People v. WintersPeople v. Winters
Decided and Entered: July 8, 2021
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Barkim Winters, Also Known as Black, Appellant.
Calendar Date: June 2, 2021
Before: Lynch, J.P., Clark, Aarons, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Colangelo, JJ.
Clea Weiss, Ithaca, for appellant.
Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), fоr respondent.
Reynolds Fitzgerald, J.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Sypniewski, J.), rendered September 6, 2017, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.
Defendant contends that his appeal waiver was overbroad and, as such, he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his right to appeal. “A waiver of the right to appeal is effective only so long as the record demonstrates that it was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006] [citatiоn omitted]). “[A] trial court must review the waiver and determine whether it meets those requirements by considering all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the waiver” (People v Sanders, 25 NY3d 337, 340 [2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). During the plea colloquy, “County Court failed to make clear to defendant that the appeal waivеr was not a total bar to defendant taking an appeal, nor did the court adequately ensure that defendant understood the contents or ramifications of the waiver” (People v Aponte, 190 AD3d 1031, 1032 [2021] [citations omitted], lvs denied ___ NY3d ___ [May 12, 2021]). Further, the record confirms that the written appeal waiver was overbroad in that it advised defendant that he was waiving “all matters relating to the conviction and sentence to the fullest extent that they may lawfully be waived” and that he was also waiving his right to appeal “any [c]ourt opinions, decisions and suppression hearing and other rulings that have
Turning to the merits, defendant contends that County Court improperly denied his motion to suppress the photo array identification as unduly suggestive, since the array listed defendant‘s legal name on the bottom of the array. “Unduly suggestive pretrial identificatiоn procedures violate due process and therefore are not admissible to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused” (People v Chipp, 75 NY2d 327, 335 [1990] [citations omitted], cert denied 498 US 833 [1990]). “While it is not requirеd that the individuals in a photo array be nearly identical to the defendant, their characteristics must be sufficiently similar to those of the defendant, so as to not сreate a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification” (People v Marryshow, 162 AD3d 1313, 1313 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
At the Wade hearing, a detective with the Sсhenectady Police Department testified as to the photo array identification process he utilized with the CI. The detective testified that he and the CI wеre the only ones in the room, that he read the standard form instructions to the CI, then gave the CI a closed manila folder containing the photo array. The CI opened the folder and, within approximately 5 to 10 seconds, stated, “[T]hat‘s Black” and pointed to defendant‘s photograph. Thereafter, the CI circled defendant‘s photograph and wrote his CI identification number in the circle. The CI never changed his answer or indicated any doubt as to defendant‘s identification. The detеctive further testified that he did not make any statements or gestures toward any particular photograph, nor did he make any threats or promises to the CI. Howеver, the detective testified that when he initially received the folder containing the photo array from another officer, he did not open it and
Anоther detective with the Schenectady Police Department testified that he managed the CI, including the controlled buy that occurred in November 2016, and that he initially asked the CI if he knew defendant by any name other than Black, and the CI stated that he only knew him as Black. The detective further testified that he never showed the CI any рaperwork that had defendant‘s name on it and never used any name other than Black when referring to defendant, nor had he heard any other officers use defendant‘s name in any conversations with the CI. Lastly, the detective testified that he created the photo array through the use of a computer program, that he generated two identical photo arrays with the exception that one contained the subjects’ names on the bottom of the array, and that he accidentally placed that array in the manila folder.
Although the inclusion of defendant‘s name on the photo array was atypical, it did not present a sеrious risk of influencing the CI‘s identification of defendant since the CI did not know defendant‘s name and only knew him by his nickname (compare People v Smith, 140 AD2d 647 648 [1988], lv denied 72 NY2d 961 [1988]). Based on the totality of the circumstances, and the similarities between defendant and the other men in the photo array, we find the inclusion of defendant‘s name did not render the photo array unduly suggestive (see People v Chamberlain, 96 AD2d 959, 960 [1983]).
Lastly, defendаnt contends that his sentence is harsh and excessive since he is a first-time felony offender battling addiction. “A sentence that falls within the permissible statutory range will not be disturbed unless it can be shown that the sentencing court abused its discretion or extraordinary circumstances exist warranting a modification” (People v Cancer, 185 AD3d 1353, 1354 [2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Westmoreland, 164 AD3d 1550, 1550 [2018]). “[A]lthough defendant has been released from prison, [he] is nonetheless on parole and [his] appeal is therefore not moot” (People v Hastings, 24 AD3d 954, 956 n [2005]; People v Stewart, 185 AD2d 381, 382 [1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 977 [1992]). The sentence imposed was in accordance
Lynch, J.P., Clark, Aarons and Colangelo, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Reynolds Fitzgerald, J.
Appellate Division, Third Department