People v. HemphillPeople v. Hemphill
¶ 1 Held: Judgment affirmed over defendant‘s claim that the trial court erred in dismissing his “petition of mandamus,” that was filed in his underlying criminal proceedings.
¶ 2 Defendant, Carl Hemphill, is currently serving concurrent 40, 10, 10, and 10 year terms of imprisonment imposed on his 2003 convictions for, respectively, first degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery. Although the facts are not pertinent to this appeal, this court discussed the evidence supporting those convictions, and ultimately affirmed defendant‘s convictions and sentences, in the Rule 23 order entered in defendant‘s direct appeal. See People v. Hemphill, No. 1-03-0895 (2005) (unpublished order
¶ 3 The record shows that on October 5, 2012, defendant filed a FOIA request with the Chicago Police Department (CPD), seeking “all arrest reports, investigative reports, and other miscellaneous documents regarding Case No. 99-CR-12045.” CPD responded to defendant on March 12, 2013. CPD gave defendant a two-page general offense case report and his arrest report, but denied access to the other requested documents. CPD informed defendant of its determination that his request was “unduly burdensome under section
¶ 4 Defendant sought review of CPD‘s decision by the Public Access Bureau of the Office of the Attorney General (PAB). On May 6, 2013, an Assistant Attorney General at the PAB sent a letter to the FOIA officer at CPD, informing the officer of the review, and the determination that “further inquiry into this matter [wa]s necessary to confirm that CPD has complied with its obligations under FOIA in responding to this FOIA request.” The PAB requested that CPD
¶ 5 On June 20, 2013, CPD responded to the PAB‘s request, attaching “unredacted copies of the records withheld from” defendant. CPD maintained that it was exempt from providing the information under sections 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(vii) of FOIA (
¶ 6 On September 4, 2013, the PAB issued a determination “conclud[ing] that the Chicago Police Department must disclose records requested by” defendant. The PAB found that CPD‘s claimed exemptions based on defendant‘s previous FOIA request, and based on an “ongoing criminal investigation” did not apply in this case. The PAB did find, however, that CPD was entitled to redact certain information including “private information,” and information “identifying any complainant or individual who provided confidential information and did not testify in open court[.]” The PAB “determined that resolution of this matter does not require the issuance of a binding opinion” and that “[t]his correspondence shall serve to close this matter.”
¶ 8 On May 6, 2016, defendant, pro se, filed a petition for leave to file a petition for mandamus, an application to sue or defend as a poor person, and a petition for mandamus. All of the foregoing pleadings were brought under defendant‘s original criminal case number—09 CR 12045—and listed defendant as the plaintiff and CPD as defendant. In the petition for mandamus, defendant stated that CPD had failed to “perform specific ministerial duties” over defendant‘s “clear entitlement to performance of” those duties. Specifically, defendant complained that CPD had failed to release “all police reports” that “the Attorney General and F.O.I.A. officer” had “order[ed]” them to release. In support, defendant attached the correspondence described above.
¶ 9 On May 18, 2016, the trial court considered defendant‘s petition for mandamus in open court. The trial court noted that defendant was “asking for a mandamus order from me as well as appointment of counsel for the city‘s failure to comply with his freedom of information request concerning the case that he was convicted of.” The court found that defendant was “certainly in the wrong for[u]m for that” and that the court was “not in a position to hold the city or to issue any mandamus order to the city” for his FOIA request. The trial court denied the motion, stating that defendant “needs to go elsewhere for his remedy.” This appeal followed.
¶ 10 In this court, defendant challenges the trial court‘s denial of his petition for mandamus. He contends that the trial court “short-circuited” the mandamus procedure, when it denied defendant‘s petition on the court‘s own motion. Defendant asks this court to reverse and remand
¶ 11 In the trial court, defendant purported to bring a petition for writ of mandamus. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel a public officer to perform nondiscretionary official duties. McFatridge v. Madigan, 2013 IL 113676, ¶ 17. In order to obtain a mandamus remedy, the plaintiff must establish a clear right to the requested relief, a clear duty of the public officer to act, and clear authority of the public officer to comply with the order. Id. A writ of mandamus is appropriate when used to compel compliance with mandatory legal standards but not when the act in question involves the exercise of a public officer‘s discretion. Id. We consider de novo the issue of whether the complaint stated a cause of action for mandamus. Newsome v. Illinois Prison Review Board, 333 Ill. App. 3d 917, 918 (2002), citing Toombs v. City of Champaign, 245 Ill. App. 3d 580, 583 (1993); see also McFatridge, 2013 IL 113676, ¶ 16 (“Our review of the circuit court‘s dismissal order is de novo.“).
¶ 12 In the present case, defendant sought mandamus relief to compel CPD to release documents that he had requested pursuant to FOIA. FOIA recognizes that “it is the public policy of the State of Illinois that access by all persons to public records promotes the transparency and accountability of public bodies at all levels of government.”
¶ 13 A person whose FOIA request is denied may file a request for review with the Attorney General‘s Public Access Counselor, who “shall determine whether further action is warranted.”
¶ 14 Based on our de novo review of the record, we conclude that defendant cannot state a claim for mandamus. As defendant acknowledges, the PAB issued a nonbinding opinion in response to defendant‘s request for review, and, as a result, “it failed to confer a clear ministerial duty on the Chicago Police Department.” However, mandamus “lies to compel an action by an officer that is purely ministerial and not discretionary.” (emphasis added) Newsome, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 918. Because defendant admits that the activity that he sought to compel was not merely ministerial, he cannot use the extraordinary remedy of mandamus to compel CPD to act.
¶ 15 Defendant also had the option to proceed under section 11 of FOIA, which allows “[a]ny person denied access to inspect or copy any public record by a public body” to file in the circuit court a “suit for injunctive or declaratory relief.”
¶ 17 Apparently acknowledging the defects in his pleading, defendant relies primarily on People v. Ross, 367 Ill. App. 3d 890 (2006), to contend that the court was required to notify him and give him an opportunity to amend or argue in support of his pleading. Defendant asserts that “[i]f he had been given a chance to amend his petition he could have added his right to relief under *** FOIA.” We disagree.
¶ 18 Our supreme court has stated that “a trial court may, on its own motion, dispose of a matter when it is clear on its face that the requesting party is not entitled to relief as a matter of law.” People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2007). In Vincent, the supreme court affirmed the trial court‘s sua sponte dismissal of an inmate‘s petition for relief brought under section 2-1401 of the Code (
“Illinois pleading requirements and well-settled principles of civil practice and procedure permit the trial [court] to have acted sua sponte in this case. Our recognition [in] this [regard] is based on long-recognized legal precepts, and is, in our view, more preferable than creating exceptions based solely on the criminal
defendant status of the petitioner [citation] or on arbitrary notions of docket control [citation].” Id., at 13-14.
¶ 19 Likewise, in Bilski v. Walker, 392 Ill. App. 3d 153, 156 (2009), the fourth district appellate court analyzed Vincent, and recognized that its holding was not limited to actions under section 2-1401 of the Code. Instead, Vincent made clear that “a trial court has authority under the principles of civil practice and procedure to sua sponte dismiss the type of claim presented in this case—namely, a frivolous lawsuit.” Id. The fourth district thus concluded that “the Vincent precepts apply here, even though this claim was ostensibly brought under section 1983.” Id., citing Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 12. For the same reasons, we conclude that Vincent applies here, where defendant purported to bring a civil action for mandamus relief. See Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App. 3d 834, 842 (2002) (“trial courts have the authority to sua sponte order stricken mandamus petitions the courts find to be frivolous and without merit.“)
¶ 20 To the extent that Ross conflicts with the more recent precedent from our supreme court cited above, we question its ongoing validity. Nonetheless, even if Ross is still good law, we find it to be distinguishable from the case at bar. The defendant in Ross requested certain documents from CPD, which denied much of the request. Ross, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 890. Ross then filed a petition for mandamus, claiming that CPD had failed to perform its duty to produce the requested records. Id. Although Ross properly named himself as plaintiff and the City of Chicago Department of Police as defendant, the clerk of the court assigned the petition to Ross‘s criminal case, effectively treating it as a post-conviction petition. The trial court then, sua sponte and without notice to either party, dismissed the petition with prejudice. Ross appealed, arguing that the court erred in dismissing the petition without notice, and that if he had received notice, he
¶ 21 Another division of the First District appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that:
“when a trial court finds a mandamus petition insufficient to state a claim for mandamus relief or for relief from a judgment, the court must first notify the petitioner of its intention to dismiss the petition as insufficient, just as the court would need to notify the petitioner before recharacterizing the petition. The petitioner then should have the opportunity to withdraw or amend his pleading and to argue in court for the sufficiency of the petition. If the trial court fails to follow proper procedures for its own motion to dismiss, and the procedural defect prejudices the petitioner, we must reverse. But this court will not reverse the judgment if the trial court committed only harmless error by dismissing a petition with patently incurable defects.” (internal citation omitted) Ross, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 893.
¶ 22 The court found that the “trial court failed to follow proper procedures when it failed to allow Ross a chance to amend the petition or otherwise respond” and that “the procedural error prejudiced Ross because Ross may have had valid grounds for administrative review of the denial of his request for certain documents in the possession of the Department.”
¶ 23 In this case, by contrast, defendant‘s petition for mandamus was not inaccurately assigned to the criminal proceeding by the clerk of the court, but instead, defendant himself filed the petition under his criminal case number. See People v. Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d 41, 58 (1998)
¶ 24 More importantly, however, the court in Ross found that it was possible for Ross to amend his petition “to state a valid claim for administrative review of the denial of his request for certain documents under [FOIA]” and that Ross may have had “valid grounds for administrative review.” For the reasons we set out above, we do not find defendant‘s petition to be similarly salvageable. See Owens v. Snyder, 349 Ill. App. 3d 35, 45 (2004) (“We agree with the trial court‘s conclusion that plaintiff did not demonstrate anything close to a clear, affirmative right to relief, the sine qua non for mandamus. There was nothing plaintiff could do to make it any better. He simply was off the track and could not get back on. We do not believe the legislature intended to require judges and clerks to jump through useless hoops aimed toward impossible goals. *** This judge apparently saw the plaintiff‘s complaint for what it was—a totally deficient claim for mandamus relief“); Ross, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 895 (2006) (O‘Malley, J., specially concurring) (“if the appellate court is capable of recognizing that defendant‘s petition is fatally flawed and not amendable to successful amendment, there is no reason that the trial court cannot be trusted to do the same without useless procedural machinations.“).
¶ 25 Although defendant contends that he “may have valid grounds for administrative review of the denial of his request for certain documents in the possession of” CPD, as stated previously, only binding opinions by the PAB are subject to administrative review.
¶ 26 With that said, defendant is not without remedy for CPD‘s alleged violations of FOIA, but he must comply with the procedures set out under FOIA when seeking that remedy. As pointed out above, the remedy is to proceed under section 11 of FOIA, which allows “[a]ny person denied access to inspect or copy any public record by a public body” to file in the circuit court a “suit for injunctive or declaratory relief.”
¶ 27 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court‘s judgment.
¶ 28 Affirmed.