THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JACK ESPINO, Defendant and Appellant.
S286987
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
July 2, 2026
Sixth Appellate District H051258; Santa Clara County Superior Court C1761121
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, Evans, and Do* concurred.
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
S286987
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
We held in People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius) that such an enhancement was “imposed” even though the enhancement was stayed rather than executed. The question in this case is whether an enhancement was “imposed” even though the sentencing court struck the punishment for the enhancement. The answer is yes.
I.
A.
We provided a detailed overview of the relevant legal background in Rhodius. (See Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1053-1055.) Briefly: Before the year 2020, former
“A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-invalid enhancement is entitled to resentencing.” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1055; but see
B.
Defendant Jack Espino was charged with several robberies and related offenses. The charging document alleged that he had previously served a prison term, citing former
After
We granted the People‘s petition for review, deferring briefing pending our disposition of Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1050. After our decision in Rhodius became final, we ordered the parties in this case to brief a question that Rhodius did not squarely present or address: Whether
II.
The question presented is one of statutory interpretation, which familiar principles help us to resolve. We begin with the statutory text, giving the language its usual and ordinary meaning. If the text is ambiguous, we may consider extrinsic aids, including legislative history. (See Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1057.) Our decision in Rhodius guides our inquiry, as Rhodius applied those same principles to the same statutory text.
A.
The Rhodius case concerned a defendant whose prior prison term enhancement had been stayed. (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1056.) To determine whether a stayed enhancement had been “imposed” in the relevant sense (
The Attorney General‘s primary argument to the contrary was based on the relationship between
Disagreeing, we explained that the phrase “lesser sentence” need not refer to a shorter sentence; rather, it can be understood to mean that the new sentence must eliminate whatever adverse effects flow from the now-invalid prior prison term enhancement, even if those effects do not take the form of a longer term of imprisonment. (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1060 possibility of imposition of the stayed portion should a reversal on appeal reduce the unstayed portion of the sentence.‘” (Id. at p. 1056.) Invalidating a stayed enhancement eliminates that possibility and is thus a “lesser sentence” in the relevant sense. (Ibid.)
We also rejected the argument for a “more fundamental[]” reason. (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1061.) Unlike
To this point, the Attorney General argued that “the Legislature may have seen no need to retroactively invalidate stayed enhancements” because it “reasonably anticipated that if the defendant‘s sentence were reopened for other reasons, a court could not order the execution of a previously stayed section 667.5(b) enhancement without running afoul of” 2019 legislation that prospectively eliminated most prior prison term
Finally, to the extent any doubt remained, we observed that the legislative history revealed an intent “not only to reduce incarceration” — which might have suggested a narrow focus on sentence enhancements that had been executed — but also more broadly to rectify what the Legislature perceived as an essential unfairness in the system of prior prison term enhancements. (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1065section 1172.75(a) because it considered it generally unjust to impose an enhancement based on the defendant‘s prior punishment for a different crime. And “[t]he legislative history,” we observed, “contains no indication that the Legislature distinguished in this regard between those enhancements that have been executed and those that were stayed.” (Rhodius, at p. 1066.)
B.
Our decision in Rhodius resolved a conflict in the Courts of Appeal concerning prior prison term enhancements that had been imposed and stayed. We explained in a footnote that the application of
The Attorney General believes the answer is yes. He argues that this case is distinguishable from Rhodius because, “[u]nlike a prior prison term enhancement with stayed punishment, an enhancement with stricken punishment lacks even the potential to result in any adverse consequence for the defendant.” This distinction is relevant, he continues, for three main reasons. He first observes that it is odd to speak of “imposing” an enhancement that can have no adverse effects at all, and argues that it is not typical to refer to a punishment-stricken enhancement (as opposed to a stayed or executed enhancement) as having been “imposed.” Second, he contends that other subdivisions of
Although there are certainly practical differences between staying punishment and striking punishment, the Attorney General‘s arguments do not persuade us that the differences warrant different treatment under
To the extent the Attorney General argues that the Legislature‘s concept of “imposed” could not have included punishment-stricken enhancements with no possible effects that could be redressed on resentencing, the argument fails because its premise is faulty. It is true that the potential effects are not the same as when an enhancement is stayed. (See Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1061 [“when a sentence is stayed, the trial court retains the ability to ‘lift the stay and impose the term under certain circumstance[s], such as if an alternately imposed term is invalidated’ “].) But that does not mean the potential effects are nonexistent, or that the Legislature would have believed them to be so.
Before enactment of
In his reply brief, the Attorney General clarifies that he does not dispute that, as a general matter, a court conducting resentencing can impose punishment based on an enhancement for which punishment had previously been stricken. He contends instead that, given the recent legislative changes we have described, a defendant faces no prospect of punishment for a prior prison term enhancement, because at resentencing, the enhancement could not be validly reimposed. Accordingly, the argument continues, a Legislature that understood the potential adverse consequences of a punishment-stricken enhancement would not have perceived the need to address them, because other principles of law would take care of any problems should they arise.
We addressed a very similar argument in Rhodius. As discussed, we held in Rhodius that a stayed enhancement was imposed even assuming that “if the defendant‘s sentence were reopened for other reasons, a court could not order the execution of a previously stayed” prior prison term enhancement. (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1062.) Though we noted that the Attorney General‘s theory there was “not implausible,” it struck us as unlikely that, without putting the matter more plainly, the Legislature “intended to exempt stayed enhancements from prompt invalidation and reexamination, instead choosing to put those matters off for another day.” (Id. at pp. 1062-1063.) So too here. Even assuming a punishment-stricken enhancement could not be given effect now because of postsentencing legislation, the most natural understanding is
Our discussion of legislative history in Rhodius bolsters this conclusion. We acknowledged in Rhodius that some of the legislative changes regarding prior prison term enhancements were made “in an effort to reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration.” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1054Id. at p. 1065.) As mentioned,