People v. PeasleyPeople v. Peasley
Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Clinton County (William A. Favreau, J.), rendered September 20, 2018, upon a verdict cоnvicting defendant of the crimes of aggravated criminal contempt and strangulation in the second degree, and (2) by permission, from an order of said court, entered July 1, 2021, which denied defendant‘s motion pursuant to
In February 2018, defendant was charged by indictment with, among other things, burglary in the second degree, aggravated criminal contempt and strangulation in the second degree.1 The charges stemmed from allegations that defendant, in violation of an order of protection, entered the premises where the victim was located and engaged in an altercation with her, during which he strangled her and caused her to suffer a physical injury.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal contempt and strangulation in the second degree but acquitted on the burglary count. He was sentenced, as a second felony offender, to a prison term of 3 to 6 years on the aggravated criminal contempt conviction, and to a prison term of four years, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision, on the strangulation in the second degree conviction. The sentences were set to run concurrently to one another, but consecutively to a prior, separate sentence that he was serving in connection with an unrelated March 2015 conviction for driving while intoxicated as a felony.2 County Court also imposed $5,000 in fines.
Defendant subsequеntly moved to vacate that part of the judgment convicting him of strangulation in the second degree asserting that newly discovered evidence in the form of an affidavit by the victim was disclosed after entry of the judgment of conviction that would have resulted in a more favorable verdict (see
We turn first to defendant‘s contention that his conviction of strangulation in the second degree is not supported by legally sufficient evidence and that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. “In reviewing legal sufficiency, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and evaluate whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the
Defendant dоes not contend that his actions were legally insufficient to support a conviction of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation. Rather, defendant asserts that the trial evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions caused the victim to suffer physical injuries or impairment from his obstructive act, which elevated the offense to strangulation in the second degree. As relevant here, “[a] person is guilty of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation when, with intent to impede the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another person, he or she . . . applies pressure on the throat or neck of such person[,] or . . . blocks the nose or mouth of such person,” regardless of whether injury results (
The trial testimony established that the victim and defendant had dated for two years prior to the altercation, at which time defendant was prohibited from communicating with her pursuant to an order of protection. On the day of the altercation, the victim was in the backyard of her sister‘s home when defendant entered without permission. The victim observed that defendant was inebriated and asked him to leave. Defendant initially obliged that request, only to return several minutes later with a bottle of champagne, proposing that he and the victim celebrate their anniversary. The victim told defendant that he should stoр drinking, took the bottle from his hands and threw it across the yard. Angered by the victim‘s response, defendant grabbed her and threw her to the ground face down. Defendant then sat on top of her, put his hands on the back of her neck, pulled the back of her shirt over her face and “pulled up on [her] neck” which сaused her to briefly lose her ability to breath. After a brief struggle, defendant momentarily paused his attack, which provided an opportunity for the victim to free herself, run into her sister‘s home and contact the police.
The victim testified that, as a result of the altercation, she sustained a broken pinky finger and damage to the cartilage in her nose that caused her pain for weeks. She also suffered bruising on her arms and neck, the latter of which resulted in “significant” pain resembling “whiplash” that lasted a couple of days. The victim sought treatment at an emergency room the following day, where she “got a splint for [her] pinky” and was prescribed over-the-counter pain relievers. One of the police officers that had responded to the altercation testified that the victim had recounted to him that, during the argument, defendant “grabbed her by [the] neck” and “threw her to the ground, at which point she had landed on her stomach” and then “lifted her shirt . . . over her neck and began squeezing it to the point where she was gasping for air and . . . couldn‘t breathe.” That officer also observed that the victim had “ligature marks” on each side of her neck as well as “a hurt pinky finger.”
We find that there is legally sufficient evidence supporting defendant‘s conviction for strangulation in the second degree. Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the injuries to the victim‘s neck and nose, which were established by the victim‘s and the officer‘s testimony, could reasonably be attributed to defendant‘s act of pulling thе victim‘s shirt
Defendant next challenges County Court‘s denial of his motion to set aside the verdict based upon newly discovered evidence (see
Based upon our review of the evidence produced at trial in comparison to the victim‘s affidavit, we find that County Court properly denied defendant‘s motion to vacate the judgment. The statements provided by the victim in her affidavit, which was submitted more than three years aftеr the altercation and two years after defendant‘s trial, directly contradict her testimony at trial when she clearly testified to the significant nature of the pain she incurred to her neck, the feeling of “whiplash” that she endured as well as the bruising to her neck as a result of defendant‘s obstructive aсt. Moreover, the victim‘s suggestion that her prior testimony was attributable to her failure to appreciate the implication of the words she used is inherently unbelievable, as the explanation she provides in her affidavit concerning her injuries is directly contradicted by the testimony she provided аt trial when she was unequivocal in describing the severity of the injuries she suffered to her neck (see People v Avery, 80 AD3d 982, 985 [3d Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 791 [2011]; see also People v Howard, 175 AD3d 1023, 1024 [4th Dept 2019]). Said differently, her testimony at trial does not reflect any indication that there was some misunderstanding concerning the significance of her injuries, and the recantation she presents now serves only to impeach and contradict her former testimony (see People v Thibodeau, 267 AD2d 952, 953 [4th Dept 1999], lv denied 95 NY2d 805 [2000]; see also People v Smith, 108 AD3d at 1077). Thus, we find that the victim‘s subsequent recantation did not present newly discovered evidence
Finally, we reject defendant‘s challenge to the severity of his sentеnce and the accompanying fines.5 County Court had the discretion to run the sentences consecutive to the sentence on defendant‘s March 2015 conviction (see
Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Pritzker and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment and order are affirmed.