THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD LEE JONES, Defendant and Appellant.
B334961
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
Filed 3/20/25
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. A982795). APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Reversed.
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this case, a jury convicted Ronald Lee Jones2 in 1990 of robbery and first degree murder and found that Jones personally used a firearm in committing both crimes. The jury also found true a robbery-murder special circumstance. In 2021, Jones sought resentencing pursuant to
As we discuss below, the jury‘s true finding on the special circumstance allegation irrefutably establishes that Jones intended to kill and, thus, had the requite mens rea under current law for murder. If the required actus reus is only aiding in the robbery, Jones failed to establish a prima facie case because the jury convicted Jones of committing the robbery that resulted in the victim‘s death. If the required actus reus is aiding in the murder itself, then the record of conviction does not foreclose the possibility of relief and Jones was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Pending clarification from the Supreme Court, we join with Kelly in holding
BACKGROUND
A. The Record of Conviction
The record of conviction for Jones in our appellate record includes the charging documents, a partial handwritten docket, the parties’ closing arguments, the jury instructions, the verdicts, and the direct appeal opinion.4
1. The Amended Information
An amended information filed September 27, 1990, charged Jones with murdering and robbing Peter Zhao (counts 1 and 2) on January 30, 1989. It alleged that in committing each crime, Jones personally used a firearm within the meaning of
2. Closing Arguments
During closing argument, the People explained that the jury could convict Jones of first degree murder under either a theory of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder or felony murder. The prosecutor stated, “according to the felony[-]murder rule, the unlawful killing of a human being, . . . which occurs during the commission of the crime of robbery i[s] murder in the first degree when the perpetrator had a specific intent to commit such crime, not the specific intent to commit murder, the specific intent to commit robbery.” “So you have a killing that occurred during the commission of a robbery. Whether the defendant, according to the felony[-]murder rule, intended to do that, whether it was an accident, whether it was intentional, is irrelevant. Under that theory, it is murder in the first degree.” The prosecutor did not discuss the special circumstance allegation.
Defense counsel argued it was not Jones but another individual who committed the killing and the robbery—in other words that Jones was not involved at all. Neither party referred to an accomplice, coconspirator, a second perpetrator along with Jones, or any aiding or abetting theory during their closing arguments. Defense counsel did suggest another culprit, arguing that police encountered a man other than Jones in the vicinity of the crime scene. Defense counsel said the police took that man to the police station, but “we don‘t know what happened to him.”
As pertinent here, the trial court instructed the jury on deliberate and premediated murder, felony murder, felony murder special circumstances, and personal use of a firearm.
Then-CALJIC No. 8.21, the felony-murder instruction, stated, “The unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs [during the commission . . . of the crime] [as a direct causal result] of [r]obbery is murder in the first degree when the perpetrator had specific intent to commit such crime. [¶] The specific intent to commit [r]obbery and the commission or attempted commission of such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Third, fourth, and fifth brackets added.)
As given, the introductory special circumstances instruction, a version of CALJIC No. 8.80, provided, “If you find [the] . . . defendant in this case guilty of murder in the first degree, you must then determine if [one or more of] the following special circumstance[s] [is] . . . true or not true: to wit the murder was committed while the [illegible] was engaged in the crime of [r]obbery.” (Fifth and sixth brackets added.) The instruction then had a portion redacted, including instructions relating to aiding and abetting.5 The instruction further stated, “If you find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the actual killer, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill a human being in order to find the special circumstance to be true.”
The special circumstance instruction relating to murder in the commission of a robbery, then-CALJIC No. 8.81.17, stated, “To find that the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder in the commission of [a r]obbery, is true, it must be proved: [¶] [1a. The murder was committed while [the] [a] defendant was [engaged in] in [sic] the [commission] . . . of a [r]obbery.] [¶] . . . [¶] [2. The murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of [r]obbery . . . . In other words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the . . . [r]obbery was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.]” (First, second, seventh, and ninth to fourteenth brackets added.)
The trial court instructed the jury concerning personal use of a firearm as follows: “It is alleged [in [c]ount[s] 1 [and] 2] that the defendant . . . [Jones] personally used a firearm during the commission of the crime[s] charged. [¶] If you find the defendant
4. Verdict, Sentencing, and Direct Appeal
The jury convicted Jones of murder in the first degree but did not specify whether it based its finding on a theory of premeditated murder or felony murder. It also convicted Jones of second degree robbery, found true the robbery-murder special circumstance allegation, and found that in committing both the murder and robbery, Jones personally used a firearm. The trial court sentenced Jones to state prison for life without the possibility of parole for murder and stayed the robbery sentence. In 1994, this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Legardy (Jan. 31, 1994, B061752) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. Changes to the Law of Felony Murder
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), which as relevant here,6 “limited the class of persons liable for felony murder by adding
Senate Bill No. 1437 also enacted a procedure for those convicted of murder under prior law to seek retroactive relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) Pursuant to
It appears that sometime in 2021 Jones sought to file a petition for resentencing. On December 5, 2022, the superior court issued a minute order explaining Jones had inquired as to the status of his resentencing request. The court responded it did not have the request and asked Jones to provide it. On January 4, 2023, the court indicated it had received Jones‘s
The People opposed Jones‘s request, arguing the jury instructions and closing arguments demonstrated that the only theory presented to the jury was that Jones was the actual killer.
At a September 20, 2023 hearing on the petition, the court stated it had reviewed the handwritten docket, the direct appeal opinion, the jury instructions, the verdict forms, and closing arguments. It observed the jury had been given a special circumstances instruction with “aiding and abetting language crossed out.” After indicating it was considering the petition at the prima facie stage, the court stated, “Based on my review, [the jury] was not instructed on natural and probable consequences or on aiding and abetting. [Jones] was convicted of a murder as the actual killer or actual perpetrator. He was the only participant.
Jones timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court‘s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless. This is consistent with the statute‘s overall purpose: to ensure that murder culpability is commensurate with a person‘s actions, while also ensuring that clearly meritless petitions can be efficiently addressed as part of a single-step prima facie review process. [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The record of conviction includes “the charging documents, jury instructions, verdicts, and to a limited extent any prior appellate opinion.” (People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 864-865.)
At the prima facie stage courts “should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) ” ‘However, if the record, including the court‘s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner” ’ ” and denying the petition at the prima facie stage. (Id. at p. 971.)
B. The Record Does Not Conclusively Establish the Jury Found All Elements Necessary to Convict Jones Under a Currently Valid Felony-murder Theory
“At the prima facie stage, a court must accept as true a petitioner‘s allegation that he or she could not currently be convicted of a homicide offense because of changes to
Jones argues the superior court engaged in premature factfinding at the prima facie stage to conclude he was the sole perpetrator and actual killer. He contends the verdict in light of the jury instructions did not irrefutably establish that the jury convicted him under a valid murder theory—namely, that he was the actual killer or committed felony murder as an aider or abettor who, with the intent to kill, aided in the murderous act. (
The People argue the record conclusively demonstrates Jones was the actual killer because (1) the trial court did not give any aiding and abetting jury instructions and the People argued
1. The Record of Conviction Does Not Establish Jones Was the Actual Killer as a Matter of Law
The People observe that the trial court did not instruct the jury pursuant to any aiding and abetting theory. Indeed, the amended information, the entirety of the jury instructions, the closing arguments, and the verdict form do not refer to an accomplice or any aiding and abetting theory. That absence, however, does not irrefutably demonstrate at the prima facie stage that the jury convicted Jones as the actual killer. Nor does the People‘s argument that Jones was the sole perpetrator. That is because the People also argued to the jury (and the jury was so instructed) that Jones could be convicted of murder so long as he had a specific intent to commit robbery and the killing occurred during that robbery—in other words, without Jones being the actual killer. Further, the defense closing argument pointed to evidence that the police had apprehended another individual near the crime scene, suggesting someone else could have been involved in the crimes. Thus, without weighing evidence, the record of conviction does not prove Jones was convicted as the actual killer.
The jury found Jones personally used a firearm within the meaning of
3. The Assault Is Not Relevant to the Murder Conviction
The People‘s argument that Jones necessarily was the actual killer because the jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury fares no better. Jones committed that assault nearly six months before Zhao‘s robbery and murder and against a victim who was not Zhao. Thus, the jury‘s assault conviction has no bearing on Zhao‘s murder.
4. The Special Circumstance Finding Does Not Conclusively Establish Jones Was Convicted Under a Currently Valid Felony-murder Theory
Pursuant to the special circumstance instruction, CALJIC No. 8.80, the trial court instructed the jury, “If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the actual killer, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill a human being in order to find the special circumstance to be true.” The People argue that because the jury found the special circumstance true,
Jones first contends that, because the numbered list of elements in CALJIC No. 8.81.17 did not include that the jury needed to find he was the actual killer or intended to kill as described in CALJIC No. 8.80, the jury likely did not make either finding.
In evaluating how the jury might have interpreted the instructions, we consider the instructions together as a whole, presume jurors understand and correlate all of the instructions, and presume the jurors followed the court‘s instructions. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1255-1256.) Accordingly, although CALJIC No. 8.81.17 provided a numbered list, CALJIC No. 8.80 also directed the jury that in order to find the special circumstance true, it needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones was the actual killer or had an intent to kill. The instructions do not conflict, and Jones does not explain why the jury would have entirely ignored one instruction in favor of the other.
Jones next argues the jury may not have read the introductory special circumstance instruction to require that it find either that he was the actual killer or had the intent to kill. He observes that in People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, the Supreme Court concluded CALJIC No. 8.80 was ambiguous. In contrast to the truncated instruction here, the court in Letner and Tobin instructed the jury, ” ‘If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was either the actual killer, or an aider and abettor, but you are unable to decide which, then you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to either kill a human being, or to aid
The three alternatives identified in the Letner and Tobin instruction—actual killer, aider or abettor, or either the aider and abettor or the actual killer but unclear which—were not provided to Jones‘s jury. The instruction here does not mention an aider and abettor at all and thus lacks the ambiguity of the instruction at issue in Letner and Tobin. Jones‘s jury thus had only two choices: find he was the actual killer or was someone who acted with the intent to kill. In that regard, the instruction here more closely aligns with the one given in People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45. In Harden, the court instructed the jury, ” ‘If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually killed a human being, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill in order to find the special circumstance to be true.’ ” (Id. at p. 54, italics omitted.) As Harden observed, “By negative inference, a defendant who was
We thus conclude that in finding true the special circumstance, the jury found either that Jones was the actual killer or had the intent to kill. As we cannot tell which of these two the jury found, at the prima facie stage we presume it was the lesser finding of intent to kill.
As a fallback, Jones argues that a finding he intended to kill is insufficient for liability under
” ‘When interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain, commonsense meaning of the language used by the Legislature. [Citation.] If the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1131.) “If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) Our role “is simply to ascertain and
We agree with Kelly‘s analysis that by its plain terms
Kelly observed, “Whereas the actus reus requirement of
Further, the plain language of
Indeed, the opening paragraph of
The model jury instruction corroborates this reading. Under CALCRIM No. 540B, a jury today would first have to find the four elements that establish traditional felony-murder liability. The jury would need to find that Jones aided and abetted a robbery, that he intended to aid and abet a robbery, that his cohort committed the robbery, and that his cohort caused a death during the robbery. However, tracking the statute, CALCRIM No. 540B then states that to establish guilt under
This reading of
Lopez I, Lopez II, and Morris reached a different conclusion, each holding that
However, as explained in Kelly and the Morris and Lopez I dissents, Dickey depended on the old felony-murder rule “that swept up all manners of assistance within its ambit” in holding that “the language in former section 190.2, subdivision (b) applied whenever the defendant aided and abetted a felony that led to the victim‘s death.” (People v. Kelly, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 174, citing People v. Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 900; see People v. Morris, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1033 (dis. opn. of Moore, J.); Lopez I, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 586 (dis. opn. of Raphael, J.).) Since Dickey, “the felony-murder rule has undergone a significant transformation.” (People v. Kelly, supra, at p. 174.) In particular, the basis on which Dickey relied—that all persons who aid and abet the commission of a robbery in which a killing occurs are guilty of first degree murder—is no longer true. (See
Morris further suggests that dicta in People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433 supports its holding. Curiel stated, “[S]uppose the jury . . . made findings on all of the other elements supporting felony murder under section 189 as amended, including (1) the commission or attempted commission of a felony enumerated in that statute and (2) the death of a person during the commission or attempted commission of the enumerated
Morris overlooks that Curiel was a natural and probable consequences case, not a felony-murder case. The Supreme Court held the jury‘s intent to kill finding as part of the gang-murder special circumstance was not sufficient to establish the requisite mens rea for direct aiding and abetting or implied malice. Curiel did not consider the actus reus element necessary for felony murder under
Lopez II, Morris, and Lopez I contend that our reading of
This argument presumes that in order to have aided and abetted a killing, a defendant‘s quantum of involvement must be at least as substantial as the major participant‘s involvement in the underlying felony. But this is not necessarily so. Additionally, as Kelly observes, a defendant who has the intent to kill, takes no action to aid the killing, but acts as the getaway driver “could actually be less culpable than someone whose participation in the felony was so considerable that it amounted to reckless indifference to human life for purposes of
Morris and Lopez I also point to the Legislature‘s intent in passing Senate Bill No. 1437 to support their position. Lopez I explains, “The whole purpose of Senate Bill [No.] 1437 was to stop the practice of imputing malice to defendants to justify convicting them of murder. . . . [B]ecause express malice is an element of
However, as stated above, in the plain language of
Thus, reading
Because the record of conviction does not conclusively establish every element required under a currently valid murder theory, the trial court erred in denying Jones‘s petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
The trial court‘s order denying Jones‘s resentencing petition at the prima facie stage is reversed. Upon remand, the trial court shall issue an order to show cause.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.