.
¶ 28 Although a challenge to a void sentence can be raised at any time, this court recognizes only two circumstances in which a judgment will be considered void: (1) when it is entered by a court that lacked personal or subject-matter jurisdiction or (2) when it is based on a statute that is facially unconstitutional and void ab initio. People v. Price, 2016 IL 118613, ¶¶ 17, 31-32; People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶¶ 11-12; People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 31-33. Neither circumstance applies here. Petitioner never sought to collaterally attack a judgment that was entered without personal or subject-matter jurisdiction, and the judgment was not based on a statute that was declared fаcially unconstitutional.
¶ 29 Furthermore, res judicata barred petitioner‘s claims. Under the well-settled doctrine of res judicata, ” ‘a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of thе parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.’ ” People v. Creek, 94 Ill. 2d 526, 533 (1983) (quoting People v. Kidd, 398 Ill. 405, 408 (1947)). The circuit and appellate courts previously adjudicated petitioner‘s Apprendi claim, relying on this court‘s decision in De La Paz, that “the rule established in Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases whose direct appeals were exhausted prior to Apprendi being decided.” Stoecker, 2014 IL App (3d) 130389-U, ¶ 16.
¶ 30 Nothing in petitioner‘s newly cited cases of Johnson and Welch alters that calculus. Rather, those cases merely reaffirm the framework for analyzing when new rules apply retroactively on collateral review, and both are consistent with our decision in De La Paz. Johnson struck down a portion of the federal sentencing statute as unconstitutionally vague. Johnson, 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 597. Welch found that the rule announced in Johnson applied retroactively. Welch, 578 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1265. Welch merely reaffirmed that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure generally do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review because they regulate only the manner of determining a defendant‘s culpability, in contrast to substantive rules that alter ” ‘the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.’ ” Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1264-65 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004)).
¶ 31 Welch determined that the new rule in Johnson affected the class of persons that the law punishes rather than the judicial procedures by which the statute applied, and therefore, it was a substantive decision having retroactive effect in cases on collateral review. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1265. Consequently, Johnson and Welch do not cast doubt on our decision in De La Paz, which concluded that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review because it announced a new procedural rule and was not among “those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered libеrty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d at 434.
¶ 32 In addition, to the extent petitioner argues that the trial court failed to make a sufficient finding to support his extended-term sentence, that argument was based on the trial court record and could have been raised on direct appeal. Therefore, petitioner could not establish the necessary due diligence in both discovering the claim and presenting the issue 18 years later in his sixth postjudgment filing. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 7-8 (holding that relief under
¶ 33 Accordingly, we hold the circuit court‘s procedural error was harmless where petitioner‘s claims were untenable
Assistance of Appointed Counsel
¶ 34 ¶ 35 We next address petitioner‘s contention that his appointed counsel failed to provide him with assistance at аny point in the proceedings. Initially, we assess the level of assistance required of appointed counsel under a
¶ 36 Additionally, unlike the provisions of the
¶ 37 This court has not articulated any specific standards of performance or requirements that apply to counsel appointed to represent a
¶ 38 In Tedder v. Fairman, 92 Ill. 2d 216 (1982), this court considered the standards applicable to the appointment of counsel in the context of petitions for habeas corpus and mandamus, two civil proceedings where
¶ 39 Petitioner contends that thе “reasonable assistance” standard applicable under the
¶ 40 A petitioner‘s right to reasonable assistance under
¶ 41 Yet, as we have explained, “the Post-Conviction Hearing Act *** has no application whatsoever to
¶ 42 Rather, any discretionary appointment of counsel in the context of a
¶ 43 Thus, we agree with petitioner that, after a discretionary appointment under
¶ 44 Here, as appellate counsel has conceded, there was nothing appointed counsel could have done to amend the pro se petition or to respond to the motion to dismiss that could have cured the defective pleading. Counsel has no duty to amend a petition where it is incurable as a matter of law. See People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 205 (2004) (under
¶ 45 Additionally, it does not appear from the record that counsel was given notice of the proceedings in which the circuit court ruled on the State‘s motion to dismiss. Had counsel been notified, he would have had an opportunity to either stand on the petition or to withdraw his representation. Thus, on this record, we cannot say counsel‘s lack of performance was necessarily deficient. Under any standard of due diligence, unless counsel‘s deficient performance could have reasonably affected the outcome of the proceedings, there would be no reason to remand the matter for further proceedings. Thus, counsel‘s failure to pursue a meritless claim cannоt constitute deficient representation warranting remand. See Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d at 568 (counsel‘s failure to pursue an error that was not cognizable under
CONCLUSION
¶ 46 ¶ 47 In sum, the procedural due process violation was harmless error, and any deficient performance by appointed counsel did not warrant remand where the defects in the
¶ 48 Affirmed.