THE PEOPLE,
S276303
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
August 8, 2024
First Appellate District, Division Five A163579; Napa County Superior Court CR183930
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans concurred.
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Evans concurred.
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
Under California law, individuals who are convicted of a crime must be ordered to make full restitution to their victims “in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed.” (
This case raises a question concerning the relationship between these provisions governing postsentencing restitution calculations and the provisions governing probation. Defendant Scotlane McCune was placed on felony probation for five years and ordered at sentencing to pay victim restitution in
The Court of Appeal rejected McCune‘s argument as inconsistent with the clear instructions in
I.
In June 2017, McCune crashed a vehicle head-on into a tree while driving without a license. He helped his injured passenger, Miguel Villa, exit the vehicle, and then fled the scene. McCune was charged with felony hit and run with injury (
The day after that filing, on January 1, 2021, new legislation took effect that capped the maximum term of felony probation to two years, subject to exceptions not relevant here. (Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2 (Assembly Bill 1950).) Because McCune had by then served approximately two and a half years of his term of probation — more than the maximum two-year term prescribed by the new law — the trial court terminated McCune‘s probation on January 14, 2021. One week later, the District Attorney moved for a restitution hearing. McCune objected that once his probation had terminated, the court no longer had thе authority to fix an amount of victim restitution. The trial court disagreed, concluding that it had the power to set the amount of victim restitution under
(McCune, at pp. 654-655.) “When a court follows this process, section 1202.46 grants the court jurisdiction ‘for purposes of imposing оr modifying restitution until such time as the losses may be determined’ (§ 1202.46), even if that occurs after probation has ended.” (Id. at p. 655.)
The Court of Appeal‘s conclusion is consistent with that of the only other reported decision concerning the postprobation exercise of section 1202.46 jurisdiction to fill in a restitution amount that could not be ascertained at sentencing, People v. Zuniga (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 870 (Zuniga), which similarly concluded that jurisdiction existed despite the early termination of probation by operation of Assembly Bill 1950. As the Court of Appeal noted, its decision is also consonant with People v. Bufford (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 966, 970-972 (Bufford), which held that where a defendant was ordered at sentencing to pay victim restitution, the jurisdiction conferred by
But the Court of Appeal parted company with other cases that had taken a different view of the relevant statutes. In Hilton v. Superior Court (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 766, 769 (Hilton) and People v. Waters (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 822, 825 (Waters), the courts held that once probation has terminated, a trial court no longer has the power to issue new restitution orders — whether ordering restitution for the first time (Waters) or adding to the restitution amount ordered at sentencing that the defendant had already fulfilled (Hilton). Although the cases addressed different questions from the one presented here, the Court of Appeal criticized their
In view of the tension in the case law, we granted review to answer the question whether a trial court retains the power to fix the amount of victim restitution under
II.
We start with an overview of the law governing victim restitution. “Under the California Constitution, as amended in 1982 by Proposition 8 (commonly known as The Victims’ Bill of Rights), every crime victim has a right to be cоmpensated by the defendant for losses incurred as a result of the defendant‘s crime. [Citation.] At the time Proposition 8 was passed, ‘victims had some access to compensation through the Restitution Fund, and trial courts had discretion to impose restitution as a condition of probation.’ [Citation.] Courts did not, however, have general statutory authority to order the defendant to pay restitution directly to the victim of his or her crime. [Citation.] In passing Proposition 8, the electorate expanded victims’ access to compensation by declaring an ‘unequivocal intention . . . that all persons
Initially the Legislature addressed victim restitution in a piecemeal fashion. One statute required victim restitution in cases in which defendants were granted probation, while a different statute required restitution when probation was denied. (See People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652-653 (Giordano).) In the mid-1990‘s, the Legislature consolidated these provisions in section 1202.4 and amended that provision to make clear that victim restitution is required ”[i]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant‘s conduct.” (
Shortly thereafter, the Legislature added the provisions at issue here, concerning the deferred calculation of victim restitution. In 1996, the Legislature amended section 1202.4 to provide that “[i]f the amount of loss cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing, the restitution order shall include a provision that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court. The court shall order full restitution.” (
In 2008, voters passed a constitutional amendment striking a provision that had previously permitted courts to decline to order a defendant to pay victim restitution for “compelling and extraordinary reasons.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) text of Prop. 9, § 4.1, p. 130.) In 2016, the Legislature amended sections 1202.4 and 1202.46 to align the statutory law with this constitutional amendment and reiterated its intent to ensure that section 1202.4, subdivision (f) (section 1202.4(f)) comports with the constitutional mandate
that restitution be ordered ” ‘in every case . . . in which a crime victim suffers a loss.’ ” (Stats. 2016, ch. 37, § 5, quoting
III.
In a leading appellate case addressing deferred restitution calculations, the Court of Appeal held that when a sentencing court has ordered a criminal defendant to pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined later under section 1202.4(f), jurisdiction to fix the amount of restitution does not automatically terminate with the completion of the defendant‘s sentence of imprisonment. (Bufford, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 970.) Thus, even if the defendant is released before the victim‘s losses can be ascertained, the trial court retains jurisdiction to settle the amount of restitution once the losses have become ascertainable. (Id. at pp. 971-972.) To conclude otherwise, the court reasoned, would be to ignore the plain import of the statutory framework and to “frustrate the clear language” of the Constitution‘s guarantee of full victim restitution. (Bufford, at p. 971.)
Since it was decided nearly two decades ago, Bufford has not been challenged, and it remains unchallenged here. McCune acknowledges that under sections 1202.4 and 1202.46, a court has the power to fix the amount of victim restitution once a victim‘s losses become ascertainable, even if the defendant has already completed a term of imprisonment. McCune contends, however, that a different rule governs in cases in which the defendant is not sentenced to prison but is instead placed on probation.
A.
We begin with McCune‘s first argument, which concerns the scope of section 1202.46. The argument turns on the meaning of the statute, so we begin with its text, considered in the сontext of “related provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.” (Larkin v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 157 (Larkin).)
The current version of section 1202.46 provides in full: “Notwithstanding Section 1170, when the economic losses of a victim cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 1202.4, the court shall retain jurisdiction over a person subject to a restitution order for purposes of imposing or modifying restitution until such time as the losses may be determined. This section does not prohibit a victim, the district attorney, or a court on its own motion from requesting correction, at any time, of a sentence when the sentence is invalid due to the omission of a restitution order or fine pursuant to Section 1202.4.”
Nothing in the operative language of this provision supports the restrictive reading McCune asks us to adopt. The provision is broadly worded, stating that a court retains jurisdiction “over a person subject to a restitution order” until losses become ascertainable. (
Considering the broader statutory context reinforces this conclusion. As all agree, section 1202.46 was meant to work in tandem with section 1202.4(f), which section 1202.46 expressly references. Section 1202.4(f) is clear about the scope of its coverage: The obligation to make full victim restitution applies in ”every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant‘s conduct.” (
After making clear that direct victim restitution must be ordered “in every case,” section 1202.4 goes on to specify that if the amount of loss cannot be ascertained at sentencing, then the trial court must issue an order providing “that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court. The court shall order full restitution.” (
McCune contends that while section 1202.46 may not explicitly distinguish between probation and nonprobation cases, such a distinction is implicit in the opening language specifying that section 1202.46 applies “[n]otwithstanding Section 1170.” To understand this argument requires some background. At the time section 1202.46 was enacted, the version of
As both sides agree, the “[n]otwithstanding” clause in section 1202.46 makes clear that even after 120 days have elapsed following a defendant‘s sentencing to a term of imprisonment, the court retains power to set an amount of restitution once the victim‘s losses become ascertainable. But McCune argues that the Legislature‘s decision to specify that section 1202.46 confers jurisdiction “[n]otwithstanding Section 1170” — but not, for instance, also “notwithstanding” the probation statute, section 1203.3 — means that section 1202.46 must apply only to custodial sentences.
The argument is unpersuasive. Not only does the operative language of section 1202.46 draw no explicit distinction between probation and nonprobation cases, but it also cross-references аnd works in tandem with a provision,
McCune cites legislative history to support his argument that section 1202.46 is more limited than it may at first appear. We may, of course, consult legislative history to resolve ambiguities in the statutory text. (E.g., Larkin, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 158.) But the statutory text is unambiguous on the question before us: The plain text of section 1202.46 confers jurisdiction to fix the amount of victim restitution once that amount becomes ascertainable, and it does so in probation cases as well as nonprobation cases. We may not consult legislative history to cloud the meaning of statutory text when its meaning is clear. (See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103 [“Only when the statute‘s language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, may the court turn to extrinsic aids to assist in interpretation.“].)
Even if we were to consider the legislative history, however, it would not alter our conclusion about section 1202.46‘s applicability in probation cases. The Legislature enacted section 1202.46 as part of Senate Bill 1126 in 1999. The legislative history addressing section 1202.46 is limited because the primary focus of Senate Bill 1126, and thus of its available legislative history, concerned a different subject: namely, expanding and making permanent a pilot project permitting defendants who commit crimes while incarcerated to make electronic court appearances for arraignments as well as for ordering restitution payments. (Stats. 1999, ch. 888, §§ 1, 2, pp. 6386-6388; see, e.g., Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Fiscal Summary of Sen. Bill No. 1126 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 26, 1999.) Nothing in the available history, however, supports the conclusion that the Legislature implicitly intended for section 1202.46 to apply in nonprobation cases only.
McCune argues that because Senate Bill 1126 was primarily focused on other matters concerning incarcerated defendants, including electronic restitution hearings, we should infer that the postsentencing restitution provision in section 1202.46, too, was exclusively aimed at incarcerated defendants. But we see no basis for understanding the intendеd scope of section 1202.46 as implicitly limited by other, unrelated provisions that happened to be in the
As McCune notes, one bill analysis prepared by the Department of General Services did assert that passage of section 1202.46 would clear up trial court confusion over section 1170‘s 120-day limit by establishing that a court retains jurisdiction over persons “sent to CDC facilities to serve their sentence.” (Dept. General Services, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1126 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 16, 1999, p. 2; see also Dept. General Services, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill. No. 1126 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 2, 1999, p. 3.) That the Department of General Services identified the clarification of jurisdiction over incarcerated defendants as one of the impacts of section 1202.46 does not mean, however, that the Department believed this was the only impact intended by the Legislature. In any event, what the Department of General Services may or may not have believed is beside the point. While agency analyses can sometimes be ” ‘instructive,’ ” they clearly do not afford the same kind of “direct window[] into legislative intent” as committee analyses and cannot, in any event, “be used to alter the substance of legislation.” (Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1219, fn. 3.) Here, as explained, the committee analyses tend to confirm what the text already tells us about the substance of the legislation: Section 1202.46 is not limited to cases involving sentences of imprisonment.
B.
McCune argues that even if section 1202.46 applies to probation cases, the time for fixing the amount of victim restitution is circumscribed by the probation statute.
McCune‘s argument rests on the provision concerning the modification or revocation of probation, which provides that a court “has the authority at any time during the term of probation to revoke, modify, or change its order of suspension of imposition оr execution of sentence.” (
Both Courts of Appeal to address this argument have rejected it. In Zuniga, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at page 877, the court reasoned that where payment of restitution has already been ordered under section 1202.4 as a condition of probation, a court does not “modify the order or impose any new condition by setting the amount once it could be determined.” The limited time for modifying a probation term under section 1203.3 therefore does not apply.
Although the Court of Appeal in this case reached the same result, it rejected the argument for what it described as a more “straightforward” reasоn. (McCune, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 654McCune, at p. 655; see id. at pp. 654-655.)
We agree with the Court of Appeal in this case. Even assuming for argument‘s sake that an order fixing the amount of restitution once the victim‘s losses become ascertainable “revoke[s], modif[ies], or change[s]” the conditions of probation within the meaning of section 1203.3, subdivision (a), McCune fails to identify any statutory conflict that would justify circumscribing a court‘s authority under section 1202.46. Section 1203.3 is a limited grant of jurisdiction for the general purposes set forth in that provision. Section 1203.3 does not purport to set an across-the-board limit on the
McCune‘s argument to the contrary is inconsistent with what we know of the Legislature‘s purpose in enacting the direct victim restitution law. The premise of McCune‘s argument is that, by ordering that restitution be included as a mandatory term of probation (
It is difficult to understand why a Legislature attempting to craft a uniform set of obligations to ensure full victim restitution in every case — “regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed” (
McCune suggests that the Legislature may have wished to demonstrate greater leniency to criminal defendants placed on probation, given probation‘s broadly rehabilitative purposes. But McCune does not explain why the distinct purposes of probation are relevant in the context of victim restitution, given the unqualified constitutional mandаte that victims be fully compensated for their losses, including in probation cases. (See
McCune raises a series of objections to this straightforward conclusion, but none is availing. First, he notes that certain subdivisions of section 1203.3 specifically refer to modifications respecting restitution. Specifically, section 1203.3, subdivision (b)(4) provides that a court‘s exercise of its authority to modify probation is subject to the following rules: “The court may modify the time and manner of the term of probation for purposes of measuring the timely payment of
restitution obligations or the good conduct and reform of the defendant while on probation. The court shall not modify the dollar amount of the restitution obligations due to the good conduct and reform of the defendant, absent compelling and extraordinary reasons, nor shall the court limit the ability of payees to enforce the obligations in the manner of judgments in civil actions.” Subdivision (b)(5) then goes on to provide: “This section does not prohibit the court from modifying the dollar amount of a restitution order pursuant to subdivision (f) of
McCune argues that the wording of subdivision (b)(5), in particular, must mean that “[t]his section” — i.e.,
McCune next invokes two appellate cases holding the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by setting the amount of victim restitution following the termination of probation. Both casesare distinguishable, however. In the first case, defendant Hilton was sentenced to probation and ordered to pay $3,215 of victim restitution. (Hilton, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 769.) More than a year after Hilton‘s probation had expired, and after Hilton had already fulfilled the initial restitution order, the victim filed a motion seeking
In both Hilton and Waters, the Courts of Appeal held that a court lacks jurisdiction to impose new restitution orders once the period of probation has lapsed. Neither case considered the scope of a court‘s jurisdiction in the scenario we confront here, in which a sentencing court has timely ordered victim restitution and later fixes the amount of restitution after the amount of the victim‘s losses become ascertainable. Still, McCune argues that even if Hilton and Waters are not precisely on point, the logic of the cases cannot be squared with a rule that would permit a court to fix the amount of restitution after probation has terminated.
McCune is incorrect. As the Attorney General notes,
McCune argues that we should instead “presume the Legislature to have acquiesced to Hilton‘s and Waters‘s interpretation” and thus rely on these distinguishable cases to find the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction here. He notes that the Legislature did not abrogate those cases when it amended
McCune next points to our acknowledgment in Chavez, supra, 4 Cal.5th 771 that “a court‘s power is significantly attenuated” after probation terminates, such that a court‘s “power to impose a sentence over the defendant
McCune further argues that reading
This brings us to McCune‘s final point. He worries that unless there is a statutory deadline for fixing the amount of victim restitution, defendants may find themselves surprised by an obligation to pay significant restitution amounts many months or years after they have completed probation. In other words, if a court has the power to set an amount of restitution even after probation has expired, the result may be to “tether probationers to the criminal justice system indefinitely.”
We acknowledge the concern. But for nearly two decades since Bufford was decided, the law has been clear that a court‘s power to fix the amount of victim restitution once it becomes ascertainable does not terminate with the completion of a term of imprisonment. McCune points to no evidence that this rule has led to unreasonable delays in fixing restitution amounts. Nor does McCune explain why applying the same rule in probation cases would be more likely to lead to such delays.
To the extent the issue might arise in the future, however, we make clear that our holding that
McCune does not argue that the trial court‘s exercise of jurisdiction in this case was untimely. (See fn. 4, ante.) Further elaboration of timeliness in the
IV.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
KRUGER, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.
PEOPLE v. MCCUNE
S276303
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu
I write to underscore the court‘s observation that “our holding that [
LIU, J.
I Concur:
EVANS, J.
Notes
The question presented here, concerning the scope of a trial court‘s power under
In People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093 (Martinez), this court held that in a hit-and-run case, section 1202.4 restitution is limited to losses caused by the crime itself — namely, leaving the scene of an injury accident — and does not cover losses attributable solely to the noncriminal act of being involved in a car crash. We cоntrasted the power to order direct victim restitution under section 1202.4 with the broader power to order restitution as a condition of probation under
It is now too late in the day for us to consider McCune‘s argument that
In particular, McCune argues that because the California District Attorneys Association argued in opposition that probation must be “long enough in order to increase the likelihood that a crime victim is paid in full,” the Legislature understood that Assembly Bill 1950 might leave some victims without access to full restitution because a court would lack jurisdiction to set the amount of victim restitution owed after the termination of probation. (See Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 6, 2020, at pp. 7–8.) We decline to infer, based on a single argument raised in opposition to a bill, that the Legislature intended such a result when it reduced the maximum length of probation in Assembly Bill 1950.
McCune relatedly argues that those individuals who lose access to direct victim restitution by operation of Assembly Bill 1950 could simply turn to the Restitution Fund as a back stop. As explained above, we reject the premise that the Legislature intended such a result. We further note that “the Restitution Fund is not intended, as direct restitution orders are, ‘to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant‘s criminal conduct . . . .’ ” (Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 664.)