People v. MarlettPeople v. Marlett
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), rendered June 21, 2019 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of predatory sexual assault (eight counts), kidnapping in the second dеgree and robbery in the first degree (two counts).
On January 9, 2016, victim A was walking home from the grocery store when defendant approached her, while holding a knife, and demanded money. Victim A gave defendant her debit and grocery card, and he fled. Shortly thereafter, defendant abducted victim B, dragged her into his apartment and raped her repeatedly while threatening her verbally and with a knife. After several hours, defendant took victim B‘s keys and left the apartment to mоve her car. While defendant was gone, victim B covered herself in a towel, crawled out through a bedroom window and ran to a nearby restaurant. As defendant was returning to his apartment, he was picked up by police and, within hours, he was questioned by police.
As a result of these incidents, defendant was charged by a 20-count indictment with eight counts of predatory sexual assault, five counts of rape in the first degree, three counts of criminal sexual act in the first dеgree, one count of kidnapping in the second degree, two counts of robbery in the first degree and one count of robbery in the third degree. A jury found defendant guilty of all charges, rejecting his affirmative defense of lack of culpability by reason of mental disease or defect (see
Defendant initially contends that the jury‘s rejection of his affirmative defense of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect was against the weight of the evidence. We disagree. “For a weight of the evidence review, this Court must first determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, a different finding would not have been unreasonable and, if not, then weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidencе” (People v Sanders, 185 AD3d 1280, 1284 [2020] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 35 NY3d 1115 [2020]). “When conducting this review, [this Court] consider[s] the evidence in a neutral light and defer[s] to the jury‘s credibility assessments” (People v Vega, 170 AD3d 1266, 1268 [2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted
The People and defendant each presented experts who offered conflicting testimony as to defendant‘s mental health and his capacity to comprehend the nature and consequences of his actions. Defendant‘s expert, psychiatrist Stephen Price, diagnosed defendant with schizoaffective disorder after examining him and reviewing his various medical and psychiatric records. Price described defendant as having a long history of serious аnd persistent mental illness, starting in his youth. Price testified that these defects affected his thought process and resulted in delusional thinking and hallucinations. Price further testified that, approximately one month prior to the incidents, defendant wаs undergoing significant decompensation, which, when coupled with his increasing dependence, overuse of alcohol, noncompliance with medication and counseling treatment, resulted in his increased paranoia and his inability to control his behavior. In Price‘s professional opinion, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect, as he lacked the substantial capаcity to know or appreciate the nature and consequences of his acts or that they were wrong.
The People called psychologist Stuart M. Kirschner, who after examining defendant and reviewing his medical and psychiаtric records, diagnosed defendant as having bipolar I disorder, antisocial personality disorder and alcohol use disorder. Kirschner testified that defendant‘s reporting of a “potpourri” of symptoms was not consistent with any mental disorder. He further opined that the symptoms described by defendant were preposterous, fabricated and the result of malingering,1 and that defendant was a habitual violent predator. In determining that “not a shred” of evidence supports defendant‘s claim that, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity at the time of the offense to know or appreciate either the nature and consequences of his сonduct or that such conduct was wrong, Kirschner specifically focused on the statements that defendant made to the victims and his behavior while being investigated by the police.
“[W]here conflicting expert testimony is presented, the question [of]
Defendant next asserts that Supreme Court‘s rulings related to voir dire violated his statutory and constitutional rights to meaningful participation in jury selection, to an impartial jury and to due process of law. Pursuant to
Prior to jury selection, Suрreme Court instructed counsel that they would each have 20 minutes to question prospective jurors in the first round and 15 minutes each in subsequent rounds. Additionally, the court stated that if either party desired more time, counsel should seek permissiоn from the court. During the first round, defense counsel requested additional time, which Supreme Court granted, giving counsel five more minutes. Neither counsel requested additional time in the subsequent rounds. As long as counsel is afforded a fair oppоrtunity to question prospective jurors about relevant matters, a restriction on the time allotted for voir dire is generally permissible (see People v Koury, 268 AD2d 896, 897 [2000], lv denied 94 NY2d 949 [2000]; People v Garrow, 151 AD2d 877, 877-878 [1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 948 [1989]). As the record does not support the conclusion that Supreme Court abused its discretion in limiting the amount of time for voir dire, we find that defendant‘s rights with respect thereto were not violated (see People v Winchell, 129 AD3d 1309, 1311-1312 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 973 [2015]; People v Wright, 13 AD3d 726, 727 [2004], lv denied 5 NY3d 857 [2005]; People v Dart, 186 AD2d 905, 907 [1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 787 [1993]).
Defendant also asserts that Supreme Court erred in refusing to instruct the prospective jurors as to the nature of his affirmative defense, thus prеventing counsel from meaningfully questioning the prospective jurors. We disagree. The record reveals that defense counsel had a fair opportunity to question prospective
Defendant next contends that Supreme Court erred in denying his
Lastly, defendant contends that his prison term was harsh and excessive. “Sentencing generally rests within the discretion of the trial court, and a legally permissible sentence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of the
Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Pritzker and Colangelo, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.