People v. CampneyPeople v. Campney
Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
Defendant urges that circumstantial proof is not permissible to allow an inference of assent to or adoption of a third party’s statement. This Court rejects defendant’s argument. Applying standard principles, we conclude that the trial court appropriately permitted the jury to consider whether defendant adopted his accomplice brother’s written statement. The order of the Appellate Division should, therefore, be affirmed.
A Stewart’s сonvenience store was burglarized on May 23, 1996. Thereafter, in connection with the burglary investigation, defendant Randy Campney and his younger brother, Burton Campney, were arrested and taken to State Police barracks for questioning. Defendant invoked his right to counsel and refused to speak with the officers. He was placed in a room, with one wrist handcuffed to a ring on the wall. Burton was interrogated elsewhere and gave a statement detailing how the two brothers burglarized the store. Burton’s statement was reduced to writing, but before he would sign it, he asked to speak with his brother, defendant-appellant here.
Accommodating Burton’s request, the officers brought him to the room where defendant was being held. The brothers conferred there privately for 10 to 15 minutes. When the investigators returned, they observed defendant holding Burton’s written statement. An officer, addressing himself solely to Burton, asked Burton if he was ready to sign the statement. Burton, in turn, asked his brother what he should do. Defendant — still holding the statement — replied, ‘You might as well sign it, you already told them all about what happened.” After this utterance, defendant handed the paper back to Burton, who thereafter signed it.
Defendant was indicted for burglary in the third degree. He moved to suppress his utterance, made in response to Burton’s question to him. The court denied the suppression motion, ruling that a foundation was laid for admission of the statement. The court also сoncluded that the statement was a spontaneous response to a question posed by Burton.
At defendant’s trial, one of the officers testified about defendant’s exclamation. Burton’s written statement was also
Following summations, the court instructed the jury that before it could consider defendant’s utterance as an adoption of Burton’s written statement, it had to find that defendant in fact made the response. The jury was further instructed that it had to satisfy itself beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, by making the response, adopted Burton’s statement as his own — the document he held in his hand at the very time he made his response. The court concluded these instructions by stating that, only after these two criteria were met, could the jury consider and weigh defendant’s utterance as an adoptive admission of Burton’s statement. The jury convicted defendаnt of burglary in the third degree and he was sentenced by the court as a second felony offender.
The Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting Burton’s confession into evidence during the People’s casein-chief. The Appellate Division reasoned that County Court (in determining whether an appropriate foundation had been established) and the jury (in determining whether defendant adopted Burton’s stаtement) were entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the direct evidence presented, including that the brothers had discussed the statement, and that defendant had read it and adopted it as his own. The dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to this Court. We are persuaded that the rulings at both lower courts are correct.
Generally, an adoptive admission is allowed when a party acknowledges and assents to something “already uttered by another person, which thus becomes effectively the party’s own admission” (4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1069, at 100 [Chadbourn rev] [emphasis in original]). This Court has cautioned that “[a]n individual’s reaction to a[n] * * * accusatory query is inadmissible as evidence of guilt, state of mind or as a demonstrative act unless at the threshold the People demonstrate that the person heard the assertion and comprehended its implications” (People v Lourido,
The determination whether a threshold foundation has been established for the admissibility of the declaration or manifested act is made by the trial court, in light of “all the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident,” while the “value or effect of this evidence” is weighed by the jury (People v Ferrara,
In People v Ferrara (supra), the Court considered an accomplice’s declaration that defendant was the person who had committed a part of the crime charged. It held that defendant’s response of shrugging his shoulders was admissible because defendant heard the statement, had knowledge of what was said, and was not prevented from replying to it (People v Ferrara, supra,
In the instant case, defendant and his brother were left alone to confer for 10 to 15 minutes, at Burton’s specific request, after he made a full confession of joint criminal responsibility for the crime under investigation. Defendant was observed holding Burton’s unsigned, written statement after the private meeting, when the police officers reentered the room. At the same time, defendant responded to Burtоn’s request for advice as to whether he, Burton, should sign the statement with, “You might as well sign it, you already told them all about what happened.” Based on these circumstances, we do not agree with the dissent’s conclusion that the People presented insufficient evidence for the jury to infer that defendant read Burton’s statement. The trial court is the proper forum, in any event, to which that factual and inferential weighing responsibility for such matters is assigned in the first
Defendant’s contention that “circumstantial evidence” can never be used to justify admission of the statement finds no support in the authorities or in sound logic. When an adoptive admission involves defendant’s acquiescence by silence, this Court has noted that “[t]here are circumstances in which the declarations of persons made in the presence of an accused are competent; but they are regarded as dangerous and should always be received with caution and should not be admitted unless the evidence clearly brings them within the rule” (People v Conrow,
The “danger” to which this Court adverted, however, is avoided when, as here, a defendant explicitly manifests an awareness of a statement and acceptance of the import of its contents (cf., People v Woodward,
Defendant’s other contentions have been considered and do not merit explication.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). Because the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence, as an adoptive admission, a written confession by defendant’s brother implicating defendant, and defendant’s response to his brother’s inquiry regarding whether he should sign the confession, I dissent.
I.
In September 1996,. defendant Randy Campney and his brother Burton were arrested for the burglary of a Stewart’s convenience store committed on May 23, 1996 in the Town of Chester, Wárren County. Bоth defendant and Burton were taken to the police station for interrogation. Defendant immediately invoked his right to counsel.
Burton gave police a statement detailing how he and defendant had burglarized the store. The statement was reduced to a writing and Burton was asked to sign it. Burton requested the opportunity to first speak with defendant who was located in another interrogation room. Once there, Burton privately conferred with defendant for apрroximately 10-15 minutes. Thereafter, two officers returned to the interrogation room, observed defendant holding the written statement and asked Burton whether he was prepared to sign the statement. Burton, in turn, asked defendant whether he should sign, to which
Defendant moved to suppress Burton’s written confession and defendant’s rеsponse to Burton’s inquiry regarding whether Burton should sign it. At the hearing, the People called two officers as witnesses. Each testified that he neither heard the conversation between defendant and Burton nor saw defendant read the statement. Both testified, however, that defendant was holding the written statement when they entered the interrogation room. Moreover, one officer could not attest to defendant’s response when Burton was asked whether he would sign the written confession. Defense counsel asked and the officers acknowledged that defendant had invoked his right to counsel prior to the time he allegedly responded to Burton’s question regarding whether he should sign the confession.
Defendant also testified at the suppression hearing. He testified that he never told Burton to sign the statement, stating, “That is ludicrous. I never would have said something like that if I had known what was on that paper.” He stated that he had not read Burtоn’s statement and did not know its contents. Instead, defendant testified that when he and Burton conferred, he was just trying to find out “what had happened” because Burton appeared “confused” and “disoriented.” Again, defense counsel inquired whether defendant had invoked his right to counsel at the time he allegedly made the statement. Defendant responded in the affirmative.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Judge credited the testimony of the officers and found that a proper foundation was laid for the admission of Burton’s written statement. The court found that the statement was admissible, not as a codefendant’s statement, but rather as “a statement given by a co-defendant that has been adopted, if the jury believes the facts of this case, it’s been adopted by the other defendant.” The court further stated, “I will give * * * [the jury] an instruction as it relates to the fact, whether or not the defendant did in fact say go ahead and sign it. And secondly, by sо stating, did he adopt as his own the admission contained in Burton Campney’s statement. There is obviously a dispute to what happened, but that is what juries are for.”
During trial, the People called Burton to testify, in contravention of their initial position not to call him as a witness. Once on the witness stand, Burton recanted his written confession,
At the close of the evidence, the court charged the jury regarding the use of Burton’s written statement and defen-, dant’s subsequent response. The court instructed,
“you [the jury] must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement number 1, attributed to the defendant was, in fact, made by him and number 2, that by making such statement the defendant adopted as his own the statement of Burton Campney. * * * [I]f you have reasonable doubt as to either or both of those you must disregard the [defendant’s] statement and the statement of Burton Campney and give it no weight whatsoever, as it has no binding effect on the defendant.”
The jury returned a guilty verdict and defendant was sentenced accordingly.
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error by, among other things, permitting Burton’s written statement into evidence and defendant’s statement as an adoptive admission. The Appellate Division affirmed, with one Justice dissenting.
II.
An adoрtive admission occurs when evidence exists to support the conclusion that an accused assents to the truth of a statement made by another (2 McCormick, Evidence, § 261, at 172 [4th ed 1992]). Thus, when a statement or declaration which tends to incriminate one accused of a crime is made in the presence and hearing of that person and such a statement is not denied or objected to by the accused, the statement, as well as the accused’s fаilure to deny the statement is generally admissible as evidence demonstrating his or her acquiescence to the truth of the statement (People v Allen,
The statement made in the presence of the accused is received into evidence for the limited purpose of establishing
Central to the disposition of the instant case is whether the People properly laid the foundation for introducing Burton’s written confession and defendant’s response as an adoptive ' admission by establishing that defendant heard, or in this case at least read, the written confession and fully “comprehended its implications” (People v Lourido, 70 NY2d, supra, at 433; People v Kennedy, 164 NY, supra, at 457; People v Robinson,
In this case, it is undisputed that the People failed to establish that defendant read Burton’s statement. Moreover, no one heard the conversation between defendant and Burton. Thus, it is imрossible to determine whether Burton fully discussed the written statement with defendant and whether Burton told defendant that he had, in fact, implicated him in the statement (see, e.g., People v Woodward,
Moreover, the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the jury was entitled to “draw whatever reasonable inferences flowed from the direct evidence presented” (
Indeed, we have stated that despite the competency of declarations made in the presence of an accused, such evidence is “regarded as dangerous, and should always be received with caution” (People v Kennedy, supra, at 456-457). Tacit adoptions are viewed as dangerous because of the ambiguity of silence. Accordingly, this Court has established the foundational safeguards which serve to minimize the misuse of this type of evidence. The policy rationale underlying this Court’s warning against the use of adoptive admissions is illustrated in the instant case. Because the People failed to demonstrate that defendant heard or read Burton’s statement and understood the
Evidence exists to support the conclusion that defendant’s words were not an adoption of Burton’s statement. Significantly, it is undisputed that defendant immediately invoked his right to counsel upon arrest. Acquiescing in a written statement which incriminated him would be completely contrary to the invocation of his right to counsel. Indeed, the People’s argument that defendant was a “sophisticated defendant” only buttresses this conclusion. Thus, absent the foundational showing that defendant heard or read the statement and understood the implications of advising Burton to sign the confession, the statement shоuld have been suppressed.
Even assuming that circumstantial evidence may be used to indicate an adoptive admission, that evidence here was inadequate.
Moreover, to date, when this Court has permitted a statement as an adoptive admission, it has been a statement that accused a defendant, and a defendant alone, of the act (see, e.g., People v Ferrara,
Finally, Burton’s written confession implicating defendant was the only evidencе linking defendant to the crime. Thus, it cannot be concluded that any error in admitting this evidence was harmless (see, People v Crimmins,
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Levine, Ciparick, Wesley
Order affirmed.
Notes
The dissent does not contend that an adoptive admission can never be proved by circumstantial evidence. Rather, in this case, the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove that the defendant’s statement was an admission of his guilt.