THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MILTON E. ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.
NO. 5-23-1099
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIFTH DISTRICT
02/05/24
2024 IL App (5th) 231099
JUSTICE
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Washington County. No. 23-CF-86. Honorable Daniel J. Emge, Judge, presiding.
NOTICE: Decision filed 02/05/24. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.
OPINION
¶ 1 The defendant, Milton E. Robinson, appeals the November 1, 2023, order of the circuit court of Washington County, granting the State‘s petition to deny pretrial release and ordering him detained. The defendant was arrested and detained prior to the effective date of Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act (Act).1 Because the defendant was arrested and detained
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 2 ¶ 3 On July 25, 2023, the defendant was charged by information with three counts of committing the offense of first degree murder in violation of
¶ 4 The Act became effective on September 18, 2023. See
¶ 5 Following discovery and several court appearances, the circuit court entered a written order on October 10, 2023, granting the State seven days to file a petition for pretrial detention. The circuit court also entered a docket entry on October 10, 2023, stating that the “Defendant requests the Court to reconsider his conditions of release.” On October 11, 2023, the State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release pursuant to
¶ 6 The circuit court conducted a hearing on the State‘s petition on November 1,
¶ 7 On November 7, 2023, the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal utilizing the Notice of Pretrial Fairness Act Appeal 604(h) (Defendant as Appellant) standardized form provided by the Illinois Supreme Court.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 8 ¶ 9 On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred when it granted the State‘s petition to detain because the State did not have the authority to file a petition to deny pretrial release due to the timing requirements of
¶ 10 The defendant further argues that, although the above issue was not listed in the defendant‘s notice of appeal, it is not forfeited since there is nothing in the circuit court‘s admonishments following a detention hearing that would put the defendant on notice that omitting an issue from the notice of appeal would result in the forfeiture of that issue. In
¶ 11 It is well established that our primary goal in interpreting a rule is to ascertain and give effect to the drafters’ intent, of which its language is the best indicator. Id. We consider the rule as a whole and give the words used by the drafters their plain and ordinary meaning, thereby ensuring that no part is rendered meaningless or superfluous. Id.; see also People v. Hilton, 2023 IL App (1st) 220843, ¶ 16. We further do not depart from the plain language of the rule by reading into it any unexpressed exceptions, limitations, or conditions, and we presume that the drafters did not intend an absurd, inconvenient, or unjust result. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 10.
¶ 12 If a rule‘s language is ambiguous such that the drafters’ intent is not apparent from its face, this court may use tools of statutory construction to help determine the drafters’ intent. See People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 117 (2005); People v. Foster, 2021 IL App (2d) 190116, ¶ 11. One such tool of statutory construction is the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expressio unius); meaning, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d at 117. Expressio unius maintains that if the drafters explicitly include certain language in one section of a rule, the exclusion of that language in another section can be interpreted as intentional. See generally Foster, 2021 IL App (2d) 190116, ¶ 11.
¶ 13 Here, the defendant states that subsections (a)-(c) of
¶ 14 The defendant argues that subsection (d) of Rule 605, which pertains to the entry of an order under the Act, states that the right to appeal an order under the Act will be preserved only if a notice of appeal under Rule 604(h) is filed. The defendant notes that subsection (d) does not contain any language regarding the forfeiture of any issue or claim of error. As such, the defendant argues that, since there is no admonishment requirement that would put a defendant on notice that omitting an issue from the notice of appeal would result in the forfeiture of that issue, all issues and claims of error are preserved by properly filing a notice of appeal under Rule 604(h). The State did not provide a response to this argument.
¶ 16 The purpose of an admonishment is to inform the defendant concerning matters that have been deemed necessary to make a proper decision. See generally People v. Saleh, 2013 IL App (1st) 121195, ¶ 16; People v. Phillips, 242 Ill. 2d 189, 200 (2011); People v. Dougherty, 394 Ill. App. 3d 134, 138 (2009). Our review of subsections (a)-(c) evinces that each of these sections require a specific written motion to be filed in order to perfect an appeal. The waiver language in subsections (a)-(c) of Rule 605 relates to the written motion and informs a defendant that the failure to raise an issue or claim of error within the written motion would deprive that defendant of a perfected appeal, and thus, the opportunity to raise the issue or claim of error on appeal would be waived. As such, the plain language of subsections (a)-(c) clearly states that waiver applies to the written motion since there is no mention of the notice of appeal within the waiver language.
¶ 17 Subsection (d) of Rule 605, however, does not require a written motion to perfect an appeal and only lists three admonishments that the circuit court is required to give a defendant following an order entered pursuant to the Act.
“(1) that the defendant has a right to appeal and, if indigent, to be furnished, without cost to the defendant, with a transcript or audiovisual communication or other electronic recording of the proceedings of the hearing;
(2) that the defendant, if indigent, has the right to have counsel appointed on appeal; and
(3) that the right to appeal the order will be preserved only if a Notice of Appeal under Rule 604(h) is filed in the circuit court within 14 days from the date on which the order is entered.”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 605(d) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023).
¶ 18 Under expressio unius, we find that the drafters’ language—which explicitly included a written motion and a waiver admonishment requirement in subsections (a)-(c) of Rule 605, while excluding that language in subsection (d)—to be intentional, as the drafters could have included such language in subsection (d) and did not do so. Since subsection (d) of Rule 605 contains no requirement for a written motion in order to perfect an appeal, there is no need of an admonishment to inform the defendant that failure to raise an issue or claim of error within the written motion would result in the waiver of that issue or claim of error. Further, this court cannot depart from the plain language of the rule by reading into it any unexpressed exceptions, limitations, or conditions. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 10. If this court would agree with
¶ 19 Although subsection (d) of Rule 605 does not contain a waiver provision, it does require an admonishment that “the right to appeal the order will be preserved only if a Notice of Appeal under Rule 604(h) is filed in the circuit court within 14 days from the date on which the order is entered.”
¶ 20 We further note that courts have generally held that the failure to object to an alleged error at the lower court level also forfeits the right to present that issue or claim of error on appeal. People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576 (1980). A criminal defendant who fails to object to an error has forfeited the error, precluding review of the error on appeal. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 175 (2005). “The rationale behind this result is ‘because failure to raise the issue at trial deprives the circuit court of an opportunity to correct the error, thereby wasting time and judicial resources.’ ” People v. Presley, 2023 IL App (5th) 230970, ¶ 28 (quoting People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 15). “This forfeiture rule also prevents criminal defendants from sitting idly by and knowingly allowing an irregular proceeding to go forward only to seek reversal due to the error when the outcome of the proceeding is not favorable.” Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 15. As such, although not subject to waiver, any issue or claim of error not properly objected to in the lower court and raised within the notice of appeal, taken in conjunction with any memorandum, remains subject to forfeiture.
¶ 21 In this matter, the defendant failed to object to the State‘s petition to detain and failed to raise the issue of timeliness of the State‘s petition in the circuit court. Thus, the defendant has forfeited this issue on appeal. Forfeiture, however, is a “limitation on the parties and not the reviewing court, and we may overlook forfeiture where necessary to obtain a just result or maintain a sound body of precedent.” People v. Gray, 2023 IL App (3d) 230435, ¶ 9 (quoting People v. Holmes, 2016 IL App (1st) 132357, ¶ 65). Given the recent enactment of the Act and the developing case law, we elect to overlook the defendant‘s forfeiture of this issue but take no position on forfeiture in future cases.
¶ 22 We will now address the defendant‘s argument that the circuit court
¶ 23 In this matter, however, the defendant, unlike the defendants in Vingara and Rios, had requested that the circuit court reconsider his conditions of release, as indicated by the circuit court‘s docket entry of October 10, 2023. There is no report of proceeding from the October 10, 2023, hearing within the record on appeal; nor was any bystander report or agreed statement of facts provided as allowed under Rule 323(a).
“an appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis.” Foutch v. O‘Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984).
“Any doubts which may rise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.” Id. at 392. Pursuant to the directive in Foutch, this court must presume that defendant‘s request to “reconsider his conditions of release” on October 10, 2023, could only stem from
¶ 24 When a defendant requests reconsideration of his conditions of release, pursuant to the Code, “[a]t that point, ‘the matter returns to the proverbial square one, where the defendant may argue for the most lenient pretrial release conditions, and the State may make competing arguments.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Carter, 2024 IL App (5th) 230977-U, ¶ 15 (quoting People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 23). Although the defendant argues that the State‘s petition was not timely pursuant to
¶ 25
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 26 ¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the November 1, 2023, detention order of the circuit court of Washington County.
¶ 28 Affirmed.
¶ 29 PRESIDING JUSTICE VAUGHAN, dissenting:
¶ 30 I agree with the majority‘s interpretation of
¶ 31 First, the Jones decision reached an opposite conclusion to that presented in People v. Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 16, and People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 23. See Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶¶ 19-22 (respectfully disagreeing with the decisions in Rios and Vingara finding that the State‘s petitions were untimely filed). The decision in Jones specifically found that the State was not barred by the timing restrictions in
¶ 32 Second, I believe Jones incorrectly states that the case “goes back to the proverbial square one.” While the State may argue for increased conditions of pretrial release when a defendant files a motion to modify pretrial conditions, the statute does not allow for the State to request detention as if the case were newly filed. The Act only allows the State to bring a verified petition requesting detention “at the first appearance before a judge, or within the 21 calendar days *** after arrest and release of the defendant upon reasonable notice to defendant” (
¶ 33
¶ 34 My colleagues further overlook that
¶ 35 The State may file a petition to revoke pretrial release and request detention only where (1) a defendant was previously granted pretrial release for a felony or Class A misdemeanor and was later charged with a felony or Class A misdemeanor that occurred while defendant was on pretrial release or (2) the defendant was previously provided pretrial release conditions and was subsequently charged with violation of a protective order or was previously convicted of a violation of a protective order and the subject of the protective order is the same person as the victim in the current matter.
¶ 36 What is important to note is that the State had the authority to request defendant‘s detention before the effective date of the Act.
¶ 37 As such, the “proverbial square one” is a misnomer. Timeliness for requesting a defendant‘s detention has, in modern times, always been required early in the case.
¶ 38 Here, the State‘s petition requested denial of pretrial release under section 110-6.1. However, such petition was untimely under both Vingara and Rios because pretrial release conditions were established prior to the filing of the State‘s petition. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 23; Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 16. Moreover, the State could not meet any of the criteria required for revocation of those pretrial conditions under section 110-6(a). As stated above, a request to detain is not an increase in pretrial release conditions under section 110-6(g). Accordingly, I find the court‘s order denying pretrial release was contrary to law.
¶ 39 Although defendant forfeited this error, my colleagues decided it prudent to overlook defendant‘s forfeiture in this case. For the purposes of this case, I adhere to my colleagues’ determination to overlook forfeiture but find the case should be reversed and remanded.
¶ 40 For these reasons, I dissent.
People v. Robinson, 2024 IL App (5th) 231099
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Washington County, No. 23-CF-86; the Hon. Daniel J. Emge, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys for Appellant: James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Jonathan Krieger, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Attorneys for Appellee: Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of Springfield, for the People.