THE PEOPLE,
2d Crim. No. B322608 | 2d Crim. No. B323765
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX
Filed 9/12/23
on rehearing
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; OPINION ON REHEARING; Super. Ct. No. 2016022491 (Ventura County); Super. Ct. No. 2014022397 (Ventura County)
Appellants’ prior prison terms had been served for offenses that were not sexually violent. After imposition of the prior prison term enhancements, former
One-Year Prior Prison Term Enhancement: Statutory History
We do not review the wisdom of legislative enactments. (People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1506, citing Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1099.) Since at least 1923 recidivism statutes have been a
“Prior to January 1, 2020,
“Later, in 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) [(‘SB 483‘)]. This bill sought to make the changes implemented by [SB] 136 retroactive. . . . It took effect on January 1, 2022, and added former section 1171.1, now section
”
Procedural History
Escobedo
In 2016 a jury convicted Escobedo of dissuading a witness from testifying in violation of
At the time of sentencing for the 2016 conviction, Escobedo received credit of 401 days for time served. While serving the remainder of his five-year prison sentence, in September 2017 Escobedo was convicted of possessing a weapon while confined in a penal institution. (
Pursuant to
Chavira
In 2015 Chavira pleaded guilty to two felonies. We refer to these convictions as “the 2015 convictions.” He was sentenced to prison for six years, four
At the time of sentencing for the 2015 convictions, Chavira received credit of 449 days for time served. While serving the remainder of his prison sentence, in March 2019 Chavira was convicted of possessing a weapon while confined in a penal institution. (
In October 2021 Chavira was convicted of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (
While still imprisoned, in July 2022 Chavira filed a petition “for a full resentencing hearing pursuant to . . .
People‘s Opposition to Petitions and Trial Court‘s Ruling
The People correctly argued that appellants were not eligible for relief under
Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied the petitions. We are quick to observe that we would grant habeas corpus relief if it were shown that a prisoner was confined solely because of a now “invalid” prior prison term.
The Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Appellants’ Petitions
“[A] ‘freestanding motion [or petition] challenging an incarcerated defendant‘s sentence is not a proper procedural mechanism to seek relief. A motion [or petition] is not an independent remedy, but must be attached to some ongoing action. [Citation.] Thus, a defendant who wishes to challenge a sentence as unlawful after the defendant‘s conviction is final and after the defendant has begun serving the sentence must do more than simply file a motion [or petition] in the trial court making an allegation that the sentence is legally infirm.‘” (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 381, italics added.)
Here, there was no “ongoing action” to which appellants’ petitions could attach. (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 381.) We reject appellants’ claim that they were authorized to file a resentencing petition because they were “on the CDCR list of eligible inmates submitted to the Superior Court” pursuant to
Appellants filed freestanding petitions “to correct an illegal sentence years after [their] conviction[s] became final and [they] had begun serving [their] sentence[s]. . . . The trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate [the petitions] for resentencing, and we lack jurisdiction over [the] appeal[s] from the [petitions‘] denial.” (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 382; see People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 633 (King) [“Although King correctly contends that the sentence on [his] conviction . . . was unauthorized, we conclude that the trial court had no jurisdiction to
“The unavailability of a motion procedure does not deprive wrongfully incarcerated defendants of a remedy. A defendant who is serving a longer sentence than the law allows may always challenge the sentence in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, the purpose of the writ is to give summary relief against such illegal restraints of personal liberty.” (King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 640; see Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 381 [“even after a judgment is final, . . . ‘incarcerated defendants [may] seek resentencing . . .’ pursuant to a ‘properly filed’ habeas corpus petition“].)
Petition for Rehearing and Motion to Augment Record
We granted appellants’ petition for rehearing. In their petition appellants “acknowledge . . . [they] fil[ed] documents styled as ‘Petitions’ and consistently referenc[ed] the underlying actions as ‘petitions for resentencing.‘” But appellants claim we erroneously concluded they had filed “freestanding petitions” for relief.” Appellants argue they “filed pleadings through appointed counsel in accord with a rolling calendar procedure agreed upon by the parties after a series of collaborative meetings between the Superior Court, the District Attorney‘s office, and the Public Defender‘s Office, after the California Department of Corrections . . . transmitted its initial resentencing list to the court in February of 2022.”
The record on appeal does not support the existence of such “a rolling calendar procedure agreed upon by the parties.” The day after the petition for rehearing was filed, appellants filed a motion to augment the record on appeal to include a purported agreed statement that allegedly shows such a procedure existed. The motion is denied because the Ventura County District Attorney did not sign the agreed statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.134(a)(1) [“The [agreed] statement . . . must be signed by the parties“].)
Even if the parties had agreed upon such “a rolling calendar procedure,” their agreement would not have conferred jurisdiction upon the superior court to adjudicate their petitions for resentencing. “‘Jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be given, enlarged or waived by the parties . . . .‘” (Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou SinoType Technology Co. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 125, 139.) Appellants’ petitions would still have been unauthorized “freestanding petitions” because “there was no ‘ongoing action’ to which [they] could attach.” (Ante, at p. 8; see King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 640.) Appellants’ convictions had been final for years, and appellants had completed serving the sentences imposed for the convictions. Moreover, there
In their petition for rehearing, appellants contend our “decision turns on an issue not raised by the Parties.” The issue is whether they filed “‘freestanding petitions’ for relief.” Appellants maintain that, pursuant to
The “freestanding petitions” issue is fairly included within the issue of the appealability of the trial court‘s orders denying appellants’ petitions. Appellants raise the appealability issue in their briefs. In their opening briefs appellants state, “A court‘s order denying resentencing is appealable as an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of appellant[s].” In their reply briefs appellants assert: “[T]he California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . identified [appellants] as being eligible for resentencing within the meaning of
Appellants’ Claim of Trial Court Error Would Fail on the Merits
Appellants claim the trial court erroneously denied their petitions for relief under
When appellants petitioned for relief, their “current judgments” were the convictions for offenses they had committed in prison while serving the sentences for the earlier 2015 and 2016 convictions. Pursuant to
“It is well settled that under
Disposition
As to both B322608 (People v. Escobedo) and B323765 (People v. Chavira), the appeals are dismissed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
Barry Taylor, Patricia M. Murphy, Judges
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, Thomas Hartnett, Snr. Deputy Public Defender, for Defendants and Appellants.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Rene Judkiewicz, Viet Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.