THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CRISTIAN RENTERIA,
S266854
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
August 25, 2022
Fifth Appellate District F076973; Tulare County Superior Court VCF304654
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred.
Late one August night, Cristian Renteria walked through a neighborhood in Tulare and fired a gun at a house. Then, after a dog barked next door, Renteria fired the gun at that house, too. For this episode — which fortunately did not result in any injuries — a jury convicted Renteria of two counts of shooting at an inhabited dwelling. (
Renteria challenged the gang penalties as unsupported by the evidence, but the Court of Appeal affirmed, relying on an expert‘s testimony that a gang member‘s acts of violence both benefit the gang and promote its members’ criminal activities by enhancing the gang‘s reputation for violence in the community.
We granted review to address the showing the prosecution must make to establish that
I.
Because this case concerns the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the gang penalties, we review the trial evidence in some detail. Evidence
A few days after the shooting, Officer Jacob Adney arrested Renteria. Earlier police contacts with Renteria indicated that he admitted being a Sureño2 gang member in 2008, when he was in middle school, and had been detained in 2011 on suspicion of spray painting gang-related graffiti in an abandoned house. After his 2014 arrest for the current offense, Renteria again admitted belonging to a Sureño gang. Renteria also acknowledged that earlier the day of the shooting he had been “hit up” — someone asked where he was from, a question understood to be a gang challenge. When Renteria heard what sounded like a shotgun being racked, he ran. Renteria assumed Northern gang members were responsible.
Jack D. testified that he lived with his wife and four grandsons and that neither his children nor grandchildren were involved in any gangs. An officer investigating the shooting noticed bullet holes in Jack‘s garage door and opened it to see if anyone was injured. No one was inside, but the officer saw a sawed-off shotgun in the garage.
Officer Adney testified as a gang expert. He explained that in gang culture, respect is everything and that gang members are expected to retaliate if they are the victim of a crime, otherwise they lose their respect. Officer Adney believed that a crime committed by a gang member would benefit or promote the gang, even if the victim were not a rival gang member, because people would see a gang crime in the news and would be reluctant to cooperate with the police or testify against the gang. Officer Adney said that unless gang members identify their gang during a crime, “[t]here‘s really no way — it‘s kind of hard to know which gang — if it is a gang, which gang is responsible.”
The jury found the gang allegation true for both counts of shooting an inhabited dwelling — that is, both for shooting at Jack‘s house and for shooting at the house next door with the barking dogs.3 On each count Renteria received a sentence of three years under
On appeal, Renteria argued, among other things, that there was insufficient evidence to support the gang allegations. A divided Court of Appeal rejected this challenge and affirmed the gang penalties. (People v. Renteria (Jan. 5, 2021, F076973) [nonpub. opn.].) Although the majority opinion noted that an unidentified companion may have been with Renteria at the time of the shootings, the court assumed that Renteria was not acting in association with or at the direction of another gang member. The court nonetheless determined
As evidence the shootings were committed “for the benefit” of the Sureño gang (
As for Renteria‘s “intent to promote, further, or assist” the “criminal conduct by gang members” (
After we granted review in this case, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which narrowed the scope of
parties agree Assembly Bill 333 applies retroactively to nonfinal cases, they disagree about the effect of Assembly Bill 333 on the gang penalties imposed on Renteria in this matter. We do not resolve this dispute because we conclude the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the gang penalties even under the law in effect at the time of Renteria‘s trial.
The gang enhancement statute was enacted in 1988 as part of the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP Act, or Act). (
The gang enhancement provisions provide one of two primary means by which the STEP Act punishes criminal gang activity. The first, codified in
offense” punishing ” ‘[a]ny person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang....‘” (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1130 (plur. opn.) (Rodriguez), quoting
The substantive offense and enhancement provisions “strike at different things.” (Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1138 (plur. opn.).) “[W]ith
The question in Albillar concerned the sufficiency of the evidence supporting gang enhancements for a forcible rape and other sex offenses perpetrated by gang members acting in concert. Upholding the enhanced sentences, we explained that the Legislature required the underlying felony be committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang “to make it ‘clear that a criminal offense is subject to increased punishment under the STEP Act only if the crime is “gang related.” ’ [Citation.] Not every crime committed by gang members is related to a gang. These crimes, though, were gang related in two ways: they were committed in association with the gang, and they were committed for the benefit of the gang.” (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 60.) Where three members of the same gang “actively assisted each other” and, because of their common gang membership, “could rely on each other‘s cooperation in committing these crimes,” there was sufficient evidence of both association and benefit — in particular, that the gang members “would benefit from committing [the crimes] together.” (Id. at p. 62.) On the latter point concerning benefit, we also cited expert testimony that the crimes bolstered the gang‘s reputation as a violent, aggressive gang. (Id. at pp. 62–63.) We explained that “[e]xpert opinion that particular criminal conduct benefited a gang by enhancing its reputation for viciousness can be sufficient to raise the inference that the conduct was ‘committed for the benefit of . . . a[] criminal street gang’ within the meaning of
As for the second requirement of the enhancement, we said that when the evidence “establishes that the defendant intended to and did commit the charged felony with known members of a gang, the jury may fairly infer that the defendant had the specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by those gang members.” (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 68.)
Albillar thus established that in cases where multiple gang members were involved in the charged offense, the fact of their joint involvement in a crime often provides sufficient evidence of association and benefit, as well as circumstantial evidence of an intent to promote the criminal activity of other gang members, in connection with the very same criminal offense. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 60, 68.) But for reasons Albillar makes clear, cases
III.
A.
In considering the nature of that showing, we start with the text.
We interpret this two-pronged requirement in light of the constitutional backdrop against which it was enacted. Decades before the STEP Act, the United States Supreme Court explained in Scales v. United States (1961) 367 U.S. 203 (Scales) that the Constitution limits the state‘s power to criminalize membership in particular groups, including groups that engage in illegal activities. As Scales put it: “In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity . . . , that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (Scales, at pp. 224-225.)
The Legislature was aware of Scales when it was drafting the STEP Act. (See People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 749.) And with Scales in mind, the Legislature wrote
In cases involving joint activity, the required nexus is generally shown by proof of criminal conduct undertaken in concert with other gang members. (E.g., People v. Castenada, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 750–751.) But in a case involving a lone actor, operation of the statute turns, at bottom, on the nature of the individual‘s actions and reasons for committing the underlying felony. Specifically, the statute requires proof that the defendant committed the underlying felony (1) for the benefit of the gang, and (2) with specific intent to promote, further, or assist the criminal conduct of gang members. Insofar as the statute “applies when a defendant has personally committed a gang-related felony with the specific intent to aid members of that gang,” it satisfies the “constitutional requirement of personal guilt.” (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 68, 67.)
Two features of the intent requirement are particularly relevant in lone-actor prosecutions. First, the specific intent to aid the criminal activities of a gang‘s members implies knowledge of the nature of at least some of those activities. (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131 [“One cannot intend to help someone do something without knowing what that person meant to do“]; see also People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 558 [to establish ” ’ “guilty knowledge and intent” ’ ” with regard to another‘s criminal conduct, the defendant must know “the perpetrator‘s criminal purpose” and “at least realize he or she is aiding” in the conduct].) As Scales holds, due process requires there be a significant connection between the defendant‘s “guilty knowledge and intent” and the criminal conduct of the defendant‘s associates — that is, “concrete” and “practical” encouragement of “specifically illegal activities.” (Scales, supra, 367 U.S. at p. 227.) Reading the statute against this backdrop, we infer that to satisfy the second prong of the statute, a defendant facing sentence enhancement allegations for a gang-related felony under
Second, the statute refers to the intent to promote “criminal conduct by gang members” (
always out of bounds; in Albillar we stated that the gang enhancement statute does not require that ” ’ “criminal conduct by gang members” be distinct from the charged offense.’ ” (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 66.) There, however, we addressed a context in which three gang members acted together; the charged offenses thus already involved each defendant assisting the criminal conduct of the other two gang members. But where, as here, the defendant acts alone, the criminal conduct of multiple gang members is not at issue. Because the showing of intent must include the intent to promote criminal activity by others, in a lone-actor case this necessarily means an intent to promote criminal activity other than the charged offense.8
B.
To establish the requisite intent in a lone-actor case, the prosecution has often relied on expert opinion about the potential for a gang member‘s crime to benefit the gang by, among other things, enhancing a gang‘s reputation for violence among rival gangs or in the community more generally. The prosecution has typically asked the jury to infer that the defendant committed the underlying felony in order to reap that reputational benefit, and, by enhancing the gang‘s reputation, to facilitate members’ future crimes.
This approach is not without basis in case law: We cited similar expert opinion in Albillar to support our conclusion that the concerted actions of gang members in that case conferred a benefit to the gang. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 63.)
Assembly Bill 333 has since placed clear limits on this approach by requiring a cognizable “benefit” to be more than purely reputational. (See fn. 6, ante.) But even setting these statutory changes to one side, there have always been limits to what expert testimony could show about a defendant‘s reasons for committing a crime. Without more, generalized expert opinion that commission of a particular crime enhances the gang‘s power in the community by increasing its reputation for violence falls short for at least two reasons.
First, this sort of expert opinion proves too much. If generalized testimony about the reputational benefits of a defendant‘s violent crime were, standing alone, sufficient to support an inference that the defendant committed the crime for the benefit of the gang, with specific intent to promote, further, or assist its members’ crimes, it would mean that essentially every violent crime committed by a gang member could be punished more severely under
Second, describing a benefit to the gang is only part of the equation; the prosecution must also establish that the defendant committed the underlying felony with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by other gang members — a requirement we have described as knowledge of at least some of the criminal activities of the gang and its members and intent to further those activities. Without more, evidence that committing a violent crime can enhance the gang‘s reputation for viciousness in the community does not support an inference that the defendant committed a particular violent crime for the benefit of the gang and with the intent to facilitate known criminal activity by other gang members.
None of this is to suggest that prosecutors may not rely on expert opinion to connect the defendant‘s crime with the conduct of the gang and its members; to the contrary, we have previously held that “[e]xpert opinion that particular criminal conduct ‘benefited a gang’ is not only permissible but can be sufficient to support the
The appellate case law offers guidance about how to ensure that expert reputation testimony is linked by specific evidence, rather than speculation or conjecture, to a defendant‘s gang-related goals in committing a particular crime. People v. Ochoa (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 650 is instructive. There, in a case involving a carjacking, the expert testified that carjacking
was a ” ‘signature’ ” crime of gangs generally, and its commission in that case would elevate the reputation of the defendant‘s gang. (Id. at p. 655; id. at p. 656.) The Court of Appeal concluded the expert opinion was based on speculation, however, finding no evidence the defendant engaged in
Some appellate courts have discerned in Albillar a broader authorization to rely on generalized reputation testimony. This overreads our opinion in that case; Albillar is best understood in light of its particular factual context.
We did state in Albillar that “[e]xpert opinion that particular criminal conduct benefited a gang by enhancing its reputation for viciousness can be sufficient to raise the inference that the conduct was ‘committed for the benefit of . . . a[] criminal street gang.’ ” (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 63.) But the showing in that case included evidence that three gang members together raped a young woman in an apartment ” ‘saturated’ ” with their gang paraphernalia (id. at p. 62) and then attempted to leverage their violence and gang membership when threatening the victim to stop her from reporting their crimes (id. at p. 53). Unlike expert testimony about the reputational benefits of crime in general, the evidence in Albillar demonstrated a connection between the gang‘s reputation for viciousness and the specific ways the gang benefited from that reputation, namely, the intimidation of specific, identifiable witnesses and the possibility that gang members might avoid prosecution or conviction for their crimes. And Albillar also highlighted the benefit the gang members derived from acting together (id. at p. 62), indicating that evidence supporting the associational element of the statute provided further circumstantial evidence of a benefit to the gang. Albillar therefore did not present a situation in which reputation evidence alone satisfied the gang enhancement statute in a case involving a felony committed
Nor do our other cases offer such authorization. In Gardeley, we found evidence supporting the
And in People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, we found evidence sufficient to establish “that Rivera specifically intended the murder [of a police officer] to benefit and promote the gang” when it showed that Rivera was an active gang member, that he participated in and pleaded guilty to offenses related to the gang‘s drug trade, that the officer killed had been leading an investigation of the gang‘s drug trade, and that the officer had questioned Rivera and searched his home regarding the investigation. (Id. at p. 332; see id. at pp. 331–332.) These facts not only connected Rivera‘s actions to the criminal activities of his gang and its members but also suggested “substantial participation” in those activities that would support an inference of knowledge and intent to facilitate them through the killing of the investigating officer. (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 630.)
In the end, any inference that might otherwise be drawn from testimony that “particular criminal conduct benefited a gang by enhancing its reputation for viciousness” (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 63) must be cabined so that
IV.
With all this in mind, we turn to the specifics of Renteria‘s challenge to the imposition of gang penalties for shooting at two inhabited dwellings.
As this guidance indicates, and as we reiterated recently, sufficiency determinations necessarily take account of the “standard of proof that applied before the trial court” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1008); that is why in criminal cases we must ensure the record demonstrates substantial evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (ibid.; see also People v. Soriano, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 281 [reiterating the standard of proof in reviewing sufficiency of gang enhancement evidence]).
This was a lone-actor case. True, as the Court of Appeal stated, “[i]t is not altogether certain defendant acted alone.” (People v. Renteria, supra, F076973.) The evidence did indicate that someone was with Renteria when he shot at Jack D.‘s house. But it did not establish who that person was or whether he or she was a gang member. The record therefore lacks substantial evidence that Renteria acted with another gang member in committing these offenses. So we proceed, for purposes of analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, on the premise that Renteria acted alone.10
In finding sufficient evidence to support the gang penalties, the Court of Appeal concluded that Renteria‘s actions intimidated the community in a way that both benefited his gang and demonstrated his intent to promote his own future criminal activity and that of other gang members. The court stated that Renteria‘s shootings intimidated rival gang members and neighborhood residents, increased his gang‘s control of contested territory, and therefore facilitated future crimes that he and his fellow gang members would commit. (People v. Renteria, supra, F076973.) The Attorney General similarly argues
The first and most fundamental difficulty with prosecution‘s case is that no substantial evidence shows that Renteria intended his actions to be attributed to his gang. The Attorney General points to evidence that, at some point on the night of the shootings, Renteria associated with a group that shouted out “Sur trece,” a gang slogan. But the description of events did not provide substantial evidence that this happened especially close in time to the shootings, and the record does not support the inference that, by walking along with the group earlier in the night, Renteria intended the later shootings to be attributed to the gang. Although the parties dispute the timing of events, the evidence shows that the group dispersed and, according to Anthony A., it was “a little while” later when Renteria returned and shot at the houses. When questioned by Anthony, Renteria minimized and distanced himself from the shouting, suggesting those involved were drunk and he was just helping them home. There was no evidence that Renteria identified himself or his gang during the shooting or took credit for it on behalf of his gang afterwards.
Nor does the record support a conclusion that Renteria could have reasonably anticipated the community would perceive a gang connection. No witnesses testified that they believed the shootings were related to a Sureño gang or gang rivalry, or that they feared Sureño gang activity. When the prosecutor asked one neighbor if he worried about testifying or feared for his family because of his role in the case, the witness denied such concerns; another neighbor testified that she was frightened by the shooting but did not connect it to gang activity, much less to Renteria‘s gang. Jack D. did not attribute the shooting of his house to gang activity either; he testified that he had not even been aware of it. And Anthony testified that he understood Renteria‘s companions to be shouting “slang gang words” earlier in the evening, but gave no indication he thought Renteria himself was a Sureño gang member or that he believed the shootings were related to a Sureño cause.
Equally important, no substantial evidence in the record supports the Attorney General‘s claim that Renteria intended the shooting to contribute to his gang‘s rivalry with Northerners. The Attorney General argues the evidence reasonably allowed the jury to infer that Renteria shot at Jack D.‘s house for the benefit of his gang because he was retaliating for being ” ‘hit up’ ” earlier the same evening. The record demonstrates that Renteria had
Finally, we see no other evidence from which the jury could infer that Renteria knew of and thus might have intended to promote the criminal activities of his gang‘s members. Renteria admitted being a Sureño when he was in middle school and a few years later police detained him at an abandoned house that had been spray painted with gang-related graffiti. Renteria again admitted being a Sureño when he was arrested for the current charges, but the prosecutor offered no evidence to show the degree of Renteria‘s involvement with the gang, to otherwise suggest his familiarity with the criminal activities of the gang‘s members, or to identify the criminal conduct Renteria‘s actions might have facilitated. (Cf. Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 62 [evidence that defendants had large gang tattoos on their torso, neck, and face and lived in an apartment ” ‘saturated’ with gang paraphernalia” showed their relationship with the gang was more than ” ‘superficial’ “]; People v. Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 331 [charged crimes involved defense of drug dealing territory and the defendant had previously pleaded guilty to offenses related to his gang‘s drug trade]; People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 699 [evidence of the defendant‘s prior law enforcement contacts “bolstered the prosecution‘s theory that he acted with intent to benefit his gang“].)
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it upheld the imposition of the
KRUGER, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
GUERRERO, J.