People v. MartinPeople v. Martin
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrus, J.), rendered November 29, 2012, convicting him of attempted assault in the first degree, assault in the third degree, and criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
At trial, the complainant testified that the defendant, with whom she was previously acquainted, assaulted her during a visit to her apartment. The complainant stated that during the course of the assault and ensuing struggle; the defendant attempted to choke her, first with a shoelace and then with a telephone cord, attacked her with a knife, punched her in the face several times, and bit her on the arm and cheek. As a result of the attack, the complainant sustained injuries including ligature marks on her neck, and lacerations on her hand and chest. The defendant raised a justification defense, taking
On appeal, the defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective because he did not object to certain alleged errors committed by the Supreme Court during its charge to the jury on the defense of justification, and that this deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree.
Initially, the defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in its charge to the jury regarding the defense of justification. Specifically, the defendant contends that the court should have charged justification with respect to each count as an element of each count, rather than give a comprehensive justification instruction after having charged the jury with respect to all counts in the indictment. However, we find that the court‘s charge, taken as a whole, conveyed to the jury the correct standard (see People v Medina, 18 NY3d 98, 104 [2011]; People v Whitney, 117 AD3d 762 [2014]). Since the instruction was adequate in that respect, defense counsel‘s failure to object to it did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel (see People v Delmas, 115 AD3d 758 [2014]).
The defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective because he did not object to the Supreme Court‘s instruction regarding the justified use of deadly physical force, and failed to request an alternative instruction. In this regard, the defendant contends that the court should have instructed that, in addition to proving the defendant‘s guilt of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the People had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not justified in attempting to use a knife to cause serious injury to the complainant to prevent the complainant from forcibly raping him (see
Finally, in this regard, the defendant contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object when, in response to a jury inquiry, the Supreme Court did not again charge the jury concerning the defense of justification as it had originally charged. However, this was not reversible error (see People v Almodovar, 62 NY2d 126, 132 [1984]; People v Grant, 127 AD3d 990 [2015]). The court‘s response to the jury inquiry adequately answered the inquiry and explained the correct standard regarding the defense of justification. Thus, defense counsel‘s failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel (see People v Delmas, 115 AD3d 758 [2014]).
The defendant also contends that the Supreme Court improperly admitted evidence of a prior altercation between the complainant and a third party. Since the People never established a connection between that incident and the instant matter, the evidence was irrelevant (see People v Giles, 11 NY3d 495, 499 [2008]; People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777 [1988]). Nevertheless, the error in admitting the evidence does not warrant reversal. The alleged bad act, which did not involve the defendant, did not present a Molineux issue (People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 [1901]), since it could show nothing about the defendant‘s propensity (see People v Arafet, 13 NY3d 460, 465 [2009]). In any event, the court‘s comprehensive instruction to the jury immediately following the testimony in question was sufficient to offset any potential for prejudice, as the jury is presumed to have followed the trial court‘s limiting instructions, and that presumption is appropriate here (see People v Morris, 21 NY3d 588, 598 [2013]; People v Harris, 117 AD3d 847, 854 [2014], affd 26 NY3d 1 [2015]; People v Mooney, 62 AD3d 725, 726 [2009]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive.
The defendant‘s remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit. Mastro, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and Maltese, JJ., concur.