THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRUCE SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 1-14-0039
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
May 18, 2016
2016 IL App (1st) 140039
JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Mason and Justice Fitzgerald Smith concurred in the judgment and opinion.
THIRD DIVISION. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. 10 CR 10937. The Honorable Clayton J. Crane, Judge, presiding.
¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant Dr. Bruce Smith, M.D. was found guilty of two counts of criminal sexual assault.
¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 We recite only those facts necessary to understand the issues raised on appeal. On August 2, 2002, defendant allegedly raped his patient T.T. during a gynecological examination. Approximately eight years later, on June 10, 2010, the State charged defendant with two counts of criminal sexual assault.
¶ 4 At trial, T.T. testified that at 8-months pregnant she scheduled an appointment with defendant because she had concerns about her baby. In the examination room, defendant directed T.T. to remove her underwear and place her legs in the stirrups on the examining table. She was not given a gown or a sheet and defendant did not leave the room while she changed. Defendant was paged out of the room several times and explained that a woman thought she was
¶ 5 After defendant left the room, T.T. wiped herself off, got dressed and immediately left the building without making a follow-up appointment. She then called her sister, Tonya, and friend, Erica Foster. Upon returning home, T.T. told the women what had happened with defendant and they encouraged her to call the police. Tonya insisted that T.T. speak with an advocate at the rape hotline who encouraged T.T. to go to the hospital to make sure her “baby was ok” and she “didn‘t have any diseases.” At the University of Chicago Medical Center (UC Medical Center), T.T. explained what had transpired to a nurse and doctor and underwent a rape kit. She spoke with a female Chicago Police Department (CPD) officer, but did not file a formal complaint because T.T. first wanted to inform her mother and boyfriend. Approximately 15 days after the incident, T.T. filed a formal complaint. In addition, she filed a civil complaint which she later voluntarily dismissed.
¶ 6 Numerous medical professionals and law enforcement officials testified at trial. Sandra Day, a UC Medical Center emergency room nurse, collected a blood sample from T.T. along
¶ 7 Defendant testified that after he delivered T.T.‘s child in 1998 she became his patient. On the day of the incident, defendant first gave T.T. an external examination and then performed an internal examination. When defendant began to remove his hands from inside T.T.‘s vagina, she placed her hand on top of his hand and guided it in and out of her vagina several times. Defendant believed this action was an “overture” and removed his pants. He then attempted to put his penis into her vagina, but was unable to do so, due to her position on the table. Consequently, T.T. slid down the table and defendant held her up as she guided her body onto his penis. No words were exchanged and T.T. did not tell defendant to stop. Defendant admitted that when he first spoke with the police and prosecutor about T.T.‘s allegations he lied and said that his penis never entered T.T.‘s vagina. Defendant also lied when testifying about the matter at an Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation hearing because he was worried about losing his license. On cross-examination, defendant remembered being paged out of the room only once and believed the examination had concluded before the sexual relations began. He never saw or spoke to T.T. after the incident.
¶ 8 After closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of two counts of criminal sexual assault (
¶ 9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, defendant contends that the prosecution of this case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and therefore, defendant‘s conviction should be reversed. When an appeal involves the trial court‘s application of the law to uncontested facts, the standard of review is de novo. People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 208 (2000). The primary objective of the court in construing the meaning of the statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Illinois legislature. People v. Botruff, 212 Ill. 2d 166, 175 (2004). Therefore, an analysis of a statute must always begin with the plain language of the provision. People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 193 (2005). “Words and phrases should not be construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute.” People v. O‘Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 91 (2001). In construing a statute, a court may also consider the reason and necessity for the
¶ 11 The State charged defendant with 2 counts of criminal sexual assault, under which the defendant “commits an act of sexual penetration” knowing that the victim “[i]s unable to give knowing consent.”
“(i) *** a prosecution for criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse may be commenced within 10 years of the commission of the offense if the victim reported the offense to law enforcement authorities within 2 years after the commission of the offense.”
720 ILCS 5/3-6 (i) (West 2002)
In addition,
“a prosecution for any offense involving sexual conduct or sexual penetration *** where the defendant was within a professional or fiduciary relationship or a purported professional or fiduciary relationship with the victim at the time of the commission of the offense may be commenced within one year after the discovery of the offense by the victim.”
720 ILCS 5/3-6(e) (West 2002).
¶ 12 Here, both parties agree that T.T. reported her sexual assault to police a few weeks after the incident. As such, the State‘s prosecution of defendant meets the statutory guidelines under section 5/3-6 (i) because criminal sexual assaults must be reported to “authorities within two years after the commission of the offense” and the prosecution “commenced within 10 years of the commission of the offense.”
¶ 13 Furthermore, defendant was charged with two counts of criminal sexual assault, which did not require the State to prove a professional relationship between defendant and T.T. Although the jury instructions mentioned that defendant was a medical professional, the instructions were given to establish whether the alleged assault was in fact part of the medical examination or whether T.T.‘s consent to the examination was vitiated such that defendant‘s conduct was a sexual assault. In other words, to prosecute a physician under the sexual assault statute, the State has the burden of establishing “what the reasonable medical standards were, that the physician intentionally transgressed those standards, and that the patient did not consent to the transgressions.” People v. Burpo, 164 Ill. 2d 261, 264-65 (1995). In this case, the jury determined that defendant‘s conduct was a sexual assault for which T.T. did not give knowing
¶ 14 Defendant also contends that the trial court failed to adequately conduct a Krankel inquiry into defendant‘s posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. When faced with a pro se post-trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a trial court makes a Krankel inquiry (People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)), which examines the factual basis of the claim to determine whether an appointment of counsel is warranted. People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78 (2003). If a defendant‘s claims, however, “indicate that trial counsel neglected the defendant‘s case,” the trial court must appoint new counsel. People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 52 (1992). A trial court may base its decision in a Krankel inquiry on: (1) trial counsel‘s answers and explanations; (2) a brief discussion between the trial court and the defendant; or (3) its knowledge of trial counsel‘s performance at trial and the insufficiency of the defendant‘s allegations on their face. People v. McLaurin, 2012 IL App (1st) 102943, ¶ 40. The issue of whether the circuit court properly conducted an initial Krankel inquiry presents a legal question that we review de novo. People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 28. But if the trial court has reached a determination on the merits of a defendant‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a Krankel inquiry, we will reverse only if the trial court‘s action was manifestly erroneous. People v. McCarter, 385 Ill. App. 3d 919, 941 (2008). Manifest error is error which is “clearly, evident, plain and indisputable.” People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384-85 (1997).
¶ 15 In the case sub judice, after receiving defendant‘s pro se motion of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court immediately determined that the circumstances warranted an appointment of counsel and APD Roper was appointed from the Public Defender‘s Office. Thus, the trial
¶ 16 We now look to determine whether defendant was “functionally unrepresented” by APD Roper and whether the trial court‘s denial of defendant‘s pro se motion was manifestly erroneous. APD Roper appeared at the May hearing on defendant‘s pro se motion, requesting a continuance to review the transcripts and filings. APD Roper then appeared on defendant‘s behalf at the September hearing and relayed to the court that she had thoroughly reviewed the pro se motion and underlying case, spoken to the necessary parties, and “according to [her] office policy and the policy according to case law,” she did not find any ineffective assistance. Thereafter, defendant amended his pro se motion and filed a subsequent motion seeking conflict-free counsel, alleging that APD Roper was unwilling to represent him because as an APD supervisor there was a conflict of interest given her relationship with defendant‘s trial counsel. The trial court, however, determined there was no conflict of interest. The court noted that “[a]lthough the outside perception from somebody who doesn‘t do this all the time may be that [APDs] back each[other] up. I have to tell you if you came and looked at my post-conviction call . . . and the degree with which members of the Public Defender‘s Office represent their clients, I don‘t find a conflict.” Therefore, the trial court did not find it necessary to appoint an independent third party, but allowed defendant leave to hire new counsel. In addition, APD Roper filed a motion for a new trial based on defendant‘s right to a speedy trial. Thus, we agree with the trial court that the record suggests no conflict of interest existed and cannot say counsel‘s refusal to pursue unmeritorious claims establishes incompetent or unwilling representation. See People v. Wilson, 164 Ill. 2d 436, 454 (1994) (counsel‘s failure to file a motion does not establish incompetent representation, especially when that motion would be futile).
¶ 17 Moreover, based on the record before us the trial court‘s denial of defendant‘s pro se motion was not manifestly erroneous. The trial court noted it reviewed all necessary documents, presided over the trial, heard witness testimony, and observed “the strategies used by various attorneys as they tried the case.” And thus, the trial court “found nothing to indicate” any error on defense counsel‘s part based on allegations contained in defendant‘s pro se motions, allegations that were “outside the purview of the jury” and would not have changed “the results of the trial.” See McLaurin, 2012 IL App (1st) 102943, ¶ 40 (trial court may base its decision in a Krankel inquiry on its knowledge of trial counsel‘s performance at trial). Therefore, the record demonstrates no clear error and the trial court properly denied defendant‘s pro se motion.
¶ 18 Finally, defendant maintains that the mandatory supervised released (“MSR“) term for a Class 1 felony, such as criminal sexual assault, is 2 years; however, the trial court imposed a three-year term. Defendant‘s entitlement to a correction of his mittimus is a legal issue that is reviewed de novo. People v. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430, 437 (2004).
¶ 19 A review of the applicable sentencing statute in effect at the time when the crimes were committed supports defendant‘s assertion. See
¶ 20 CONCLUSION
¶ 22 Affirmed; mittimus corrected.