People v. MullerPeople v. Muller
Kavanagh, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Columbia County (Nichols, J.), rendered June 19, 2007, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of murder in the first degree (two counts).
Defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of murder in the first degree in connection with the fatal shooting in June 2006 of his estranged wife‘s parents, Dennis Lynch (hereinafter
On the night of June 27, 2006, defendant went to the home of his in-laws armed with a loaded pump-action shotgun looking for his estranged wife. After he arrived at the premises, defendant was confronted by Lynch and, moments later, three shots were discharged from the shotgun mortally wounding Lynch and his wife. What transpired immediately prior to and at the time of the shooting was the subject of dramatically different testimony given at trial by defendant and his estranged wife. Defendant denied harboring any ill will toward his in-laws and claims that he went to their home to commit suicide in front of his wife who was seeking a divorce. He admits being armed with a loaded shotgun, but claims that the weapon accidentally discharged three times during a physical struggle that he had with Lynch shortly after he arrived at the premises. Defendant‘s wife, who was present in the home at the time of the shootings, claims that defendant came to her parents’ home intending to kill her and, while there, executed her two parents when they sought to intervene on her behalf.
The principal issue raised by this appeal concerns County Court‘s decision to bar defendant from asserting as an affirmative defense that he was acting under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance (hereinafter EED) when he fired the rounds from the shotgun that caused the death of his in-laws (see
Upon receipt of this notice—and over the next five months—the prosecution sent defendant‘s counsel a series of letters pointing out that the notice was not only untimely, but also inadequate and, as such, did not satisfy defendant‘s obligations under the statute.2 When defendant failed to provide any additional information regarding the prоposed defense, the prosecution on January 8, 2007—two months prior to the commencement of trial—filed a motion to preclude defendant from asserting any psychiatric defense at trial or from introducing any evidence regarding psychiatric treatment that defendant may have received prior to the incident. In an apрarent response to this motion, defendant, on February 7, 2007—almost four months after his arraignment on the indictment—filed a one-page document entitled “CPL 250.10 Supplemental Notice,” which stated that he would “present lay witness evidence only concerning the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.” Again, defendant did not prоvide any details regarding the content of this proposed testimony nor did he identify the existence of any mental infirmity or what role such infirmity played in his decision to deliberately shoot and kill Lynch and Lynch‘s wife (see People v Smith, 1 NY3d 610, 612 [2004]; People v Roche, 98 NY2d 70, 75 [2002]; People v LeFebvre, 45 AD3d 1175, 1175-1176 [2007]; see generally People v Ross, 34 AD3d 1124, 1125 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 879 [2007]).
One month prior to trial, defendant‘s counsel for thе first time disclosed that the EED defense he was seeking to assert
Despite the fact that defense counsel did not describe how defendant‘s depression and his attempts at suicide were causally related to the shooting and did not acсount for the significant delay incurred in providing this information to the prosecution, County Court decided to allow defendant to assert an affirmative defense at trial based on the existence of an EED. However, the court put in place certain conditions that had to be met by defendant or he would be precluded from raising this defense at trial. In that regard, the court specified that defendant had to provide the prosecution with an amended/supplemental notice in writing of its intent to assert this defense and to submit to a psychiatric evaluation by an expert employed by the prosecution (see
Initially, we note that the notification process contained in the statute “is designed to create a format by which psychiatric evidence may be prepared and presented manageably and efficiently, eliminating the element of surprise. With that in mind
Defendant argues that any preclusion order issued by County Court should have been limited to expert medical testimony that he sought to introduce in support of this psychiatric defense and should not have included lay testimony regarding his attempts at suicide or his chronic state of depression. In that regard,
Moreover, even if we were to conclude that County Court did not have an apрropriate basis to preclude defendant from asserting this defense based on the existence of an EED, defendant would not have been prejudiced because he has never established that the requisite elements of such a defense in fact exist. In that regard, defendant sought to offer testimony from lay witnesses, as well as medical records to establish that at the time of the shootings he was suicidal and depressed. However, while expert testimony is not an essential prerequisite for establishing the existence of such a defense (see People v Smith, 1 NY3d at 612), defendant was still obligated to prove that a relevant connection existed between his claimed mental infirmity and his decision to deliberately shoot and kill two innocent people (see id.; People v Roche, 98 NY2d at 75; People v Casassa, 49 NY2d 668, 677-678 [1980], cert denied 449 US 842 [1980]). Not only has defendant failed to state how he would establish that such a connection existed, but his task in that regard was made even more problematic by statements he made after the shooting but prior to his arrest,5 and sworn testimony he gave at trial, as well as arguments made on his behаlf during the prosecution and on this appeal—all of which are manifestly inconsistent with the essential elements of this psychiatric defense. Throughout this process, defendant has consistently maintained that this shooting was accidental—that this pump-action shotgun inadvertently discharged three times during his struggle with Lynch accidentally killing Lynch and his wife—and has nevеr acknowledged either personally or through counsel that he deliberately shot and killed the two victims while under the influence of an EED. In short, his contention that these shootings were the result of a tragic accident is so at odds with any claim that he deliberately shot and killed the two victims while under the influence of an EED, that it makes his assertion of such аn affirmative defense inherently implausible, and underscores the legal insufficiency of the evidence previously submitted by him in support of it (see People v Smith, 1 NY3d at 612; People v White, 79 NY2d 900, 903 [1992]).
We find no error in the restrictions placed by County Court on defendant‘s cross-examination of his estranged wife, or that its rulings in some way prevented defendant from establishing that his wife was hostile towards him or that this hostility might have in some way affectеd her trial testimony (see People v Wallace, 60 AD3d 1268, 1269-1270 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 922 [2009]; People v Ortega, 292 AD2d 792, 793 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 679 [2002]). In this regard, we note that his wife was subjected to an extensive cross-examination at trial, which included questions regarding her relationship with another man and her request for equitable distribution of the parties’ assets in a pending action for divorce. While some limits were placed on counsel by the court in his cross-examination of defendant‘s wife, it is simply inconceivable, given the attendant circumstances, that a juror would not recognize that his wife harbored an animus against defendant and would be hostile towards him (see People v Corby, 6 NY3d 231, 234 [2005]; People v Gosso, 41 AD3d 206, 207 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 876 [2007]; People v McNamara, 304 AD2d 908, 909 [2003]; People v Krug, 282 AD2d 874, 879 [2001], lv denied 98 NY2d 652 [2002]).
Furthermore, the prosecution was not obligated to provide defendant with recordings of taped telephone conversations he had with third parties while in jail awaiting trial. Such disclosure would be required if the prosecution intended to introduce the tape recordings into evidence at trial even if these recordings were not “made during the course of the criminal transaction” (
Defendant also claims that it was reversible error to allow Peter Rupp, his jail cellmate, to describe certain gestures he claimed defendant made while they disсussed the shootings. The gestures as testified to by Rupp were admissible as an integral part of a conversation he had with defendant regarding the shootings (see People v Campney, 94 NY2d 307, 311-312 [1999]; People v Lourido, 70 NY2d 428, 433 [1987]). Moreover, County Court limited Rupp‘s testimony to a description of the gestures, as well as to when, how and in what context they were made, while refusing to allow the witness to testify to his interpretation of their meaning.
Finally, defendant‘s sentence was not harsh or excessive. He stands convicted of the intentional murder of his wife‘s parents in the presence of his two-year-old son. We know of no circumstance in this record, given the gravity of the underlying crimes, which would warrant a modification of the sentence imposed by County Court (see People v Caruso, 34 AD3d 863, 864-865 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 879 [2007]; People v Walker, 12 AD3d 1107, 1108 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 804 [2005]).
Peters, J.P., Malone Jr., McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.