THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DeANGELO M. STEVENSON, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 4-18-0143
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District
April 14, 2020
2020 IL App (4th) 180143
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Harris and Holder White concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County, No. 16-CF-904; thе Hon. Thomas E. Griffith Jr., Judge, presiding. Judgment: Affirmed.
James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Todd T. McHenry, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Jay Scott, State‘s Attorney, of Decatur (Patrick Delfinо, David J. Robinson, and Rosario David Escalera Jr., of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 The Macon County circuit court denied an amended motion by defеndant, DeAngelo M. Stevenson, to withdraw his guilty pleas. Defendant appeals, arguing that the court‘s guilty plea admonitions were defective. Acknowledging that he has procedurally forfeited this issue by omitting it from the amended motion, defendant invokes the doctrine of plain error. Alternatively, he claims that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by omitting the issue from the amended motion.
¶ 2 We hold that, becаuse the admonitions were not clearly or obviously defective, the doctrine of plain error does not avert the forfeiture. Absent a clear or obvious error in the admonitions, we are unable to say that omitting to object to them was ineffective assistance. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 Through defense counsel, defendant informed the circuit court that he wished to plead guilty to count II of the informatiоn filed against him, aggravated battery (
“That would include your right to plea[d] not guilty and to have a trial, either a jury trial or a bench trial. You‘re giving up your right to confront and cross-exаmine your accusers, and by entering a guilty plea, you‘re agreeing that the State can prove the charge or charges against you beyond a reasonable doubt.”
See
¶ 5 After the circuit court admonished the group of defendants, “proceedings were had in other causes,” to quote a parenthetical notation in the transcript. Then defendant‘s case came up. “Finally, we have 16-CF-904,” the circuit court said. The record does not reveal how long the “other causes” had taken, but it was still August 5, 2016—it is still the same transcript. The court stated the terms of the proposed plea agreement between defendant аnd the State and admonished him further. See
“THE COURT: And you were present when I went through your constitutional rights some time ago?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand those rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”
¶ 6 Finally, after finding a factual basis, the circuit court accepted defendant‘s guilty pleas to counts II and III. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court dismissed count I and imposed a sentence of 24 months’ probation.
¶ 7 On September 1, 2016, defense counsel moved to withdraw the guilty pleas. On September 12, 2017, a new defense counsel
¶ 8 This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Defendant contends that, in its admonitions, the сircuit court violated Rule 402(a) in two ways. First, the court admonished defendant as a member of a group. In defendant‘s view, the court thereby violated the requirement of “addressing the defendant personally.”
¶ 11 Defendant admits that his amended motion to withdraw his guilty pleas made no mention of the Rule 402(a) admonitions. “Upon apрeal[,] any issue not raised by the defendant in the motion to *** withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment shall be deemed waived,” that is to say, forfeited.
¶ 12 We will address those two theories—plain error and ineffective assistance—one at a time.
A. The Theory of Plain Error
¶ 14 A plain error is, to begin with, plain. A plain error is more than an arguable error; it is “a cleаr or obvious error.” McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 489. We ask, then, whether it was a clear or obvious violation of Rule 402(a) for the circuit court to do the following: (1) admonish defendant initially in a group of other defendants and (2) attend to some other cases before turning to defendant again and asking him if he understood the group admonitions the court gave earlier.
¶ 15 We answer that question de novo (see People v. Chavez, 2013 IL App (4th) 120259, ¶ 14), and our analysis begins with the text of Rule 402(a):
“(a) Admonitions to Defendant. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or а stipulation that the evidence is sufficient to convict without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him or her of and
determining that he or she understands the following: (1) the nature of the charge;
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences;
(3) that the defendant has the right to plead not guilty, or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, or to plead guilty; and
(4) that if he or she pleads guilty there will not be a trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty he or she waives the right to a trial by jury and the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her; or that by stipulating the evidence is sufficient to conviсt, he or she waives the right to a trial by jury and the right to be confronted with any witnesses against him or her who have not testified.” (Emphases added.)
Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(a) (eff. July 1, 2012).
¶ 16 We interpret this supreme court rule the same way we would interpret a statutе, giving the words their plain and ordinary meanings (see People v. Marker, 233 Ill. 2d 158, 165 (2009)), which can be found in a dictionary (People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 330 (2007)). According to the New Oxford American Dictionary, the word “personally” means “with the personal presence or action of the individual specified.” New Oxford Amеrican Dictionary 1276 (2001). A synonym for “personally” is “in person.” Id. If the judge is present in person and two or more defendants likewise are present in person and the judge makes clear that he or she is speaking to all of them, the judge can address all of them “personally” at the same time.
¶ 17 This is not to deny the potential pitfalls of en masse admonitions, but the pitfalls can be avoided with a thought-out method. Care is required because it would be easy to lose track or get confused. For example, the judge might ask one defendant whether he understands but forget to ask another defendant if she understands. See United States v. Fels, 599 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1979). Or the judge might ask one defendant if he had been threatened or had been promised anything and forget to ask another defendant that question. See id. at 147. Another pitfall would be inviting a general response from a group so large that it would be impossible to tell whether each defendant аnswered in the affirmative. United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2009).
¶ 18 In defendant‘s case, the circuit court avoided those pitfalls by saving for later its dialogue with defendant, the part where the court “determin[ed] that he *** underst[ood].”
B. The Claim That Defense Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance
¶ 20 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must establish two elements: (1) counsel‘s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unрrofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 326 (2011).
¶ 21 The first element allows ample room for defense counsel to use their professional judgment. A defendant must overcome “the strong presumption that counsel‘s performance fell within [the] wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (1994). In this case, defendant has failed to overcome that strong presumptiоn. His critique of the Rule 402(a) admonitions is debatable. Omitting to raise a debatable point is “within [the] wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 In sum, the Rule 402(a) issue is forfeited, and the doctrine of plain error does not avert the forfeiture. The alternative claim of ineffective assistance fails for failure to establish the element of deficient performance. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court‘s judgment.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH
JUSTICE HARRIS and JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE concurred in the judgment and opinion.