People v. Lupyak

Aug 19, 2026
C102037

While driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.19 percent, defendant Sarah Elizabeth Lupyak drove the wrong way on a freeway and struck two cars, killing one person and injuring three others. Defendant pled guilty to murder and gross vehicular manslaughter in exchange for an agreed sentence of either an indeterminate term of 15 years to life on the murder conviction or a determinate term of 10 years for the gross vehicular manslaughter conviction. The trial court imposed sentence on both convictions and stayed execution on the gross vehicular manslaughter conviction under Penal Code1 section 654. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider her alcoholism as a factor that significantly reduced her culpability and warranted imposition of the lesser sentence. We disagree and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I

2016 Prior Driving Under The Influence Conviction

On August 13, 2016, defendant drove the wrong way on a freeway while having a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.21 percent. She pled no contest to driving under the influence of alcohol while having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or higher. As part of her plea agreement, defendant signed and initialed an advisement of rights, which included the admonition that she could be charged with murder if she continued to drive while under the influence of alcohol and someone was killed as a result of her driving. During the plea hearing, defendant orally confirmed that she read and understood the admonition.

The trial court placed defendant on three years of probation. Her probationary terms included that she complete a nine-month driving under the influence program, attend 40 Alcoholics Anonymous or therapy sessions and a victim impact panel, and not drive with a measurable amount of alcohol in her blood. She satisfactorily completed probation.

II

2021 Current Convictions

Early in the morning of September 11, 2021, defendant drove the wrong way on a freeway with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.19 percent. She hit one car, injuring three people. She continued driving and hit another car, killing the driver.

Defendant was charged with second degree murder,2 gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, and driving under the influence of alcohol and causing injury.

The trial court released defendant on bail. The conditions of bail included not consuming or possessing alcohol. On January 1, 2024, officers responded to a call and found defendant extremely intoxicated, belligerent, and screaming obscenities. She did not listen to the officers’ commands and continually ran out into the street as cars were driving by. The officers arrested her due to her signs of intoxication and the danger she presented to herself and the public. Following a hearing and based primarily on the need to protect the public, the trial court remanded defendant to custody.

On April 23, 2024, defendant pled guilty to murder and gross vehicular manslaughter. The trial court dismissed the driving under the influence of alcohol and causing injury charge with a Harvey3 waiver as to restitution only. The parties agreed the court would sentence defendant to either a determinate sentence of 10 years for gross vehicular manslaughter or an indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life for murder. The parties also agreed that under section 654, the trial court had discretion to choose which sentence to stay.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court considered defendant‘s sentencing memorandum, probation‘s presentence report, and oral argument.

The prosecutor argued the trial court should sentence defendant to 15 years to life on the second degree murder conviction and stay the gross vehicular manslaughter sentence. The prosecutor argued this sentence was appropriate because defendant‘s current crime consisted of the same conduct underlying her prior conviction, despite extensive programming aimed at teaching her the lethal consequences of that conduct. Indeed, the prosecutor detailed that, as part of defendant‘s prior conviction, she received an advisement of potential murder liability for drunk driving, attended a victim impact panel, and participated in nine months of driving under the influence classes. According to the prosecutor, this programming provided evidence her intent was that required of second degree murder.

Defense counsel argued the trial court should sentence defendant to 10 years for gross vehicular manslaughter and stay the 15-year-to-life sentence for second degree murder. Defense counsel argued for several mitigating factors, including that defendant suffered from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced her culpability for the crime, specifically alcohol addiction. (Cal. Rules of Court,4 rule 4.423(b)(2).)

When issuing its ruling, the trial court discussed several aggravating and mitigating factors the parties raised at the sentencing hearing. The trial court found several aggravating factors true: The crime involved great violence; defendant engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society; and her crimes were of increasing seriousness. (Rule 4.421(a)(1) & (b)(1), (2).)

The trial court also found several mitigating factors true, including defendant had an insignificant prior criminal record, acknowledged wrongdoing at an early stage in the criminal process, and had prior satisfactory performance on probation. (Rule 4.423(b)(1), (8), (15).) The trial court also considered defendant‘s positive steps toward rehabilitation as a mitigating factor. (Rule 4.408(a).) In the absence of evidence that defendant‘s commission of the current offense was connected to her prior victimization as a young child and as a victim of intimate partner violence, the trial court rejected these experiences as mitigating factors. (Rule 4.423(b)(4), (5).)

As to counsel‘s argument that defendant suffered from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced her culpability for the crime, the trial court acknowledged there may be a mental or physical condition present and alcoholism is a disease but concluded it did not reduce her culpability. The trial court found that although the current offense was committed five years after the prior conviction, the current offense was “so egregious” and defendant was “so culpable” because she repeated exactly the same criminal conduct as before and it led to the death of another human being. The trial court also noted defendant continued to drink alcohol and put the public‘s safety at risk after the commission of the current offense.

The trial court exercised its discretion under section 654 and imposed sentence on both counts, sentencing defendant to 15 years to life on the second degree murder conviction and staying execution of the midterm of six years on the gross vehicular manslaughter conviction.

Defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider her alcoholism as a mitigating factor that significantly reduced her culpability and warranted imposition of the lesser sentence under section 654. We disagree.

The parties agree that under section 654 the trial court had discretion to choose whether to stay sentence on either the lesser term of 10 years or the greater term of 15 years to life. We review a trial court‘s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) To find the trial court abused its discretion, the decision must be so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it and is not reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)

A ” ‘trial court must consider the possibility that [the defendant‘s] alcoholism is a circumstance in mitigation within the meaning of rule [4.423], and must then weigh this factor along with the other relevant circumstances.’ ” (People v. Reyes (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 957, 960.) First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant‘s addiction was operative when the crime was committed “and second, to what extent, if any, it influenced the commission of the crime.” (People v. Regalado (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 531, 538.) If the court believes the defendant‘s mental or physical condition contributed to the offense, then it is required to assess whether the defendant‘s culpability was significantly reduced by the addiction. (Id. at pp. 538-539.) As a policy matter, when a defendant, such as a felony drunk driver, has a substance abuse problem, “has failed to deal with the problem despite repeated opportunities, … shows little or no motivation to change his[, her, or their] life style, and where the substance abuse problem is a substantial factor in the commission of crimes, the need to protect the public from further crimes by that individual suggests that a longer sentence should be imposed, not a shorter sentence.” (Reyes, at p. 963.)

As in Regalado, the trial court considered the possibility that defendant‘s alcoholism may be a circumstance in mitigation. The trial court reviewed probation‘s presentence report and defendant‘s sentencing memorandum, and defense counsel argued this point in oral argument. The trial court also explicitly recognized defendant‘s alcoholism may be a mental or physical condition but found it did not significantly reduce her culpability for this crime. This is ample evidence the trial court considered the possibility of alcoholism being a mitigating factor. (People v. Regalado, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 537.)

Also, much like the reasoning in Reyes, defendant‘s conduct resembles that of “the felony drunk driver who is suffering from an uncontrolled alcoholism [that] should be sentenced to a longer term, not a shorter one, … to prevent [her] from driving under the influence again.” (People v. Reyes, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 963.) Defendant had a prior driving under the influence conviction after which she participated in victim impact education, therapy, and self-help programming. She also signed and orally confirmed her understanding of an admonition that she could be charged with murder if she continued to drive under the influence of alcohol and someone was killed as a result of her driving. Despite her education, therapy, and previous advisement and understanding of her potential murder liability, she repeated the same conduct of driving the wrong way on a freeway with a blood-alcohol concentration more than twice the legal limit and, this time, killed a person. Even after she killed someone while under the influence, she continued to drink alcohol and put the public at risk, becoming belligerently drunk, yelling obscenities at law enforcement officials, and running into oncoming traffic, endangering herself and others. It was not unreasonable for the trial court to consider these circumstances as outweighing any factors in mitigation.

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting defendant‘s alcoholism as a mitigating factor, imposing sentence on the second degree murder conviction, and staying the lesser term.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

/s/

ROBIE, J.

We concur:

/s/

HULL, Acting P. J.

/s/

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

Notes

1
Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2
Defendant was charged with second degree murder based on her prior conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, the murder admonition she received in her prior conviction, and the educational and therapeutic programming she received as a result of that conviction. (People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 298 [a murder charge is appropriate when the conduct “can be characterized as a wanton disregard for life” and “facts demonstrate a subjective awareness of the risk created“].)
4
Undesignated rules references are to the California Rules of Court.