People v. RochaPeople v. Rocha
In this appeal, defendant contends that he should have been given the opportunity to be present with counsel at a hearing on remand. In a supplemental brief, he further contends that the matter should be remanded to give the trial court an opportunity to exercise its discretion to dismiss his five-year prior serious felony enhancement under recent revisions to
We agree with defendant on both points and therefore reverse the order. On remand, the court shall hold a hearing to consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement under
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (
We affirmed defendant‘s conviction. He timely filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court, and subsequently filed a supplemental petition based on the newly enacted amendment to
On reconsideration, we again affirmed defendant‘s conviction. We remanded the matter to the trial court “for the trial court to exercise its discretion under
On remand, the court called the case “for hearing on remittitur.” The prosecutor was not present, nor were defendant or defense counsel. The court issued a written statement entitled “Trial Court‘s Statement of Discretion Resulting in No Change to Defendant‘s Sentence.” In that statement, the court stated that it “has considered the matter and declines to exercise its discretion and strike the 12022.53 allegation.” After summarizing the facts of the case and noting defendant‘s strike conviction and lengthy sentence, the court reiterated its decision not to exercise its discretion by striking the enhancement. The court stated that
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that he had a constitutional right to be present with counsel when the court exercised its discretion on remand. The People disagree. They argue that the proceeding was not a “critical stage” in the criminal prosecution, and “did not bear a reasonable and substantial relation to [defendant‘s] full opportunity to defend against the charges.”
Both positions are grounded in the state and federal constitutions and state statutory law. “A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel by the Sixth Amendment to the United States constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417.) This constitutional right to counsel exists “at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution, including sentencing.” (Id. at p. 453; see also People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 257 (Rodriguez).) Both constitutions similarly afford a defendant the right to be present at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution. (People v. Willen (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 270, 286.) Likewise,
We need not determine which party has the better constitutional argument. “Our jurisprudence directs that we avoid resolving constitutional questions if the issue may be resolved on narrower grounds.” (Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1102.) Here, the issues may be resolved on narrower statutory grounds, as evidenced in Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.4th 253.
Rodriguez presented an issue very similar to that here. After the Supreme Court held in People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 that a trial court had the discretion to strike allegations of prior strike convictions, the question arose as to the process due to the “narrow class of defendants whose sentencing courts . . . believed. . . that they lacked discretion to strike prior felony conviction allegations under the ‘Three Strikes’ law (
The Rodriguez Court began and ended its analysis with
The Rodriguez Court rejected the People‘s contentions that answering the question affirmatively in the context of a remand for resentencing under Romero would be “superfluous” and “inefficient.” (Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 258-259.) The Court explained, “The evidence and arguments that might be presented on remand cannot justly be considered ‘superfluous’ because defendant and his counsel have never enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to marshal and present the evidence supporting a favorable exercise of discretion.” (Id. at p. 258.) It further deemed “reasonable” the defendant‘s observation that “‘[i]t would have been a waste of the court‘s time for [defendant] to have attempted to present evidence which might convince the court to strike a “strike” at a time when the court believed it had no discretion to do so.‘” (Ibid.) The Court found that it would not be inefficient to require hearings and counsel in Romero
The Court then returned to
Rodriguez is indistinguishable from the present case. Defendant is within a “narrow class of defendants whose sentencing courts . . . believed . . . they lacked discretion to strike”
The Rodriguez Court held that it was “manifestly unfair” to permit the trial court to decide how to exercise its post-Romero discretion without input from defendants and their counsel. We arrive at the same conclusion and hold that it is “manifestly unfair” to permit the trial court to decide how to exercise its new discretion under
The Rodriguez Court eliminated the unfairness by remanding the matter to the trial court for “a hearing in the presence of defendant, his counsel, and the People to determine whether to dismiss one or more prior felony conviction findings pursuant to
We follow the Rodriguez Court and conclude that remand is necessary. Even under the Watson standard, which applies to errors of state law, reversal is required if it is reasonably probable that the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) That standard is met here: it is reasonably probable that input from defendant and his counsel would lead to a more favorable exercise of the court‘s discretion. As defendant points out in his opening brief, he was not given the opportunity “to emphasize mitigating evidence that weighed in favor of leniency.” Indeed, the trial court rested its decision primarily on the facts of the underlying crime and did not consider other factors defendant and his counsel may have been able to bring to its attention. A remand is necessary to ensure proceedings that are just under the circumstances, namely, a hearing at which both the People and defendant may be present and advocate for their positions.
Defendant argues that such a hearing should also include an opportunity for the trial court to exercise its discretion under
We agree with defendant that the trial court should consider whether to strike the prior conviction enhancement at the remand hearing. As the People concede, the law applies to defendant. (See People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 972-973.) The trial court‘s order sheds no light on how it might rule on this issue, and neither the People nor defendant had an opportunity to present arguments relating to the amended provisions. The scope of our previous remand does not restrict our authority under
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. The case is remanded with directions to the trial court to decide, at a hearing at which defendant has the right to be present with counsel, whether it will exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement under
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
MANELLA, P. J.
CURREY, J.