In re: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff, v. Regina M. SPRINKLE, Defendant.
Supreme Court Case No. 21SA3
Supreme Court of Colorado
June 28, 2021
489 P.3d 1242
En banc
Attorneys for Defendant: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Stephanie Lalonde, Deputy Public Defender, Colorado Springs, Colorado
JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 In this original proceeding, we review the district court‘s order requiring the El Paso County Sheriff‘s Office (“EPCSO“) to give Regina M. Sprinkle access to internal investigation files about two of its deputies. EPCSO asks us to vacate the order and remand with instructions to quash the subpoena duces tecum (“SDT“) that prompted this action.
¶2 We conclude that the district court properly exercised its subject matter jurisdiction in resolving this controversy through a hearing to show cause, as provided under the
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶3 In early 2020, the El Paso County District Attorney charged Sprinkle with several criminal offenses. The two EPCSO deputies whose files are at issue have been endorsed as witnesses, and Sprinkle claims their testimony is central to the case against her.
¶4 In preparation for trial, a defense investigator submitted a request to EPCSO “to inspect or obtain copies of Internal Affairs records that relate” to the two deputies; specifically, “any complaints filed, investigation reports completed and disciplinary actions taken or disposition records related to these [deputies].” EPCSO denied the request. After quoting the
¶5 Sprinkle then subpoenaed the deputies’ internal affairs records by filing an SDT. EPCSO moved to quash the SDT, and the district court held a hearing on the motion to quash.
¶6 At the hearing, the court observed that the request for these records seemed to fall under the
¶7 Four days before the show cause hearing, however, EPCSO filed a motion claiming the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court held the show cause hearing as scheduled but began with the parties’ arguments on the subject-matter-jurisdiction objection. Based on the statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction in
¶8 EPCSO petitioned this court under C.A.R. 21 for a rule to show cause, which we granted.
II. Analysis
¶9 We begin by discussing our jurisdiction to hear this matter and the applicable standard of review. We then analyze the district court‘s subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ dispute under the
A. Original Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
¶10 Relief under Rule 21 is extraordinary and wholly within the discretion of this court. C.A.R. 21(a)(1). Such relief is appropriate “when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, when a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, or when a petition raises ‘issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered.’ ” People v. Rowell, 2019 CO 104, ¶ 9, 453 P.3d 1156, 1159 (quoting Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 194 (Colo. 2001)).
¶11 We choose to exercise our original jurisdiction here for two reasons. First, EPCSO seeks relief from the district court‘s order to release internal investigation records to Sprinkle, and “the damage that could result from disclosure would occur regardless of the ultimate outcome of an appeal from a final judgment” in the underlying criminal case. People v. Kilgore, 2020 CO 6, ¶ 11, 455 P.3d 746, 749 (quoting Ortega v. Colo. Permanente Med. Grp., P.C., 265 P.3d 444, 447 (Colo. 2011)). Second, the petition raises an important issue of statewide concern that we have not yet considered; namely, how to interpret a recent legislative change broadly affecting the public‘s access to certain criminal justice records. See
¶12 The issues presented raise questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation, which are questions of law. Therefore, our review is de novo. In re J.C.T., 176 P.3d 726, 729 (Colo. 2007); Thompson v. People, 2020 CO 72, ¶ 22, 471 P.3d 1045, 1051.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
¶13 EPCSO contends that the district court erred by exercising its subject matter jurisdiction in this case because Sprinkle failed to file the required application for a hearing to show cause under
¶14 “A court‘s ‘jurisdiction’ concerns its ‘power to entertain and to render a judgment on a particular claim’ “; put simply, “it is the court‘s power to decide.” People v. C.O., 2017 CO 105, ¶ 21, 406 P.3d 853, 858 (quoting In re Estate of Ongaro, 998 P.2d 1097, 1103 (Colo. 2000)). Jurisdiction consists of two parts: “jurisdiction over the subject matter of the issue to be decided (subject matter jurisdiction), and jurisdiction over the parties (personal jurisdiction).” Id. at ¶ 22, 406 P.3d at 858. Only subject matter jurisdiction is at issue here.
¶15 ” ‘[S]ubject matter jurisdiction’ concerns the court‘s authority to deal with the class of cases in which it renders judgment, not its authority to enter a particular judgment within that class.” Id. at ¶ 24, 406 P.3d at 858; see Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136, 1140 (Colo. 2011) (“A court has subject matter jurisdiction where it has been empowered to entertain the type of case before it by the sovereign from which the court derives its authority.“).
¶16 District courts are courts of general jurisdiction, meaning they “have original jurisdiction in all civil, probate, and criminal cases.”
Any person who has been denied access to any information in a completed internal affairs investigation file may file an application in the district court in the county
where the records are located for an order directing the custodian thereof to show cause why the withheld or redacted information should not be made available to the applicant.
¶17 However, “[i]t is not sufficient that the court has, in the abstract, the authority to decide the particular class of case which is before it. The court‘s authority must be invoked before it can act.” In re Marriage of Stroud, 631 P.2d 168, 171 (Colo. 1981); accord People in Int. of Clinton, 762 P.2d 1381, 1387 (Colo. 1988).
¶18 We conclude that filing an application is a non-jurisdictional procedure. The
¶19 And a non-jurisdictional procedure is all that the parties waived here. As part of the criminal case over which the court exercised its general subject matter jurisdiction, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the SDT and the related motion to quash, which implicated records encompassed by the
¶20 Accordingly, we conclude that Sprinkle‘s failure to file an application for a show cause hearing didn‘t divest the district court of subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Therefore, we turn to the merits.
C. The CCJRA Order
¶21 EPCSO also contends that the district court erred in its interpretation of the Amendment because, under EPCSO‘s interpretation, the Amendment requires the requesting party to itemize the “specific, identifiable incidents of official misconduct” that the requestor seeks to inspect. Again, we disagree.
¶22 In interpreting statutes, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the legislature‘s intent. Thompson, ¶ 22, 471 P.3d at 1051. To do so, we look first to the plain language of the statute, read the statute as a whole, and give its words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We read words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Id. If the language is clear, we apply it as written. Id. If it is ambiguous, meaning it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we may employ the traditional tools of statutory construction to aid our interpretation. Id. These tools include analysis of the statute‘s legislative history. Id. Although “[s]tatements made before a legislative committee are not conclusive proof of legislative intent,” they do “provide guidance in interpreting the statute.” People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d 410, 419 (Colo. 2005). And “the testimony of a bill‘s sponsor concerning its purpose and anticipated effect can be powerful evidence of legislative intent.”
¶23 In 2019, the General Assembly amended the
Upon completion of an internal investigation, including any appeals process, that examines the in-uniform or on-duty conduct of a peace officer ... related to a specific, identifiable incident of alleged misconduct involving a member of the public, the entire investigation file, including the witness interviews, video and audio recordings, transcripts, documentary evidence, investigative notes, and final departmental decision is open for public inspection upon request; except that the custodian may first provide the requester with a summary of the investigation file and if, after reviewing the summary, the requester requests access to the investigation file, the custodian shall provide access to the entire investigation file subject to [the redaction provisions] of this section.
¶24 The parties submit that the main issue before us is who must identify the “specific, identifiable incident.” EPCSO argues that the person seeking access to the files must do so. Sprinkle argues that the records custodian must identify the relevant files. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the phrase “specific, identifiable incident,” when read in context, refers to the types of incidents subject to investigation, not who must identify those incidents as part of a request to inspect investigation files. Therefore, the person requesting access to internal investigation files need not reference a “specific, identifiable incident” of alleged misconduct in the request.
¶25 This becomes apparent if we more broadly examine the language and structure of the Amendment, rather than immediately zooming in on a few words.
1. Plain Language
¶26 Using a wide lens, we first note that the Amendment begins by specifying the procedural status of files available for inspection: “[u]pon completion of an internal investigation, including any appeals process.” A plain reading of this introductory phrase indicates that only files from completed investigations are available; thus, the statute does not provide for the release of files of ongoing or pending investigations. See also
¶27 The next phrase is set off in the sentence by commas and describes the subject matter of the investigation that was completed: “that examines the in-uniform or on-duty conduct of a peace officer ... related to a specific, identifiable incident of alleged misconduct involving a member of the public.”
¶28 The legislature did not define “identifiable” in the
¶29 The Amendment then provides that “the entire investigation file ... is open for public inspection upon request.”
¶30 Thus, read in its entirety, the plain language of the Amendment provides that any member of the public is entitled to inspect the entire file from any completed internal investigations into specific, identifiable instances of alleged officer misconduct while that officer was on-duty or in-uniform and interacting with the public. It doesn‘t require that people seeking to inspect the files know of the specific, identifiable instances of misconduct or that they include any such designation in their request. And we may not add such a requirement to the Amendment. See Oakwood Holdings, LLC v. Mortg. Invs. Enters. EEC, 2018 CO 12, ¶ 12, 410 P.3d 1249, 1252.
¶31 Based on the Amendment‘s plain language, we conclude that a records custodian for a criminal justice agency may not deny a request to inspect internal investigation files simply because the requesting party has not identified a specific incident of misconduct in their request.
¶32 But even if we were to assume that the word “identifiable” is ambiguous, our review of the legislative history yields the same conclusion.
2. Legislative History
¶33 The legislative history more fully illuminates the proponents’ intent in passing the Amendment.
¶34 Before this amendment, records custodians presented with requests to access internal affairs records were expected “to consider and balance the public and private interests relevant to the inspection request.” Harris v. Denver Post Corp., 123 P.3d 1166, 1174 (Colo. 2005); see also Freedom Colo. Info., Inc. v. El Paso Cnty. Sheriff‘s Dep‘t, 196 P.3d 892, 898-99 (Colo. 2008). We instructed custodians to consider multiple factors, including
the privacy interests of individuals who may be impacted by a decision to allow inspection; the agency‘s interest in keeping confidential information confidential; the agency‘s interest in pursuing ongoing investigations without compromising them; the public purpose to be served in allowing inspection; and any other pertinent consideration relevant to the circumstances of the particular request.
¶35 The sponsoring legislators’ statements and the committee members’ questioning of witnesses during hearings on the Amendment make it abundantly clear that the Amendment‘s proponents sought to eliminate custodians’ discretion to deny access to certain internal affairs records and to make it easier for the public to obtain such records without involving the courts. Hearing on
¶36 During the committee hearings, several witnesses testified that custodians were not applying the Harris balancing test as intended. See H. Judiciary Comm. (statements of Denise Maes, Public Policy Director, ACLU; and Rebecca Wallace); Hearing on
¶37 Several witnesses testified that Denver was the only county in the state that allowed access to these types of records, but even that access had drastically declined over the decade preceding the Amendment. See H. Judiciary Comm. (statements of Denise Maes and Rebecca Wallace); S. Judiciary Comm. (statement of Margaret Kwoka).
¶38 Although some legislators and witnesses expressed concern that the proposed legislation would threaten officer privacy rights and personal safety, the Amendment‘s proponents maintained that it struck “a balanced compromise by protecting the sanctity of internal investigations while defending every Coloradan‘s right to public information about their public servants. This bill removes the ability to deny requests for a specific type of incident; however, [it] expands the ... redactions to protect officers’ investigations and public safety.” H. Judiciary Comm. (statement of Rep. James Coleman). The proponents emphasized that their goal was to improve transparency, fairness, accountability, and the public‘s trust in law enforcement. See S. Judiciary Comm. (statement of Sen. Mike Foote, bill sponsor). For example, Senator Foote described “the top values of this bill” by reading from a “recent” court case that said that “open access to internal affairs files enhances the effectiveness of internal affairs investigations rather than impairing them. Knowing that they will be scrutinized makes investigators do a better job and makes them and the department more accountable to the public. Transparency also enhances public confidence in the police department ....”
¶39 Thus, by passing the Amendment, the General Assembly abrogated the balancing test of Harris and its progeny in this context. In other words, it eliminated the discretion previously granted to records custodians to deny
¶40 The hearings also made clear that the proponents intended for the Amendment to grant access to anyone who asked for it, whether they were involved in the underlying incidents or not. In support, individuals from several local media outlets explained how they use these records. See H. Judiciary Comm. (statements of Noelle Phillips, News Editor, Denver Post; Jill Farschman, Chief Executive Officer, Colorado Press Association; and Chris Halsne, Investigative Reporter, multiple news outlets). For example, Ms. Farschman described her regular requests to the Denver police department for “every disciplinary letter [it has] issued this month.”
¶41 In sum, these media witnesses’ testimony indicates that their routine practice was to request officer files without knowing what they would uncover; that is, without necessarily knowing of a specific, identifiable incident they wished to investigate. And the legislators’ questioning of these witnesses doesn‘t indicate that the legislators had any concern with members of the public making such broad requests. Nothing in the legislative history suggests that a requester should have to identify a specific incident or that the Amendment makes such broad requests impermissible.
¶42 Thus, the Amendment‘s legislative history reflects the General Assembly‘s intent to provide broad access to completed internal investigation files regarding specific types of incidents of alleged officer misconduct, regardless of whether the person requesting access to the files can identify the specific incident.
III. Conclusion
¶43 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction, and the plain language and legislative history of the Amendment support the district court‘s application of the Amendment here.1 The district court properly ordered EPCSO to release the requested records to Sprinkle. We therefore discharge the rule.
JUSTICE SAMOUR dissents, and CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT joins in the dissent.
JUSTICE SAMOUR, dissenting.
¶44 The plain text of
¶45 In 2019, the General Assembly amended
Upon completion of an internal investigation, including any appeals process, that examines the in-uniform or on-duty conduct of a peace officer ... related to a specific, identifiable incident of alleged misconduct involving a member of the public, the entire investigation file, including the witness interviews, video and audio recordings, transcripts, documentary evidence, investigative notes, and final departmental decision is open for public inspection upon request; except that the custodian may first provide the requester with a summary of the investigation file and if, after reviewing the summary, the requester requests access to the investigation file, the custodian shall provide access to the entire investigation file subject to [the redaction provisions] of this section.
¶46 The majority takes the untenable position that the legislature‘s use of the phrase “specific, identifiable incident” in
¶47 The practical effect of today‘s decision is to allow access to all completed internal investigation files regarding any incidents of alleged misconduct by a peace officer involving a member of the public. So long as a requester asks for all such files with respect to a named peace officer, he or she will be entitled to access them. Nowhere does the plain language of
¶48 While the majority cites the tenet of statutory interpretation requiring that we “read words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of grammar and common usage,” maj. op. ¶ 22 (citing Thompson v. People, 2020 CO 72, ¶ 22, 471 P.3d 1045, 1051), its construction is not faithful to that principle. A commonsense reading of
¶49 But in order to illustrate where the majority and I diverge, I must first explain where the majority and I align. And, because a thorough parsing of
¶50 The beginning of
¶51 First, like the majority, I understand the introductory portion of this subsection to “specify[ ] the procedural status” of the type of file available for inspection —namely, any file documenting an internal investigation that has been completed. Maj. op. ¶ 26. And, unsurprisingly, I agree with the majority on the corollary point: The statute does not provide for the inspection of any file in an “ongoing or pending” investigation. Id.
¶52 Second, the “internal investigation” referenced is modified by the adjectival phrase “related to a specific, identifiable incident of alleged misconduct involving a member of the public.”
¶53 Third, the “investigation file” referenced following the aforementioned qualification harkens back to the “internal investigation” described earlier in the sentence. Read in context, these words make plain that the “investigation file” designated as “open for public inspection” is one that “relate[s] to a specific, identifiable incident of alleged misconduct.”
¶54 Given our agreement on these three analytical steps —each of which is supported by the plain language of the statute — it is difficult to understand how the majority could land where it does.
¶55 While I discuss the myriad issues with the majority‘s position below, it is worth noting at the outset that, even under its own constraints, the majority uses the word “identifiable” in a way that engenders perplexing conclusions. For instance, is it the case that an investigating officer cannot feasibly identify and investigate allegations regarding general patterns of behavior? Under the majority‘s theory, which postulates that “identifiable” operates to “distinguish[ ] an incident of alleged misconduct that is capable of being identified and investigated from one that is not (e.g., a vague allegation about an officer‘s general behavior on the job),” id., that would appear to be the case. But logically, that can‘t be so —nothing prevents the investigation of allegations regarding general patterns of behavior that have been identified by complaints.
¶56 Even overlooking this peculiar aspect of the majority‘s approach, the interpretation of subsection (4)(a) endorsed today is problematic. The majority understands
Upon completion of an internal investigation related to a specific, identifiable incident of alleged misconduct [i.e., a specific incident of alleged misconduct capable of being identified and investigated by the investigating officer] the entire investigation file is open for public inspection upon request.
But the majority cites no authority for the supposition it applies here (i.e., its definition of the word “identifiable“), and none exists. Yet, without this supposition, the resulting interpretation crumbles.
¶57 Indeed, if we use “a wide lens” and zoom out, as the majority invites us to do, maj. op. ¶ 26, there are a number of textual clues that point to the conclusion that “identifiable” was never intended to describe incidents that an investigating officer can identify and investigate, but was instead intended to convey that the requester must always identify the incident to which the requested investigation file pertains.
¶58 To begin, subsection (4)(a)‘s overarching purpose is to describe any investigation file that must be disclosed in response to a records request, not to delineate what incidents are capable of being identified and investigated. See
¶59 To hold otherwise, as the majority does, is to adopt a temporally tortured reading of the statute that begs the question: Why would the legislature seek to qualify the nature of incidents that can feasibly be investigated (a process that would have necessarily concluded at the time of a viable
¶60 In fastening the investigating officer (rather than the requester of information) to the word “identifiable,” maj. op. ¶ 28 (stating that the term “identifiable” relates not “to the records request but, rather, to the investigation“), the majority skirts the natural reading of subsection (4)(a) and fails to give effect to the legislature‘s intent. This has adverse consequences: Defining “identifiable” as capable of being identified by the investigating officer, while simultaneously permitting a requester to submit a request not tied to a specific incident, will necessarily result in the records custodian having to identify any incidents of alleged misconduct in response to a broad request.
¶61 Hence, despite the fact that the majority earlier suggests that “identifiable” refers to neither the requester nor the records custodian, id. at ¶ 24 (explaining that the phrase “specific, identifiable incident” does not refer to “who must identify those incidents as part of a request to inspect investigation files“), the inevitable result of its holding — that “a records custodian ... may not deny a request ... simply because the requesting party has not identified a specific incident of misconduct,” id. at ¶ 31 — is that a records custodian will be required to identify any incidents of alleged misconduct in response to a broad request. But, in my view, there is no textual support — grammatical or otherwise —for accepting an interpretation under which a custodian must take it upon himself or herself to “identif[y]” incidents of alleged misconduct at the outset. See
¶62 In fact, the opposite is true. A plain-text reading of the latter half of subsection (4)(a) proves my point. That half explains: The custodian, in response to a public records request, “may first provide the requester with a summary of the investigation file and if, after reviewing the summary, the requester requests access to the investigation file, the custodian shall provide access.” Id. (emphases added). The least strained understanding of this part of subsection (4)(a), which is clearly focused on the file documenting a completed investigation, is that “identifiable” qualifies the investigation file being requested.
¶63 A context-driven construction of both halves of subsection (4)(a), then, yields the conclusion that the request itself must “relate[ ] to a specific, identifiable incident of alleged misconduct.” In response to such a request, the custodian need only provide “a summary,” rather than summaries, and produce the corresponding “investigation file,” rather than multiple corresponding investigation files. See id. Splicing and dicing the subsection cannot cloud the legislature‘s choice to describe one public records request, corresponding to one investigation, with respect to one incident of alleged misconduct, as to which one summary may initially be provided, potentially resulting in the disclosure of one investigation file.
¶64 My understanding is further supported by the fact that the legislature did not outline a process whereby a custodian must determine which incidents fall within a more general, all-encompassing records request —a process that the majority‘s interpretation implicitly demands —or a procedure for challenging a custodian‘s determination if the requester suspects that not all of the files relevant to a broad request have been disclosed. Instead, the legislature contemplated only a situation where a requester knows that information has been withheld or redacted (because, at the outset, the request itself pertained to a specific, identifiable incident of alleged misconduct involving a member of the public):
Any person who has been denied access to any information in a completed internal affairs investigation file may file an application in the district court in the county where the records are located for an order directing the custodian thereof to show cause why the withheld or redacted information should not be made available to the applicant.
¶65 In sum, the plain meaning of the language in subsection (4)(a) leads to the conclusion that a
¶66 For the reasons articulated in this opinion, I respectfully dissent. I fear that today‘s decision will have undesirable consequences the legislature neither considered nor intended.
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT joins in this dissent.