People v. McKimmy
338 P.3d 333
Colo.2014Background
- Defendant Michael McKimmy, a parolee jailed in Jefferson County, sent pro se letters in four separate criminal cases saying he "formally request[ed] protection under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA)" and copied the local prosecutor, rather than delivering requests to a DOC superintendent as the statute prescribes.
- The trial court initially did not read or act on the letters; the prosecutor received some letters but misfiled or did not become aware of their contents; timing of the prosecutor's actual awareness for some letters was unclear.
- McKimmy later raised UMDDA concerns in counsel-colloquies only generically as "speedy trial" until counsel expressly invoked the UMDDA in open court on September 9, 2008; motions to dismiss followed and were denied; McKimmy pleaded guilty and was sentenced.
- On appeal the court of appeals treated the People’s earlier concession that they had "actual notice" as binding, calculated UMDDA deadlines from dates the prosecution purportedly received the letters, and ordered convictions vacated for UMDDA violations.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether mere receipt of a UMDDA request by the prosecutor—absent awareness of its contents—constitutes the required "actual notice," and whether the People could challenge their earlier concession on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | McKimmy's Argument | People/State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the People may argue on appeal that they lacked "actual notice" despite a prior concession | The People’s concession in trial court is binding; issue not re-litigable | Concession concerned fact not legal definition; appellate courts may decide the legal meaning of "actual notice" | People may argue definition of "actual notice" on appeal; concession did not forfeit the legal question |
| What "actual notice" means under the UMDDA for substantial-compliance invocations | Receipt by the prosecutor (or court forwarding it) suffices to trigger the UMDDA clock | "Actual notice" requires prosecutorial actual knowledge of the request, not mere receipt | "Actual notice" means "actual knowledge"; receipt alone is insufficient |
| Whether McKimmy’s pro se letters invoked UMDDA rights as of their receipt | Letters substantially complied and thus invoked rights upon receipt by prosecutor | Because prosecution lacked actual knowledge at receipt, rights were not invoked until prosecutor actually knew | Remanded to determine when prosecutor gained actual knowledge in each case and whether any UMDDA violation occurred |
| Whether court of appeals erred in treating People’s concession as binding | Concession should bind appellate review | Concession did not bind appellate court on the legal definition issue | Court of appeals erred to the extent it refused to address the People’s legal argument; case remanded for fact-finding |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Mascarenas, 666 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1983) (established doctrine that a prisoner may invoke UMDDA via substantial compliance plus prosecution "actual notice")
- People v. Campbell, 742 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1987) (receipt/forwarding of defendant's letter to prosecutor satisfied notice and supported dismissal where trial not held within UMDDA period)
- People v. Trancoso, 776 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1989) (receipt by court and prosecutor initiates UMDDA period; delivery to superintendent is mechanism to effect receipt)
- People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1986) (UMDDA’s purpose: allow incarcerated persons to obtain speedy, final disposition to avoid disruption of prison rehabilitation programs)