People v. DartPeople v. Dart
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Otsego County (Mogavero, Jr., J.), rendered March 4, 1991, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of murder in thе second degree.
As a result of the fatal stabbing of Gillian Gibbons in a municipal parking garage in the City of Oneonta, Otsego County, between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m. on September 12, 1989, defendant was indicted for murder in the second degree in violation of
Testimony elicited at the suppression hearing reveals that on the morning of September 14, 1989, a young woman advised the police that two days earlier, at about 1:15 p.m., she observed defendant, whom she knew because they had attended the same school, "hanging around” in the garage near the stairwell which led to the parking level where the victim’s car was located. She also informed the police that when defendant was younger he had been implicated in a sexual assault involving a girl. Upon rеceiving that information, members of a joint homicide team comprised of State Troopers and Oneonta police officers initiated mobile surveillance of defendant’s activities. When defendant, for no apparent reason, drove by the murder site on at least two occasiоns and after he had proceeded along State Route 28, several miles from the scene of the homicide, the surveillance team of State Police Senior Investigator Robert Courtright and Oneonta Police Officer Allen Taylor stopped defendant’s vehicle for the purpose of questioning him. Given the officers’ knowledge that a witness reported seeing defendant in the garage at approximately the time when the stabbing occurrеd and the fact that they had observed defendant unnecessarily drive by the crime scene several times that day, notwithstanding thé contrary view held by defendant, we find these conditions led to a reasonable suspicion that defendant committed the crime and hence afforded the officers an adequate basis to stop defen
His car having been pulled over, defendant was interviewed for about 30 minutes in the police car. The officers then askеd defendant to accompany them to the police station for further questioning, which he did. After about two hours at the station, and being confronted with the fact that he had been seen in the parking garage at about the time of the murder and that he had previously represented to the officers that he was at home some 30 miles away at the time, defendant broke down, orally confessed to the killing and gave the police a map showing the location of the murder weapon, where it was ultimately found. Pursuant to consent forms signed by defendant, police searched his car and apartment and found the knife sheath. It is this evidence, and the confession, which defendant argues should have been suppressed.
There is no doubt that once defendant confessed, probable cause for his arrest was present. He contends, however, that he was placed in custody before there wаs probable cause to do so, either when he entered the police vehicle or when he was transported to the police station for further questioning. We are unconvinced.
The officers testified that after they stopped defendant’s vehicle, he voluntarily agreed to sit in the back seat of the two-door unmarked police car to be questioned, and that he later agreed to go with them to the police station for further questioning. Nothing in the record indicates that defendant refused to cooperate in any way, or that the officers proceeded in spite оf resistance. No guns were drawn, defendant was not handcuffed, nor was he told that he was under arrest. Having been arrested several times before, defеndant testified that each time he had been informed that he was under arrest. Thus, the record supports County Court’s determination after the suppression hearing that the People carried their burden of proving that defendant assented to the questioning, and that a reasonable person, innocent оf any crime, would not have believed that he was under arrest under the circumstances (see, People v Yukl,
We also reject defendant’s assertion that the manner in which thе suppression hearing was conducted prejudiced him. He maintains that he was greatly disadvantaged because one of the testifying officers was permitted to confer with the District Attorney during a customary break in the proceed
As for the time constraints placed by County Court on the jury voir dire—individual counsel were allotted 15 minutes to question each panel of prospective jurors—it is worth noting that absent a showing that the actual process usеd was unfair or that defendant was prejudiced thereby, a trial court has broad discretion in this often time-consuming aspect of criminal jury trials (see, People v Pepper,
The рrocess employed was not unfair. Prior to their own individual examination of the jurors, trial counsel were given the opportunity to review written juror questiоnnaires and to submit questions to County Court to be asked by it during its preliminary interrogation. No such questions were submitted by the defense. Moreover, a reading of the voir dire transcript discloses that the court’s examination was extensive, and that the court displayed no reluctance to excuse jurors when pоssible bias was uncovered. Most importantly, there is no evidence that the jurors chosen were not impartial (see, People v Pepper, supra, at 359).
Also without merit is the fault defendant ascribеs to County Court’s instructions to the jury. The court’s charge on circumstantial evidence presented a fair and balanced interpretation of the law to be applied, including the standard of reasonable doubt (see, People v Adams,