People v. MilnerPeople v. Milner
Justices Johnson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Mitchell specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 The circuit court ordered defendant Anthony Milner detained pending trial, under the dangerousness standard set out in
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 2 ¶ 3 Mr. Milner stands charged, personally or through a theory of accountability, with numerous
¶ 4 Mr. Milner was arrested prior to the amendments to
¶ 5 On the date of the hearing, the State petitioned for Mr. Milner to be detained pretrial. It argued, pursuant to
¶ 6 Mr. Milner represented himself at the November 14, 2023, hearing on the State‘s petitions. He argued that because the State had not filed a petition at his first court appearance, it was,
¶ 7 The State argued that the timing requirements in
¶ 8 The State proffered evidence supporting the charges in each of Mr. Milner‘s four cases. On appeal, Mr. Milner does not challenge the substantive merits of the State‘s petitions or of the evidence presented. The court concluded that the proof was evident and the presumption great that Mr. Milner had committed the charged offenses, that he “posed a real and present threat to the safety of people and the community,” and that there were “no conditions or combination of conditions that [could] mitigate [that] real and present threat.” It noted that in a period of four months, Mr. Milner was charged with shooting four people, killing two and seriously wounding two others, offenses for which he faced life in prison.
¶ 9 The State‘s evidence—which included the testimony of complaining witnesses, eyewitness identifications, video evidence, and identification by a detective who was familiar with Mr. Milner—was, in the circuit court‘s view, “fairly overwhelming.” The circuit court also took
¶ 10 Mr. Milner did not appeal within 14 days. Instead, on May 22, 2024, he filed a “response” in each of his cases to the State‘s petitions for pretrial detention, as well as a motion for reconsideration of the court‘s detention order. The circuit сourt treated those filings as a request, made pursuant to
¶ 11 In his filings, and at the hearing held on May 29, 2024, Mr. Milner again argued that the State‘s petitions were untimely under
¶ 12 Noting that courts had “disagreed on when petitions can be filed,” the circuit court again concluded that the State‘s petitions were timely. The judge told Mr. Milner, “You can certainly disagree and you can appeal it.”
¶ 13 The circuit court agreed with the State that continued detention was necessary. The court again noted that Mr. Milner had five pending cases, with five separate victims, all involving violent crimes. Electronic monitoring and home confinement, which “cannot prevent people from possessing weapons, from being out and about, [or] from threatening potential witnesses” were, in the court‘s view, “absolutely not appropriate,” given the fact that Mr. Milner “face[d] potentially
¶ 14 On June 7, 2024, Mr. Milner filed such a motion. He again argued that the State‘s petitions were untimely, and the circuit court again rejected that argument.
¶ 15 Mr. Milner now appeals.
II. JURISDICTION
¶ 17 On May 29, 2024, the circuit court considered whether Mr. Milner should continue to be detained pretrial and entered an order concluding that he should. As a prerequisite to this appeal (
¶ 18 The State argues that we lack jurisdiction to consider Mr. Milner‘s appeal, however, because the issue he is appealing—the timeliness of the State‘s petitions for pretrial detention—was first decided by the circuit court on November 14, 2023. At that time, Rule 604(h) required a notice of appeal from a pretrial detention order to be filed within 14 days of the entry or denial of the order.
¶ 19 In support of this argument, the State cites our decision in People v. Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482. There, as here, the defendant did not file a notice of appeal from the circuit court‘s initial pretrial detention order within 14 days but filed a timely appeal from the court‘s subsequent order finding that continued detention was appropriate. Id. ¶ 26. We concluded that the issues the defendant in that case sought to appeal—including the timeliness of the State‘s petition—arose from the circuit court‘s initial pretrial detentiоn order, which we had lost the ability to review. Id. ¶ 28. We reached the same conclusion in People v. Castle, 2024 IL App (1st) 240669-U, ¶¶ 19-21, and People v. Cross, 2024 IL App (1st) 240616-U, also cited by the State.
¶ 20 Replies are not typically filed in appeals from pretrial detention orders but may be allowed “by order of court for good cause shown.”
¶ 21 Retroactivity is a question we review de novo, employing the same analytical framework used to determine whether statutory amendments should be applied retroactively. People v. Easton, 2018 IL 122187, ¶¶ 13-14. In Illinois,
¶ 22 Mr. Milner argues that because he filed his pro se notices of appeal on June 7, 2024, after Rule 604(h) was amended, there were still ongoing proceedings that the amended rule could retroactively apply to. He notes that the same was not true in the cases the State relies on. See Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482, ¶ 14 (notice of appeal filed on December 19, 2023); Castle, 2024 IL App (1st) 240669-U, ¶ 12 (notice of appeal filed on March 18, 2024); Cross, 2024 IL App (1st) 240616-U, ¶ 27 n.4 (date not specified, but noting that the notice of appeal was filed before the amendments to Rule 604).
¶ 23 This argument presumes that the filing of a notice of appeal is merely procedural. We acknowledge that courts have referred to the notice of appeal as a “procedural device.” Lake County Grading Co. v. Forever Construction, Inc., 2017 IL App (2d) 160359, ¶ 34. But our supreme court has distinguished between statutory time periods that merely fix the time within which a remedy may be sought and those that confer jurisdiction, as the filing of a notice of appeal plainly does. See Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 208-09 (1985) (holding that the statutory requirement that a complaint for administrative review be filed within 35 days was substantive in nаture because it was necessary to convey jurisdiction on the circuit court to hear the matter).
¶ 24 At least one panel of this court has concluded that the filing of a notice of appeal is procedural and that the new rule therefore applies retroactively if the defendant‘s notice of appeal was filed after the amendment‘s effective date. See People v. Lasenby, 2024 IL App (1st) 240918-U, ¶ 26. But because the defendant in that case filed his notice of appeal before the amendment took effect, the court had no need to consider whether retroactive application means that we may go back and review an initial pretrial detention order even where subsequent hearings have been held and subsequent detention orders entered. Under such circumstances, the initial order may no longer represent the basis on which the defendant is being held. Given this uncertainty, we are not inclined to decide this issue where, for the reasons below, we believe other grounds for our jurisdiction exist.
¶ 25 Mr. Milner reintroduced his argument regarding the timeliness of the State‘s petitions—in his May 22, 2024, motion (and at the May 29, 2024, hearing on that motion) and in his June 7, 2024, motion for reconsideration—and the record reflects that, at both junctures, the circuit court considered the argument anew, expressly incorporated its prior findings, and restated its ruling. We held in People v. Triplett, 2024 IL App (2d) 230388, ¶ 11, that where the circuit court reaffirms its prior ruling on the timeliness of the State‘s petition in an order for continued pretrial detention, that issue is reviewable on appeal from the latter order. See People v. Williams, 2024 IL App (1st) 240480-U, ¶¶ 26-27 (distinguishing Hongo and following Triplett). That is true here, and that is the basis on which we find we have jurisdiction to consider these consolidated appeals and, specifically, to consider Mr. Milner‘s argument that the detention petitions filed by the State were untimely.
III. ANALYSIS
¶ 27 Mr. Milner‘s sole argument on appeal—that the State‘s petitions for pretrial detention were untimely—is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. People v. Ramyyeh, 2024 IL App (1st) 240299, ¶ 10. When interpreting a statute, our primary objective “is to ascertain and give effect tо the legislature‘s intent,” looking to “the language of the statute, given its plain
¶ 28 Here,
¶ 29 The State urges us to follow those decisions holding that detention petitions were timely under such circumstances. That is the position this court took in People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807. The defendant in that case, like Mr. Milner, had monetary bail set and was in custody when the Pretrial Fairness Act amendments took effect. Id. ¶ 2. He petitioned to remove the financial conditions of his pretrial release, prompting the State to request a pretrial detention hearing. Id. The defendant in Whitmore argued both that
“(a) On or after [the effective date], any person having been previously released pretrial on the condition of the deposit of security shall be allowed to remain on pretrial release under the terms of their original bail bond. This Section shall not limit the State‘s Attorney‘s ability to file a verified petition for detention under Section 110-6.1 or a petition for revocation or sanctions under Section 110-6.
(b) On or after [the effective date], any person who remains in pretrial detention after having been ordered released with pretrial conditions, including the condition of depositing security, shall be entitled to a hearing under subsection (e) of Section 110-5.”
¶ 31 The Whitmore court rejected that argument, relying on the imperative in
¶ 32 The Whitmore court then considered the defendant‘s alternative argument, mаde here by Mr. Milner, that the State was barred by a plain reading of the timing requirement in
¶ 33 The Whitmore court instead concluded that the only way “[t]o give meaning to all the provisions in the Code” was to read
“for individuals detained prior to the effective date of the Act who elect to seek relief under the amended Code—and only for such individuals—the State may file a petition for the denial of pretrial release ‘at the first appearance before a judge’ after the effective date of the Act.” (Emphasis added.) Id. (quoting
725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022) ).
The defendant in Whitmore had moved for relief from the financial conditions of his release, and the hearing on that motion was “his first appearance before a judge since the Act became effective.” Id. ¶ 16. The State filed its petition that same day, to be heard at the same hearing, and the petition was therefore timely. Id.
¶ 34 Building on the holding in Whitmore, the court in People v. McDonald, 2024 IL App (1st) 232414, ¶ 28, recently considered a slightly different set of cirсumstances—where the State also petitioned for pretrial detention in response to the defendant‘s petition for pretrial release under the Pretrial Fairness Act, but where it did not do so at the defendant‘s very first appearance following the Act‘s effective date. The defendant in McDonald filed his petition for pretrial release on October 17, 2023. Id. That was his first appearance before a judge following the effective date of the amended statute. Id. The hearing was continued, however, until November 1, 2023 (14 days later), and it was not until this second appearance before the court following the effective date of the amended statute that the State filed its petition for pretrial detention. Id. Extending the analysis in Whitmore, the McDonald court concluded that the State‘s detention petition was timely. Id. By petitioning for pretrial release, the defendant had “opened the door to proceedings dictated by the amended statute, including the State‘s ability to file a pretrial detention petition in response.” Id. In the court‘s view, a defendant should not be able to avail himself of the benefit of the amended statute without also subjecting himself to the procedures it dictated. Id.; see also People v. Watson, 2024 IL App (1st) 240207-U, ¶¶ 28-43 (Tailor, J., dissenting) (following McDonald).
¶ 35 A number of other panels of this court have concluded, like the Whitmore court, that the timing requirements in
¶ 36 Mr. Milner urges us instead to follow two cases—People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (1st) 231890, and People v. Watkins-Romaine, 2024 IL App (1st) 232479, appeal allowed,
¶ 37 We are likely soon to have guidance on this issue, as our supreme court heard argument in Watkins-Romaine on September 10, 2024. We believe, however, that the answer to the question presented by this appeal is far simpler than either the parties’ arguments or these cases imply.
¶ 38 Nothing in
¶ 39 That said, we do believe the appropriate mechanism for the State to argue that no conditions of pretrial release are adequate in a reopened hearing on the conditions of release is a verified
¶ 40 Here, it was Mr. Milner, and not the State, who initiated proceedings under the Pretrial Fairness Act by requesting, pursuant to
IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the above reasons, we affirm the circuit court‘s order detaining Mr. Milner pending trial.
¶ 43 Affirmed.
¶ 44 JUSTICE MITCHELL, specially concurring dubitante.
¶ 45 I agree with my colleagues that the State can bring a petition to detain under the
People v. Milner, 2024 IL App (1st) 241284
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 18-CR 1297101, 19-CR-0760001, 19-CR-0908701; the Hon. Diana L. Kenworthy, Judge presiding.
Attorneys for Appellant: James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Benjamin Wimmer, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Attorneys for Appellee: Kimberly M. Foxx, State‘s Attorney, of Chicago (Andre L. Milton, Assistant State‘s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.