THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CALEB A. MEZO, Defendant-Appellant.
2024 IL App (3d) 230499
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT
January 8, 2024
JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Hettel concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Peterson dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant, Caleb A. Mezo, appeals the circuit court‘s order denying him pretrial release. He argues, among other things, that he was denied a fair hearing on the State‘s petition because the State relied on his criminal history but never provided it to the defense or filed it with the court. We agree the State‘s failure to tender the criminal history to the defense before the hearing warrants a new hearing. We therefore reverse and remand for a new hearing.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On September 26, 2023, the State charged defendant by information with unlawful possession of a weaрon by a felon (Class 3) (
¶ 4 A hearing was held on the petition on September 26, 2023. At the hearing, the State relied on a Law Enforcement Agency Data System (LEADS) report it had in its possession and told the court that defendant had a pending aggravated battery charge in Champaign County. Defense counsel noted “there was no criminal history provided to the public defender‘s
¶ 5 During argument, dеfense counsel reiterated that “no prior criminal history was filed” and if the State “intended to use that as a basis to detain him, [the State] should have filed it as per the [Code].”
¶ 6 The court granted the State‘s petition. It found defendant posed a real and present threat to the cоmmunity, based in part on defendant‘s criminal history. It also found no conditions could be imposed that would mitigate the threat to the community.
¶ 7 This appeal followed.
¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 9 On appeal, defendant contends, among other things, he was denied a fair hearing on the State‘s petition. Specifically, he argues the State imрroperly relied on defendant‘s criminal history as its primary basis for detention when it had not “filed or otherwise provided a criminal history” to the defense. Further, defendant asserts the circuit court erred when it allowed the State to use the criminal history over his objection and also used thе criminal history to justify defendant‘s detention.
¶ 10
¶ 11 There must be a reason the legislature included in the Code the requirement that the State tender to the defense any available criminal history; otherwise, the legislature would not have included it in the statute. See e.g., Kloeppel v. Champaign County Board, 2021 IL App (4th) 210091, ¶ 17 (“[T]he court may not declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). And those purposes are evident: to allow the defense an adequate opportunity to effectively respond to the State‘s petition to deny release, to ensure the reliability of
¶ 12 In reaching this conclusion, we reject the dissent‘s position that defendant forfeited review of this contention. First, we note the State does not argue that defendant forfeited review of this contention. See People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426, 433 (2003) (principles of forfeiture apply equally to the State). In fact, the State offers no response at all to defendant‘s contention that he was denied a fair hearing. More importantly, defendant did not raise this issue for the first time on appeal. When the State began using the LEADS report during the hearing, defense counsel objected, telling the cоurt the State had not filed it or tendered it to the defense. During argument, defense counsel maintained that if the State intended to use defendant‘s criminal history as a basis for detention, it should have “filed it as per the [Code].” Not only did defense counsel timely object, the circuit court recоgnized but disregarded the State‘s clear obligation under the Code. In his notice of appeal2, defendant argued he “was denied an opportunity for a fair hearing prior to the entry of the order denying *** pretrial release.” He explained the basis for that conclusion: the Stаte failed to tender his criminal history before the hearing but nevertheless relied on it, and the circuit court allowed its use over his objection and then relied on it to justify his detention. Under these circumstances, we find this issue was properly preserved for review.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 14 For the foregoing reasоns, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County and remand for a new hearing.
¶ 15 Reversed and remanded.
¶ 16 JUSTICE PETERSON, dissenting:
¶ 17 I respectfully dissent. I believe the doctrine of forfeiture, if not waiver (see People v. Davis, 2023 IL App (1st) 231856, ¶¶ 37-39), applies to the issue regarding the State‘s failure to tender defendant‘s criminal history before the hearing. I furthеr believe the majority ignores the practical aspects of detention hearings and the specific aspects
¶ 18 The majority correctly points out that the State did not argue the forfeiture issue, but argues that as a result, we should not consider the doctrine. I disagree. “[O]ur supreme court has indicated that we may consider the issue of forfeiture sua sponte.” Anderson v. Nelsen, 2023 IL App (4th) 220801, ¶ 112. The court in Anderson was referring to, and cited, the supreme court‘s opinion in People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 106 (2008), wherein the court stated “the ascertainment of its own jurisdictiоn is one of the two most important tasks of an appellate court panel when beginning the review of a case. The other is to determine which issue or issues, if any, have been forfeited.” The supreme court went on to state that “[b]y giving careful attention to each of thesе tasks, a court can avoid the possibly unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources.” Id. The concern with avoiding the unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources is especially poignant in these pretrial detention matters, considering the significant number of such аppeals and the short deadlines imposed for reaching a disposition. Thus, I believe it is particularly important in these matters to honor the procedural default and not expend judicial resources on issues that were not properly raised below.
¶ 19 At the detention hearing, counsel twice pointed out to the court that the State had not tendered the criminal history, but neither time did counsel move to bar its consideration by the court. Counsel merely stated that if the State “intended to use that as a basis to detain him, [the State] should have filed it as per the [Code].” Counsel did not request a continuance for a few minutes, for a few hours, or until the next day, in order to have the opportunity to review such history if she was actually unaware of its contents.3 Had counsel moved for some sort of relief from the court, the court would then have ruled on such motion and a proper issue framed for
review would be before this court. Counsel tossed out the failure to timely tender the criminal history and then remained silent on what this meant or what remedy should result. The defense has forfeited the arguments raised on appeal because they were not made to the trial court. See People v. Estrada, 394 Ill. App. 3d 611, 626 (2009) (“It is axiomatic that arguments may not be raised for the first time on appeal.“). I note that this issue would likely not be before us had the trial court simply asked defense counsel if she was asking for a remedy from the court and obtained an answеr which then could have been considered by this court, but that is inapposite. Thus, I would rule that these arguments are forfeited and I would opine actually intentionally waived by defense counsel, as will be discussed.
¶ 20 I now discuss the practical facts and circumstances that bear on the issuе of waiver. Had counsel moved to bar or
touch her client‘s criminal history with a proverbial ten-foot pole at the detention hearing. What this demonstrates by reasonable inference is that counsel intentionally declined to ask for аny remedy at the first hearing which would likely have resulted in more attention being drawn to her client‘s criminal record and then didn‘t raise any factual issues regarding what was contained in that history at the second hearing. This was sound trial strategy and, arguably, good lawyering. This is why I would opine that counsel‘s failurе to move to bar or for time to examine the criminal history and silence on the issue of a proper remedy at the original hearing was actually waiver, not just a forfeiture. See Davis, 2023 IL App (1st) 231856, ¶¶ 37-39; see also Home Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 307, 326 (2004) (waiver is the “intentional relinquishment of a known right“).
¶ 21 The majority apparently considers counsel‘s cоmments a motion to bar the criminal history. I disagree. So what is this matter being remanded for the court to do? Rule on the State‘s petition without considering the State‘s proffer? Or hear the petition again considering the State‘s proffer with the defense now having had the opportunity to review defendant‘s criminal history and argue the impact of the criminal history on the court‘s decision? The trial court has already reexamined this issue at the second detention hearing, at which counsel chose to remain silent regarding her client‘s criminal history. This court now remands this matter for a thorough delve into defendant‘s criminal history, which trial counsel has refused to ask for (twice) and clearly does not want. I would also find that the State satisfied its burden on all issues and that the court did not abuse its discretion by granting the State‘s petition. I would affirm. Thus, I respectfully dissent.