People v. FiveashPeople v. Fiveash
(Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the оpinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.)
An indictment charging the 23-year-old defendant with criminal sexual assault for offenses committed when he was 14 and 15 years of age was improperly dismissed, since section 5-120 of the Juvenile Court Act does not prohibit the criminal prosecution of an adult defendant for crimes committed when defendant was under 17 years of age.
Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Simon concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 The issue before this court on appeal is whether an adult defendant may be prosecuted in criminal court for crimes that he allegedly committed when he was under 17 years of age. Defendant David Fiveash was 23 years old at the time he was charged by indictment with criminal sexual assault of his 6-year-old cousin. The offenses allegedly occurred during the period of time when defendant was 14 and 15 years of age. He filed a motion to dismiss the charges for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 The essential facts of this case are straightforward and undisputed. Defendant was born on October 10, 1988. His cousin P.A. was born on December 10, 1996. On May 16, 2012, when he was 23 years old, defendant was chargеd by indictment with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and two counts of criminal sexual assault for acts of sexual penetration that he allegedly committed upon P.A. between January 1, 2003, and January 1, 2004. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the State delayed charging defendant until he had reached an adult age.
¶ 4 On July 17, 2012,1 defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him for lack of jurisdiction. Citing
¶ 5 A hearing was held on October 4, 2012. Thereafter, the trial court entered a written order rejecting the assertion that it lacked jurisdiction, noting that “[t]he issue of whether a person is tried in juvenile court or criminal court is a matter of procedure rather than jurisdiction.” The court nonetheless concluded, after reviewing
¶ 6 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 7 In this appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment where defendant was not a minor at the time he was charged. Specifically, the State argues that
¶ 8 It is initially relevant to note that neither party appears to dispute that the 23-year-old defendant is not subject to juvenile proceedings under the Act. Yet, the parties’ disagreement centers on whether
¶ 9 The Act expressly defines the terms “Adult” and “Minor.” An “Adult” is defined as “a person 21 years of age or older.”
¶ 10 Section 5-120 of the Act states as follows:
“Exclusive Jurisdiction. Proceedings may be instituted under the provisions of this Article concerning any minor who prior to the minor‘s 17th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal or State law or municipal or county ordinance. Except as provided in Sections 5-125, 5-130, 5-805, and 5-810 of this Article, no minor who was under 17 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.”
705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2002) .2
¶ 11 The central dispute in this case concerns the last sentence of
¶ 13 A. In re Luis R.
¶ 14 In Luis R. I, the Second District addressed the issue of whether juvenile proceedings under the Act could be initiated against an adult defendant for a crime that he allegedly committed when he was under 17 years of agе. There, the State filed a delinquency petition against the 21-year-old respondent, alleging that he committed aggravated criminal sexual assault when he was 14 years old. Luis R. I, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 730-31. The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds the juvenile court was ” ‘without jurisdiction over [his] person.’ ” Luis R. II, 239 Ill. 2d at 297. The State then sought to prosecute the respondent under the criminal laws as an adult pursuant to the discretionary transfer provision (
¶ 15 The court then went on to consider whether there were grounds for departing from the plain lаnguage of the statute. Id. at 736. The State argued that “interpreting the Act to exclude those 21 years of age or older who committed crimes prior to their seventeenth birthdays would be absurd, because it would allow certain juvenile offenders who commit serious crimes to escape any consequences whatsoever.” Id. at 737. The court responded that the State‘s argument presupposed that a criminal prosecution of an adult age 21 or older for an offense allegedly perpetrated by him before he was 17 years old would be forbidden and stated, “a definitive decision that respondent is or is not subject to prosecution under the criminal laws would be premature; as no criminal charges are pending, we think an opinion on the question would be advisory.” Id. The court nonetheless found such a proposition to be “doubtful enough that [it could not] rеly on it as a ground to depart from the plain language of
“[T]he first sentence of
section 5-120 restricts proceedings under article V to ‘any minor who prior to the minor‘s 17th birthday’ has violated or attempted to violate the law. [Citation.] The second sentence provides that, subject to certain exceptions, ‘nominor who was under 17 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.’ [Citation.] For purposes of the first sentence, we agree with respondent that his status as an adult or a minor is to be determined as of the time that proceedings under article V are commenced. By virtue of the same reasoning, it would seem that respondent‘s status, for purposes of the second sentence, should be determined as of the time the State prosecutes him under the criminal laws. The second sentence‘s language defining the class excluded from criminal prosecution—‘minor who was under 17 years of age at the time of the alleged offense‘—is structurally identical to the salient language of the first sentence. It consists of a noun (‘minor‘) followed by a restrictive relative clause (‘who was under 17 years of age at the time of the alleged offense‘). Thus, a defensible argument can be made that the plain language of section 5-120 does not forbid the criminal prоsecution of an adult for an offense committed before he or she reached the age of 17.” Id. at 737-38.
The court was clear, however: “We do not reach the question of whether an individual who commits a crime before the age of 17 may be prosecuted under the criminal laws after reaching the age of 21.” Id. at 738-39.
¶ 16 The supreme court subsequently reversed the appellate court, finding that “to the extent that it was based upon a perceived lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court‘s order dismissing the State‘s petition was in error.” Luis R. II, 239 Ill. 2d at 303. The Luis R. II court‘s analysis was based on “whether the State‘s delinquency petition alleges the existence of a justiciable matter to which the circuit court‘s constitutionally granted original jurisdiction extends.” Id. at 302. It concluded that the juvenile court had authority to adjudicate the legal sufficiency of the delinquency petition because it was properly vested with subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. Id. at 303, 305. Addressing the portion of the Second District‘s opinion concerning whether any 21-year-old adult could be prosecuted under the criminal laws for offenses committed before the age of 17, the supreme court stated in admonishment: “Although the appellate court ultimately did not express an opinion on this question, the entire discussion was advisory and should have not been included in the court‘s disposition.” Id. at 299 n.1.
¶ 17 On remand, respondent again moved to dismiss the delinquency petition, and the juvenile court ultimately dismissed the petition without stating a statutory ground for the dismissal. Luis R. III, 2013 IL App (2d) 120393, ¶¶ 8, 10, 15. The Second District again affirmed the lower court, holding that the delinquency petition was properly dismissed because “the Act does not authorize the State to institute proceedings against persons over the age of 21.” Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 18 B. People v. Rich
¶ 19 In 2011, аlmost a year after the supreme court‘s decision in Luis R. II, but prior to Luis R. III, the Second District released another opinion addressing the second sentence of
¶ 20 On appeal, the Second District concluded that dismissal of the indictment was proper on two grounds. Id. ¶ 6. First, the indictment was legally defective because it charged defendant with the commission of a crime at the age of 12 in viоlation of the criminal code provision stating that ” ‘no person shall be convicted of any offense unless he had attained his 13th birthday at the time the offense was committed.’ ” Id. ¶ 7 (quoting
¶ 21 In reviewing the issue of whether the 21-year-old defendant was subject to criminal proceedings for acts he allegedly committed before the age of 15, the court held:
“[I]t is critical here that defendant is not charged with an automatic-transfer crime under
section 5-130 of the Act (the second exception provided bysection 5-120 ). [Citation.] Section 5-130 provides, in part, that any minor who commits a specified crime, including aggravated criminal sexual assault, and, at the time of the offense, was ’at least 15 years of age,’ shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this state. [Citation.] This provision clearly reflects that, as it relates to prosecution and sentencing, the General Assembly determined critical an interplay between age and specific crimes such that, where a minor age 15 or older commits any of the specified crimes, prosecution in criminal court, with its attendant correctional scheme, is deemed appropriate. Indeed, it is automatic. Conversely, then, when a minor under age 15 commits any of those same crimes, there is no automatic transfer to criminal сourt and, therefore, the reasonable presumption is that the General Assembly did not wish to automatically attach criminal court proceedings and penalties to those minors who, under age 15, commit certain crimes. Here, defendant is charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault, but he is charged with committing the crime before age 15. Therefore, he is not charged with a crime that the Act automatically transfers to criminal court.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 11.
¶ 22 C. People v. Baum
¶ 23 The final case cited by the parties is the Fourth District‘s opinion in Baum. In Baum, a 19-year-old defendant was charged by information with three counts of criminal sexual assault for acts that he allegedly committed while under the age of 17. Baum, 2012 IL App (4th) 120285, ¶ 3. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges, asserting that they should have been brought in juvenile court, and the trial court granted his motion. Id. ¶ 4. The Fourth District, on appeal, concluded that the trial court properly granted defendant‘s motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to
“Peering into the future of the proceedings against defendant concerning these alleged crimes, the State predicts that the trial court‘s judgment will have the effect of ‘shield[ing defendant] from prosecution.’ On that basis, the State asks us to overlook the clear application of the relevant statute to the facts here. We will not do so. Moreover, to the extent the State‘s argument invites us to speculate or advise the parties as to future litigation and the possible application of other laws not yet at issue in this case, we decline. [Citation.]” Id. ¶ 12.
¶ 24 D. Applicability of the Cases
¶ 25 Of the preceding cases, only Luis R. I and Rich address the precise issue before this court, i.e., whether
¶ 26 “Our primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, bearing in mind that the best evidence of such intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” People v. Johnson, 2013 IL 114639, ¶ 9. “[T]here is no rule of construction that authorizes a court to say that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute provides.” In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). Thus, “[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court must give it effect as written, without reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 9.
¶ 27 In determining whether
¶ 28 Defendant attempts to compare the instant case to Rich. We initially note that Rich is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In Rich, unlike here, the defendant was initially charged as an adult while he was still a “minor.” The State therefore had the opportunity to initiate juvenile proceedings against defendant (see
¶ 29 This distinction notwithstanding, we resрectfully disagree with the Second District‘s reliance on
¶ 30 Defendant claims that it would be “absurd *** [to] prosecute an adult for a crime that occurred as a 14 year old, coupled with the extreme minimum punishment and sentence that he would not have been subjected to as a 14 year old under the [Act].” Contrary to his claim, however,
¶ 31 Defendant additionаlly maintains that the proposed interpretation of
¶ 32 Defendant lastly attempts to advance the argument that, as a policy consideration, allowing an adult defendant to be tried in criminal court for crimes he is charged with having committed as a minor eight years ago raises the possibility of a disparity in sentencing if found guilty. We acknowledge that this may be a valid concern. However, any such policy consideration is a matter for the legislature, not this court. We find thаt
¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and remand the cause for further proceedings.
¶ 35 Reversed and remanded.