*1
The PEOPLE of the State
Colorado, Petitioner, MCKIMMY, Joseph Respondent.
Michael
Supreme Court Case No. 13SC702
Supreme Court of Colorado.
October
Rehearing Denied November *2 Suthers,
Attorneys Petitioner: John W. for General, Brady, Senior C. Attorney Christine General, Denver, Colora- Attorney Assistant do M Law
Attorneys Respondent: MS & for Denver, Office, Mooney, Colorado Nicole M. RICE delivered JUSTICE CHIEF Opinion of the Court. clarify the requires us to
T1 This case invoking rights under the for one's process Detainers Mandatory Disposition of Uniform ("the Act"), §§ 16-14 or "the Act UMDDA" (2014). -108, prisoners When 101 to C.R.S. procedur strictly comply with the UMDDA's they Act mandates that requirements, al pending charges within to trial on be 16-14-102(1), §§ days request. their (2014). when Even strictly comply with prisoners do not previously requirements, we have UMDDA's invoke determined that nevertheless (1) the Act if their their under require substantially complies with the Act's (2) ments, prosecution receives "ac People v. of their See tual notice" (Colo.1983). Mascarenas, 666 P.2d case, strictly did not In this the defendant Act; rather, attempted he comply with the rights by mailing multi invoke his UMDDA prosecution and the trial ple letters to the But, while the court. requests, initial it failed to
the defendant's aware of them until well become proceedings. therefore must later We resolve, impression, an of first as issue receipt of such a whether "actual notice" sufficient to letter constitutes rights under the UMD-D prisoner's invoke a A.1
{2 Rather, does not. We conclude that it purposes of substantial we hold UMDDA, no- compliance knowledge." In this tice" means "actual is unclear as to because the record gained precisely when the misinterpretation of the term 'actual based on a granted Specifically, we certiorari to consider: appeals applies erred when it [UMDDA]." "Whether the court of as notice' felony four convictions ordered the dismissal of knowledge questing protections the defendant's various UMD- requests, determine DA we cannot whether all four letters included purporting a footer any UMDDA occurred. There- violations copy the letter to the prosecutor of that fore, judgment we reverse the of the court of particular case. remand with appeals and instructions to re- prosecu- 5 Neither the trial court nor the turn the case to the trial court for further tion, however, initially became aware of *3 fact-finding. Specifically, the trial McKimmy's requests in the cases. The (1) should determine: when the ignored trial court the letters without read- gained knowledge of the defendant's ing pursuant policy them to refusing its of cases, in each of his acknowledge pro-se by repre- letters sent point
which the defendant would have effec- parties, sented while the Act; tively rights invoked his under the and inadvertently the 2007 letters but misfiled (2) whether UMDDA violations subse- Crucially, them. the record is inconclusive quently occurred. whether the immediately became aware of the 2008 McKimmy letters when History I. Facts and Procedural sent them in March 2008. 2007, September Respondent T3 In Mi- 4, 2008, February 16 On McKimmy pled Joseph McKimmy chael was arrested for new cases, guilty not in the 2007 and at a subse parole offenses while on and was incarcerat- quent 2008, status conference March County People ed in the Jefferson Jail. The potential trial court discussed trial dates with cases, McKimmy, charged separate in two parties. point, McKimmy At this insist theft, second-degree burglary, identity ed "speedy that he did not wish to waive his theft, count; burglary and a habitual offender however, trial rights"; he never mentioned these cases are numbered OTCR2686and court, specifically. the UMDDA The trial People OTCR3264. In filed com- impression McKimmy was cases, plaints against McKimmy in two new referring to his as defined in section including charges second-degree burgla- for (2014),2 made certain that theft, theft, ry, identity aggravated motor the trial dates fell within six months from the theft, mischief; vehicle and criminal these MeKimmy's not-guilty date of pleas, and it cases are numbered 08CR543 and O8CRS552. July set May the trials for 2008. On 20, 2007, T 4 On November unbeknownst process repeated itself for the 2008 defender, public McKimmy pro-se sent McKimmy pled guilty (rejecting cases: not Judge letter in case OTCR2686to the Chief People's global plea offer for all four Court, County the Jefferson in which he cases) requested that "the Court be cer "formally request[ed] protection under my tain [trials] that we set these within Mandatory Disposition Uniform of Detainers frame," speedy point trial time at which footer, wrote, McKimmy Act." In the letter's court set the 2008 for trial in cases October Deputy Attorney "CC: District [Prosecutor MeKimmy Again, made no reference later, days McKimmy Name]." Seven sent a requests. to his UMDDA pro-se similar letter case OTCRS264.As cases, 5, 2008, Thereafter, McKimmy alleged for the 2008 on March McKim- T7 a con- O8CRS552; defender, my public sent a similar letter in did he flict of interest with his Thus, days judge hearing the same two later in O8CR5483. a different trial held a conflict cases, McKimmy pro-se During hearing, in all four sent McKim- let- June 2008. attorney's knowledge my trying day ters without his that he had from Jef- stated "been my County's Judge formally rights" ferson Chief one to assert but that re- indicted, "Speedy again against, 2. Section 18-1-405 is entitled trial." shall not be informed (1) or committed for the same offense.... Subsection provides, pertinent part: added.) (Emphasis contrast, a defendant not [I]f to trial on the information, provides days held within 182 complaint, that trial shall be issues raised or receipt" "after the of the defendant's indictment within six months the date entry plea disposition charges. guilty, pending final of untried 16-14- not 104(1). charges dismissed, shall be and the defendant Department of Correec- [the he was in file a lieve refused to had public defender MceKimmy judge then told The trial tions]." grounds." jurisdictional on to dismiss "motion regarding motion to file a that if he wished particu- him on judge pressed When violations, he could do alleged MeKim- grounds, jurisdictional these lars of counsel, not so, as he could only through misspeak want "I don't my said that represented defen- motions as a pro-se file he reiterated anything," but misstate dant. my speedy trial my belief "it's lim- already and the time violated have been Thereafter, attorney filed McKimmy's jurisdic- is no expired and there [have] its cases, asserting four to dismiss all a motion explained that judge then tion." jurisdiction be- lacked the trial court you time enter from the trial runs "[sJpeedy comply the time failed to it had cause had six months because your plea" and response, In their UMDDA. limits of the from the date yet elapsed had People conceded that trial violation had not-guilty pleas, no complied" the Act *4 "substantially judge a con- Ultimately, the found occurred. notice" of his they had received "actual that appointed alter- reasons and flict for other they argued that requests, but respective during point At no counsel. nate defense impliedly waived his UMDDA McKimmy had MceKimmy mention the hearing 15, 2008, did this trial court rights. On October UMDDA. to the from the bench as denied the motion cases, McKimmy could not stating that 2008,3 July August McKim- During and T8 finding and that "lay traps for the court" trial court for nu my before the appeared pushed the tri- McKimmy's conduct had own At one such con status conferences. merous beyond the UMDDA deadline. al dates ference, McKimmy again requested that the in its address the 2007 cases court did not speedy help me assert the judge "please trial bench order. in the trials] set [right] [the trial in the frame," McKimmy went to trial judge respond T11 then and proper time 2008, jury and the ed, try guard your in October "Absolutely.... 2008 cases second-degree burglary, carefully." guilty of ... Notwithstand found him that on February theft, In regarding "speedy criminal mischief. repeated concerns and ing his 2009, ruling from judge adopted its trial," McKimmy mentioned the UMD- the trial never MceKimmy's motion 2008 and denied any these conferences. October DA at cases. Trial then as to the 2007 to dismiss hearing Finally, during scheduling for T9 OTCR2686, jury and the found in proceeded 9, 2008, September McKim- all four cases on identity and theft. McKimmy guilty of theft Specifi- by name. my invoked the UMDDA 07CR3264, begin on trial was slated As for that McKimmy's counsel told the court cally, however, date, 18, 2009; that February on that he McKimmy recently informed her had agitated fell McKimmy highly [and] "became propri- longstanding issue about had "a sereaming," hyperventilating and to the floor going forward due ety of these cases trial, continue the forcing the court to rights under speedy his to violation of {12 discharged attor- McKimmy then his Mandatory Disposition of De- the Uniform alternate defense judge ney obtained new McKimmy and the trial tainers Act." attorney new filed MceKimmy April In colloquy, counsel. engaged in a then (the in to dismiss 07TCR3264 a second motion previously had "filed a formal stated that he trial), alleging awaiting that only case still disposition." The trial invoking letters in had sent requests were "not judge said that such rights in the 2007 cases to the court file," prosecutor the court and she asked At a in November 2007. prosecutor and the if he familiar with them. The was McKimmy's rep- hearing, counsel subsequent handwritten responded, "I have a lot of prosecutor to the court McKimmy, I don't be- resented things from Mr. but counsel, obtaining the trial originally light new Although McKimmy's cases had 2008, McKimmy agreed July temporarily trial dates. trial in vacated those been set for rights in cases in those to toll his 11CA0458, slip op. WL 3680044 McKimmy's seeing" initial let- "doesn't recall 2013) (Colo.App. July (unpublished). ters, subpoena the court allowed him to so First, prosecution's case file to determine appeals the court of refused to consid received these letters. whether it had fact People's argument er the prosecu later, the court conducted a sub- Two weeks tion lacked MecKimmy's actual notice of initial motion, hearing on the and McKim- stantive Instead, requests. Id. at 11. my's that the letters counsel confirmed appeals court of People's response cited the in the were indeed located file dismiss, McKimmy's first motion to they were "stuck between People they which the conceded that had computer and had thus printouts" some been received "actual notice." Id. It concluded "lost in the shuffle." binding concession constituted a order, 113 In a written the trial court re-litigated admission that could not be on denied the second motion to dismiss. its Second, appeal. appeals the court of order, the trial court found that neither the whether, calculated People's based on the court nor the became aware of admission of when received actual no MceKimmy the 2007 letters until filed the tice, McKimmy's various trials were conduct April second motion 2009. The trial court ed within the UMDDA's time limit. It ulti that, prior filing further found mately held that behavior did motion, attorneys second "all of the and the operate respective to toll the Act's dead impression court were under lines, meaning jurisdiction the trial court lost receipt of a valid UMDDA first *5 prior of all four cases to trial. See id. 13- McKimmy Mr. was the that he filed Therefore, appeals 21. the court of directed 6, on March 2008." The trial court then McKimmy's the trial court to vacate convie- McKimmy impliedly determined that had granted tions. Id. at 21. We certiorari. rights, noting waived his UMDDA that a court cannot enforce a defendant's un- der the Act "if the defendant himself is con- II. Preservation of "Actual Notice" cealing the information from the and court Argument Appeal Thereafter, MceKimmy
his own counsel." matter, preliminary As a 116 we sought People's original global to enforce the offer, People may plea granted must determine whether and the trial court his pursue argument regarding their "actual no request. McKimmy pled guilty to various cases, charges in all four and the trial court appeal. responding tice" on In to McKim- him sentenced to concurrent sentences total- dismiss, my's People initial motion to ing years. they conceded that had actual notice of each requests of his when the { first following year, MceKimmy 14 The filed a respective People received the letters.4 The post-conviction motion for relief in all four 85(c). contend, however, now that pursuant cases to Crim. P. The trial "present[ed] court found that the vir- motion lacked actual notice of tually argument" 9, 2008, the same as the second September until when motion to dismiss. The trial court thus de- McKimmy first mentioned the UMDDA in motion, adopting analysis nied the its appeals open court. The court of refused to stating its order and that earlier argument, holding that consider this instead bring "cannot continue to successive motions People represen were "bound [their] grounds already that have based on similar [they] notice of tation that had actual against him." been decided MceKimmy's requests." (citing Id. at 11 Peo Curren, 253, ple (Colo.App. v. McKimmy appealed, and the 2009)). appeals People McKimmy, reversed. v. Specifically, response acknowledged People agree 4. that the Defendant has 'sub- People stantially complied' requirements ''the the Defendant letters from UMDDA, demanding People compliance notice' with the UMDDA" on and that the had 'actual compliance of said on the afore-mentioned August 19, 2007; 6, 2008; November March dates." 26, stated, further "The response
238% (Colo. 810, P.2d People Kyler, 991 perceive appellate do not 117 We > citing operate rigidly. 1999).5 procedure to so Curren, equat appeals impliedly the court of judi binding People's Analysis statement ed the IV. admission, as "a which Curren defined cial previously have determined 120 We formal, party or that a deliberate declaration strictly fails to even when a defendant judicial proceeding attorney makes in a
his
UMDDA, he nevertheless
comply with the
proof
purpose
dispensing
for the
(1)
the Act if
invokes
which there
matters or of facts about
formal
the Act's
substantially complieswith
(citing
228 P.8d at 257
dispute."
no real
is
(2)
re
requirements,
(Colo.
Hurd, 713 P.2d
Kempter v.
of his
See
ceives "actual notice"
1986)).
case, however, recognized
That same
P.2d at
But we
judicial admission "has
doctrine of
Thus, al
"actual notice."
never defined
very
applied in
limited contexts"
been
factually complex,
though this case is
an
authority
purporting
exists
to bind
that no
on certiorari
legal
that we must resolve
issue
prosecution's
state
appellate court
to "the
whether the
straightforward:
is
Furthermore,
in the trial record."
ments
request, absent
receipt of a valid UMDDA
only applies
pro-forma
factual
the doctrine
knowledge of the
constitutes
pertain to contested
matters-it
does not
"actual notice."
Brannon, 207 P.3d
of law. Miller v.
issues
question,
we first ex-
121 To answer
this case illus
(Colo.App.2009). As
its under-
text of the UMDDA and
amine the
trates,
notice"
proper definition of "actual
jurisprudence
lying purpose, as well as our
factual one. There
legal question,
not a
compliance. We then
regarding substantial
fore,
notice"
People
conceded "actual
merely sending a substan-
consider whether
to dismiss does not
opposing
a motion
pros-
tially compliant
right
litigate
mean that
forfeited the
provide
"actual notice."
ecution suffices
interpretation
legal
of that
term of art on
-
it does not and instead
appeal.
We conclude
purposes
that for
of the.
determine
{18 Accordingly, we conclude that
*6
knowledge."
notice" means "actual
preferred defini-
People may advance their
Finally,
the record in this case is
because
appeal
on
and that the
tion of "actual notice"
to when
obtained
unclear as
properly
us.
issue is
before
knowledge
McKimmy's various
of
requests, we remand to the trial
of Review
III. Standard
fact-finding.
further
court for
statutory
review issues of
We
People, 2014
interpretation de novo. Cain v.
A. The UMDDA
¶49, 10,
249;
People
327 P.3d
see also
v.
CO
(inter
¶60, 9,
COA
judge at physically defendant] was ("Although [the alleged "jurisdic- his regarding specifics for County at the El Paso Jail at the confined dismissal, McKimmy's grounds" tional superin delivered his time he In es- vague and evasive. were responses custody tendents; legal in the he was sence, attempted to use his McKimmy time be at that of corrections department charges dis- get his requests to UMDDA his the time of parolee a he was cause His behavior missed, tried. get them ("[Elven arrest."); at 309 Campbell, P.2d similarity to striking regard bears in this parolee-defendant] county jail [the when in Mascarenas, who of the defendant that department of custody of the in the was his UMDDA neglected to mention meaning [the of UMD- within corrections hearings. Id. at 106. separate during seven DAJ."). Indeed, Trancoso, defendant Moreover, McKimmy's assertion that superintendent a letter sent his UMD- to invoke no other avenue he had Facility in Cafion Correctional Territorial McKimmy need false. rights patently DA El in the Paso City while he was incarcerated gain prosecution to relied on the not have Jail, letter held that this County and we instead, requests; he could knowledge of his rights. his UMDDA to invoke sufficed to the su his simply delivered circum Because the same P.2d at strictly complied with and thus perintendent case, argu MeKimmy's apply to stances statute, no thereby obviating the actual merit. ment is without pursue But he elected to requirement. tice McKimmy's argu- reject Finally, we path compliance, of substantial path knowledge is "un- requiring ment requires notice. plainly We reiterate pur- fair, with the unjust, inconsistent invoking one's method of alternative that this Brief at 19. Answer pose of the UMDDA." mecha judicially created rights is a UMDDA "knowledge" under equating "notice" In not authorize it at does nism-the Act, hardly alterna- crippling the we are such, wary expanding we must be all. As compliance entire- method of substantial tive prisoners manner in which broadly the too Instead, what simply explicating ly. we are the Act without their under can invoke always implied: if a we have statute. See complying with the rights in a attempts to invoke his Enter. v. Colo. City ex rel. Util Aurora Act, by prose- matter not authorized (Colo.2005) P.3d Eng'r, 105 State attempt. aware of cution must become be general laws should ("Exceptions to the bury their Certainly, prosecutors cannot not the legislature, narrowly construed. prevent prisoners in the sand and heads court, if de exceptions these expand should through willful invoking their UMDDA omitted)). (citation sirable." differs misconduct ignorance. But bad-faith this, McKimmy argues mistake, McKimmy spite does not 1 35 from honest here, an compliance was not as it is malfeasance allege prosecutorial in his substantial in fact the prosecutor simply but was failed undisputed mechanism that the alternative MceKimmy's pro-se he could only method which available to take notice of Specifically, not condone the his UMDDA letters. We do invoke carelessness, that its he was incar we cannot conclude that because claims requests operative County Jail rather rendered in the Jefferson inattention cerated McKimmy wished to Again, if the Act. Department of Corrections than of his was aware strictly ("DOC"), incapable of ensure that literally he was his own have informed requests, no DOC he could as complying open court. or raised it of the issue receipt counsel to take superintendent existed *10 actions, may Because he chose not to take such the trial court also need to address gain did not actual McKimmy knowl- whether waived those edge requests of the 2007 until well after it appeals performed court of analy- a detailed (1) received them. regard, sis in holding this that MceKimmy expressly never waived his rights, UMDDA Accordingly, pur- T we hold that for the (2) and McKimmy's to the extent that behav- poses compliance of substantial with the deadline, ior 180-day tolled the Act's the trial UMDDA, "actual notice" means court nevertheless failed to hold his trials Therefore, knowledge." when within McKimmy, slip op. the deadline. UMDDA, strictly comply fails to he 13-17. appeals But because the court of rights nevertheless invokes his under the Act notice, declined to address the issue of actual (1) request substantially complies if with predicated analysis its on the notion that (2) requirements, the Act's prosecu- McKimmy invoked his rights UMDDA as is, tion receives actual notice-that actual soon as the received his letters. knowledge-of request. With this un- ("[Blecause Id. at 12 McKimmy substantially mind, derstanding of the Act we now complied with the prosecu- UMDDA and the any address whether UMDDA violations oc- tion conceded it had actual notice of his in McKimmy's curred four cases. requests, we conclude that Required began C. Remand deadline Is run on the dates that the prosecution admitted it received actual notice illustrated, 138 As we have onee a illustrated, requests."). As we have rights-wheth invokes his UMDDA Supra, this was incorrect. 1117-18. Be- through compliance er strict or substantial tolling cause the issue of waiver is not and/or compliance plus notiece-he must be us, express before opinion we no on the 16-14-104(1). days. § to trial within 182 point matter other than to out that the issue Here, MceKimmy substantially compliant sent may be relevant to the trial court's ultimate requests Ideally, in four if different cases. analysis on remand. definitively the record established when the (that is, prosecution gained actual notice ac V. Conclusion knowledge) separate tual requests- these and, thus, proverbial when the UMDDA previously determined that We began clock to run each case-we could compliance under the doctrine of substantial MecKimmy's calculate whether trials were notice, plus prisoners even when do 180-day held within the deadline.8Unfortu strictly comply procedur- with the UMDDA's nately, the convoluted record in case requirements, al nevertheless invoke impossible. simply renders such a task We (1) rights their under the Act if their determine, any degree cannot of confi substantially complies require- with the Act's dence, prosecution gained when the actual (2) ments, receives "ac- knowledge McKimmy's particular UMD- tual notice" of their We now hold Therefore, DA in each case. we purposes prong of the second must remand to the trial court to conduct "actual notice" means "actual fact-finding further on this issue. knowledge." Accordingly, we reverse the overarching judgment
139 We also note that appeals of the court of and remand issue for the trial court to resolve on remand with to return instructions the case to the remains whether fact-finding. violations oc- trial court for further On re- Thus, mand, (1) determining curred. in addition to the trial court should determine: prosecution gained when invoked his UMDDA when the actual knowl- (ie., prosecution gained when the edge McKimmy's cases, knowledge respective requests) point of his each of his four at which he effectively would have invoked his un- counting days point, forward 180 from that 16-14-104(1), Compare § 8. The effective version of the UMDDA at the time mandated. CRS. provided period trials for a time (2011), (2014). days, days currently of 180 rather than 182 as *11 re- prisoner's a UMDDA (2) misplaces Act; any otherwise whether the der quest. occurred. subsequently violations single- question that the There is no 43 MARQUEZ dissents.
JUSTICE requests in this which page, written court and properly addressed were does not BOATRIGHT JUSTICE substantially complied with the prosecution, participate. view, my requirements of the UMDDA. undisputed receipt of such prosecution's the dissenting. MARQUEZ, JUSTICE the notice" for "actual requests constitutes {41 The Uniform respectfully I dissent. prisoner's speedy triggering a purpose of Act Disposition of Detainers Mandatory law. our UMDDA case trial ("UMDDA") "the re expressly provides respectfully dissent. Accordingly, prose request" by the court and ceipt the obligation to triggers the cutor I. untried prisoner's of a timely dispose person that a provides 44 The UMDDA (2014). De charges. § C.R.S. correc custody department the in the establishing "receipt language spite plain this disposition of may request a final tions speedy trial clock request" as the of the against him Colo charges pending untried law despite court's case trigger, and this (2014). -104, §§ rado. 16-14-101 to allow "liberally construling]" the UMDDA to in prisoners a mechanism gives The Act the compliance with prisoner's substantial untried speedy disposition of such on the sist protections long so as the to secure its
Act pre disrupt can charges, which otherwise prison of the has "actual notice" prison rehabilita prisoner's access to clude a Trancoso, People 776 P.2d v. er's see Higginbotham,712 People v. programs. tion 374, (Colo.1989), today majority im 380 (Colo.1986); People v. Mas 997 P.2d requirement knowledge" ports a new "actual (Colo.1983). carenas, P.2d 105 squared cannot be into the Act that invoked, re properly When Maj. op. 21. plain language of the statute. untried to dismiss quires the court majority concludes Specifically, if are not charges prejudice prisoner's pro-se written that even where a speedy UMDDA's to trial within the unmistakably clear requests are 16-14-104(1). period. § proseen- the court and the and even where UMDDA, interpreting the T 45 When requests, those tor's office receive prisoner who fails to has held that a protections cannot claim the still procedural Act's re strictly comply with the also and until he can of the UMDDA unless sufficiently invokes quirements nonetheless knowledge" has "actual prove prosecutor substantially if he sitting prosecutor's in the requests of the prosecu provisions and the complies with its Indeed, 114, 40. rather file. Id. at own case prisoner's re "actual notice" of the tion has prosecution with actual no- charge than 106; P.2d at accord quest. of its own files-as tice of the contents (Colo. People Campbell, 16-14-104(1) es- "receipt" trigger in section 1987). majority now re- sentially requires-the disputes that McKim- 1 Because no one precisely quires to establish "substantially complied" with when, prosecutor my's ob- following receipt, dispositive requirements, issue the Act's knowledge" prisoner's tained "actual added) (re- notice" to the constitutes "actual here is what (emphasis at T21 requests. MeceKimmy's prosecution of pros- manding determination of when purpose of for the majority concludes knowledge of McKim- gained ecution matter, compliance under the substantial my's requests). practical As a necessarily means "actual unfairly notice" majority's requirement burdens "actual new majority knowledge." Maj. op. T21. The prose- effectively rewards the prisoners and never defined this court has files or asserts neglects it to review its where ecution By defining notice" in the context of the UMDDA. 1 48 "actual "actual notice" as "actual equating It then reasons that knowledge," majority Id. at 120. effectively invents knowledge" "actual notice" with requirement a new UMDDA that exists no- protecting purpose serves the UMDDA's and, where in doing, the statute in so mis- prisoner's right constitutional to a subsequent reads Mascarenas and our case "logic prose- trial because dictates" applying compliance" law its "substantial only goals cution can effectuate the Act's if it rule. This troubling only result is be- knowledge" prisoner's has "actual of a re- express language cause contravenes the *12 quest. Applying Id. at 180. its new "actual statute, but, so, doing the in effectively it here, knowledge" requirement majority the places trigger prisoner's the of the UMDDA prosecution concludes that the did not have speedy squarely trial clock in the hands of | McKimmy's requests-not "actual notice" of prosecution. the because the never letters, rather, because his IL.
requests apparently were "stuck in between
computer printouts"
prose-
.
some
the
A.
got
cution's file and thus
"lost in the shuffle."
Id. at 1 12.
begin by looking
language
1 49 I
to the
Although
majority
the
limits
16-14-102(1)
its new
requires
the UMDDA. Section
knowledge" requirement
to invoca-
prisoner
who seeks to invoke his UMDDA
tions of the UMDDA "in the context of the
speedy
rights
trial
request
to submit a
"in
compliance,"
doctrine of substantial
id. at writing," "addressed to the court" in which
30, 34,
T29;
point
at M1
it can
see also id.
indictment,
information,
the
or criminal com-
language
justifies
no
in the Act
this
plaint
pending,
prosecuting
is
"and to the
majority's
limitation. Nor is the
rationale
responsible
official"
for prosecuting it. The
requirement
logically
for its new
limited to a
request
written
place
must also "set forth the
compliance analysis.
substantial
In other
16-14-108(1)(b)
of confinement."
Id. Section
words,
"logic
if
dictates" that the
requires
prisoner's request
the
to be "deliv-
goals "only
can
...
effectuate the Act's
if it
superintendent
prison-
ered to the
where the
gains
knowledge"
prisoner's
of a
re-
confined,"
er is
who must
then forward a
quest,
logic
id. at
then
see
such
neces-
copy
request
of the
to the
and the
sarily applies
every request
the
prosecuting attorney.
UMDDA-including
strictly
those that
com-
16-14-104(1)
Importantly,
1 50
section
ex-
ply
requirements. Assuming
with the Act's
pressly provides
"receipt
request"
of the
actually
prisoner's
the
receives a
prosecuting
trig-
the court and the
official
majority's logic
the
cannot
gers
speedy
period,
the
trial
if the
explain why
prosecution's
the
"actual knowl-
charges
period,
are not tried within that
the
edge"
necessary
request
of that
is
under a
jurisdiction
court loses
and must dismiss the
(because
compliance analysis
substantial
the
charges
prejudice:
prisoner
request directly
sent
the
to the
prosecution), yet
eighty-two days1
would be irrelevant under a
one
Within
hundred
after
(had
compliance analysis
receipt
request by
the
prisoner
strict
the
the
the court and
official,
indictment,
request
pris-
prosecuting
instead sent the identical
to the
the
Thus,
information,
superintendent).
I
complaint
on
fail to discern
or criminal
shall be
majority's
logic any principled
brought
basis to
to trial....
If after such a re
indictment, information,
today,
quest,
conclude
after
or erim-
"receipt
request"
complaint
mere
ever
inal
to trial within
suffices
period,
prisoner's
no court of this state shall
trigger
thereof,
jurisdiction
longer have
nor shall
notes,
(citing
majority
McKimmy sought
UMDDA,
182-day period.
maj. op.
See
138 n.8
1. As
when
16-14-104(1),
(2011);
to invoke his
under the
the ver-
§
§
C.R.S.
sion of the Act then in effect established a 180-
(2014)).
day speedy
period,
rather than the current
to trial"
indictment,
information,
"bring the untried matters
cution to
or
the untried
added)).
(emphasis
any further force
complaint be of
criminal
effect,
shall dismiss
and the court
sought to
prejudice.
by mailing written
invoke his UMDDA
added).
16-14-104(1)
lan-
This
(emphasis
courts in both
directly to the district
trial clock
plainly tethers
guage
Counties
El Paso and Weld
request" and not to
"receipt of the
trigger to
County
Court
The El Paso
District
which,
receipt,
following
point at
pros-
forwarded Mascarenas's
pris-
reviews the
prosecuting official
an order
and issued
ecution
that district
notably absent
request. Also
oner's
bring
defen-
directing
prosecution to
any requirement
statutory language is
contrast,
By
the clerk for
dant to trial.
verbally
his re-
reiterate
forward
County
Court did not
District
Weld
invoke the
open court
in order to
quest
in that
prosecuting
official
UMDDA.
majority
Today,
Id. at 106.
district.
(to
Moreover,
first
long
suggests
as the court
that Masearenas's
T51
so
*13
Court)
oper-
was
actually
County
the
El
District
receive
the
Paso
prosecution
16-14-104(1) expressly
"gained knowl-
prosecution
re-
nothing in section
ative because the
(to
it;
contrast,
be received
the
prisoner's
edge"
to
the second
quires the
in
Court)
inoperative
directly
superintendent.
County
In other
was
the
District
Weld
words,
it
prosecution
and mails
"never knew even
prisoner
who addresses
because the
directly
Maj. op.
and the
to the court
existed."
29.
has,
practical
attorney
for all
prosecuting
However,
reading
of Mas-
a closer
superintendent's most
purposes, fulfilled the
analysis
tethered our
reveals that we
carenas
statutory duty
16-
under section
important
than "actual
"receipt"
in
rather
that case
14-108(1)(b) by sending
the
to the
Specifically, this court conelud-
knowledge."
power
responsibility
with the
entities
in
El Paso case
prosecution
that the
the
ed
recognize
speedy
I
enforce his
attempt
"actual notice" of Mascarenas's
had
compliance with the UMDDA is
that strict
request was
the Act because "[his]
to invoke
said,
plain language of
preferable. That
the
Coun
subsequently delivered to the El Paso
Assembly's
evinces the General
the statute
Mascarenas,
P.2d
ty
attorney."
district
request" suffi-
"receipt
make
of the
intent to
added). Nothing in our
(emphasis
at 106
prosecutor to
the court and the
cient to bind
notice to the
hinted that actual
discussion
trial timeline.
attorney
required
case
more
district
"delivery"
prisoner's
re
of the
than mere
B.
prosecuting
County
quest. And the Weld
{52
plain language of
In
to the
addition
request because
official was unaware of the
statute,
confirms
this court's case law
the
case,
County
El
the re
the
Paso
"[ulnlike
knowledge," is
receipt, and not "actual
prosecuting
quest
not
was
forwarded
legal
under the UMD-
requisite
the
standard
added).
(emphasis
official." Id.
Trancoso,
("Receipt of
157 In on whether logically knowledge" restrict its "actual prisoner's July re- sufficiently 1984 letter quirement compliance" to a "substantial invoked anal- we 1129-30, ysis. See id. at If requirement referred to our indeed Mascarenas "logic only dictates that the can "actual notice" of goal ensuring effectuate the Act's prisoner's (citing Id. at 310 gains trials if it knowledge 106). actual of a defen- Crucially, 666 P.2d at we hinges receipt: observed that UMDDA request," notice on dant's id. at then logic Although copy respect every the defendant did not mail a such holds with UMD- *14 "strict, request-even DA prisoner where a request attorney's of his to the district ly" office, complies by sending prop- a provided prosecutor the court the Act request superintendent. er with actual notice letter defendant's mailing by copy a The his dis- office. Further, majority's holding today T 61 19, 1984, attorney July trict received the implications troubling has for who prisoners July letter on 28. This the statu- fulfilled prove prosecutors' must now "actual knowl- tory purpose giving prose- notice to the edge" requests. prac- of their UMDDA As a cuting official.... matter, tical I grasp fail to how a added) (emphasis Id. at 310 Mascare- (citing might prove knowledge"beyond "actual reit- 106). mas, passage 666 P.2d at This in erating open require- court-a Campbell prosecution confirms that has appears that nowhere in the statute. ment "actual notice" when it receives the defen- prosecutor admittedly Even where a receives request. dant's request, prisoner's trial Trancoso, recently, trigger depends upon Most we reaf- clock now when the Campbell delivery firmed view in that prosecutor gains knowledge" our "actual of that receipt Today's holding only are the touchstones of notice creates knowledge." problems proof prisoner, under the Act-not for the but raises case, "knowledge" P.2d at 374. deliv- new issues: Is mere "aware- superinten- something ered his UMDDA to a ness" of the more? who failed knowledge? dent to forward the to the And who must have this Is it prosecution, required by court and as sufficient that a staff member know (citing § UMDDA. Id. at 16-14- prosecuting attorney request? The alone? 103). Importantly, we observed had Although majority suggests "prose- superintendent complied with his duties bury cutors their heads in the sand cannot prevent prisoners invoking under section 16-14-1083 to forward the re- their quests, prosecution rights through ignorance," the court and "would UMDDA willful it nevertheless absolves the of its copies request," have received of Trancoso's 14-104(1), (1986), § C.R.S. provided 2. At the time of this (2014). 90-day speedy period. Compare for a 16- purpose of UMDDA case law for the at 186. In der our case. in this "inattention" McKimmy's speedy triggering responsibility no on deed, majority places Accordingly, respectfully I dissent. the contents be aware of Rather, places the burden of its own files. prisoner to "ensure
entirely on requests" of his
prosecution was aware open court" and blames "rais[ing] [them] he chose "[blecause in this case Today's hold actions." Id.
not to take such ig who effectively prosecutors
ing
rewards
form (CRS-16-14-102) in the above-named
Act critically, And it is undis- number[s]."
case
puted requests.
these *15 However, place any rather than bur-
T63 prosecution to
den on the be aware files, majority
contents of its own instead McKimmy "deception" for choos-
accuses "actively prior written
ing to conceal" his specifical-
requests because he failed to refer
ly repeatedly he raised to the UMDDA when colloquies prosecution's
court. Id. at 188. Yet requests-due negli-
failure to read those oversight, simply because it mis-
gence, not be blamed on the
placed them-should
prisoner.
{ view, my plainly teth- 64 In "receipt clock to the
ers the Here, request" nothing more. undisputed receipt McKim- "actual notice" un-
my's constitutes * Booras, J., grant. repeatedly majority would 3. The insists that failed to inform his counsel of his own eg., see, id. at the record before yet requests, point. unclear on this us is best