People v. MarlettPeople v. Marlett
Paul J. Connolly, Delmar, for appellant.
P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Emily Schultz of counsel), for respondent.
Reynolds Fitzgerald, J.
Appeal from a judgmеnt of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), rendered June 21, 2019 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of predatory sexual assault (eight counts), kidnapping in the second degree and robbery in the first
On January 9, 2016, victim A was walking homе from the grocery store when defendant approached her, while holding a knife, and demanded money. Victim A gave defendant her debit and grocery card, and he fled. Shortly thereafter, defendant abducted victim B, dragged her into his apartment and raped her repeatedly while threatening her verbally and with a knife. After several hours, defendant took victim B‘s keys and left the apartment to move her car. While defendant was gone, victim B covered herself in а towel, crawled out through a bedroom window and ran to a nearby restaurant. As defendant was returning to his apartment, he was picked up by police and, within hours, he was questioned by police.
As a result of these incidents, defendant was charged by a 20-count indictment with eight counts of predatory sexual assault, five counts of rape in the first degree, three counts of criminal sexual act in the first degree, one count of kidnapping in the second degree, two сounts of robbery in the first degree and one count of robbery in the third degree. A jury found defendant guilty of all charges, rejecting his affirmative defense of lack of culpability by reason of mental disease or defect (see
Defendant initially contends that the jury‘s rejection of his affirmative defense of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect was against the weight of the evidence. We disagree. “For a weight of the evidence review, this Court must first determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, a different finding would not have been unreasonable and, if not, then weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence” (People v Sanders, 185 AD3d 1280, 1284 (2020) [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 35 NY3d 1115 (2020)). “When conducting this review, [this Court] consider[s] the evidence in a neutral light аnd defer[s] to the jury‘s credibility assessments” (People v Vega, 170 AD3d 1266, 1268 (2019) [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 33 NY3d 1074 (2019)). With respect to defendant‘s affirmative defense,
The People and defendant each presented experts who offered conflicting testimony as to defendant‘s mental health and his capacity to comprehend the nature and consequences of his actions. Defendant‘s expert, psychiatrist Stephen Price, diagnosed defendant with schizoaffective disorder after examining him and reviewing his various medical and psychiatric records. Price described defendant as having a long history of serious and persistent mental illness, starting in his youth. Price testified that these defects аffected his thought process and resulted in delusional thinking and hallucinations. Price further testified that, approximately one month prior to the incidents, defendant was undergoing significant decompensation, which, when coupled with his incrеasing dependence, overuse of alcohol, noncompliance with medication and counseling treatment, resulted in his increased paranoia and his inability to control his behavior. In Price‘s professional opinion, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect, as he lacked the substantial capacity to know or appreciate the nature and consequеnces of his acts or that they were wrong.
The People called psychologist Stuart M. Kirschner, who after examining defendant and reviewing his medical and psychiatric records, diagnosed defendant as having bipolar I disorder, antisоcial personality disorder and alcohol use disorder. Kirschner testified that defendant‘s reporting of a “potpourri” of symptoms was not consistent with any mental disorder. He further opined that the symptoms described by defendant were
“[W]here conflicting expert testimony is presented, the question [of] whether the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of the commission of the crime is for the fact finder, who may accept or reject the opinion of any expert” (People v Hadfield, 119 AD3d 1217, 1222 (2014) [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 25 NY3d 989 (2015)). “[A]fter weighing the conflicting testimony, the strength of conflicting inferences from such testimony and the other proof presented at trial,” we are unpersuaded that the jury‘s determination to reject the affirmative defеnse was against the weight of the evidence (People v Downs, 38 AD3d 1019, 1020 (2007), lv denied 8 NY3d 984 (2007)).
Defendant next asserts that Supreme Court‘s rulings related to voir dire violated his statutory and constitutional rights to meaningful participation in jury selection, to an impartial jury and to due process of law. Pursuant to
Prior to jury selection, Supreme Court instructed counsel that they would each have 20 minutes to question prospective jurors in the first round and 15 minutes each in subsequent rounds. Additionally, the court stated that if either party desired more timе, counsel should seek permission from the court. During the first round, defense counsel requested additional time, which Supreme Court granted, giving counsel five more minutes. Neither counsel requested additional time in the subsequent rounds. As long as counsеl is afforded a fair
Defendant also asserts that Supreme Court erred in refusing to instruct the prospective jurors as to the naturе of his affirmative defense, thus preventing counsel from meaningfully questioning the prospective jurors. We disagree. The record reveals that defense counsel had a fair opportunity to question prospective jurors about defendant‘s affirmative defense, even though the court did not provide a specific preliminary instruction regarding it. Defendant‘s counsel was, from the outset of each round, able to ask extensive questions about the jurors’ potential bias towards individuals who use mental illness as an excuse to break the law and about the insanity plea, and whether they could apply the law even if it meant finding that defendant was not responsible by reason of mental disease оr defect (see People v Jean, 75 NY2d 744, 745 (1989); People v Sewnarine, 156 AD3d 459, 459 (2017), lv denied 31 NY3d 1087 (2018); People v Erickson, 156 AD2d 760, 761 (1989), lv denied 75 NY2d 966 (1990)). Furthermore, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the court‘s failure to read an affirmative defense instruction during voir dire (see People v Steward, 17 NY3d 104, 113 (2011); People v Jean, 75 NY2d at 745).
Defendant next contends that Supreme Court erred in denying his
Lastly, defendant contends that his prison term was harsh and excessive. “Sentencing generally rests within the discretion of the trial court, and a legally permissible sentence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of the sentencing court‘s discretion or extraordinary circumstances” (People v Turner, 172 AD3d 1768, 1773 (2019) [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 34 NY3d 939 (2019)). Although defendant has a history of mental illness and had a traumatic childhood, defendant also has a lengthy criminal history, and his horrific acts will have a lifetime impact on victim B. As such, we find no abuse of discretion or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant a modification of defendant‘s sentence, which was within permissible statutory guidelines, in the interest of justice (see People v Reese, 166 AD3d 1057, 1062 (2018), lv denied 33 NY3d 953 (2019); People v Stover, 178 AD3d 1138, 1147 (2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 1163 (2020)).
Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Pritzker and Colangelo, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.