People v Marcus T.

Aug 6, 2026
Ind No. 70512/21|70512/21|Appeal No. 6538|Case No. 2025-03393|
Versions:2026 NY Slip Op 04913

People v Marcus T.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (April A. Newbauer, J.), rendered May 15, 2025, resentencing defendant, based on his conviction, same court and Justice, rendered December 19, 2022, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and assault in the second degree, to concurrent prison terms of two and one-half years followed by three years of postrelease supervision, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of vacating defendant‘s sentence and remanding for resentencing, and otherwise affirmed.

Courts are statutorily mandated to consider youthful offender (YO) treatment for eligible defendants (CPL 720.20). Therefore, a defendant cannot bargain away or expressly waive YO status during plea agreements (People v Rudolph, 21 NY3d 497, 501 [2013]; People v Pacherille, 25 NY3d 1021, 1029 [2015, Rivera, J., dissenting] [“in the YO context . . . a defendant cannot barter the right to YO consideration“]; Letter in Support from Thomas J. Mackell, Queens County District Attorney, Bill Jacket, L 1971, ch 981, at 13 [“[a]ny attempt to bargain the stigma-less adjudication as youthful offender in exchange for waiver . . . has been rejected“]).

Such a restriction might seem disadvantageous to eligible defendants in the plea-bargaining process. However, it must be viewed through the lens of the YO statute‘s intended purpose of providing eligible youth with a second chance by “relieving [them] from the onus of a criminal record” (see CPL 720.20[1][a]). Therefore, a sentencing court‘s consideration of YO treatment is indispensable to the fair administration of justice (People v Drayton, 39 NY2d 580, 584 [1976] [“The youthful offender provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law emanate from a legislative desire not to stigmatize youths . . . with criminal records triggered by hasty or thoughtless acts“]), with the decision to award a YO adjudication being within the sentencing court‘s discretion (People v Middlebrooks, 25 NY3d 516, 526-527 [2015]).

Recognizing the mandatory nature and underlying importance of the YO statute, this Court previously vacated defendant‘s sentence and remanded this matter for defendant to be considered for YO treatment (People v Marcus T., 233 AD3d 622, 623 [1st Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 964 [2025]). The question now before us is whether the sentencing court assured that the information upon which it based its determination was “reliable and accurate” (People v Minemier, 29 NY3d 414, 422 [2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

On remand, the sentencing court confusingly stated that its “reasons for not finding [defendant] a youthful offender ha[d] to do with the manner in which the crimes were committed. And his direct role in the two crimes, more specifically the second one.” The court went on to state that “these incidents were separate in time, giving him some ability to reflect the nature of his [crime] . . . there are two separate counts, and they have to do with two separate things.” The court admitted that it was “[m]aybe . . . confused.” Crucially, the facts and factors put forth in the court‘s reasoning are not indicative of defendants’ criminal history nor present in defendant‘s case. To be clear, defendant‘s case involved one incident that plainly did not occur separately in time as the court indicated.

In making a YO treatment determination, sentencing courts may consider “the gravity of the crime and manner in which it was committed, mitigating circumstances, defendant‘s prior criminal record, prior acts of violence, recommendations in the presentence reports, defendant‘s reputation, the level of cooperation with authorities, defendant‘s attitude toward society and respect for the law, and the prospects for rehabilitation and hope for a future constructive life” (People v Cruickshank, 105 AD2d 325, 334 [3d Dept 1985], affd sub nom. People v Dawn Maria C., 67 NY2d 625 [1986]). While courts are not required to place their reasons for denying YO treatment on the record (Minemier, 29 NY3d at 419), at minimum, YO consideration requires the court to have familiarity with the relevant facts and circumstances of the case before it (see CPL 720.20[1][a]).

Here, the sentencing court tracked the statutory language in denying defendant YO treatment. However, it is unclear whether the court was cognizant of the relevant facts and circumstances of defendant‘s case to appropriately consider YO treatment, much less the Cruickshank factors (105 AD2d at 334).

At the very least, this record calls into question whether defendant was appropriately considered for YO treatment. The sentencing court‘s confusion exposes that it was so unaware of the facts of the underlying offense that we cannot be sure it considered the mitigating factors specific to this defendant that might warrant YO treatment, i.e. that the instant offense is defendant‘s first conviction, signaling that he is not a hardened criminal; defendant‘s expressed remorse, despite acting in self-defense; the overt steps he has taken to lead a law-abiding life; or the lack of serious injuries to the victim.

Undoubtedly, to give effect to the legislative intent behind enacting the YO statute, a sentencing court‘s knowledge of the facts and circumstances regarding the actual defendant being considered for YO treatment is necessary. The record before this Court does not demonstrate that such knowledge was present for defendant to be properly considered for a YO adjudication.

Therefore, while we find defendant‘s waiver of appeal valid (People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545, 560 [2019]), we remand this matter to the sentencing court for a proper youthful offender determination upon reasoned judgment of the considerations herein.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: August 6, 2026