People v. I.V.People v. I.V.
Daniel Brian Yeager, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Alastair J. Agcaoili and Britton B. Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
AARON, J.—Minor I.V. appeals a dispositional order adjudging him a ward of the court pursuant to
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In May 2016, 15-year-old I.V. became angry with his mother when she would not give him shopping money. He went into his bedroom in his grandfather‘s home, punched and kicked the walls, and threatened his grandfather when his grandfather tried to intervene. I.V.‘s mother called the police, who arrived to find a broken lock on I.V.‘s bedroom door, a damaged bedframe, holes in the wall, and damaged furniture.
The San Diego County District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to section 602, alleging that I.V. had committed felony vandalism (
Psychologist Richard Jordan evaluated I.V. and submitted a report. I.V. informed Dr. Jordan that he had previously been diagnosed with ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) and ODD (oppositional defiant disorder), but he claimed to no longer experience ADHD symptoms and said that he had not taken medication in two years. I.V. told Dr. Jordan that he had had an individualized education program (IEP) at school but did not state the reason.4 I.V.‘s K-BIT25 test results indicated that he had a composite I.Q. in
At the settlement conference in early June, I.V. asked the court to release him on home supervision. His trial counsel stated that I.V. had to attend an IEP appointment at school, attend individual counseling, and see a psychiatrist to inquire about ADHD medication. The court granted the request and released I.V. on home supervision.
At the adjudication hearing on June 16, 2016, the juvenile court heard testimony from I.V.‘s mother, grandfather, and the responding police officer and received in evidence a video recording of the incident. The court determined that the People had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the damage exceeded $400 so as to sustain the felony vandalism allegation in the petition. However, the court sustained the petition, finding that I.V. had committed the lesser included offense of misdemeanor vandalism (
In late June, the probation department submitted a social study evaluating I.V. for the disposition hearing. The social study noted I.V.‘s history of damaging property when upset and his mother‘s tendency to downplay his volatile behavior. The social study indicated that I.V. entered special education during his elementary school years but did not take advantage of available services, and that he had an IEP of an unknown date. I.V.‘s mother reported that I.V. had had an IEP in place since elementary school.7 The probation department requested a copy of I.V.‘s current IEP, but the high school registrar did not honor the request. I.V.‘s high school did send a record of his grades, attendance, and disciplinary actions. I.V. received failing grades in all of his classes in his first semester of high school, and he had a history of truancy. He was suspended for possessing marijuana and was subsequently
Given I.V.‘s poor academic performance and history of truancy, the social study recommended that the court order him to participate in Reflections as a condition of probation, suggesting that I.V. would benefit from the structured environment, psychiatric and counseling services, and wraparound services that the program would provide. The probation department attached a copy of Dr. Jordan‘s psychological evaluation to the social study.
At the disposition hearing on June 30, 2016, the juvenile court adopted the probation department‘s recommendations, adjudged I.V. a ward of the court pursuant to section 602, and placed him on supervised probation under his mother‘s care. Among the conditions of probation was a requirement that I.V. participate in the Reflections program (the Reflections condition): “The minor . . . shall successfully complete the Reflections Day Center Program and abide by the rules and conditions of the program. If, for the protection of the minor, staff, or other wards, the Reflections staff deems it necessary to temporarily remove minor from the program, the minor may be detained in Juvenile Hall for a period not to exceed 36 hours for stabilization and mental health crisis intervention.” I.V. objected to the Reflections condition, but the court overruled his objection and denied his request to set a contested disposition hearing to assess his special educational needs.8 In addition to the Reflections condition, the juvenile court imposed the following search condition: “Minor shall submit his/her person, property, or vehicle, and any property under his/her immediate custody or control to search at any time, with or without probable cause, with or without a search warrant by any law enforcement officer or peace officers, probation officers, school officials or officers, and any other state security officers or agents engaged in the lawful performance of their duties.”
I.V. timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, I.V. challenges the Reflections condition, arguing that the juvenile court failed to make necessary findings under
A. The Reflections Condition
I.V. contends that the juvenile court failed to comply with
1. Legal Principles
Special education law involves an interplay of state and federal statutes. Pertinent here, at the federal level, Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (
The IDEA lays out a substantive procedure for developing an IEP for children with disabilities. (County of San Diego v. California Special Education Hearing Office (9th Cir. 1996) 93 F.3d 1458, 1461.) A parent or local educational agency may request an initial evaluation. (
At the state level,
The California Rules of Court implement these federal and state mandates in juvenile delinquency proceedings. “Rules of court have the force of law and are as binding as procedural statutes as long as they are not inconsistent with statutory or constitutional law.” (R.R. v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 185, 205 [103 Cal.Rptr.3d 110].)
Before a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court “must ensure that, to the extent the information was available, the social worker or the probation officer provided [certain] information in the report for the hearing.” (
2. Application
At the disposition hearing, the court indicated that it was inclined to follow the recommendations set forth in the probation department‘s social study. I.V. objected to the Reflections condition and requested that he instead be allowed to return to his high school. I.V.‘s mother argued that I.V. would do better in a “regular school environment,” whereas Reflections would “set him back.” She acknowledged his poor school attendance record but claimed that I.V. took longer than others to recover from illnesses. By contrast, the People argued that I.V.‘s actions demonstrated his need for a more structured environment, which Reflections would provide.
The court then imposed the Reflections condition. The court found that I.V.‘s grades and behavior were poor and observed that his psychological evaluation, which was attached to the social study, “indicates that he could use the additional support that will be provided at Reflections.” The court found I.V. to be “a young man who definitely needs the structure and support that Reflections will provide.”
Those findings satisfy
I.V. contends that the court erred when it imposed the Reflections condition “without a single detail about his IEP,” and suggests that the court was required to procure a copy of the IEP. Although the social study stated that I.V. had been a special education student during his elementary school years and that he had an IEP of an unknown date, there is no indication that the court failed to consider this information in making its findings.
I.V. also argues that the juvenile court failed to complete the Judicial Council JV-535 form, as required under
After the court made its ruling, I.V. requested a contested disposition hearing to challenge the Reflections condition but made no proffer as to what new information he might present at such a hearing. Counsel suggested that I.V. could meet with an education specialist and high school representative to determine whether he could benefit from educational services. However, in seeking release on home supervision three weeks prior, I.V. stated that he had to attend similar meetings, including an IEP appointment at school, a counseling session, and a psychiatric appointment. These appointments, which were scheduled to take place before the dispositional hearing,
Moreover, I.V. remained free to revisit the Reflections condition through an appropriate petition for modification. (
In arguing that the juvenile court failed to make required findings, I.V. relies chiefly on In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 809] (Angela M.). In that case, the juvenile court committed the minor to the California Youth Authority (CYA)13 after she admitted to having violated the terms of her probation. (Angela M., at p. 1394.) The minor‘s evaluating psychologist strongly believed that she had a learning disability and recommended an IEP assessment. (Id. at p. 1395.) Despite being “clearly on notice” that the minor may have had special educational needs, the juvenile court “did not mention this issue when committing her to the CYA.” (Id. at pp. 1398–1399.) The appellate court concluded that by doing so, the court failed to fulfill its obligation to consider the minor‘s educational needs and ordered a limited remand “to permit the juvenile court to make proper findings, on a more fully developed record, regarding [minor‘s] educational needs.” (Id. at p. 1399.)
Angela M. stands for the proposition that where the juvenile court is on notice that special attention to a minor‘s educational needs is appropriate, the court must make adequate findings on a sufficient record as to whether the minor has special educational needs before it commits the minor to DJJ. (Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1398.) Here, the court expressly considered I.V.‘s educational needs, particularly his need for greater structure and support, in imposing the Reflections condition, and the psychological evaluation revealed no indications of a learning disability. Unlike in Angela M., a “more fully developed record” is not required. (Id. at p. 1399.)
B. The Search Condition
I.V. challenges the probation condition requiring him to submit his “person, property, or vehicle, and any property under [his] immediate custody or
Although the juvenile court has broad discretion to impose reasonable conditions of probation (
I.V. did not object to the search condition in the juvenile court, but claims to bring a facial constitutional challenge that may be raised for the first time on appeal. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.) I.V. contends that “no probationer would be adequately notified of the scope of the term ‘property’ as it relates to electronic devices” and that the condition is overbroad, “invariant to his circumstances.” “[G]enerally, given a meaningful opportunity, the probationer should object to a perceived facial constitutional flaw at the time a probation condition initially is imposed in order to permit the trial court to consider, and if appropriate in the exercise of its informed judgment, to effect a correction.” (Ibid.) At the disposition hearing, the court asked I.V. if he had “any other concerns as to any of the other conditions.” I.V. did not voice any concerns or seek clarification of the search condition.
Although I.V. purports to raise a facial challenge, we conclude that he forfeited his overbreadth claim by failing to object in the juvenile court. I.V. contends that the search condition serves no rehabilitative purpose and
By contrast, I.V.‘s vagueness claim does present a facial constitutional challenge. I.V. contends that the word “property” in the search condition is unconstitutionally vague as to whether it encompasses electronic devices and data. Because this challenge may be addressed without examining the record, it is not subject to forfeiture. (Sheena K, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887.)
We apply de novo review to evaluate constitutional challenges to probation conditions. (People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723 [199 Cal.Rptr.3d 637].) To withstand a vagueness challenge, “a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the probationer has violated the condition.” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500 [213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794] (Hall).) A probation condition is not impermissibly vague “‘simply because there may be difficulty in determining whether some marginal or hypothetical act is covered by its language.‘” (People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 606 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 753, 170 P.3d 129].) We give the condition “‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader‘” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1]), and may consider the juvenile court‘s “additional oral or written comments clarifying” the condition (Sheena K, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 891). A probation condition survives a vagueness challenge if it can be given any reasonable and practical construction. (Hall, at p. 501.)
Applying those principles, we conclude that the search condition is not unconstitutionally vague. At the outset, we observe that probation conditions authorizing searches of a probationer‘s person, property, and vehicle are “routinely imposed.” (In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 296 [200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841].) In other wardship proceedings, juvenile courts have expressly imposed specific electronics and password conditions in addition to the standard search condition where they intend to subject a minor‘s electronic data to search. (See, e.g., id. at p. 292; In re Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907, 910 [192 Cal.Rptr.3d 919]; In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 752 [195 Cal.Rptr.3d 589].) There is no indication in this case that in imposing the standard search condition, the juvenile court intended to authorize searches of I.V.‘s electronic data.15
As imposed, the condition authorizes warrantless searches of I.V.‘s “person, property, [and] vehicle.” Reasonably construed, the search condition applies only to tangible physical property, and not to electronic data. We find support for this conclusion in U.S. v. Lara (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3d 605 (Lara). Lara considered whether a probation condition that allowed warrantless searches of a probationer‘s “person and property, including any residence, premises, container or vehicle under [his] control” encompassed searches of his cell phone data. (Id. at p. 610.) The Ninth Circuit concluded that it did not, explaining that the types of objects named in the probation condition were “physical objects that can be possessed,” whereas cell phone data were “not property in this sense.” (Id. at p. 611.) The court further noted that some data, such as medical and banking records, were held by third parties and could neither be “possessed physically” nor be under the probationer‘s “control,” as the probation condition specified. (Ibid.) Consequently, the court held that evidence obtained from a search of the defendant‘s cell phone data (images, text messages, and GPS data) should have been suppressed despite the probation search condition. (Id. at pp. 607, 614.)
Giving the search condition its reasonable and practical construction, we conclude that it extends only to tangible property, and not to electronic data. As so construed, the condition is not unconstitutionally vague. (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 501 [“a probation condition should not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague ‘if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language‘“].) In recent years, the digital revolution has effected a sea change in how people store and carry around their private information and communications. Given this reality, we conclude that it would not be reasonable to construe the standard property search condition, the origin of which precedes the digital era, to encompass searches of electronic data. If a court intends to authorize warrantless searches of a probationer‘s electronic data, the procedure is straightforward—the court must impose an explicit search condition pertaining to electronic data.16
I.V. asks this court to modify the search condition to provide, “The minor shall submit for suspicionless search his person, vehicle, and the physical aspects of his property and of any property under his immediate custody or control at any time.” We decline to do so. “At core, what [I.V.] seeks through modification is ‘absolute clarity’ in the text of the condition itself, without the need to rely on ‘a judicial construction.’ But the question before us is not whether this degree of precision would be desirable in principle, but whether it is constitutionally compelled.” (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 503.) The vagueness doctrine demands no more than a reasonable degree of certainty. (Ibid.) Given our decision today, the condition is properly construed as authorizing warrantless searches of I.V.‘s person, vehicle, and tangible property. “[W]e decline [I.V.‘s] invitation to modify [the search condition] simply to make explicit what the law already makes implicit.” (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Nares, Acting P. J., and Haller, J., concurred.