THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HILDO OCAMPO ESTRADA, Defendant and Appellant.
B324576
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT
Filed 4/9/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PA086118)
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Charles S. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Hildo Ocampo Estrada appeals from the superior court‘s order denying his petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage of the proceedings under
BACKGROUND
I. Relevant factual and procedural history
On August 1, 2017, the Los Angeles County District Attorney‘s Office charged Estrada under count 1 with the murder of Martin Corio (
On July 18, 2017, a preliminary hearing took place. Detective Christian Mayes and Officer Juan Garcia testified. Officer Garcia testified that on or about February 9, 2016, he responded to a call at a liquor store. Officer Garcia approached a man who was in the fetal position with his face covered in blood. The man said his name was Carlos, later identified as Carlos Zuniga Flores. A woman named Rosa told Officer Garcia and his partner that someone was stabbed, and directed Officer Garcia to the injured man. Officer
Detective Mayes testified that an autopsy report showed that Corio sustained 12 stab wounds. His cause of death was multiple stab wounds from a homicide.
On or around April 13, 2016, Detective Mayes interviewed Adame. Adame told Detective Mayes that Estrada and two individuals named Jose and Conejo were drinking alcohol in a parking lot near an encampment. Their group got into a fight with another group that included Zuniga Flores. Zuniga Flores pulled Adame by her hair. Multiple people were involved in the fight. Adame did not indicate whether Gonzalo and Perez were involved in the fight. Adame stated that Estrada sustained an injury on the side of his face. Estrada and Adame went to the hospital and returned to the encampment the same night. Estrada was angry and obtained a knife. Adame stated that Estrada found Corio and stabbed him.
Adame saw Zuniga Flores laying on the ground. She said she was angry that he accosted her earlier in the day. She yelled at him and out of anger, kicked him in the face. Adame then stated that Estrada kicked Zuniga Flores twice in the face and stomped down on his head once. Adame then observed Gonzalo walking towards the parking lot.
On or around February 8, 2016, Detective Mayes also interviewed Estrada. Detective Mayes testified that Estrada told him that there was a fight between two groups and Corio stabbed him. According to Detective Mayes, Estrada was upset over the fight and his injury. Adame told him, “let‘s just do something about it.” Detective Mayes further testified that Estrada and Adame found Corio asleep or passed out. Detective Mayes testified that Estrada said he stabbed Corio “two or three times.” Detective Mayes further testified that Estrada also told him that he kicked Zuniga Flores once in the face and stomped on his head twice.
On July 9, 2018, the prosecution filed an amended information. Count 1 charged Estrada with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of
On July 10, 2018, Estrada pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter (
Estrada‘s plea form shows that he stipulated and agreed there was a factual basis for his plea and that he was pleading no contest to take advantage of a plea bargain under People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595. A West plea is a “a plea of nolo contendere, not admitting a factual basis for the plea.” (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 932.)
On May 11, 2022, Estrada filed a petition for resentencing under
On August 17, 2022, the prosecution filed an opposition stating that Estrada was ineligible for relief because he was the actual killer.
On October 3, 2022, Estrada filed a reply to the People‘s opposition. Estrada argued that the record of conviction does not establish that Estrada is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Estrada argued that the record of conviction did not foreclose that malice was imputed onto him based solely on his participation in a crime.
On October 17, 2022, the court held a hearing on Estrada‘s petition for resentencing. The court concluded that “it would appear that a prima facie case cannot be made because Mr. Estrada was the actual killer.” The court did not state which portion of the record of conviction supported its conclusion.
Estrada timely appealed.
II. Attorney General‘s request for judicial notice
The Attorney General requests that we take judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript in People v. Estrada (Los Angeles County, 2022, No. PA086118). Appellant does not oppose the request. We grant the request
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable legal background
The California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) to ” ‘amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723.)
Senate Bill 1437 did this by amending
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775) ” ‘[c]larifie[d] that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and] probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder under the same theories.’ ” (People v. Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 865, fn. 18; People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 377, 388.)
“In its current form,
Prior to these amendments, a jury could convict a defendant of murder under the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine without finding malice. A defendant could be convicted of attempted murder under the theory that the defendant aided and abetted a crime where murder was a natural and probable consequence. (See People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161.) Under the law at that time, it was not necessary to prove that the defendant intended that the attempted murder be committed or even that the defendant subjectively foresaw that attempted murder could result. (See id. at pp. 161-162.) Under the felony-murder rule as it existed before 2019, malice was imputed if the defendant intended to commit the underlying qualifying felony. (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1184.)
Eligible defendants may petition for resentencing relief. (
“In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.] . . . [T]he ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) “At the prima facie stage, a court must accept as true a petitioner‘s allegation that he or she could not currently be convicted of a homicide offense because of changes to section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, unless the allegation is refuted by the record. [Citation.] And this allegation is not refuted by the record unless the record conclusively establishes every element of the offense.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463 (Curiel).) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of eligibility, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.)
We review de novo whether the trial court conducted a proper inquiry under
II. Analysis
Estrada contends that the trial court erred by finding him ineligible for relief under
The information charged Estrada with attempted murder, alleging that Estrada “unlawfully and with malice aforethought attempt[ed] to murder” Zuniga Flores. Because the crime of attempted murder was generically charged, the complaint allowed the prosecution to proceed on a theory of
Estrada‘s plea to the attempted murder charge does not answer the question of whether intent could have been imputed to him under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1007-1008.) Estrada did not plead to any particular type of malice when pleading to attempted murder. Further, he did not admit to any specific theory of attempted murder. Instead, the record shows that he pleaded to the generic charge of attempted murder without the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” allegation. He did not admit he harbored an intent to kill.
In pleading no contest to voluntary manslaughter of Corio, Estrada also did not admit to a specific theory of guilt. (Gaillard, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1212.) Estrada only admitted to “voluntary manslaughter in generic terms.” (Ibid.) Thus, the prosecution could have proceeded under any theory of liability, including a natural and probable consequences theory. (Ibid.; see also People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 977.) As such, his generic plea does not make him ineligible for relief at the prima facie stage as a matter of law.
Likewise, Estrada‘s bare admission of the enhancements for personal use of a deadly weapon (
The Attorney General contends that the trial court‘s ruling should nonetheless be affirmed because the amended information establishes that Estrada was the sole perpetrator of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter. Thus, malice could not have been imputed to him.
The amended information does establish that Estrada was charged alone, but a charging decision does not establish any facts as a matter of law. (See People v. Das (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 954, 962.) Moreover, we are aware of no authority requiring prosecutors to try all codefendants together, so this single charging document does not foreclose the possibility of other people having been charged for related crimes. Even further, the information did not foreclose the prosecution from presenting imputed malice before a jury regardless of whether it charged others. Thus, the charging document here does not establish ineligibility as a matter of law, where Estrada‘s ” ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.)
Moreover, the trial court did not state the basis for its finding that Estrada was the actual killer. To the extent the court relied on the preliminary hearing transcript, such reliance here was improper because it required the court to engage in impermissible fact finding.
Our Supreme Court has emphasized that at the prima facie stage, a trial court is only permitted to deny the petition if the record of conviction “foreclose[s] [the] possibility [that the petitioner was convicted under an invalid theory] as a matter of law.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470.) If there is a possibility that the petitioner could provide evidence to rebut the evidence in the record of conviction, including the preliminary hearing transcript, the resolution of the matter involves factfinding, and an evidentiary hearing is required. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.)
Courts of Appeal are divided on whether a trial court can consider a preliminary hearing transcript at the prima facie stage for resentencing under
Estrada did not stipulate to the preliminary hearing transcript as a factual basis for his plea. But even assuming the trial court could rely on the preliminary hearing transcript, we conclude that Patton, Pickett, and Mares are distinguishable. In those cases, the Courts of Appeal held that the evidence contained in the preliminary hearing transcript conclusively foreclosed the possibility that the petitioner was convicted under an invalid theory of liability. Thus, the preliminary hearing evidence did not require the court to engage in impermissible factfinding.
Here, in contrast, relying on the preliminary hearing transcript to foreclose a successful
Accordingly, the court erred in denying Estrada‘s petition at the prima facie stage. We express no opinion on the merits of the petition at the evidentiary hearing.
The order summarily denying Estrada‘s petition is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause under
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.