THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LASHAUN LASHLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 1-13-3401
2016 IL App (1st) 133401, FOURTH DIVISION
June 30, 2016
Appeal from the
JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Howse and Cobbs concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 After a bench trial, defendant Lashaun Lashley was convicted of one count of Class 1 possession of between 15 and 100 grams of heroin and two counts of Class 4 possession of less than 15 grams of heroin. At the time defendant committed these offenses, he was serving a sentence of Cook County impact incarceration (i.e., boot camp) for his convictions in circuit court case Nos. 08 CR 1513801 and 11 CR 0497201. See
¶ 2 On appeal, defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed at least 15 grams of heroin, and, therefore, this court should reduce his Class 1 conviction to Class 4 possession, i.e., possession of less than 15 grams of heroin. He further contends that his sentences should run concurrently with the sentences imposed in the two prior cases and that the trial court improperly entered extended term sentences on his two Class 4 heroin possession offenses.
¶ 3 We affirm defendant‘s conviction because the State presented sufficient evidence
¶ 4 But we agree with defendant‘s arguments regarding his sentencing. Although the trial court did not expressly say why it imposed consecutive sentences, none of the provisions of section 5-8-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections (
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 ¶ 6 The State charged defendant with possession of 15 to 100 grams of heroin with intent to deliver, possession of less than 15 grams of heroin with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a public park, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school, aggravated battery, and resisting a police officer.
¶ 7 At trial, Chicago police officer John Lipka testified that, shortly after noon on January 30, 2012, he was conducting narcotics surveillance on the 100 block of North Karlov Avenue in Chicago. From 200 feet away and using binoculars, he observed defendant and Darrien Forrest standing in front of 122 North Karlov Avenue. Lipka described three transactions that he observed between Forrest and unknown individuals. Vehicles would pull up to the curb and stop. Forrest would approach the vehicles and speak to the drivers. He would then walk into the gangway on the north side of the building at 122 North Karlov Avenue, bend over, retrieve an object, and hand it to the motorist, who would then leave.
¶ 8 Officer Lipka also testified that he observed defendant walk up to a vehicle and talk to the motorist, who handed him money. Defendant then walked over to the gangway at 122 North Karlov Avenue, bent over, picked up an object from the ground, and handed it to the driver. The officer observed defendant retrieve the object from the same area he had seen Forrest go to on the three prior occasions. Officer Lipka believed that he had witnessed multiple illegal narcotics transactions.
¶ 9 Officer Lipka then broke his surveillance, and he and his partner, Officer Edward Heidewald, drove to 122 North Karlov Avenue in an unmarked vehicle. They were in plain clothes and wearing their stars and belts. As they approached, they saw a woman hand defendant money. Defendant looked in the officers’ direction and immediately began to walk south on Karlov Avenue. The officers exited their car and approached defendant for a field interview. Heidewald saw purple plastic bags in defendant‘s mouth and asked him to spit them out; defendant refused. As Heidewald attempted to handcuff defendant, defendant fled. Officer Lipka grabbed defendant, who pulled him, and a struggle ensued. Lipka knocked defendant‘s feet out from under him, and he and the officers fell to the ground, injuring
¶ 10 After gaining control of defendant, Officer Heidewald again asked defendant to spit out the objects in his mouth. Defendant spit out 10 purple plastic bags containing a white powder substance, which the officers suspected to be heroin.
¶ 11 Officer Lipka directed Officer Alan Rogers to the gangway where Rogers retrieved a clear plastic bag containing five knotted bags, inside of which were multiple Ziploc bags containing suspected heroin. In total, Rogers recovered 83 small bags. Both Heidewald and Lipka identified defendant in court.
¶ 12 The items recovered from the gangway were inventoried under No. 12525847, and those recovered from defendant‘s mouth were inventoried under No. 12525853. The parties stipulated that forensic chemist Peter Anzalone performed tests for ascertaining the presence of a controlled substance on the recovered items. The parties stipulated that Anzalone would testify:
“[t]hat after performing the tests on the contents of 65 of the 83 items recovered in Inventory 12525847, the chemist‘s expert opinion within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty is that the contents of the tested items were positive for the presence of heroin. That actual weight of those items was 15.2 grams.
That the chemist would further testify that the total estimated weight of the 83 items would be 19.4 grams.”
The stipulation also stated that Anzalone would testify that the items recovered from defendant‘s mouth tested positive for the presence of heroin and “the actual weight of those items was 3.9 grams.”
¶ 13 The parties also stipulated that the doctor who treated Officer Lipka‘s hand would testify that, based on the amount of swelling and tenderness in the officer‘s fingers, Lipka had a nondisplaced fracture. The doctor gave Lipka a removable splint and prescribed physical therapy.
¶ 14 The trial court found defendant guilty of three lesser-included offenses of the charged offenses: one count of possession of 15 to 100 grams of heroin (
¶ 15 At sentencing, the State asked the court to impose an extended-term sentence on each of the possession counts. The court sentenced defendant to concurrent, extended terms of four years’ imprisonment on the three possession convictions, followed by two years of mandatory supervised release (MSR). The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed in two prior cases (case Nos. 08 CR 1513801, 11 CR 0497201) in which defendant was sentenced to two periods of county impact incarceration.1 No sentence was entered on the conviction for resisting a police officer.
¶ 16 Defendant appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of Evidence of Weight
¶ 19 Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in possession of 15 to 100 grams of heroin. The State responds that the parties stipulated to the laboratory results that the recovered heroin in question weighed over 15 grams, and defendant, therefore, waived his right to appeal this issue.
¶ 20 The State cites People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455 (2005), and People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318 (2005), in support of its argument that defendant waived his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of the weight of the heroin. In Woods, the defendant stipulated to the weight and results of chemical testing on narcotics that the defendant had been charged with possessing. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 461. On appeal, the defendant alleged that the State had failed to prove the chain of custody for the narcotics, rendering the narcotics evidence inadmissible. Id. at 465. The supreme court noted that a defendant “may waive the necessity of proof of chain of custody by entering into a stipulation with respect to the evidence.” Id. at 468. The court also “reject[ed] the notion that a challenge to the State‘s chain of custody is a question of the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 471. Instead, because “[a] chain of custody is used to lay a proper foundation for the admission of evidence,” the court found that “a challenge to the chain of custody is an evidentiary issue that is generally subject to waiver on review if not preserved by defendant‘s making a specific objection at trial and including this specific claim in his or her posttrial motion.” Id. Thus, the court concluded both that the defendant had forfeited his chain-of-custody challenge by failing to object at trial and that he had “affirmatively waived” his challenge by entering into the stipulation and signaling that “there was no dispute involving the admissibility of the narcotics evidence.” Id. at 475.
¶ 21 Similarly, in Bush, the court held that the defendant had affirmatively waived his challenge to the foundation for an expert opinion that a certain substance contained cocaine where the defendant had stipulated to the expert‘s testimony. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d. at 333. By stipulating that the expert‘s opinion was admissible, the defendant “waived the necessity of proving the requisite foundation for that opinion.” Id.
¶ 22 We do not find either Woods or Bush to be applicable here. Defendant does not challenge the admissibility of the stipulated testimony on the basis that it lacked a proper foundation. Instead, he claims that the State failed to prove that he possessed more than 15 grams of heroin, and that he could only have been convicted of the lesser offense of possessing less than 15 grams of heroin. When the State charges a defendant with possessing a certain amount of drugs, and the defendant may be found guilty of lesser-included offenses involving smaller quantities of drugs, the weight of the drugs recovered from the defendant is an essential element of the charges that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Jones, 174 Ill. 2d 427, 428-29 (1996). And it is well established that “when a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, his or her claim is not subject to the waiver rule and may be raised for the
¶ 23 Defendant did not stipulate to the conclusion that the State had proved the element of the weight of the drugs beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, he stipulated that Anzalone would testify that the contents of 65 of the 83 bags tested positive for heroin and weighed 15.2 grams. Whether that evidence was sufficient to prove that the heroin weighed more than 15 grams—an essential element of the State‘s case—is not an issue that defendant was required to raise below. We reject the State‘s claim that defendant waived review of this issue.
¶ 24 Turning to the merits of defendant‘s sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed between 15 and 100 grams of heroin because the stipulation regarding the weight of the heroin indicated that the forensic chemist weighed the heroin along with the plastic bags in which the heroin was packaged. According to defendant, the plastic bags likely weighed more than 0.2 grams, so the fact that the heroin and the bags weighed 15.2 grams together does not establish that the heroin weighed at least 15 grams.
¶ 25 The parties stipulated that the forensic chemist would testify that he received inventory No. 12525847, which contained “83 plastic bags with powder substance and six empty plastic bags.” They also stipulated:
“That after performing the tests on the contents of 65 of the 83 items recovered in Inventory 12525847, the chemist‘s expert opinion within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty is that the contents of the tested items were positive for the presence of heroin. That [the] actual weight of those items was 15.2 grams.”
Defendant claims that the word “items” in the final sentence refers to the 65 “items” taken from inventory No. 12525847, which included both heroin and plastic bags.
¶ 26 In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact with regard to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to each witness‘s testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Id. A defendant‘s conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 225 (2009).
¶ 27 As we noted above, when a defendant is charged with possessing a specific amount of drugs and there is an available lesser-included offense of possessing a smaller amount, the weight of the drugs is an essential element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones, 174 Ill. 2d at 428-29. When the samples of the drug are not sufficiently homogenous—such as packets containing powder—“a portion from each container or sample must be tested in order to determine the contents of each container or sample.” Id. at 429. The State cannot rely on an inference that the untested samples also contain the drug unless they are actually tested. Id. at 430.
¶
¶ 29 In any event, defendant was free to cross-examine the expert on these points but did not do so. Had defendant raised such challenges at trial, the State would have had the opportunity to respond. But defendant did not, and thus the State provided no further evidence on this point. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and with no contrary evidence put forth by defendant, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that defendant possessed more than 15 grams of heroin.
B. Consecutive Sentencing
¶ 31 Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in ordering that his sentences in this case run consecutively with his sentences in case Nos. 08 CR 1513801 and 11 CR 0497201, which he was serving at the time he committed the instant offense.
¶ 32 Before reaching the merits of defendant‘s argument, we must address two procedural bars raised by the State: (1) that this issue is moot; and (2) that defendant has forfeited review of this issue by failing to raise it below. We turn first to the mootness argument, then to forfeiture.
¶ 33 An issue is moot if no actual controversy exists or where events occur which make it impossible for the court to grant effectual relief. Dixon v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 151 Ill. 2d 108, 116 (1992).
¶ 34 The State contends that this issue is moot because defendant is no longer incarcerated. We disagree. Defendant is currently serving a two-year term of MSR, which is part of defendant‘s sentence.
¶ 35 With respect to forfeiture, defendant acknowledges that he did not raise this issue below. But he argues that this issue amounts to plain error exempt from forfeiture. The first step in determining whether an error is plain error is to determine whether an error occurred at all. People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189 (2010). Thus, we turn to the merits of defendant‘s argument.
¶ 37 The State responds that it was likely that the trial court applied section 5-8-4(d)(6) of the Unified Code of Corrections (
“If the defendant was in the custody of the Department of Corrections at the time of the commission of the offense, the sentence shall be served consecutive to the sentence under which the defendant is held by the Department of Corrections.”
730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(6) (West 2012).
The State points out that defendant was serving his sentence for case Nos. 08 CR 1513801 and 11 CR 0497201 at the time that he was arrested in this case, and argues that consecutive sentencing was thus required.
¶ 38 Defendant contends that section 5-8-4(d)(6) was also inapplicable because he was not “in the custody of the Department of Corrections at the time of the commission of the offense.”
¶ 39 It is undisputed that, on May 11, 2011, defendant was sentenced to Cook County‘s impact incarceration program (also known as boot camp). See
¶ 40 Thus, the question in this case is whether, under section 5-8-4(d)(6), defendant was required to serve his sentence in this case consecutively with the sentence imposed on May 11, 2011. This is a question of statutory construction that we review de novo. People v. Giraud, 2012 IL 113116, ¶ 6.
¶ 41 When interpreting the language of a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. Id. The best indicator of that intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must apply it as written, without relying on extrinsic aids to statutory construction. Id. If the language is ambiguous, we construe the statute so that no part of it is rendered meaningless or superfluous. Id.
¶ 42 We reject the State‘s argument because, with respect to its application to defendants on monitored release from county impact incarceration, section 5-8-4(d)(6) is ambiguous for two independent reasons: (1) it is reasonable that “the Department of Corrections” refers only to the Illinois Department of Corrections and not also the county officials responsible for administering the county impact incarceration program; and (2) even if “the Department of Corrections” referred to county officials and facilities it is reasonable to read section 5-8-4(d)(6) as excluding an individual on monitored release because such a person is not “held” by that facility or agency (
1. “The Department of Corrections”
¶ 44 Defendant argues that section 5-8-4(d)(6) does not apply to offenders in the county impact incarceration program. Defendant claims that the use of the phrase “in the custody of the Department of Corrections” in section 5-8-4(d)(6) refers to the Illinois Department of Corrections, not the county sheriff, who is tasked with administering the county impact incarceration program. We agree.
¶ 45 We begin by noting that the responsibility for establishing and administering the county impact incarceration program falls on county officials, not the Illinois Department of Corrections. Section 5-8-1.2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (
¶ 46 Notably, section 5-8-1.2 uses the phrase “Illinois Department of Corrections” when referring to that institution. See
¶ 47 By contrast, section 5-8-4(d)(6) only requires consecutive sentences for individuals who commit offenses while in the custody of ”the Department of Corrections.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 48 But other provisions of section 5-8-4 specifically refer to county officials. For example, if a person charged with a felony commits another felony while “in pretrial detention in a county jail facility or county detention facility,” the sentences for the two felonies must be consecutive. (Emphases added.)
¶ 49 These provisions show that, had the legislature intended to include individuals in the custody of county officials in section 5-8-4(d)(6), it would have used some language suggesting as much. But section 5-8-4(d)(6) uses the phrase “Department of Corrections” (
¶ 50 Other provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections also show that “the Department of Corrections” refers to an Illinois governmental agency, not a county agency. Chapter III of the Unified Code of Corrections (
¶ 51 Each of these provisions shows that the legislature has drawn a clear distinction between “the Department of Corrections” and county entities. If we were to accept the State‘s argument that “the Department of Corrections” referred to in section 5-8-4(d)(6) includes county corrections officials, we would run afoul of the numerous provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections envisioning that the Department of Corrections is a state entity that operates independently of counties. Thus, the plain language of section 5-8-4(d)(6) indicates the legislature‘s intent to exclude individuals in the custody of county correctional offices.
¶ 52 The State simply assumes that “the Department of Corrections” referred to in section 5-8-4(d)(6) includes “the Cook County Department of Corrections.” It
¶ 53 We find defendant‘s interpretation of the phrase “the Department of Corrections” as referring to the Illinois Department of Corrections alone to be reasonable. Consequently, section 5-8-4(d)(6) is, at the very least, ambiguous with respect to offenders in the custody of the county impact incarceration program. See In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d 510, 515 (2002) (“A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation.“). But, as we explain more fully below, that is not the only reason why section 5-8-4(d)(6) is ambiguous.
2. “Held”
¶ 55 Our second basis for finding that section 5-8-4(d)(6) is ambiguous with respect to individuals, like defendant, on monitored release from county impact incarceration is that the statute provides that an individual in the custody of the Department of Corrections at the time he commits a subsequent offense must serve his sentence for that offense consecutive “to the sentence under which the defendant is held by the Department of Corrections.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 56 Our conclusion is guided by our supreme court‘s decision in People ex rel. Gibson v. Cannon, 65 Ill. 2d 366, 368 (1976). There, the defendant was on parole after serving five years in the penitentiary when he committed a burglary. At the time of his sentencing, the following statute was in effect:
” ‘A sentence of an offender committed to the Department of Corrections at the time of the commission of the offense shall not commence until expiration of the sentence under which he is held by the Department of Corrections.’ ” Id. at 369 (quoting 1972 Ill. Laws 2258 (§ 5-8-4(f)).
The court noted that a person released on parole remains in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Id. at 370. But the court highlighted the use of the word “held” in the statute and found that ” ‘[h]eld’ connotes a state or degree of physical restraint” that was inconsistent with a parolee‘s status. Id. The court noted that the “lack of physical restraint is underscored by the fact that a parolee is entitled to a hearing before his parole is revoked,” at which he is entitled to notice of the charges against him and the ability to call witnesses on his behalf. Id. The court concluded that the statute was ambiguous because of its simultaneous reference to individuals “committed” to the Department of Corrections and individuals “held” by the Department of Corrections. Id. Because the statute was ambiguous, the court applied the rule of lenity and strictly construed it in defendant‘s favor. Id. at 370-71.
¶ 57 Section 5-8-4(d)(6) mirrors the language of the statute at issue in Cannon. Section 5-8-4(d)(6) provides that an individual “in the custody of the Department of Corrections” at the time he commits an offense must serve his sentence for that offense consecutive to “the sentence under which the defendant is held by the Department
¶ 58 And like parolees charged with violating their parole, individuals on monitored release from county impact incarceration have a right to notice of the charges (
¶ 59 Our conclusion is further supported by People v. Gillespie, 45 Ill. App. 3d 686, 688-90 (1977), where this court, distinguishing Cannon, found that a defendant who committed an offense while on work release was subject to mandatory consecutive sentencing. The court noted that, unlike parolees, “a defendant on work release is in custody and confined to or held by a prison with the only difference in status from that of an ordinary prisoner being that an offender on work release is allowed outside the actual prison to a limited extent.” Id. at 688-89. Moreover, if offenders on work release were absent for an unauthorized reason, they could be prosecuted for the offense of escape. Id. at 689.
¶ 60 Monitored release from county impact incarceration does not resemble work release. Offenders on monitored release are not confined to a prison, with only limited time outside the prison walls. Rather, they are among the general population, albeit with reporting requirements and travel restrictions.
¶ 61 As shown by Cannon, the use of the word “held” in section 5-8-4(d)(6), as applied to an individual on monitored release from county impact incarceration, creates an ambiguity in that statute. We now turn to the effect of the two ambiguities that we have identified.
¶ 63 Having found that section 5-8-4(d)(6) is ambiguous in two respects with regard to individuals on monitored release from county impact incarceration, we also find that application of the rule of lenity is appropriate. The rule of lenity provides that “ambiguous criminal statutes will generally be construed in the defendant‘s favor.” Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12; see also Cannon, 65 Ill. 2d at 371 (” ‘If a statute creating or increasing a penalty or punishment be capable of two constructions, undoubtedly that which operates in favor of the accused is to be adopted.’ ” (quoting People v. Lund, 382 Ill. 213, 216-17 (1943))). Thus, we adopt the construction of section 5-8-4(d)(6) which favors defendant, i.e., that section 5-8-4(d)(6) does not apply to an individual on monitored release from county impact incarceration.
¶ 64 In sum, we reject the State‘s argument that the trial court properly sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences under section 5-8-4(d)(6). Defendant was not in the custody of the Department of Corrections when he committed the instant offense; he was in the custody of the Cook County sheriff. Nor are we convinced that that provision even applies to individuals, like defendant, who commit offenses while serving a period of monitored release from county impact incarceration under section 5-8-1.2. Because no other provision of section 5-8-4 arguably required or authorized defendant‘s consecutive sentence, we find that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences.
4. Plain Error
¶ 66 We must now consider whether this error constitutes plain error exempt from forfeiture. In order to find plain error “[i]n the sentencing context, a defendant must *** show either that (1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010).
¶ 67 Defendant argues that both prongs apply. With respect to the first prong, defendant notes that the trial court imposed a minimum-term sentence of four years for his possession of 15 to 100 grams of heroin. Thus, defendant argues that the trial court “was not trying to sentence [him] harshly,” and the court “would not likely have sentenced him harshly had [the court] correctly understood the law.” Defendant also contends that the second prong applies because, “[b]y misunderstanding consecutive sentencing, the [trial court] denied [defendant] a fair sentencing hearing.”
¶ 68 This court has previously held that a trial court‘s mistaken belief that consecutive sentences are required constitutes plain error under the second prong “[b]ecause the right to be lawfully sentenced is a substantial right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Dover, 312 Ill. App. 3d 790, 799-800 (2000); see also People v. Moncrief, 276 Ill. App. 3d 533, 535 (1995); People v. Wacker, 257 Ill. App. 3d 728, 732 (1994) (recognizing, in dicta, that improper imposition of consecutive sentences might violate defendant‘s fundamental rights under second prong). More generally, our supreme court has stated that “[t]he imposition of an unauthorized sentence affects substantial rights” under the second prong of plain error. People v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 545 (1998); see also In re Danielle J., 2013 IL 110810, ¶ 32 (“Plain error may properly be invoked
¶ 69 Here, the trial court misapprehended the law in ordering that defendant serve his sentence in this case consecutively with his sentences in his prior cases. This misapprehension denied defendant of his substantial right to be given a proper sentence under the law. We hold that this error constituted second-prong plain error.
¶ 70 The State argues that this error was not plain error because “defendant cannot establish prejudice where the evidence is beyond overwhelming that the court‘s finding was inevitable.” We hardly see how we can characterize the trial court‘s finding as “inevitable” when it was incorrect as a matter of law. In fact, most of the State‘s argument against the application of plain error is an argument about the applicability of section 5-8-4(d)(6). But as we explained above, the State‘s argument is unavailing.
¶ 71 Because we find that this error constituted plain error, we decline to reach defendant‘s alternative argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the consecutive sentences.
C. Extended-Term Sentences
¶ 73 Finally, defendant contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred in imposing extended-term sentences on the lesser Class 4 felony convictions where he was also convicted of a Class 1 felony. He requests this court to reduce his four-year sentences on the two Class 4 felonies to the maximum nonextended term of three years’ imprisonment.
¶ 74 Defendant is correct that an extended-term sentence may be imposed only for the most serious class of offense of which defendant was convicted.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 76 For the reasons stated, we affirm defendant‘s conviction. We remand for resentencing, with directions that the trial court order defendant‘s sentence to be served concurrently with those imposed in Cook County circuit court case Nos. 08 CR 1513801 and 11 CR 0497201, and to reduce the sentences for the Class 4 felonies to three years’ incarceration.
¶ 77 Conviction affirmed; remanded for resentencing with directions.