People v. Hughes
855 N.W.2d 209
Mich. Ct. App.2014Background
- On Nov. 19, 2009, Detroit officer Nevin Hughes used force against Dajuan Hodges-Lamar at a gas station; officers Sean Harris and William Little were present as witnesses. Hodges-Lamar later obtained video contradicting officers’ OCI statements.
- The Detroit Board of Police Commissioners Office of the Chief Investigator (OCI) interviewed the three officers in 2010 after advising them via departmental forms that refusal to answer could lead to dismissal but that statements could not be used in criminal proceedings.
- Hughes admitted pulling Hodges-Lamar from the car but denied using force; Harris and Little denied any assaultive contact beyond a pat-down.
- Prosecutors charged Hughes with misconduct in office, assault and battery, and obstruction of justice; Harris and Little were charged with obstruction of justice based on alleged false statements to the OCI.
- The district court dismissed the obstruction charges, excluding the officers’ OCI statements under the Fifth Amendment and MCL 15.393 (the disclosures by law enforcement officers act); the circuit court affirmed. The prosecution appealed and the court of appeals reversed and remanded to reinstate obstruction charges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Fifth Amendment (Garrity) barred admission of officers’ compelled OCI statements in obstruction prosecutions | Prosecution: Garrity does not bar use of compelled statements to prove independent crimes like obstruction or false statements | Defendants: Garrity protects compelled statements from use in any subsequent criminal proceeding, including perjury/obstruction | Held: Fifth Amendment did not bar use of the officers’ false statements in obstruction prosecutions; Garrity’s protection is limited and does not immunize lies (court adopts post-Garrity federal precedent) |
| Whether MCL 15.393 barred admission of officers’ involuntary OCI statements (statutory protection) | Prosecution: MCL 15.393 protects only truthful "information" compelled from officers; lies are not "information" and fall outside the statute | Defendants: MCL 15.393 broadly bars use of involuntary statements and any information derived from them in any criminal proceeding, including perjury/obstruction | Held: Majority: MCL 15.393 does not protect false statements because the statute’s term "information" implies truthful factual information; lies are excluded. (Concurrence would reach opposite conclusion.) |
| Precedential effect of People v Allen (1968) holding Garrity-like protection extends to perjury prosecutions | Prosecution: Allen is inconsistent with later U.S. Supreme Court decisions and should not control | Defendants: Allen remains controlling state precedent | Held: Majority disavowed Allen reasoning and declined to follow it (Allen was decided before court rule limiting stare decisis); concurrence notes Allen still binding unless overruled but would interpret MCL 15.393 as providing broader protection |
| Remedy/relief | Prosecution: Reinstatement of obstruction charges and admissibility of OCI statements at preliminary examination | Defendants: Continued exclusion and dismissal of obstruction counts | Held: Court reversed district and circuit courts and remanded for reinstatement of obstruction-of-justice charges against all three defendants |
Key Cases Cited
- Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (statements obtained under threat of job loss are coerced and inadmissible against public employees in subsequent prosecutions for the underlying misconduct)
- United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977) (Fifth Amendment does not shield perjury; compelled testimony may be used in prosecutions for perjury)
- United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980) (immunity and Fifth Amendment do not permit false testimony; untruthful compelled statements may be used in prosecutions for perjury/false statements)
- McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 2005) (Garrity does not bar use of compelled statements in prosecutions for collateral offenses such as obstruction or false statements)
- Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975) (to invoke the Fifth Amendment witness must have a reasonable belief that testimony could incriminate in future proceedings)
- Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (Fifth Amendment privilege protects against compelled incrimination but does not protect false statements)
- People v. Bassage, 274 Mich. App. 321 (2007) (state self-incrimination protection aligned with federal law; false statements may be treated as independent offenses)
- People v. Allen, 15 Mich. App. 387 (1968) (held Garrity protection extends to perjury prosecutions; majority here disavowed this reasoning)