People v. FlemingPeople v. Fleming
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- PeÑA, Franson, Smith
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Arlan L. Harrell, Judge.
-ooOoo-
OPINION
INTRODUCTION
When an invited guest, knowing his friend is asleep in the living room, gets into a bed where his friend‘s wife is asleep and digitally penetrates her vagina without her knowing consent but without her initial objection or resistance, has he committed sexual penetration by artifice, pretense, or concealment in violation of
Defendant contends on appeal he did not violate
FACTS
Prosecution Case
The evening of December 12, 2014, defendant went out with friends for dinner and dancing to celebrate Taryn W.‘s birthday. The party included Cheyenne, Blake and his wife D.P., and neighbors Megan and Mitchell. Cheyenne left after dinner because she was not old enough to drink alcohol. D.P. said they all drank enough that evening that they should not be
About 7:00 a.m. the next morning, defendant entered the family room to retrieve his cell phone from underneath the sofa and called his employer to say he was not coming to work. D.P. was awakened by defendant, got up from the sofa, and went into her bedroom and shut the door. D.P. changed into a tank top and pajamas before climbing into bed around 7:30 a.m. She was alone in her room. D.P. slept facing the wall and bedroom closet.
Sometime before 9:15 a.m., defendant went into D.P.‘s room without her noticing. D.P. was sleeping. Defendant climbed into Blake‘s side of the bed and lay down behind D.P. underneath the covers. D.P. felt a body against her and thought it was her husband. D.P. could not see the person behind her. Defendant did not say anything. Defendant groped D.P., putting his fingers inside her vagina. D.P. thought her husband was with her in bed and “started getting into it.”
D.P.‘s cell phone rang. D.P. explained: “So I woke up to—because my phone rang and I realized that somebody was in bed with me and he was touching me, and I thought it was my husband Blake.” As D.P. turned over and reached across Blake‘s side of the bed to retrieve her phone from the dresser, defendant pulled the covers over his head. D.P. pulled the covers back and saw defendant. She screamed. D.P. was shocked and deeply disturbed. Defendant had been friends with her husband for a long time and was in their wedding.
Defendant and D.P. never had a sexual relationship. D.P. did not consent to defendant‘s conduct. D.P. did not give defendant permission to touch her and felt violated. D.P. ran out to the living room and woke her husband. Blake confronted defendant in the master bedroom, ordering defendant to get out of his bed. Defendant pretended he did not know what was happening. Defendant was not wearing a shirt and his belt was on the floor. Blake told defendant to leave.
D.P. was very upset and cried. Blake could not comfort her. D.P. did not sleep in her bed for a month; she reported the incident to the police on Monday, two days after the incident.
Defendant briefly left, but after a few minutes he crawled back into the bedroom on his hands and knees. Defendant looked up at Taryn from the floor and said, “‘You look beautiful when you‘re sleeping.‘” Cheyenne again told defendant to get out. Before leaving the room, defendant said, “‘You are evicting me from your room?‘” Sometime after defendant left the bedroom the second time, Cheyenne heard D.P. yelling and hysterical. D.P. was accusing defendant of touching her. Defendant also became hysterical and said nothing had happened.
Defense
Deputy Rudolfo Tafoya of the Fresno County Sheriff‘s Department prepared a report from D.P.‘s description of the incident on December 15, 2014. D.P. reported the crime as a rape. On direct examination D.P. testified she had asked, “Blake, what are you doing?” after the incident. D.P. told Deputy Tafoya she had said, “[Defendant], what are you doing here?” When D.P. met with the investigator at the district attorney‘s office on February 24, 2015, she made no reference to asking, “Blake, what are you doing?” Since D.P. had already washed her night clothes and the bed sheets before the officer came to her home, there was no physical evidence for him to collect.
DISCUSSION
I. Evidence of Artifice, Pretense, or Concealment
Introduction
Defendant contends his conviction must be reversed because there was no evidence he committed pretense, artifice, or concealment when he touched D.P., an element of
An earlier version of the statute and the jury instruction included the element that at the time of the sexual penetration, the alleged victim submitted to the act under the belief the defendant was the victim‘s spouse. Beginning on September 9, 2013,
Defendant asserts the only prior opinion on point, People v. Leal (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 782 (Leal), is inapposite because it involved a different factual scenario and misinterpreted
Substantial Evidence
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts must review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard of appellate review is the same in cases in which the People primarily rely on circumstantial evidence. Although a jury must acquit if it finds the evidence susceptible of a reasonable interpretation favoring innocence, it is the jury and not the reviewing court that weighs the evidence, resolves conflicting inferences, and determines whether the People have met the burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trier of fact‘s findings are reasonably justified under the circumstances, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances may also be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. (People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 823–824.) After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1212–1213.)
Unless the testimony of a single witness is physically impossible or inherently improbable, it is sufficient for a conviction. (
Analysis
In Leal, husband A. and wife T.C. celebrated her birthday in their duplex. Over the course of the evening, both drank large amounts of alcohol and became highly intoxicated. T.C. changed into her pajamas about 1:00 a.m. and went to sleep in their bedroom. She was joined by A. a few minutes later in their queen-sized bed. During that night, T.C. felt her vagina being penetrated by a penis as she was lifted up and placed on the edge of the bed. (Leal, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 785.) Although T.C. believed she was having sex with her husband, they had not had sex in that manner before, and in fact it was the defendant, who was a stranger and had entered the duplex through a window. (Leal, at pp. 785–786.)
T.C. did not feel hair on the back of the stranger, though A. had hair on his back, and she felt facial hair on the stranger, though A. had no facial hair. A. also usually woke her up and asked her if she wanted sex. Because T.C. was so intoxicated, she was unable to fully process the significance of these differences. When the encounter was over, T.C. lay back on her pillow and saw what appeared to be the silhouette of someone leaving the room. She reached across the bed and found A. lying there. T.C. said she thought someone was there, but A. did not respond. T.C. was taken to a hospital and examined and a rape kit was prepared. Three years later the DNA profile made from the kit matched defendant‘s DNA. (Leal, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 786.)
Leal was convicted of rape and sexual penetration by artifice, pretense, or concealment (
Leal noted California was one of only a handful of states with current laws defining rape to include acts of sexual intercourse in which the victim‘s apparent consent is induced by the belief the person performing the act is her spouse. (Leal, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 788.) As already noted, the element of personating a spouse is no longer an element of
The court in Leal noted the only published case in California involving false personation of a spouse was a 1922 appellate court decision where the defendant obtained consent to intercourse after a feigned marriage. (Leal, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 788, citing People v. McCoy (1922) 58 Cal.App. 534.) Leal turned to a case from North Carolina and one from Arizona. North Carolina had a statute “‘prohibiting carnal knowledge of a married woman by fraud in personating her husband.‘” (Leal, supra, at p. 788, citing State v. Williams (1901) 128 N.C. 573 [37 S.E. 952, 953] (Williams).)
The wife in Williams was visiting her ill mother but was expecting her husband to join her that evening. During the night, the defendant lay down next to the sleeping wife, squeezed her hand, and pulled her towards him. When the wife asked who was there, the defendant said nothing initially. Thinking it was her husband, the wife asked when he had arrived. In a whisper, the defendant replied he arrived a little while ago. His voice was so low the wife did not suspect the defendant was not her husband and sexual intercourse followed. The court in Williams found sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant‘s conviction, reasoning the defendant knew he was not the woman‘s husband and he also knew the wife thought the defendant was her husband. The Williams court reasoned the defendant acted to “keep up the delusion until he accomplished his purpose.” Williams found that even if the defendant lay down on the pallet by mistake, once he found the woman there and pulled her hand to solicit her to consent to intercourse, the defendant knew he was obtaining intercourse by fraud in personating the wife‘s husband. (Williams, supra, 128 N.C. at p. 575 [37 S.E. at p. 953]; see Leal, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 788.)
Arizona had a statute similar to the North Carolina statute. In State v. Navarro (1961) 90 Ariz. 185 [367 P.2d 227] (Navarro), the victim went to sleep in the bedroom she shared with her husband while he and four other men, including the defendant, drank beer and watched television in another room. The victim remembered waking up in the middle of the night with defendant on top of her trying to have sexual intercourse. Believing the defendant to be her husband, the wife submitted to him. In a matter of seconds she became aware he was not her husband and cried out asking who he was. The defendant covered her mouth with his hand and told her not to scream. When she cried and resisted, the defendant escaped from the house, leaving clothes behind. (Navarro, supra, at p. 187 [367 P.2d at p. 228]; Leal, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 789.) The Navarro court found the victim‘s testimony was
The Leal court used the following definitions for artifice, pretense, and concealment:
“Artifice is defined as ‘[a] clever plan or idea, [especially] one intended to deceive.’ (Black‘s Law Dict. (8th ed. 2004) p. 120, col. 2.) Pretense in this context is commonly understood to connote an act of pretending (Roget‘s II: The New Thesaurus (3d ed. 1995) p. 763), while concealment can refer to either an ‘act of refraining from disclosure’ or hiding to prevent discovery (Black‘s Law Dict., supra, at p. 306, col. 2).” (Leal, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 789.)
The court in Leal found the jury could reasonably infer the defendant employed deceptive methods when he quietly entered T.C.‘s dark bedroom in the middle of the night, began to masturbate her as she was sleeping next to her husband, and engaged in sexual intercourse with her. Leal reasoned the jury could also reasonably conclude a woman in T.C.‘s situation would reasonably believe these acts were being committed by her husband. (Leal, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 789.) Leal concluded that viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence supported the jury‘s finding the defendant intended to induce T.C. to believe he was her husband, and for that reason she submitted to his sexual advances. (Leal, supra, at p. 790.)
Defendant argues the facts of Leal are distinguishable from the instant action. He further argues the holding in Leal improperly relies on the concept of passive concealment as used in civil tort law. Defendant contends