People v. CastlePeople v. Castle
¶ 1 Held: Affirming the trial court‘s continued detention order, where the court properly found that continued detention was necessary to avoid the safety threat posed by defendant.
¶ 2 Defendant, Malik Castle, appeals the trial court‘s order for his continued detention. The record shows that defendant was charged with robbery (
¶ 3 Defendant apparently was initially denied pretrial release on October 13, 2023, the day after his arrest, although no orders, transcripts, or other documents appear in the record on appeal from these initial proceedings. Thereafter, on March 6, 2024, defendant filed a motion for pretrial release pursuant to
¶ 4 That same day, the trial court held a hearing on defendant‘s motion. At that hearing, the State proffered that the
“incident occurred on October 12th of 2023, at the CTA Red Line, located on 95th Street. The victim was walking through the concourse of the 95th and Red Line Station when he was approached by the defendant and two co-defendants. As they got to where the victim was standing, the three defendants began hitting the victim about the body and face with closed fists, approximately five to seven times.
The victim was knocked to the ground, and this defendant began to go through the victim‘s pockets. When the victim tried to move around one of the [two] co-defendants, the other co-defendant then kicked the victim in the head area, money fell out of the victim‘s pocket and a co-defendant picked up the *** money and all three fled.
In total, $80 was taken from the victim and he suffered from bruising to his head and was taken to the hospital. All three of the defendants, including this defendant, were positively identified in a showup.”
¶ 6 The defense responded, pointing out that only the robbery charge was detainable. Defense counsel stated that he had viewed the body-worn camera footage of the victim reporting the crime to the police, and counsel did not observe any injuries to the victim. Counsel expected the medical records from the hospital to say the victim was treated and released for “minor injuries.” Defense counsel also argued that defendant did not pose a threat to the victim because there was “no history of animosity between them” and the victim lived in Indiana, so there was a “low” chance that defendant and the victim would come in contact with one another. Defense counsel agreed that defendant was on parole for possession of a stolen motor vehicle at the time of the arrest, but asserted that his parole had “since been discharged,” which counsel contended was “a changed circumstance from” defendant‘s first appearance.
¶ 7 Defense counsel then asserted that defendant is a 23-year-old, high school graduate from Chicago, with prior work experience, and family support. Counsel argued that electronic monitoring or home confinement could mitigate any risk defendant may pose, noting that defendant‘s mother has “a stable, regular address in Chicago, where she can and will host him on any sort of monitoring the Court might impose.”
¶ 9 In ruling, the court explained that it was “trying to figure out what‘s new here that would cause me to decide that he‘s no longer a violent offender, after having been convicted of a violent robbery in his past and not completing probation in that case.” The court pointed out that defendant‘s criminal history included “probation terminated unsatisfactory,” and, although he was no longer on parole at the time of the hearing, “[t]he fact of the matter is he was on parole when he allegedly committed this violent offense.” The court agreed that there were no medical records or evidence of the extent of the victim‘s injuries, but stated that this “was an extremely violent attack on an individual who was a passenger at a bus terminal or a CTA transit line and by a gang of three, allegedly. Three on one and stole his money.”
¶ 10 The court further stated that it was “leery of electronic monitoring” because defendant‘s “track record on—when he was on probation in the past is not good. His prior robbery was a probation terminated unsatisfactory. His parole while on possession of a stolen motor vehicle didn‘t seem to stop him from getting arrested on a new violent offense.”
¶ 11 In ruling, the court expressed confusion as to whether it had to enter a “new order” for detention order in these circumstances, where it was continuing defendant‘s detention. Uncertain as to whether such an order was required, the trial court made the required findings for initial detention, specifically, that the State had shown by clear and convincing evidence (1) that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense; (2) that he poses
¶ 12 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 18, 2024. Utilizing the form approved for Rule 604(h) appeals by defendants, defense counsel checked three boxes. First, counsel asserted that the “State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the offense(s) charged.” In the space below, counsel wrote, “The State proceeded by way of proffer only and did not present any video evidence of the incident, or the identification procedure, though such evidence should exist based on the location of the incident.”
¶ 13 Counsel also checked the box asserting that the “State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case.” In the space below, counsel wrote,
“The facts developed at the detention hearing were that the alleged victim in the case may have suffered minor injuries only, and the State offered no proof of any serious injuries. The State proceeded by way of proffer and proffered no facts that would show [defendant] poses any real and present threat to the alleged victim‘s safety. His criminal history is not such that he poses a real and present threat to the community. He is not alleged to have used any weapon in the commission of the offense.”
¶ 15 In the space below, counsel wrote that defendant
“has a stable resident in Chicago. It was shown at the hearing that he can live with his mother and be placed on electronic monitoring. Electronic monitoring, in combination with any other condition the Court may impose, would mitigate any real and present threat [defendant] poses to the alleged victim or the community.”
¶ 16 Thereafter, on April 26, 2024, defense counsel filed a notice of intent not to file a Rule 604(h) memorandum in this appeal. Counsel asserted that, after reviewing the record, counsel “has concluded [that] the notice of appeal adequately communicates the defendant-appellant‘s contentions of error, which are fact-driven arguments, and identifies to the extent possible the portion of the argument relevant to each issue. Defendant-appellant elects to stand on the notice of appeal and will not file a Rule 604(h) memorandum.”
¶ 17 In the State‘s memorandum, it points out that, although defendant frames his appellate challenges under the findings required for an initial detention order, the order defendant appeals is not an initial detention order, but an order for continuing detention.
¶ 18 Indeed, this court has previously explained the difference between initial orders of detention, and orders for continued detention. See People v. Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482, ¶ 20-21. Ordinarily, a court holds a pretrial detention hearing “[u]pon verified petition by the State,” at the first appearance before a judge, or within 21 calendar days (
“Although this determination necessarily entails consideration of the threat or flight risk posed by a defendant and the potential mitigation of such threat or flight risk by conditions of release, the [statute] does not require the court to again make specific findings that the State proved the three propositions by clear and convincing evidence as required at the initial hearing.” People v. Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶ 13.
¶ 19 Defendant‘s arguments on appeal all rest on the faulty premise that at the March 2024 proceeding, the State had the burden to establish the three factual findings listed in
¶ 20 While the court questioned whether a “new order” was necessary, the court ultimately made the three findings applicable to initial detention hearings and entered an order consistent with those findings. Although such findings were not necessary, defendant went on to challenge those findings in his notice of appeal. However, it is sufficiently clear from the record that the court believed defendant‘s continued detention was necessary to protect against a real and present safety threat, and defendant‘s notice of appeal contains his arguments as to why he does not pose such a threat and should have been released.
¶ 21 Accordingly, the only issue before this court is whether the trial court properly ordered defendant‘s continued detention in March 2024 order, and we will construe defendant‘s appellate arguments in his notice of appeal as they relate to that issue. As stated above, at subsequent court appearances, the court is required to assess whether “continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant‘s willful flight from prosecution.”
¶ 22 We recognize that there has been considerable disagreement among the five districts of the appellate court as to which standard of review applies to pretrial release orders. See People v. Lee, 2024 IL App (1st) 232137, ¶ 21. This panel has previously determined that a mixed approach is appropriate, under which the circuit court‘s findings of fact are reviewed under the manifest weight
¶ 23 There is a similar dispute regarding whether a continued detention decision should be reviewed under the manifest weight or abuse of discretion standard. Compare People v. Alcantara, 2024 IL App (5th) 240195-U, ¶ 33 (manifest weight), with People v. Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶¶ 11-13 (abuse of discretion). We believe that the circuit court‘s decision on whether continued detention is necessary is subject to abuse of discretion review. As the court in Casey explained, the factual findings which we would review for manifest weight of the evidence are not at issue during subsequent appearances:
“Although [the continued detention] determination necessarily entails consideration of the threat or flight risk posed by a defendant and the potential mitigation of such threat or flight risk by conditions of release, the Code does not require the court to again make specific findings that the State proved the three propositions by clear and convincing evidence as required at the initial hearing. As defendant did not appeal from the court‘s granting of the State‘s petition for denial of pretrial release, the questions relating to whether the State proved each of the three propositions by clear and convincing evidence during that initial hearing are not before us. Instead, the only question we consider is whether the court abused its discretion in finding that continued detention was necessary.” Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶ 13.
¶ 24 Accordingly, we will review defendant‘s challenge for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs “when the circuit court‘s decision is ‘arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable,’ or
¶ 25 Here, defendant contends that the court erred in ordering his continued detention because “the State proceeded by way of proffer only” and because the alleged victim “may have suffered minor injuries only.” Defendant further asserts that his criminal history does not show that he poses a real and present threat to the community where he is not alleged to have used any weapons in the commission of the offense. Defendant also asserts that electronic monitoring would mitigate any safety risk he poses because he “has a stable residence in Chicago” and can live with his mother.
¶ 26 Defendant‘s argument that the State was required to submit the evidence on which it relied to the court, rather than proceeding by proffer, is not well-taken. At a pretrial detention hearing, the Act explicitly permits the State to present evidence “by way of proffer based upon reliable information.”
¶ 27 And although defendant emphasizes that the victim “may have suffered minor injuries only,” and that he is not alleged to have used any weapons in the commission of the offense, the use of a weapon or a particular level of injuries is not necessary to establish defendant‘s guilt of
¶ 28 Regardless of the victim‘s injuries, or whether defendant used a weapon, the record shows that defendant participated in a violent offense, during which he and other codefendants approached a stranger in a CTA station, hit the victim five to seven times about the body and face with closed fists, and knocked the victim to the ground. Defendant searched the victim‘s pockets, and one of his codefendants kicked the victim in the head, before they seized the victim‘s money and fled. From this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s determination that defendant continues to pose a real and present threat to a person or persons or the community. See
¶ 29 We also reject defendant‘s argument that the court abused its discretion in failing to order his release on electronic monitoring because he has a “stable residence” and the ability to live with his mother. Despite defendant‘s apparent family support, the record shows that defendant was on parole for another offense, when he and his co-defendants committed the instant offense. The trial court explicitly considered electronic monitoring, but found it inappropriate based on defendant‘s “track record“—defendant had shown an inability to abide by similar conditions of release where his probation was terminated unsatisfactorily and he committed the charged offense while on parole. See People v. Lee, 2024 IL App (1st) 232137, ¶ 33 (“Where, as here, defendant has a demonstrated history of refusing to abide by conditions of release, we find that that the State met its burden of showing clear and convincing evidence that no less restrictive conditions would reasonably ensure the safety of a person, persons or the community, and that the trial court did not
¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 31 Affirmed.