People v. KnowlesPeople v. Knowles
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Offense Conduct1
On April 28, 2020, Knowles was 23 years old and unhoused. He resided at Midnight Mission, which provides services including shelter for homeless persons. Around midnight, a 53-year-old security guard at the facility named William Bullock was performing bunk checks. According to another resident, Knowles approached to show Bullock an object Knowles was holding. Evidence obtained after the fact suggested that Knowles was holding a broken knife handle. Bullock looked at what Knowles was holding, and Knowles then swung at Bullock and punched him in the head three to four times. Bullock backed away, lost his footing, and fell to the ground. Bullock hit his head as he fell; he began bleeding and became nonresponsive. He was transported to the hospital and later died of his injuries. The medical examiner determined the cause of death to be blunt force trauma to the head.
B. Charges and Plea
An information filed on April 15, 2021, charged Knowles with murder (
C. Sentencing
Prior to sentencing, the court received a mitigation packet from Knowles, a diagnostic report from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), and sentencing memoranda from both the prosecutor and defense counsel.
1. Mitigation Packet
The mitigation packet included a letter from defense counsel expressing deep remorse on behalf of Knowles for his conduct. It also contained two psychological assessments, dated February 12 and 15, 2021. The packet included evidence that when Knowles was seven years old, his father was shot and killed in a case of mistaken identity. Knowles was sexually abused by a schoolteacher, who was subsequently prosecuted. Knowles was also bullied and harassed in school. Knowles was hospitalized at the age of 20 or 21 after experiencing hallucinations, and was
Dr. Kevin Booker examined Knowles and opined that Knowles “appear[ed]” to have been suffering from schizoaffective disorder since adolescence or early adulthood, and that his untreated disorder had “likely impaired his . . . executive decision-making at the time” of the offense. Dr. Booker stated that individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia “may be prone to impulsive,” “disinhibited behavior” and generally exhibited “unwary, disorganized, and negligent behavior.” (Italics omitted.) Dr. Booker also opined, however, that Knowles‘s personality type was consistent with “generally responsible, socially acceptable, adult behavior,” with no impulsive traits or antisocial tendencies, and that there was no overt evidence of “delusions, hallucinations, or bizarre thinking” at the time of examination.
Dr. Haig J. Kojian also examined Knowles. He listed “disturbances of perception, disturbed affect,” and “withdrawing from reality” as behaviors associated with schizophrenia. Dr. Kojian similarly reported that at the time of examination Knowles exhibited clear thinking, and “[t]here was no acute evidence of psychosis.” Dr. Kojian also opined that Knowles can become “quite disorganized and psychotic at times especially when not treated with medication” and that Knowles stated “he hadn‘t been taking his medication for a number of months before the incident.”
2. Diagnostic Report
CDCR‘s diagnostic report included a psychological evaluation dated September 21, 2022. Knowles told the clinical sociаl worker that he was hospitalized at the age of 19 and
In statements to correctional counselors, Knowles claimed that Bullock had sexually harassed and verbally insulted him. Knowles claimed Bullock grabbed him and raised a fist to strike at him. Knowles thеn punched Bullock once and ran out. Knowles denied repeatedly hitting Bullock.
CDCR also reported that on October 4, 2021, while in custody, Knowles had approached another inmate, after which Knowles and others attacked and punched the inmate. Knowles denied hitting the victim and claimed he intervened to break up an altercation. Video footage supported the victim‘s version of events, which was that Knowles attacked him, and Knowles received а disciplinary write-up and loss of privileges for two weeks.
Both the social worker and the correctional counselors opined that Knowles was a poor candidate for probation because he had minimized his role in Bullock‘s death, including failing to admit he had punched Bullock, and because his conduct while in custody showed he presented a significant risk to society.
Knowles‘s sentencing memorandum expressed remorse and requested that the court impоse the low term because of his age, his suffering of psychological and childhood trauma, his lack of a prior criminal record, and his low risk of recidivism. Knowles said Bullock “‘had a reputation of picking on new residents at the facility,‘” and argued his past trauma and mental illness “distorted his perception of Mr. Bullock‘s conduct and his need to act in response to it.”
The prosecution‘s sentencing memorandum reminded the court of its general discretion to impose a term not in excess of the midterm (
4. The Court Imposes Sentence
On January 12, 2023, the court sentenced Knowles to serve the midterm of 6 years imprisonment. The court found the midterm sentence “in the interest of justice [because] the aggravating factors do outweigh the mitigating factors.” The court identified the aggravating factors as the victim‘s vulnerability, Knowles‘s disciplinary writeup while in custody, and that Knowles had repeatedly minimized his involvement in Bullock‘s death. The court found the mitigating factors to be Knowles‘s age at the time of the offense and his lack of a criminal
DISCUSSION
Knowles contends the court abused its discretion in not sentencing him to the low term оf three years imprisonment. He argues the court misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion, disregarded substantial mitigating evidence triggering the low term presumption, and otherwise abused its discretion in imposing a midterm sentence.
A. Applicable Law
1. Standard of Review
We review discretionary sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) A court abuses its sentencing discretion when it acts arbitrarily and capriciously, relies on improper matter in reaching its decision, or is unaware of the scope of its discretion so that it does not exercise informed discretion at all. (People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 837.) Exercises of sentencing discretion must be “consistent with the letter and spirit of the law.” (People v. Sandoval, supra, at p. 847.) “‘[A]ll exercises of legal discretion must be grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.‘” (Ibid., quoting People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187, 195.)
2. Section 1170, Subdivision (b)(6)
As applicable here, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) creates a presumption that the court should impose the low term “if any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The [defendant] has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. [¶] (B) The person is a youth [meaning under the age of 26 years of age] . . . at the time of the commission of the offense.” This presumption may be overcome if the court “finds that the aggravating circumstances outwеigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (
B. The Court Did Not Misunderstand the Scope of its Sentencing Discretion
Knowles argues that we should reverse because the court applied the wrong standard to its weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. According to Knowles, the low term presumption in
We disagree. Knowles seeks to re-write the statute.
We find unpersuasive Knowles‘s reliance on our Supreme Court‘s recent decision in People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024 to support his proffered construction of
Knowles asserts
“[D]ifferent statutes should be construed together only if they stand in pari materia.” (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 124, fn. 4.) The phrase “in pari materia” means “‘[o]f the same matter; on the same subject.‘” (Altaville Drug Store, Inc. v. Employment Development Department (1988) 44 Cal.3d 231, 236, fn. 4.) “‘Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of person[s] [or] things, or have the same purpose or object. Characterization of the object or purpose is more important than charаcterization of subject matter in determining whether different statutes are closely enough related to justify interpreting one in light of the other. It has been held that where the same subject is treated in several acts having different objects the statutes are not in pari materia. “The adventitious occurrence of . . . similar subject matter, in laws enacted for wholly different ends will normally not justify applying the rule.“’ [Citation.]” (Walker v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 124, fn. 4.)
When statutes are in pari materia, they are construed together as one statute. (City of Huntington Beach v. Board of Administration (1992) 4 Cal.4th 462, 468.) But when two statutes are not in pari materiа, which given their myriad differences sections 1170 and 1385 are not, we do not construe their unrelated provisions together. Furthermore, the in pari materia “rule of statutory construction does not mean . . . that one statutory definition may be ignored and replaced by a different one.” (People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 328.) We decline to read into the statutory language of
C. The Court Did Not Improperly Fail to Consider Mitigating Evidence
Knowles next argues we should remand for resentencing because the court failed to consider relevant mitigating evidence. It is true the court did not mention all of the mitigating evidence, including Knowles‘s childhood trauma, during the sentencing hearing. We presume, however, that the court properly considered such evidеnce “unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise.” (
Knowles next points to the court‘s statements to the families of Knowles and Bullock at the beginning of the sentencing hearing that “[t]here is nothing I am going to say or do in the next few moments that will make your life any easier. I feel very much for your loss.” Addressing Bullock‘s family in particular, the court then said, “If I were to impose the most severe sentence I could possibly think of, that wouldn‘t bring your love[d] one back. It seems like he was a very great man and I am very sorry. It is my job to impose the law. I am constrained by what the law is. I have to look at the aggravating and the mitigating factors on both sides and come up with what I believe is a fair judgment based on the law. I can pretty much tell the Bullock family the sentence I am going to impose is nоt a sentence that will make you happy. The law simply doesn‘t allow me to give a sentence which would make you happy or satisfied.”
Knowles claims this statement shows the court did not want to sentence him to the low term even though the law required it, and the court therefore disregarded the applicable law because it felt that voluntary manslaughter has an unreasonably low mitigated term. We find this interpretation unsupported. The court did not say it would not follow the law. It expressly stated to the contrary, and conveyed to the victim‘s family that, regardless of whether it imposed the low term or the midterm, it understood the family might consider the sentence imposed insufficient given their loss. We decline to read this
D. The Court Did Not Otherwise Abuse its Discretion in Sentencing Knowles
Knowles lastly claims the court abused its discretion in how it weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances before it. Weighing those circumstances is the province of the trial court. We may not reverse a sentencing decision “‘merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez), supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 978.) The court‘s analysis here of the evidence before it along with the applicable sentencing factors was neither irrational nor аrbitrary, and we therefore will not disturb it.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
KELLEY, J.*
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on September 16, 2024, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
WEINGART, J. BENDIX, Acting P. J. KELLEY, J.*