THE PEOPLE, Plаintiff and Respondent, v. ANTOINE LEON RICHARDSON, Defendant and Appellant.
B335039
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT
Filed 2/19/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MA084241)
Lenore De Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Antoine Leon Richardson of being a felon in possession of a firearm, being a felon in possession of ammunition, and misdemeanor exhibiting a concealable firearm in public. On appeal, we conclude Richardson‘s conviсtions for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition are constitutional because only law-abiding citizens are among the class of people covered by the text of the Second Amendment. We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s implied finding that Richardson‘s convictions for possessing а firearm and exhibiting
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In September 2022, Mckyla Middleton went to a liquor store in Lancaster. As Middleton approached the store, Richardson accused her of cutting him off. Richardson walked into the store before Middleton and tried to close the door to prevеnt her from entering. After Middleton entered the store, Richardson continued to claim that she cut him off. Richardson cursed at Middleton and threatened to beat her up.
When Middleton left the store, Richardson followed her to her car. Middleton got inside her car, locked the doors, and started the engine. Before Middleton could drive away, Richardsоn approached the driver side window of her car and flashed a gun. According to Middleton, Richardson pulled part of the gun out of a satchel that he was wearing and said, ” ‘That‘s what you get.’ ”
The police searched Richardson‘s home in November 2022. They found many rounds of handgun and rifle ammunition inside a closet. The police did not find any guns in Richardson‘s hоme.
Richardson was later arrested and interviewed by the police. Richardson admitted that in September 2022, he was at the Lancaster liquor store, where he brandished a gun during an argument with a female. Richardson also admitted that the ammunition found inside his home during the November 2022 search belonged to him.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In an amended information, the People charged Richardson with being a felon in possession of a firearm (
A jury found Richardson guilty of counts 1 through 3. The jury also found that Richardson suffered three prior felony convictions and, as to count 1, it
Richardson appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Richardson‘s convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition do not violate the Second Amendment
Relying on New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen), Richardson contends his convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition must be reversed because
As a threshold matter, Richardson did not argue below that sections
When reviewing a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, we сonsider only the text of the statute, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual. (People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 474 (Alexander).) We will not invalidate a statute unless it ” ’ “pose[s] a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.” ’ ” (Ibid.) We independently review whether a statute is constitutional. (Ibid.)
The Second Amendment states, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” (
In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller), the United States Supreme Court invalidated laws banning the possession of handguns inside the home. (Id. at p. 635.) The Court recognized that the Second Amendment‘s protections are “not unlimited” and do not confer a “right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” (Heller, at p. 626.)
In McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) 561 U.S. 742 (McDonald), the Court held that the Second Amendment applies to states through the Fourteenth Amеndment. (McDonald, at p. 791.) The Court reiterated that nothing in its decision should cast doubt on laws prohibiting, among other things, ” ‘the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.’ ” (Id. at p. 786.)
In Bruen, the Court clarified its test for assessing the constitutionality of firearm regulations under the Second Amendment. The Court explained, “When the Second Amendment‘s plain text covers an individual‘s conduct, the Constitution prеsumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation‘s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual‘s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment‘s ‘unqualified command.’ ” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 24.)
Applying this test, the Court in Bruen struck down New York‘s concealed carry law, which required applicants to show proрer cause to get a license, because the law impermissibly prevented “law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 71.) The court explained that its decision did not call into question the constitutionality of ” ‘shall-issue’ ” licensing schemes implemented by 43 other states, “under which ‘a general desire fоr self-defense is sufficient to obtain a [permit].’ [Citation.] Because these licensing regimes do not require applicants to show an atypical need for armed self-defense, they do not necessarily prevent ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ from exercising their Second Amendment right to public carry.” (Id. at p. 38, fn. 9.)
Notably, the Court in Bruen acknowledged that its decision was consistent with Heller and McDonald, which held “that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of an ordinary, law-abiding citizen to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at pp. 8-9.) The Court also emphasized that the petitioners in Bruen, in whose favor it ruled, were “law-abiding” citizens and, as such, “part of ‘the people’ whom the Second Amendment protects.” (Id. at pp. 31-32.)
Here, sections
District held that these statutes do not violate the Second Amendment. (Alexander, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 477-480.) The court explained that the conduct criminalized by the statutes is not covered by the Second Amendment “because according to Heller and Bruen only law-abiding citizens are included among ‘thе people’ whose right to bear arms is protected by the Second Amendment.” (Alexander, at p. 478.) Since convicted felons are, by definition, not law-abiding citizens, they do not have the right to possess firearms under the Second Amendment. (Alexander, at p. 479.)
Several courts have since followed the same or similar reasoning as Alexander to uphold the constitutionality of sections
After conducting a thorоugh review of “sources from 17th-Century England, colonial America, and the early federal period,”
under custody or control, any ammunition or reloaded ammunition.”
Anderson concluded that “California‘s felon-in-possession firearm regulations comport with our national tradition of firearm regulation. In that tradition, categories of persons thought to pоse a danger to the community were forbidden to have arms, and individuals were sometimes disarmed as a consequence of being convicted of criminal conduct. When the founding generation framed and debated constitutional text, it considered such limitations inherent in the right the Second Amendment protects.” (Anderson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 589.) Anderson emphasized that “categorical disarmament laws are not inconsistent with the Second Amendment.” (Id. at p. 598.) Indeed, the court noted, the “historical evidence shows that individuals were disarmed as a preventative measure when the law assessed they were unwilling to respect sovereign authority, and they were disarmed as a sanction for criminal conduct, whether or not involving physicаl violence. California‘s felon disarmament measures are ’ “relevantly similar” ’ in serving both of these purposes.” (Ibid.)
We agree with the reasoning of Alexander, Odell, and similar cases that under the United States Supreme Court‘s precedent, only “law-abiding” citizens are among the class of people covered by the text of the Second Amendment. (See Alexander, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 478-479; Odell, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 316-317.) Because the possession of firеarms and ammunition by convicted felons is not protected by the Second Amendment, sections
Richardson contends the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in United States v. Duarte (9th Cir. 2024) 101 F.4th 657 (Duarte) compels a different result in this case. In Duarte, the Ninth Circuit held that a fеderal statute prohibiting the possession of firearms by anyone who has been convicted of an offense punishable by more than one year in prison was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. (Id. at pp. 670-691.) The court explained that the government failed to present any evidence that the defendant‘s underlying convictions, nоne of which were for
We decline to follow Duarte for a few reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc in that cаse, and the decision in Duarte has since been vacated. (See United States v. Duarte (9th Cir. 2024) 108 F.4th 786.) Second, even assuming Duarte remains good law, we are not bound by decisions of the Ninth Circuit (Donley v. Davi (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 447, 461), and we find more persuasive the California authority discussed above upholding the constitutionality of sections
Finally, we reject Richardson‘s contention that insufficient evidence supports his convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition “under a proper interpretation of sections 29800 and 30305.” As we just explained, those statutes are valid on their face under the Second Amendment. Richardson does not dispute that he possessed a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, nor does he contend that the People otherwise failed to prove he violated sections
2. The court‘s imposition of multiple sentences for Richardson‘s firearm-related convictions does not violate section 654
Next, Richardson argues the court erred when it did not stay his sentence for exhibiting a firearm in public under
Under
” ‘It is [the] defendant‘s intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible.’ ” (People v. Hicks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 784, 789.) ” ‘[I]f all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating оne objective, [the] defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once.’ ” (Ibid.) But if the defendant acts with multiple criminal objectives that are independent of, and not merely incidental to, each other, he may be punished for separate violations, even though the violations shared common acts or were part of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. (People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, 737 (Vasquez).)
A court‘s determination, express or implied, “that two crimes were separate, involving separate objectives,” under
Whether being a felon in possession of a firearm is a ” ’ “divisible transaction from the offense in which [the defendant] employs the weapon depends upon the facts and evidence of each individual case. Thus where the evidence shows a possession distinctly antecedent and separate from the primary offense, punishment on both crimes has been approved. On the other hand, where the evidence shows a possession only in conjunction with the primary offense, then punishment for the illegal possession of the firearm has been held to be improper where it is the lesser offense.” ’ ” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143 (Jones).)
Generally,
Here, the evidence supрorts an implied finding that Richardson possessed the gun before he flashed it at Middleton. Middleton testified that she saw Richardson pull part of the gun out of a satchel that he was wearing, while Richardson admitted that he “brandished” the gun from his waist. No evidence was presented that suggests Richardson fortuitously obtained the gun shortly before he threatened Middleton with it. Based on this evidence, the court reasonably could find that Richardson harbored separate intents when he possessed the gun—i.e., an intent to possess a firearm—and when he exhibited the gun in public—i.e., an intent to scare or threaten Middleton.
DISPOSITION
The trial court‘s judgment is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
GRIMES, J.