*469Dеfendant Marlowe William Henderson, Jr., pleaded no contest to charges of stalking, vandalism, and disobeying a court order. At issue here is the validity of the trial court's resulting restitution ordеr, which encompassed the victims' expenses for purchase and installation of a home security system.
BACKGROUND
In July 2016, defendant pleaded no contest to charges of stalking Christina T. bеtween January 14, 2016, and February 23, 2016 ( Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a) ),
At the restitution hearing, defendant argued he could not be ordered to pay restitution for the victims' security system expenses because he was not convicted of a violent felony as required by section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J). Defendant alternatively argued the security system was "redundant"
*470and "excessive." The trial court opined that the order sought was "well within its discretion" but failed to articulate any analysis of the relevant statutory scheme. The court ordered defendant to pay $7,997.02 in restitutiоn including $5,796.79 for installation of the system.
*908DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J) limits restitution for residential security systems to defendants convicted of violent felonies. As it is undisputed that he was not convicted of a violent felony, he argues the trial court erred when it included the security system costs within the restitution order. Defendant's argument is purely statutory; under these circumstances, where "the propriety of a restitution order turns on the interpretation of a statute, a question of law is raised, which is subject to de novo review on appeаl." ( People v. Williams (2010)
We conclude section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J) does not limit discretionary restitution for residential security systems to defendants convicted of a violent felony, thus the restitution order in this case was generally authorized under section 1202.4, subdivision (f).
Subdivision (f) of section 1202.4 provides, with certain exceptions not applicable here, that "in every case in which a victim has sufferеd economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court."
Subdivision (f)(3) of section 1202.4 explains:
"To the extent possible, the restitution order ... shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, all of the following:
"[¶] ... [¶]
"(J) Expenses to install or inсrease residential security incurred related to a violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, including, but not limited to, a home security device or system, or replacing or increasing the number of locks."
*471Defendant confines himself to a narrow argument on appeal; he does not contend that the court's restitution order was not supported by suffiсient evidence. Nor does he argue that the security system does not qualify as an "economic loss" within the meaning of the statute, nor that the order constituted a general аbuse of discretion.
Instead, defendant argues only that-presumably because section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J) requires the trial court to order restitution for residential security where the crime of cоnviction is a violent felony as defined by statute-the court is precluded from ordering restitution for residential security in the absence of a violent felony. We disagree that the requirement of rеstitution in one situation operates to preclude restitution in the other.
Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3) expressly states that the enumerated list, including subparagraph (J), is a nonexclusive list of examples. As we have set forth, the statute requires that the restitution order "shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the rеsult of the defendant's criminal conduct, including, but not limited to , all of the following [including subparagraph (J) ]...." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3), italics added.)
" ' "A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court should ascertain the intent оf the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In construing a statute, our first task is to look to the language of the statute itself. [Citation.] When the languаge is clear and there is no uncertainty as to the legislative intent, we look no further and simply enforce *909the statute according to its terms." ' " ( People v. Keichler (2005)
The plain language of section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J) requires that where a defendant is convicted of a violent felony, the trial court shall include in the restitution award expenses reasonably incurred by a victim in installing a residential security system. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(J).) The statute does nоt purport to preclude restitution for such installation under other circumstances; in fact, it says nothing about any restriction on restitution whatsoever. Where the mandatory language does not apply-as in this case, because defendant's crimes of conviction were not classified by the relevant statute as violent felonies-the direction to the trial court remains as set forth in the introductory language of section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3), ante , that is, to include in its restitution order "every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct, including, but not limited to , all of the following...." (Italics added.)
As we have previously hеld, "[b]ecause the statute uses the language 'including, but not limited to' these enumerated losses, a trial court may *472compensate a victim for any economic loss which is prоved to be the direct result of the defendant's criminal behavior, even if not specifically enumerated in the statute." ( People v. Keichler , supra ,
Defendant's argument to the contrary relies primarily on People v. Salas (2017)
In Salas , the defendant was convicted of a domestic violence offense-not a violent felony as described by the relеvant statute-but the trial court found that because the defendant's conduct caused great bodily injury to the victim, the court was "nonetheless authorized to order restitution for residential security expenses" pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J). ( Salas , supra ,
The Salas court explained that "[t]he statute's plain language and legislative history," along with select canоns of statutory construction, support the conclusion that "residential security expenses are recoverable under section 1202.4(f)(3)(J) only when they are 'incurred related to a violent felony, as defined in section 667.5, subdivision (c).' " ( Salas , supra,
Moreover, to interpret the disputed provision as limiting restitution for home security systems to victims of violent felonies would require us to read the words "including, but not limitеd to" out of section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3). In the context of statutory interpretation, our Supreme Court has recently reemphasized that " 'construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.' " ( People v. Valencia (2017)
Thus, the trial court's order here was not precluded or otherwise made erroneous by section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
Blease, Acting P. J.
Hull, J.
Notes
Further undesignated statutory referencеs are to the Penal Code.
The trial court sentenced defendant to two years eight months in state prison. He timely appealed the judgment.
To the extent that Salas contains broad language such as "the Legislature intended that residential security expenses remain recoverable via restitution only when they are incurred related to a 'violent felony' " (Salas, supra,