In
i
These appeals arise out of a police-citizen interaction on November 19, 2009, involving Dajuan James Hodges-Lamar and defendants. Defendant Hughes, a Detroit police officer, approached Hodges-Lamar at a Detroit gas station and asked him questions regarding his license, registration, and the presence of drugs in his car. Hughes then opened the door of Hodges-Lamar’s automobile, pulled Hodges-Lamar out by the collar, slammed Hodges-Lamar against the car, and searched him. Defendants Harris and Little, also Detroit police officers, were standing nearby. Hughes pushed Hodges-Lamar toward Harris and Little. Hughes subsequently punched Hodges-Lamar in the throat with an open hand, punched him again, pushed him to the ground, picked him up by the collar several times, slammed him onto the car, and finally pushed him back toward Harris and Little. Hodges-Lamar never alleged that Harris and Little assaulted him.
Defendants arrested Hodges-Lamar and searched his car. Hodges-Lamar received tickets for failure to wear a seatbelt, no proof of registration, and no proof of insurance. Eventually, the tickets were dismissed. Hodges-Lamar sought medical attention and another police officer took his statement at an area hospital.
The Detroit Board of Police Commissioners Office of the Chief Investigator (OCI) investigated the incident and interviewed defendants in July and August 2010. The OCI provided defendants with a standard departmental constitutional-rights form. The fourth paragraph of the form stated: “If I refuse ... to answer questions ... I will be subject to departmental charges which could result in my dismissal from the police department.” The fifth paragraph stated: “If I do answer . .. neither my statements nor any information or evidence which is gained by reason of such statements can be used against me in any subsequent criminal proceeding.” Defendants also received a reservation of rights form, which provided, in relevant part:
It is my further belief that this Statement and the Preliminary Complaint Report will not and cannot be used against me in any subsequent proceedings other than disciplinary proceedings within the confines of the Department itself. For any and all other purposes, I hereby reserve my Constitutional rights to remain silent under the FIFTH and FOURTEENTH AMMENDMENTS [sic] to the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, and Article I, Section 17 of the MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION.
The investigation was closed. Hodges-Lamar hired an attorney, who ultimately obtained a video recording of the assault and battery from the security camera at the gas station. The video recording was provided to the Detroit Police Department Internal Affairs Section. The prosecution subsequently charged Hughes with felony misconduct in office, MCL 750.505, misdemeanor assault and battery, MCL 750.81, and obstruction of justice, MCL 750.505. The prosecution charged Harris and Little each with one count of obstruction of justice, MCL 750.505. The video recording was played for the district court by stipulation of the parties. The district court dismissed the obstruction-of-justice charges against all three defendants, relying on the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and § 3 of the act concerning the disclosure of certain state-merits by law enforcement officers,
ii
The prosecution argues that the district court should have admitted at the preliminary examination defendants’ statements made during the OCI investigation because neither Garrity v New Jersey,
A
We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision whether to admit evidence, but review de novo the trial court’s decision on any preliminary question of law. People v Gursky,
B
The district court abused its discretion by excluding defendants’ statements under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” This prohibition “not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also ‘privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding,civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’ ” [People v Wyngaard, 462 Mich 659 , 671-672;614 NW2d 143 (2000), quoting Minnesota v Murphy,465 US 420 , 426;104 S Ct 1136 ;79 L Ed 2d 409 (1984), in turn quoting Lefkowitz v Turley,414 US 70 , 77;94 S Ct 316 ;38 L Ed 2d 274 (1973).]
To invoke the protection of the Fifth Amendment, a witness must only possess a reasonable belief that the evidence could be used against him or her in a criminal prosecution. Maness v Meyers,
In Garrity,
Since its decision in Garrity, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment does not protect a defendant from a subsequent prosecution for perjury predicated on statements that the defendant made on the stand after being granted immunity from prosecution regarding the underlying crime. See United States v Wong,
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has observed that, as a general rule, “the Fifth Amendment permits the government to use compelled statements obtained during an investigation if the use is limited to a prosecution for collateral crimes such as perjury or obstruction of justice.” McKinley v City of Mansfield,
This Court’s precedent similarly instructs that we view a defendant’s false statements as independent chargeable offenses, for which the allegedly false statements are not admitted to prove any underlying charge, but rather to prove the independent offense of lying. See Bassage,
We acknowledge that the case against Hughes differs from the cases against Harris and Little because the focus of the internal investigation was the assault and battery of Hodges-Lamar, which was committed exclusively by Hughes. Hodges-Lamar never accused Harris or Little of any assaultive behavior; Harris and Little were only interviewed as witnesses to Hughes’s misconduct. At the same time, however, all three defendants could have reasonably believed that their statements during the OCI interviews might lead to criminal proceedings against them for various nonassaultive offenses, such as misconduct in office (including nonfeasauce). See Maness,
But, as noted previously, the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the use of defendants’ statements “in prosecutions for the independent crimes of obstructing the public employer’s investigation or making false statements during it.” McKinley,
We recognize that our holding in this regard, as well as the post-Garrify federal caselaw, conflicts with this Court’s decision in People v Allen,
The Allen Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the principle announced in Garrity should not apply in prosecutions for perjury. Id. at 393-394. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment barred the admission of the defendants’ grand-jury testimony in the subsequent perjury proceedings. Id. The Allen Court noted that the prosecution could not presume that the defendants’ statements were false, and thereby escape the confines of Garrity, because the truth or falsity of a defendant’s statement was ultimately an issue to be determined by the trier of fact in a perjury prosecution. Id. at 393.
Given the intervening developments in federal law, including Apfelbaum,
We are not bound to follow Allen, which was decided before November 1, 1990. MCR 7.215(J)(1); People v Ford,
The Fifth Amendment did not bar the admission of defendants’ false statements in the instant prosecutions for obstruction of justice. The district court abused its discretion by relying on the Fifth Amendment to exclude defendants’ false statements from evidence.
C
The district court also abused its discretion by excluding defendants’ false statements under MCL 15.393, which precludes the use of a police officer’s “involuntary statement” against that officer in a criminal prosecution. Specifically, MCL 15.393 provides:
An involuntary statement made by a law enforcement officer, and any information derived from that involuntary statement,shall not be used against the law enforcement officer in a criminal proceeding.
We recognize that whereas the Fifth Amendment only protects witnesses from incriminating themselves with respect to “crimes already committed,” Bassage,
The phrase “involuntary statement” is defined as “information provided by a law enforcement officer, if compelled under threat of dismissal from employment or any other employment sanction, by the law enforcement agency that employs the law enforcement officer.” MCL 15.391(a) (emphasis added). But when an officer is compelled to make a statement during an internal investigation, and provides only misinformation and lies, he or she has not provided any “information” at all within the commonly understood meaning of that word. Among other things, “information” is defined as “knowledge communicated or received concerning a particular fact or circumstance.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). The word “knowledge,” in turn, is defined as “the body of truths or facts accumulated in the course of time.” Id. Because an officer’s lies do not impart any truths or facts, they necessarily do not constitute “information.” See MCL 15.391(a). In other words, an officer’s lies and false statements do not qualify as “involuntary statement[s]” under MCL 15.393, and consequently may be used as evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
We conclude that the Legislature’s manifest intent was to create a mechanism for facilitating internal police investigations and to provide an incentive for officers who cooperate by providing needed facts. The Legislature certainly did not intend to immunize police officers by precluding the use of their lies and false statements in criminal proceedings. Indeed, such a strained construction of MCL 15.393 would be wholly contrary to the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the statute. In sum, the plain language of MCL 15.391(a) establishes that an “involuntary statement” includes only truthful and factual information. Quite simply, when an officer lies, he or she provides no “information.” Accordingly, MCL 15.393 does not preclude the use of the officer’s lies in a criminal proceeding.
Defendants’ lies during the OCI investigation were not entitled to the protection of MCL 15.393. The district court abused its discretion by relying on MCL 15.393 to exclude defendants’ false statements from evidence in the prosecutions for obstruction of justice.
hi
In sum, the district court erred by misconstruing the Fifth Amendment guarantee as well as MCL 15.393. This error of law led the district court to abuse its discretion by excluding defendants’ false statements from evidence and dismissing the obstruction-of-justice charges against them on this ground. The circuit court erred by affirming the district court’s rulings. We reverse the decisions of the district court and the circuit court in this regard. We remand to the district court for reinstatement of the obstruction-of-justice charges against all three defendants.
Notes
People v Hughes, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 3, 2013 (Docket No. 316072).
People v Harris, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 15, 2013 (Docket No. 317158); People v Little, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 15, 2013 (Docket No. 317272).
MCL 15.391 et seq.
We wish to make clear that the district court did not err insofar as it followed the reasoning of Allen. Lower courts are hound to follow this Court’s published decisions unless and until they are overruled, vacated, or modified. MCR 7.215(C)(2); People v Herrick,
Concurrence in Part
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority’s determination in Part 11(B) that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the use of defendants’ statements under the Fifth Amendment. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that the district court misinterpreted MCL 15.393 and abused its discretion by dismissing the charges of obstruction of justice against defendants. I would conclude that defendants’ statements were protected under MCL 15.393.
I
MCL 15.393 provides: “An involuntary statement made by a law enforcement officer, and any information derived from that involuntary statement, shall not be used against the law enforcement officer in a criminal proceeding.” The Legislature defined “involuntary statement” as “information provided by a law enforcement officer, if compelled under threat of dismissal from employment or any other employment sanction, by the law enforcement agency that employs the law enforcement officer.” MCL 15.391(a).
The principles of statutory interpretation are well established. The “goal in interpreting a statute ‘is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. The touchstone of legislative intent is the statute’s language. If the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and we enforce the statute as written.’ ” People v Hardy,
A
As is true with the Fifth Amendment, which, under Garrity v New Jersey,
The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to incriminate themselves. The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent. That practice, like interrogation practices we reviewed in Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S. 436 , 464-465 [86 S Ct 1602 ;16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966)], is “likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice.” We think the statements were infected by the coercion inherent in this scheme of questioning and cannot be sustained as voluntary under our prior decisions. [Id. at 497-498.]
While the Fifth Amendment protects witnesses only from incriminating themselves with respect to crimes already committed, Lefkowitz v Turley,
B
Moreover, although the Fifth Amendment does not allow witnesses to swear falsely, United States v Apfelbaum,
The word “misinform” is defined as “giv[ing] false or misleading information to.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997) (emphasis added). Therefore, the term “information” as used in MCL 15.393 must be interpreted to include the giving of “misinformation.” Our United States Supreme Court has ruled that similar language in the federal immunity statute, 18 USC 6002, “makes no distinction between truthful and untruthful statements made during the course of the immunized testimony.” Apfelbaum,
In addition to using the dictionary to give meaning to undefined statutory terms, we also look to the use by the Legislature of the same or similar terms in other statutes to divine Legislative intent.
The Legislature has used the term “information” in a number of statutes. For example, in MCL 769.34(10), our Legislature provided that a sentence “within the appropriate guidelines sentence range” should be affirmed on appeal “absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied upon in determining the defendant’s sentence.” (Emphasis added.) In MCL 750.492a(1) the Legislature provided that “a health care provider or other person, knowing that the information is misleading or inaccurate, shall not intentionally, willfully, or recklessly place or direct another to place in a patient’s medical record or chart misleading or inaccurate information regarding the diagnosis, treatment, or cause of a patient’s condition.” (Emphasis added.) See also MCL 168.467b(6) (providing a right to equitable relief for a candidate receiving “incorrect or inaccurate written information”) (emphasis added), MCL 487.2140(2) (providing for the correction of submitted information when the “information ... is no longer accurate”) (emphasis added), and MCL 791.235(1)(b) (providing that the parole board shall not consider “[information that is determined by the parole board to be inaccurate or irrelevant”) (emphasis added). The Legislature’s specifir, references to inaccurate or misleading information in the above-cited provisions demonstrate that the distinction between accurate and inaccurate information was relevant to those legislative schemes, and that when such a distinction is important to the Legislature to make, it will do so. The Legislature’s failure to make a distinction between accurate and inaccurate information here demonstrates its intent that MCL 15.393 broadly apply to defendants’ involuntary statements, regardless of their accuracy. Underwood,
C
Our United States Supreme Court, in 1967 in Garrity, and this Court, in 1968 in People v Allen,
D
When it crafted MCL 15.393, the Legislature used broad language that did not just protect factually true statements, but “involuntary statements],” and did not only protect statements made during the investigation of crimes already committed, but more generally, statements made “in a criminal proceeding.”
II
Although the Fifth Amendment did not bar the use of defendants’ statements in their prosecution for obstruction of justice, I would conclude that MCL 15.393 does operate to bar such statements. I recognize it may seem an untenable result, to permit law enforcement officers to make false denials with impunity when giving involuntary statements under the threat of an employment sanction. The great majority of law enforcement officers, who perform their duties with honor and distinction, would neither need nor desire to take advantage of this anomaly in the law, which seems inconsistent with the design of our system of justice to seek out the truth. See Polk Co v Dodson,
Section 6002 differs from MCL 15.393 in that it requires a witness granted immunity to testify and precludes the witness from invoking the privilege against self-incriminations.
Although legislative analyses are not “an official form of legislative record in Michigan,” and I acknowledge that “legislative analyses should he accorded very little significance by courts when construing a statute,” In re Certified Question,
See Lewis v LeGrow,
The Legislature’s enactment of MCL 15.395 in the disclosures by law enforcement officers act also demonstrates its intention to codify broader protections for officers’ involuntary statements by making them confidential communications, except under limited circumstances. Myers v City of Portage,