People v. McGeePeople v. McGee
¶ 1 A jury convicted defendant Marchello McGee of armed habitual criminal (AHC) (
¶ 2 In a September 28, 2016, supervisory order, our supreme court instructed us to vacate our judgment in People v. McGee, 2016 IL App (1st) 141013, and to determine whether in light of People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, a different result is warranted. People v. McGee, No. 120590 (Ill. Sept. 28, 2016) (supervisory order). The parties were allowed to file supplemental briefs with respect to the McFadden decision. Upon recommendation, we now vacate our previous judgment and enter this opinion in its stead.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Defendant was charged with nine counts of possessing a firearm and ammunition on or about September 11, 2012. Seven counts were nol-prossed before trial.1 The State proceeded to trial on two counts. Count I alleged that defendant committed the offense of AHC in that he possessed a firearm “after having been convicted of [UUWF] under case number 08CR13500 and [AUUW] under case number 07CR5014.” See
¶ 6 Before this court, defendant contends that his AHC and UUWF convictions must be vacated because the predicate felony convictions alleged were aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) convictions based on statutory provisions that were declared facially unconstitutional in Aguilar. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
¶ 7 To sustain a conviction for AHC, the State is required to prove that defendant possessed a firearm after having “been convicted a total of 2 or more times of any combination of the following” qualifying offenses, which include, but are not limited to, a forcible felony, AUUW, and/or a Class 3 or higher drug felony.
¶ 8 To prove defendant guilty of UUWF, the State was required to prove that defendant knowingly possessed any firearm and had previously been convicted of any felony.
¶ 9 In case No. 07 CR 5014, which served as one of the predicate felony offenses for the AHC charge, defendant was convicted of AUUW (
¶ 10 In case No. 08 CR 13500, which served as a predicate felony offense for both the AHC charge and the UUWF charge, defendant was convicted of two counts of UUWF (
¶ 11 In this case, the trial evidence established that, on the night of September 11, 2012, police officers responding to a report of a man with a rifle saw defendant on a sidewalk holding a large object and discarding it before walking away. The discarded object was immediately found to be a loaded rifle. After defendant was arrested, he did not expressly admit to possessing the rifle but told the police “I can get you two more guns if you let me walk on this rifle.” The parties stipulated2 and the jury was told “that the defendant has been convicted of
¶ 12 In its response brief filed before the ruling in People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, the State argues that defendant‘s merged AHC and UUWF convictions need not be reversed because the predicate felony convictions in case Nos. 07 CR 5014 and 08 CR 13500 are based on the Class 2 version of AUUW, which has not been declared unconstitutional, and that the merged UUWF conviction is properly based on the predicate felony of UUWF.
¶ 13 On the date of this 2012 offense, the unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) statute, with certain exceptions, essentially prohibited a person from carrying or concealing on or about his person, or in any vehicle, a firearm except when on his land or in his abode or fixed place of business (
¶ 14 One‘s right to carry a gun outside of the home was discussed in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116. Our supreme court adopted the reasoning of District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), and Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012), and held that the second amendment right to keep and bear arms extends beyond the home. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶¶ 19-20. The court further held that, “on its face, the Class 4 form of section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d) violates the right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by the second amendment to the United States Constitution” because, while “we are in no way saying that such a right is unlimited or is not subject to meaningful regulation” “we are dealing not with a reasonable regulation but with a comprehensive ban” on possessing an operable firearm outside one‘s home. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. “In other words, the Class 4 form of section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d) amounts to a wholesale statutory ban on the exercise of a personal right ***.” Id. ¶ 21.
¶ 15 Aguilar was qualified in our supreme court‘s decision in People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 22. In Burns, our supreme court “acknowledge[d] that our reference in Aguilar to a ‘Class 4 form’ of the [AUUW] offense was inappropriate. No such offense exists. There is no ‘Class 4
¶ 16 Burns did not alter the core result in Aguilar. Second amendment rights remain protected by the scope of the Aguilar ruling. However, Burns did remove any question as to its applicability: every person is protected without regard to their criminal background. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 32 (section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) “is not enforceable against anyone“) .
¶ 17 Our supreme court decided People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, on June 16, 2016, which involved a direct appeal from a UUWF conviction for possessing a firearm after having a prior conviction for AUUW. On direct appeal, McFadden argued that his UUWF conviction should be vacated because it was predicated on his prior AUUW conviction, which was entered under the section of the statute that was held facially unconstitutional in Aguilar, and thus, the State failed to prove all of the elements of the offense. People v. McFadden, 2014 IL App (1st) 102939. We vacated the defendant‘s UUWF conviction on the basis that the predicate offense of AUUW was void ab initio based on Aguilar. Id. ¶ 43.
¶ 18 Reversing, our supreme court held that defendant‘s status as a felon was not affected by Aguilar. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, ¶ 13. The McFadden court examined the language of the UUWF statute, which prohibits a person from knowingly possessing a firearm ” ‘if the person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction.’ ” Id. ¶ 27 (quoting
“It is axiomatic that no judgment, including a judgment of conviction, is deemed vacated until a court with reviewing authority has so declared. As with any conviction,
a conviction is treated as valid until the judicial process has declared otherwise by direct appeal or collateral attack. Although Aguilar may provide a basis for vacating defendant‘s prior 2002 AUUW conviction, Aguilar did not automatically overturn that judgment of conviction. Thus, at the time defendant committed the UUW by a felon offense, defendant had a judgment of conviction that had not been vacated and that made it unlawful for him to possess firearms.” Id. ¶ 31.
¶ 19 In this case, the parties filed supplemental briefs discussing McFadden‘s impact on issues defendant presented. Defendant now argues that the AHC statute, which is distinguishable from both the UUW statute at issue in McFadden and the federal felon-in-possession of a firearm statute in Lewis, is not satisfied by proof of a prior conviction that violates the second amendment. The State responds that this court has already considered and rejected this argument in People v. Perkins, 2016 IL App (1st) 150889.
¶ 20 In Perkins, we applied the McFadden analysis to an AHC conviction. Perkins was convicted as an AHC and filed a postconviction petition alleging the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because his AHC conviction was predicated on the AUUW statute found facially unconstitutional under Aguilar and therefore his AUUW conviction was void ab initio. Id. ¶ 2. The State appealed from the trial court‘s order granting postconviction relief. Id. ¶ 3.
¶ 21 Before this court on appeal, Perkins argued that McFadden‘s reasoning was limited to the offense of UUWF because “UUWF impose[d] a ‘status-based disability’ that precludes any convicted felon from possessing a firearm” whereas “the offense of [AHC] requires the State to prove that the defendant was convicted of specific enumerated offenses.” Id. ¶ 6. Perkins further argued that UUWF imposed a ” ‘status-based disability,’ ” whereas the AHC conviction ” ‘imposes a conduct-based disability *** based on a defendant‘s commission of specific acts,’ ” and therefore “because the conduct of which he was previously convicted—possession of a firearm—was constitutionally protected, it cannot serve as a predicate for his [AHC] conviction.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.
¶ 22 The Perkins court rejected defendant‘s attempt to distinguish the UUWF offense from the AHC offense in this context as a “distinction without a difference.” Id. ¶ 7. We explained:
“In order to sustain its burden to prove that a defendant is an [AHC], the State need only prove the fact of the prior convictions of enumerated offenses [citations], just as the State need only prove the fact of a prior felony conviction to support a UUWF conviction. Nothing in the [AHC] statute requires a court to examine a defendant‘s underlying conduct in commission of the enumerated offenses in order to find that the State has sustained its burden of proof. And because here, as in McFadden, Perkins’ prior convictions had not been vacated prior to his [AHC] conviction, they could properly serve as predicates for that conviction.” Id.
¶ 23 Defendant acknowledges Perkins but argues it was wrongly decided. We disagree and find the reasoning employed in Perkins applies and defeats defendant‘s attempt to distinguish the AHC statute in this case from the UUWF statute in McFadden. Because defendant failed to vacate his prior AUUW conviction prior to the time he possessed a firearm in this case, the prior AUUW conviction could serve as the predicate offense for his AHC conviction. Id. ¶ 10. Accordingly, we reject defendant‘s argument.
¶ 24 Defendant also argues that Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), and Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880), mandate that defendant‘s convictions for both
¶ 25 We reject defendant‘s argument that the McFadden court did not consider Montgomery. Defense counsel in McFadden was granted leave to cite Montgomery as additional authority and in response to the defendant‘s reliance on Montgomery, the State argued that the United States Supreme Court decision in Lewis was controlling. Our supreme court agreed. People v. Smith, 2017 IL App (1st) 122370-B, ¶ 28; McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, ¶ 34; Perkins, 2016 IL App (1st) 150889, ¶ 9.
¶ 26 In view of the foregoing, we review defendant‘s convictions. In count I, defendant was charged with AHC, which required the State to plead and prove the essential element of at least two enumerated prior felony convictions. The State alleged and proved by way of stipulation that defendant was previously convicted of a “qualifying” felony in case No. 07 CR 5014 and case No. 08 CR 13500.
¶ 27 Defendant‘s felony conviction in case No. 07 CR 5014 was alleged as an element of the AHC offense, and may serve as a predicate felony pursuant to McFadden because there is no evidence presented that the conviction in case No. 07 CR 5014 was vacated by any judicial process. Therefore the case No. 07 CR 5014 conviction can properly serve as proof of an essential element of one of two prior felony convictions necessary to prove the offense of AHC as charged in count I. We affirm defendant‘s conviction on count I.
¶ 28 McFadden is also dispositive of defendant‘s claim that his UUWF conviction is invalid because the predicate felony conviction (case No. 07 CR 5014) in case No. 08 CR 13500 is constitutionally invalid under Aguilar and Burns. Count II charged defendant with UUWF—possession of a firearm “after having been previously convicted of the [sic] felony offense.” The State proved by stipulation one felony required for this charge: a felony conviction under case No. 08 CR 13500. An essential element of proof was that the defendant‘s status as a felon be established beyond a reasonable doubt, not that a particular or specific felony be proved or that the felony was charged under a specific or indentified case number. As discussed, defendant did not vacate his felony conviction for AUUW in case No. 07 CR 5014, and therefore it properly served as a predicate felony for case No. 08 CR 13500, which the State used to prove defendant‘s status as a felon. In any event, in case No. 08 CR 13500, defendant was convicted of six firearm related felony counts, of which four were for AUUW. Two of those counts were for possession of a firearm without a valid FOID card under section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) (
¶ 29 CONCLUSION
¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant‘s conviction for AHC and UUWF.
¶ 31 Affirmed.
¶ 33 I agree with my colleagues that People v. McFadden controls the result. I write separately, as I did in my special concurrence in People v. Spivey, 2017 IL App (1st) 123563, to urge the legislature to amend the relevant statutes to indicate that if a person was convicted under the unconstitutional AUUW statute, that void conviction may not be used to enhance a later charge. This would undo the residual effect of the continued viability of convictions obtained under a statute that has been declared void ab initio and without legal consequence.