THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALEJANDRO RODRIGUEZ LEON, Defendant and Appellant. [and 3 other cases.]
No. F065532, No. F065533, No. F065746, No. F066004
Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California
January 13, 2016
Rehearing Denied January 28, 2016
243 Cal. App. 4th 1003
[CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*]
John Hardesty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Alejandro Rodriguez Leon.
Patricia L. Brisbois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Daniel Mendoza Rivas.
Hilda Scheib, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Victor Centeno.
Cheryl Rae Anderson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Robert Palofox.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Brian G. Smiley and Laura Wetzel Simpton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
GOMES, J.—Victor Centeno, Alejandro Rodriguez Leon (Leon), Robert Palofox, and Daniel Mendoza Rivas were tried together on charges of
Appellants allege error with respect to the admissibility of various evidence used at trial and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting certain convictions. The trial court‘s sentencing decisions are challenged on multiple grounds. There are also assertions of constitutionally deficient performance by trial counsel, as well as a claim that racial discrimination tainted the jury selection process. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
In the published portion of the opinion, we apply the California Supreme Court‘s recent decision in People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 518, 351 P.3d 1010] (Elizalde) to resolve challenges to evidence of gang affiliation admissions made by Centeno and appellants’ coconspirators when they were booked into jail. We conclude any prohibited use of Centeno‘s admission was harmless error, and that the self-incriminating statements were not testimonial for purposes of the constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. Our published discussion further holds that trial courts have discretion under
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The underlying events occurred in February and March of 2010 when a group of people from Arizona, working in conjunction with an individual who lived in California, carried out a series of home invasion robberies in the cities of Atwater, Clovis, Kerman, and Selma. The crimes were carefully coordinated, sometimes involving upwards of 10 perpetrators, and followed the same general pattern. The men would split up into two groups of lookouts and intruders, with the former stationing themselves in parked cars at strategically selected locations and maintaining communication with the intruders over cell phones and walkie-talkies. The intruders, meanwhile, would enter homes and force the occupants inside to surrender cash, gold, and other items of value. Armed with guns, they threatened to kill their
A joint investigatory effort by law enforcement agencies in California and Arizona led to the arrest and prosecution of nine suspects. On March 22, 2011, a Fresno County grand jury returned an 18-count indictment against appellants and their accomplices, Gilbert Beltran, Christopher Escobedo, Estevan Landeros, Christian Rodriguez, and Eric Rodriguez. Count 1 of the indictment charged all parties with criminal conspiracy in violation of
Appellants were tried before a Fresno County jury in May and June 2012. A bifurcated trial was conducted on gang allegations that were made pursuant to
The first two robberies occurred on February 24, 2010, in Clovis and Atwater. For his part in the Clovis robbery, Rivas was convicted of robbery in concert (
The third robbery took place in Kerman on March 15, 2010. For this incident, Leon and Rivas were convicted of robbery in concert (count 9) and false imprisonment by violence (count 10). As to Leon, the robbery was found to be gang related within the meaning of
The fourth and fifth robberies occurred on March 16, 2010, in Atwater and Selma. For the (second) Atwater robbery, all appellants were convicted of
Leon was sentenced to an aggregate term of 48 years to life in prison. For robbery in concert under counts 9, 11, and 16, he received consecutive terms of 15 years to life based on the alternate penalty set forth in
Centeno and Palofox received sentences of 30 years to life in prison based on the gang-related robbery convictions on counts 11 and 16. Concurrent terms were imposed for counts 13, 14, 15, and 18. All other sentences were stayed.
Rivas was sentenced to a total of 22 years in prison as follows: The upper term of nine years under count 2 for robbery in concert, plus consecutive two-year terms (one-third of the middle term) for each robbery in concert conviction under counts 5, 9, 11 and 16, plus a consecutive three-year term for count 4, and a consecutive two-year term for count 13. Concurrent terms were imposed as to counts 8, 14, 15, and 18. Stayed sentences were imposed for all remaining counts.
DISCUSSION
I.–V.*
[*See footnote, ante, page 1003.]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. Gang Findings
A bifurcated jury trial was conducted as to the gang-related allegations in counts 9, 11, and 16. Each of those counts involved the substantive offense of robbery committed within an inhabited dwelling house and in concert with two or more other persons (
The prosecution argued that appellants knowingly committed the underlying offenses in association with members of a criminal street gang, and were therefore liable under
On appeal, Centeno renews his Miranda objection and summarily joins in arguments made by Leon. Leon‘s briefing challenges all of the prosecution‘s
During the pendency of this appeal, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Elizalde, which addresses and resolves the Miranda issue raised by Centeno. It is now settled that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is implicated when law enforcement officers ask “routine questions about gang affiliation” while processing a defendant into jail. (Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 527.) As will be explained, the admission of evidence concerning Centeno‘s jail classification statements was erroneous under Elizalde. The more difficult question is whether the error was prejudicial, and the answer depends in part on the admissibility of the statements made by accomplices/coconspirators who were not parties to the case. We conclude appellants do not have standing to assert the constitutional rights of those third parties, nor could they have asserted their own Sixth Amendment confrontation rights as a basis for excluding evidence of the third party admissions. Given the significance of the accomplices’ self-incriminating statements in combination with other admissible evidence presented at trial, the violation of Centeno‘s Miranda rights did not constitute reversible error.
Additional Background Information
Trial of the gang allegations began with a hearing conducted pursuant to
The prosecution‘s case-in-chief included testimony by correctional officers from the Fresno County Jail. Witness Cynthia Diaz described herself as a “jail classification officer” or “population management officer.” Her duties involved placing inmates in the appropriate custodial setting based on their responses to a standardized intake interview. The process required interviewees to answer questions listed on a preprinted form, including, “Do you
Officer Diaz conducted two classification interviews with Estevan Landeros. She observed and documented the presence of tattoos on his body of the words “South Side” and of three dots grouped together in a triangular pattern. Recognizing the tattoos as being indicative of a connection to the “Sureño” gang, Officer Diaz was skeptical when Landeros initially denied being a gang member or associate. During the second interview, she advised him that he needed to answer the gang association question truthfully for his own safety. At trial she explained: “If he denied then I would have to put him in general population, [where] we have rival gangs and he would be assaulted.” The majority of inmates in general population housing were members of the regional “Bulldogs” gang, which viewed the Sureños as a rival group. Landeros eventually informed Officer Diaz that he “associated with the Sureños.”
The correctional officer who interviewed Centeno testified that he admitted to being a “Sureño from Phoenix.” Christian Rodriguez similarly identified himself as a “Phoenix Sureño” during his jail classification interview. Christopher Escobedo admitted to being a “South Side associate from Phoenix,” and Gilbert Beltran claimed to be a “South Side Sider from Phoenix.” Beltran and Escobedo were noted to have tattoos of the letters “SS.” Escobedo reportedly obtained a three-dot tattoo subsequent to his admission into the jail.
Detective Andrew Simonson of the Fresno County Sheriff‘s Department testified as the prosecution‘s gang expert. He explained, based on his training and experience, that the Sureño criminal street gang is controlled by a prison gang known as the “Mexican Mafia.” Since most members of the Mexican Mafia are “locked down in protective housing units throughout the state and federal system,” they rely on the Sureños to act as their “foot soldiers” outside of prison, generating money for the organization through criminal activity.
The Sureños have a nationwide presence and commonly identify with certain words and symbols. The name itself translates to “southerner,” and terms such as “sur” (meaning “south”) “south side” or “south sider” are often used to indicate a Sureño affiliation. The number 13 has significance to Sureños because the 13th letter of the alphabet is “M,” which to them connotes the Mexican Mafia. Gang members will display the number 13 using Roman numerals or a symbol from the Mayan numbering system of two horizontal lines underneath three dots. According to Detective Simonson, the most common tattoo used by Sureños to signify their membership is three dots grouped together in a triangular pattern.
Detective Simonson opined that appellants and their accomplices were all Sureño members or associates. His opinions with respect to the accomplices were primarily based on their admissions during jail classification interviews. The expert stressed that he considered such admissions to be the most reliable form of evidence to determine gang affiliation (“For us it‘s basically a stand-alone criteria.”). As a practical matter, gang members are motivated by “self-preservation” to answer jail classification questions truthfully because “[t]hey don‘t want to be placed in housing with rival gang members where they can be killed [or] assaulted.” Falsely claiming association with a particular gang can also be deadly. In Detective Simonson‘s experience, the occupants of a segregated Sureño “pod” will assault or kill non-Sureños if such individuals are housed with them.
Leon denied having gang ties during his classification interview and was accordingly housed in a minimum security location. Nevertheless, Detective Simonson believed Leon was a Sureño “associate.” The expert had personally participated in the execution of a search warrant at Leon‘s residence in Arizona, and had observed distinctive gang graffiti displayed in various locations on the property. He testified to seeing the number 13 carved into trees near the trailer in which Leon was living, and, in other locations, the three-dot imagery, the words “South Side” and “Hayden Park,” and the letters “SS” and “VHPLS.” The letters VHPLS purportedly stood for “Vario Hayden Park Locos,” a Phoenix area subset of the Sureños. Photographs of the graffiti were admitted into evidence.
The expert‘s opinions about Leon were further based on his review of police reports and other information provided to him by members of the Phoenix Police Department. According to those sources, Leon had previously been seen wearing gang clothing and was known to associate with Estevan Landeros. Phoenix police believed Landeros and Leon were both part of the Vario Hayden Park Locos.
As to Centeno, the expert relied on “jail classifications as well as Phoenix Police reports.” These records indicated that Centeno had gang tattoos and belonged to a Sureño subset known as the “Vario Happy Homes Locos.” He was also known to associate with Palofox and Gilbert Beltran.
On direct examination, Detective Simonson opined that Palofox was a Sureño member based upon his review of “the Phoenix Police reports as well as local classification documents.” On cross-examination, Palofox‘s attorney elicited testimony from the expert regarding his client‘s denial of gang membership during a classification interview at the Fresno County Jail—information not previously disclosed in front of the jury. Defense counsel also successfully moved to have Palofox‘s signed jail classification questionnaire
Finally, with respect to Rivas, the expert acknowledged there was no evidence to indicate he was a gang member. Detective Simonson believed Rivas had associated with gang members through his involvement with the codefendants and other accomplices, but conceded there was no evidence Rivas actually knew those individuals were members of a gang. As stated above, the gang allegations against Rivas were found not to be true.
The Elizalde Decision
In Elizalde, the California Supreme Court considered “whether routine questions about gang affiliation, posed to [a] defendant while processing him into jail on murder charges, come within Miranda‘s well-recognized booking exception.” (Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 527.) The key holding of the opinion is as follows: “Gang affiliation questions do not conform to the narrow exception contemplated in [Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291 [64 L.Ed.2d 297, 100 S.Ct. 1682]] and [Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582 [110 L.Ed.2d 528, 110 S.Ct. 2638]] for basic identifying biographical data necessary for booking or pretrial services. Instead, they must be measured under the general Innis test, which defines as ‘interrogation’ questions the police should know are ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.’ ” (Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 538.) Whether or not a gang-related inquiry by jail personnel requires a Miranda admonition will depend on the nature of the charges the inmate is facing.
The Elizalde defendant was asked gang affiliation questions by sheriff‘s deputies who were aware he had been charged with murder but did not know the offense was gang related. (Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 529.) Ignorance of the latter circumstance was immaterial because murder is “a crime frequently committed for the benefit of criminal street gangs, and a qualifying offense establishing a ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ” for purposes of section 186.22. (Elizalde, at p. 540.) Therefore, the questions were likely to elicit an incriminating response and needed to be prefaced with a Miranda admonition, “even if the deputies’ subjective intention was benign.” (Ibid.) “While officers were permitted to ask these questions for institutional security purposes, defendant‘s un-Mirandized responses were inadmissible against him during the [prosecution‘s] case-in-chief.” (Id. at p. 527.)
Under Elizalde, Centeno‘s objection to the admission of his jail classification statements should have been sustained. The jail classification officer who interviewed him knew of his connection to the other inmates from Arizona, and the record indicates the officer would have also been aware of his charges. As discussed in footnote 8, ante, robbery in concert in violation of
Palofox‘s situation does not fit squarely within the parameters of the Elizalde decision. It appears he approached correctional officers on his own accord and volunteered information about his gang status in conjunction with a request for alternate housing arrangements. The record does not demonstrate that his admission was the product of interrogation. He has made no effort to argue this issue on appeal, and we will not endeavor to make arguments on his behalf. (See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364 [178 Cal.Rptr.3d 185, 334 P.3d 573] [although joinder of claims is broadly permitted, “ ‘each appellant has the burden of demonstrating error and prejudice’ ”].) Under current law, a gang expert‘s opinion may be based on hearsay, and when testifying, he or she may describe the material that forms the basis for their opinion. (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 618 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713].) We therefore assume Detective Simonson‘s testimony in regards to Palofox‘s admission was permissible.
Due Process Considerations
Leon claims his due process rights were violated by the admission of evidence of his coconspirators’ jail classification statements. He argues those statements were coerced in that each person faced a Hobson‘s choice of providing self-incriminating information or jeopardizing their personal safety by being housed with rival gang members. Leon further alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial attorney‘s failure to make these arguments below.
“It is settled that the accused has no standing to object to a violation of another‘s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” (People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877] (Badgett).) However, a defendant does have limited standing to assert that his own due process right to a fair trial has been violated through the admission of improperly obtained statements made by a third party. (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 452 [111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589, 233 P.3d 1000] (Williams); People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 966 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044] (Jenkins).) This relatively uncommon issue has arisen in the context of a challenge to coerced trial testimony, and in relation to the “fruits” of a third party‘s involuntary out-of-court statements. (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 452–454; Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 966–967; Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 342–348; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 501–505 [268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640]; People v. Varnum (1967) 66 Cal.2d 808, 811–813 [59 Cal.Rptr. 108, 427 P.2d 772].) Leon cites to most of these cases in his briefs, but provides no further authority regarding due process challenges to the type of evidence at issue here.
“The violation of a third party‘s privilege against self-incrimination may deprive a defendant of his or her due process rights if such action adversely affects the reliability of testimony offered against the defendant at trial.” (Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 966.) “[W]hen the defendant‘s claim is based upon the involuntariness of a third party‘s statement, the exclusionary rule applicable to a claimed violation of the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply. [Citation.] Rather, the defendant may prevail only by demonstrating fundamental unfairness at trial, normally by establishing that evidence to be produced at trial was made unreliable by coercion.” (Ibid.; see Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 348 [“Testimony of third parties that is offered at trial should not be subject to exclusion unless the defendant demonstrates that improper coercion has impaired the reliability of the testimony.”].)
Respondent argues there is no due process violation under the framework set forth in cases such as Jenkins and Badgett because the circumstances in which the statements of Leon‘s coconspirators were made, and the independent evidence of their gang affiliations, overwhelmingly demonstrate that the admissions were reliable. Leon does not disagree with the reliability argument, but submits that a due process violation should be found because the third party admissions were procured by “outrageous police misconduct.” We find respondent‘s argument to be more persuasive given the authorities upon which the parties have relied. The Elizalde decision may inevitably lead to future claims that even Mirandized jail classification admissions are inherently coercive, but we need not resolve that issue in order to dispose of Leon‘s current claim. The ineffective assistance claim fails pursuant to the foregoing analysis and given the state of the law at the time of trial. (See People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, 851 P.2d 802] [“Reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence.”].)
Leon alleges a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [158 L.Ed.2d 177, 124 S.Ct. 1354] (Crawford). Two categories of evidence are relevant to his claim. He describes the first category as “hearsay evidence from Phoenix police,” referring to the documents and verbal information Detective Simonson obtained from Arizona law enforcement officers and relied upon in forming his expert opinions. The second category is comprised of the jail classification admissions of his codefendants and third party accomplices.
“The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ The right of confrontation includes the right of cross-examination.” (People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 917 P.2d 187].) In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause bars the admission of out-of-court testimonial hearsay statements except when “the declarant is unavailable . . .” and the defendant “had a prior opportunity to cross-examine” the declarant. (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59.)
The issue of whether a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is violated by a gang expert‘s reliance on testimonial hearsay is currently pending before the California Supreme Court. (People v. Sanchez, review granted May 14, 2014, S216681; People v. Archuleta, review granted June 11, 2014, S218640 [briefing deferred pending consideration and disposition of Sanchez]; People v. Eberhart, review granted Nov. 24, 2015, S229864 [same].) We decline to speculate as to how the issue will be decided, and conclude the verdict in this case would have been the same even without Detective Simonson‘s testimony regarding the contents of Phoenix police reports and his conversations with out-of-state law enforcement officers. (See further discussion, post.) The outcome would likely have been different if appellants’ Sixth Amendment rights were implicated by evidence of their accomplices’ jail classification admissions, but for the reasons that follow we conclude those admissions were not “testimonial” for purposes of Crawford.
In Elizalde, our Supreme Court determined that jail classification interviews are a form of custodial interrogation for purposes of the Fifth Amendment insofar as the questioning is likely to elicit an incriminating response. (Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 531, 538–539.) However, while responses to such interrogation may be considered “testimonial” in a Fifth Amendment context, the same is not necessarily true for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. (Elizalde, at p. 532, fn. 7.) The Elizalde opinion contains a
The Crawford opinion does not define the term “testimonial,” but says it “applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68.) As originally decided, Crawford left no room for debate over the last category: “Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard.” (Id. at p. 52.) The high court revised its position in Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [165 L.Ed.2d 224, 126 S.Ct. 2266] (Davis) to make an exception for emergency situations. The Davis case instructs that “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” (Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 822.) This aspect of the opinion has come to be known as the “ ‘primary purpose’ ” test. (Ohio v. Clark (2015) 576 U.S. 237 [192 L.Ed.2d 306, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 2179] (Clark).)
Since Davis, the United States Supreme Court has adopted the view that “not all those questioned by the police are witnesses” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and not all “ ‘interrogations by law enforcement officers,’ [citation], are subject to the Confrontation Clause.” (Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. 344, 355 [179 L.Ed.2d 93, 131 S.Ct. 1143] (Bryant), quoting Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 53.) Hearsay evidence must now satisfy the primary purpose test in order to be considered testimonial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. (Clark, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 2180; People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1288–1289 [171 Cal.Rptr.3d 347, 324 P.3d 183].) In its current formulation, the test asks whether the statement at issue was “procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” (Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. at p. 358.) The California Supreme Court has described the test in substantially similar terms: “First, to be testimonial the statement must be made with some degree of formality or solemnity. Second, the statement is testimonial only if its primary purpose pertains in some fashion to a criminal prosecution.” (People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608, 619 [147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527, 286 P.3d 442].)
The primary purpose test is essentially a totality of the circumstances analysis. “[T]he relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that
Here, the statements in dispute were made with a sufficient degree of formality. However, we cannot conclude the primary purpose of those statements—from the perspective of either the person asking the questions or the person answering them—was to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony or to otherwise contribute to a criminal investigation or prosecution. Nothing suggests that Leon‘s codefendants and third party accomplices disclosed gang membership or affiliation for the purpose of making a confession against themselves or an accusation against someone else. Likewise, based on all of the available evidence, including testimony by the correctional officers who appeared at trial, we are convinced the primary purpose for the gang affiliation questions was to further institutional security objectives, i.e., to ensure the safety of inmates and jail personnel. The answers to those questions also had evidentiary value from a prosecutorial standpoint, but the objective primary purpose “reasonable participants would have had” in this context was not the creation of an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. (Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. at p. 360.) Therefore, appellants did not have a Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine each other or their accomplices about the jail classification admissions.
Prejudice
The erroneous admission of a jail classification statement obtained in violation of Miranda is reviewed for prejudice under the standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824]. (Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 542.) The People must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the jury‘s verdict. (Ibid.) “To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.” [Citation.] Thus, the focus is what the jury actually decided and whether the error might have tainted its decision.” (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280].) The error in Elizalde was found to be harmless because the defendant‘s gang connections were established through independent evidence.
Focusing on what the jury actually decided in this case, we cannot ignore its findings as to Rivas. Both Leon and Rivas denied having gang ties during their jail classification interviews, but only Rivas was exonerated. Rivas stood apart from his coconspirators as the only member of the conspiracy from California. The other men resided in or around Phoenix, Arizona. Rivas‘s only apparent connection to the group was that he had dated Estevan Landeros‘s sister during the relevant time period. When Rivas took the stand in the first phase of trial, he denied having any involvement in the robberies and claimed to be barely acquainted with Landeros.
A trier of fact can rationally infer a crime was committed “in association” with a criminal street gang within the meaning of
Only Leon and Rivas were convicted on count 9, i.e., the robbery which took place in Kerman on March 15, 2010. Because Centeno was not accused of participating in this offense, it stands to reason that his jail classification statements did not impact the jury‘s findings with respect to Leon on that count. Since the jury impliedly found Rivas was neither a gang member nor gang associate, it would appear Leon‘s culpability under section 186.22 was based on his association with the third party accomplices, most likely Estevan Landeros and Christian Rodriguez. Numerous victims had identified Landeros and Rodriguez to police and/or during their trial testimony, and both men were alleged to have participated in all five robberies.
Cell phone evidence showed Leon was in contact with Landeros during the course of the conspiracy. Eyewitness testimony also placed Leon and Landeros together on various dates. Their connection to one another was sufficiently established even without the information contained in the Phoenix police
Counts 11 and 16 respectively pertained to the robberies in Atwater and Selma on March 16, 2010. Since each appellant was convicted of these crimes, Palofox‘s admission of gang membership effectively forecloses any claims of prejudice by Leon and Centeno. As to them, the
Palofox‘s gang findings were established through his own admissions and by evidence of codefendant Leon‘s gang associations. The victim of the count 11 robbery had also identified Estevan Landeros and Christian Rodriguez as being among the perpetrators who entered his home, thus removing any doubt about the gang-related nature of that offense. The count 16 findings were further established by evidence of Gilbert Beltran‘s involvement. Beltran pawned a ring that was stolen during this robbery after the group returned to Arizona. Palofox was reportedly living with Beltran at the time of his arrest, and the jury heard recordings of a discussion between Palofox and Beltran in which both incriminated themselves. For all of these reasons, it is evident beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury‘s verdict was not tainted by the erroneous admission of Centeno‘s jail classification statements.
VII. Sentencing
A. Consecutive Sentences for Gang-related Home Invasion Robberies
Centeno, Leon, and Palofox received consecutive sentences of 15 years to life for their gang-related robbery convictions pursuant to the trial court‘s conclusion that such punishment was mandatory under the holding of
The Attorney General submits that the issue is forfeited as a result of appellants’ failure to object at the time of sentencing. However, she impliedly concedes the merits of appellants’ argument by urging us to find, to the extent the claim is reviewable, that “the trial court fully understood its discretionary power” and “properly exercised its discretion to select consecutive sentences.” We conclude appellants have carried their burden of establishing error.
Regarding forfeiture, the error complained of may fall within a narrow class of sentencing issues that are reviewable in the absence of a timely objection. “ ‘Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Where, as here, a sentence choice is based on an erroneous understanding of the law, the matter must be remanded for an informed determination.” (People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 912 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 627].) In any event, we would exercise our discretion to resolve the claim in the interests of fairness and judicial economy, since the matter is already being remanded for other sentencing matters, and to forestall unnecessary ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161–162, fn. 6 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429]; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 282 [266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892].)
1. Background
At Leon‘s sentencing hearing, defense counsel made statements regarding the anticipated length of his client‘s sentence given the
While sentencing Centeno, the trial court indicated that it would have been inclined to grant him leniency if it had discretion to do so. The relevant statements were as follows:
“The issue, of course, is what sentence the court should impose. And it seems to me I would agree with the prosecution that in light of everything that I‘ve read here, that the court really does not have authority to do otherwise but to impose the sentences with respect to Counts Eleven and Sixteen. But I want to say, in fairness to Mr. Centeno here, and to some future court evaluating this, that if the court believed and understood that it did have the authority to exercise discretion, I might. I might have done that with respect to Mr. Centeno, primarily because of his age and his involvement with a lot of other adults who certainly should have known better.
“And so, you know, I think I want to make—leave that door open here, because I don‘t know what the Appellate Court might do in the future on this subject. But this is a situation where, given his limited involvement in this matter and his age as a minor—that‘s the most important thing in this court‘s view, being a minor at the time of the commission of these crimes—that the court might have exercised its discretion to do other than impose life terms on this case. But in the court‘s view, for the reasons that counsel here from the People have a cited authority which is primarily the case of [People v. Jones, supra, 47 Cal.4th 566] [the] California Supreme Court has made it clear that sentencing for the crime of robbery in concert, you know, in a home invasion robbery scenario for gang purpose, which is what the jury found to be true here, that that‘s not an enhancement. And in this court‘s view, therefore, is not subject to relief under [section] 186.22(g) that the defense has asked the court to make—grant a motion to strike. This is, in fact, an alternate sentence for this crime. And the court has no authority but to impose that alternate sentence.
“And under the cases that I think I‘ve cited earlier, and I‘ll make reference to now, which is People [v.] Felix, that‘s 22 Cal.4th 651, F-E-L-I-X, that‘s a 2000 decision of the California Supreme Court, Mr. Lindahl. 22 Cal.4th 651. Essentially, what that says is where there is separate home invasion robberies they are required to be served fully consecutive—mandatory full consecutive terms . . . . [T]he mandatory sentence, the only sentence this court can impose is 30 years to life.”
The trial court referenced Felix yet again during the pronouncement of sentence for Palofox: “I do agree with your attorney, however, that in light of
2. Analysis
Contrary to the statements of the trial court, the Felix case does not involve alternate penalty provisions, nor does it reference home invasion robberies or section 186.22. The opinion addresses how enhancements are applied to indeterminate sentences. (Felix, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 654–659.) A term of imprisonment for life or a specified number of years to life is an indeterminate sentence for purposes of California‘s statutory sentencing scheme (
Under
The trial court seems to have conflated two different provisions of section 186.22. Subdivision (b)(1) of the statute provides: “Except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5), any person who is convicted of a felony committed
As previously discussed,
Relief from a trial court‘s misunderstanding of its sentencing discretion is available on direct appeal when such misapprehension is affirmatively demonstrated by the record. (See People v. Meloney (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1145, 1151 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 602, 70 P.3d 1023]; People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 945 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 941 P.2d 1189].) Here, the trial court‘s repeated citation to Felix, combined with statements regarding its purported lack of discretion to impose anything other than consecutive sentences for the gang-related home invasion robberies, is most reasonably interpreted as confusion over the scope of its sentencing authority. Since the record does not conclusively show whether the trial court would have exercised its discretion to impose concurrent terms on the robbery convictions if it had known that it had such discretion, appellants are entitled to relief. (People v. Gamble (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 891, 901 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 612].) The appropriate remedy is a limited remand to give the trial court an opportunity to exercise its discretion under
B., C.*
[*See footnote, ante, page 1003.]
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed in part and reversed in part. As to Rivas, the judgment is modified to reflect a conviction under count 4 of the lesser included offense of attempting to prevent a victim or witness from reporting a crime in violation of
As to Centeno, the sentences imposed for counts 11, 13, 15, 16, and 18 are reversed subject to the conditions set forth herein. Centeno shall be resentenced for these counts on remand in a manner consistent with this opinion. As to Leon, the sentences imposed for counts 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, and 18 are reversed subject to the conditions set forth herein. Leon shall be resentenced for these counts on remand in a manner consistent with this opinion. As to Palofox, the sentences imposed for counts 11, 13, 15, 16, and 18 are reversed subject to the conditions set forth herein. Palofox shall be resentenced for these counts on remand in a manner consistent with this opinion. As to Rivas, the sentences imposed for counts 4, 8, 13, 15, and 18 are reversed subject to
Hill, P. J., and Detjen, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 28, 2016, and on January 19, 2016, the opinion was modified to read as printed above. The petitions of all appellants for review by the Supreme Court were denied April 13, 2016, S232355.
Notes
We note the indictment actually cited to